Transcript [00:00] The fear of the forever war has [00:02] captivated the American mind and not [00:05] without reason. [00:06] 20 years in Afghanistan, nearly nine [00:08] years in Iraq, half a decade fighting [00:11] ISIS. [00:12] In the aftermath, Americans have turned [00:14] inward. A 2023 poll showed a majority, [00:18] 53% [00:19] of Republicans now say the United States [00:22] should stay out of world affairs. [00:25] And even some of Trump's most ardent [00:27] defenders have joined [music] his [00:28] critics. Kentucky Congressman Thomas [00:31] Massie asked, "Why are we going to war [00:33] with Iran? American families in my [00:36] district want to know how this is going [00:37] to help them pay for groceries, how does [00:40] this make them safer in schools or in [00:41] their neighborhoods, how does this help [00:43] them pay for housing? [music] Have we [00:45] learned nothing?" [00:47] Former Georgia representative Marjorie [00:49] Taylor Greene took a similar tact. She [00:52] said it's always a lie and it's always [00:54] America last. Their critiques were [00:57] echoed by congresspeople across the [00:59] aisle. [01:00] Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez [01:02] said, [01:03] "People of rational sense in this [01:05] country are opposed to this senseless [01:07] Iran war." [01:09] Ro Khanna followed adding, "Another war [01:11] in the Middle East is not America [01:13] first." [01:14] But despite the outrage from some [01:16] Americans and their congressman, what [01:18] does someone who's actually seen wars up [01:20] close think? [01:22] I sat down with John Spencer, [01:24] >> [music] [01:24] >> a retired US Army major and elite combat [01:27] veteran. When he's not teaching strategy [01:30] at West Point, he's going into conflict [01:32] zones in Ukraine, [music] Kashmir, [01:34] Lebanon, Azerbaijan and more to study [01:37] war. [01:38] He's been in Gaza seven times. That's [01:41] more trips into Gaza than anybody [01:43] outside of the IDF. He just wrote a book [01:45] about his time in and out of war zones, [01:47] aptly titled 20 times I almost died. [01:52] Today, I sit down with him and he says [01:54] we are better off from our involvement [01:56] in Iran and that it is a worthwhile [01:58] endeavor to set their nuclear program [02:01] back. That prior administrations had [02:03] been kicking the can down the road. That [02:05] war tests all assumptions and that we [02:07] will learn from our miscalculations and [02:09] that appeasement is not a strategy. [02:12] We also discussed the status of the wars [02:14] in Ukraine and Gaza and I ask about the [02:17] challenges and debates spilling out of [02:19] each conflict. [02:20] >> [music] [02:20] >> Is America's missile stockpile [02:22] dangerously low? [02:23] Has Israel been careful or careless when [02:25] it comes to Palestinian lives? Is [02:28] Ukraine asking for too much in their [02:30] negotiations with Russia? [02:32] Has the peace deal in Gaza been [02:33] successful or not? [02:36] Hear all of this and more in my [02:37] conversation with John Spencer. [02:41] John Spencer, thank you so much for [02:43] being here. [02:43] >> Oh man, amazing to be here. Thanks for [02:45] having me. [02:46] >> Of course. I think a lot of our audience [02:48] will already know you, but just in case [02:49] I'm going to introduce you. You served [02:51] 25 years in the army. [02:53] Two combat deployments in Iraq. Taught [02:56] strategy at West Point. You're now the [02:58] director, executive director, excuse me, [03:00] of the Urban Warfare Institute and your [03:02] new book is 20 times I almost died, [03:06] aptly titled, about 20 near-death [03:07] experiences. Everything from killer bees [03:11] to car accidents to encounters with IEDs [03:14] and we're going to get into all of that. [03:16] Before we do, let's start with Iran, [03:18] obviously the most front of mind [03:21] conflict happening. I think we're two [03:23] days out from being six months into the [03:25] war. [03:25] >> Yeah. [03:26] >> As we tape this. [03:28] The biggest debate right now I think is [03:29] six months later are we better or worse [03:32] than we were on February 27th, the day [03:34] before we got involved? [03:35] >> I guess we'd have to answer who are the [03:37] we. [03:37] >> You, Americans. [03:38] >> Yeah, Americans, I 1,000%. I don't think [03:41] anybody, depending on what metrics that [03:43] you want to use, are [03:45] um our interests are better served now [03:47] than they were six months ago. Um and I [03:49] think the war has validated that. If you [03:51] look at why the war started on February [03:53] 28th, the four reasons that the [03:55] president gave to the country, I believe [03:57] these things are worth fighting for. I I [03:59] would find it really hard to debate [04:00] somebody to say that [04:02] Iran is not set back on its ambitions, [04:06] clear ambitions, even according to [04:08] before even the 12-day war, IAEA, saying [04:11] that they are in violation of [04:13] non-nuclear proliferation. [04:14] So, just from that fact, yes, we're [04:16] safer as in [04:18] I believe non-nuclear proliferation is [04:20] worth fighting for. We have nine [04:21] countries that have nuclear weapons. We [04:23] don't need a 10th one that is a [04:25] terrorist state that says it wants one [04:26] to destroy the United States. [04:29] Whether you believe in whether JCPOA was [04:32] working or not, [04:33] by fact, that military action set them [04:36] back. Their scientists, their [04:38] centrifuges, their their sites buried, [04:42] these things. [04:43] From the aspect of their missile [04:45] collection, right? So, that was their [04:46] other ambition and which is what is one [04:48] of the four goals set by the president [04:51] on February 28th was this missile [04:55] shield they had. [04:56] You can count the number of ones they [04:58] launched and the number of ones they [04:59] supposedly have unburied. Whatever it [05:01] is, their manufacturing sites, they were [05:04] trying, on top of their nuclear program, [05:06] to build this missile umbrella, [05:09] which actually they implemented since [05:11] the war. Like, "Okay, if you don't let [05:12] us do what we want, then we'll just [05:14] start attacking everybody." Which is [05:15] what we've seen. [05:16] They have less missile capability. Their [05:18] military industrial complex to build [05:20] more missiles is destroyed. So, just by [05:23] that fact, we're in a safer place. Our [05:25] allies in the region, our bases. [05:27] And they taught us where our weaknesses [05:29] are. Whether that's in our interceptor [05:32] stockpile, whether it's low or not, [05:34] well, we're going to fix that. [05:35] Whether it's our allies and our basing, [05:37] well, we're going to fix that. So, this [05:39] is the aspect of war testing all [05:41] assumptions. But, you asked a very [05:43] simple question. I do believe we're in [05:45] in place. [05:46] Now, we have to talk about the Strait of [05:47] Hormuz. And this is it's an easy [05:49] question. It would seem like a simple [05:50] question, but it's not. Is the Strait of [05:52] Hormuz, [05:53] which was technically open before the [05:56] Operation Epic Fury even began, [05:59] but was it was open under the threat of [06:01] closing. So, like Secretary Rubio said, [06:05] Iran played its economic nuclear card. [06:07] It'll never be able to play it again the [06:08] same way. [06:10] We already have the pipelines, you know, [06:12] whether it's Saudi Arabia's, Iraq's um [06:14] being restarted, uh the railroads that [06:17] that want to be made. [06:19] Uh and I wrote this for the Wall Street [06:20] Journal, the Strait of Hormuz will never [06:22] be played like that again because it [06:23] won't be as relevant ever again. [06:26] >> What do you mean by that? [06:28] >> So, yes, 20% of the world's energy flow [06:31] was flowing out. Actually, 80% of the [06:33] Gulf States' imports were coming through [06:35] there. [06:36] But as war tests those choke points, [06:38] then you develop alternatives, [06:40] >> So, everyone will build pipelines. [06:41] >> Pipelines. [06:42] >> Iran included though, right? Like they [06:44] might try to pipeline their own oil out. [06:46] >> They could. It's a lot harder where [06:48] they're trying to get it. Like who are [06:49] their buyers? China. [06:51] >> To pipeline into China's difficult. [06:52] >> Difficult. India. Difficult. Yeah, these [06:55] aspects of [06:57] but it'll become less relevant. Just by [06:59] the fact that they played it. Whether [07:00] it's open or closed right now, which we [07:02] were talking about right before we [07:02] started, is a great debate. Uh [07:04] >> What what's your read on the situation? [07:06] >> The read is that it's both open and [07:07] closed. Unless you physically go there [07:10] and watch ships, you truly don't know. [07:12] But we all thought that it was fully [07:14] closed that no ships were getting [07:15] through. And come to find out on the [07:17] basically friendly side of the Strait of [07:19] Hormuz, there is a possibility. Of [07:21] course, it's not at the level the free [07:23] level that you need to be in the cost of [07:25] insurance and everything. But there at [07:26] one point there was a you know, 20 [07:28] million barrels a day at one [07:30] it ebbs and flows. So, it is open, but [07:33] clearly not at the freedom that it needs [07:34] to be. And this is the other aspect as [07:36] an American, [07:37] I believe freedom of navigation of the [07:39] seas is worth fighting for because if [07:41] not, I know the consequences. [07:43] >> I want to just articulate the argument [07:45] that I think a lot of critics are [07:47] vocalizing on X and beyond, which is [07:51] something along the lines of, you know, [07:53] the strait is closed that wasn't closed [07:54] before. Iran has been to some extent [07:56] successful in striking US allies in the [08:00] Gulf. Also our own bases. [08:03] And there's this question of what to do [08:05] about the remaining nuclear material. [08:07] Dilute it, get it out of the country. [08:09] How are we going to do that when we're [08:11] dealing with the baseline issue of [08:12] opening the strait. And so there's these [08:13] other intractable things that aren't [08:14] even top of mind that are to your point, [08:17] the most central problem is the nuclear [08:18] program, right? What do you say to those [08:20] critics who look at the picture very [08:22] differently from the way you're looking [08:23] at it and saying [08:25] it doesn't seem worth it. [08:27] >> Yeah, this is the problem of explaining [08:29] this simply to people when war is even [08:31] the simple is complex. Uh [08:34] that the nuclear is related to the [08:36] Strait of Hormuz. Because why does Iran [08:38] want nuclear capabilities besides what [08:40] it says it wants it to do? It wants to [08:42] rise as a regional power. It wants to [08:43] control the Strait of Hormuz. It wants [08:45] to have these proxies that can do its [08:47] bidding and has enacted all of its [08:49] proxies during this war. Iran wanted the [08:52] nuclear weapon to not just have it as a [08:55] deterrent and threatening tool, but to [08:57] do all that it wanted to do in the [08:59] Middle East, which directly impacts [09:01] every household in the United States. Is [09:03] if they can cut off the Strait of [09:05] Hormuz, if they can attack any ally they [09:07] want with any [09:09] desalination plant, gas, whatever, [09:11] because there's so many variables and [09:13] it's really hard to say simply [09:15] is that it's just not a reality that [09:17] before [09:18] February 28th, all things were good. [09:21] Because we were kicking this can down [09:23] the road, just like the nuclear program. [09:25] I I I had [09:27] you know, Mossad Yossi Cohen on my my [09:29] podcast talking about the 2008 Tehran [09:31] raid where they they they they went in [09:33] and had to physically take [09:35] a million pieces of paper and bringing [09:37] them out to show the United Nations they [09:39] still have a nuclear weapons program and [09:41] even if you and I talked to some of [09:43] these people you're talking about like, [09:44] "Yeah, yeah, but they but they didn't." [09:46] But they did. [09:48] Um this is the the alternatives to [09:52] use of force, right? And this is the [09:55] kind of the anti-war. There's never a [09:56] reason to go to war. I believe it should [09:58] be a last resort, but it does there are [10:01] things worth fighting for and we had [10:03] kicked this can down the road. Almost [10:06] like a foreign policy insanity. Just [10:08] trying the same thing over and over [10:09] again while Iran, according to them, cuz [10:12] this is the boasting that they did to um [10:15] you know, like uh Steve Witcoff and [10:17] others like, "Yeah, we have enough for [10:18] 11 nuclear bombs." And they're supposed [10:20] to have enough for zero nuclear bombs. [10:22] But we kicked the can on the nuclear. We [10:24] watched them build this missile and [10:26] China helped them build it this missile [10:27] arsenal, the proxy program. I mean, the [10:30] terror armies that they built in other [10:32] countries and destabilized the Middle [10:34] East. All these things weren't going to [10:37] just go away with diplomacy. [10:39] So those are the naysayers. If they want [10:41] to have a a simple conversation, I can [10:43] try to do it rapidly, but it's not a [10:45] simple conversation. It's all [10:46] interconnected. Um and there is always [10:49] great power competition. So this is the [10:51] China investing in Iran heavily. 90% of [10:54] its oil it's buying, but they're also [10:56] building [10:57] gas fields, railroads, ports. [11:00] Not just in our own backyard like in [11:02] Panama and Venezuela and others, but [11:03] they were doing it in the Middle East. [11:05] Even if you're an American firster, our [11:07] interest globally like freedom of [11:09] navigation of the seas were greatly at [11:12] risk and we're continuing to be and [11:14] finally um despite all the rhetoric uh [11:17] this administration took action because [11:19] it was getting to a point where it'd be [11:20] too late, right? That's the North Korea [11:22] scenario. [11:23] >> Do you think the Marjorie Taylor Greenes [11:25] and the Joe Kents and the Tucker [11:26] Carlsons and the Tom Massies, you know [11:27] this [11:28] cohort of American commentators, do you [11:31] think they know all this? That they know [11:32] what you're saying and are saying [11:33] another thing for, you know, political [11:36] opportunism or do you think they [11:37] genuinely believe that it was a bad [11:39] idea? [11:39] >> Yeah, well, [11:41] I think that's for political reasons. [11:44] But it is interesting that we all have [11:46] access to some of the same facts, but we [11:48] you know, push it through the paradigm [11:50] of our own lens and it becomes out as [11:52] something and in some cases like crazy. [11:54] Like I just just you know, Jewish space [11:56] lasers according [laughter] to are the [11:58] reason according to um, Marjorie Taylor [12:01] Greene. [12:02] >> these lights. You didn't know? [12:03] >> That's [laughter] right. [12:05] If you put it through this prism, which [12:06] is so interesting to me is an you know, [12:09] like the the genocide claim when the [12:11] overwhelming body of evidence and I have [12:14] young kids. So for me it's like critical [12:15] thinking like [12:17] how did you get to the point you believe [12:18] what you believe when we all have access [12:20] to the same information? You just push [12:22] it through a filter that makes it come [12:24] out as gobbledygook. I mean, it's just I [12:26] believe they know, but I also don't [12:30] understanding you know, psychology. I [12:33] don't [12:34] push off that they truly believe some of [12:36] the things that they say about the cabal [12:39] and the conspiracy and [12:41] you know, all these evils that allow [12:43] them not to deal with the complexity [12:45] because we want people that can just you [12:47] know, nobody has the time to do this [12:49] amount of study. They just want somebody [12:50] to tell them simply. [12:52] And it's there is some psychology to [12:54] believing the conspiracy is easier than [12:56] believing the complexity of the truth. [12:59] >> At this point in the war, [13:01] what do you think gets us closer to the [13:02] most fundamental goals? I mean, there's [13:05] a cohort of people that would say we [13:06] need to go full throttle on, you know, [13:08] the military side. Other people would [13:09] say there's only negotiation that will [13:12] get the remaining nuclear material out [13:15] of the country and open this trade and [13:16] so forth. [13:19] Of course, you know, we've tried maximum [13:22] sanctions in the past. It seems like [13:24] that has been re-upped with the economic [13:26] D-Day plan as presented by Scott [13:28] Vincent. [13:30] All of these options on the menu, like [13:33] what what's the path? [13:36] >> So, I really try to stay out of the [13:37] crystal ball [13:39] theory of where where are we going [13:41] because I I know the uncertainty of war. [13:44] >> I guess the question is not where are we [13:45] going, but what should where should we [13:46] be going? [13:47] >> I believe [13:49] that where we should go is we have to [13:50] accomplish the objectives, not just [13:53] because of the reasons of that pushing [13:55] the can down the road aspect, and not [13:57] just letting the smoke clear and then [13:59] they rebuild it with billions of dollars [14:01] of investments or in some deal where [14:02] they get billions of dollars. [14:04] >> Which was presented? [14:04] >> Which was presented [14:06] in studying active wars. There's [14:08] probably four people that truly have all [14:12] the information. [14:13] >> Who are those four people? [14:14] >> Um of course the president. [14:15] >> Yep. [14:16] >> Um probably his chief of staff. [14:17] >> Mhm. [14:18] >> National security advisor. [14:19] >> Mhm. [14:20] Marco Rubio? [14:21] >> I don't So, [14:23] they'll know more than anybody else. Um [14:27] but if you take in the variables and and [14:29] really I I [14:30] as I travel the world to to to explain [14:32] to people, I mean who does get access to [14:34] the level of information where you would [14:35] know [14:36] um that national security [14:39] council. [14:40] >> Mhm. [14:40] >> Right? It's very unique, right? So, we [14:41] have the secretary of treasury, [14:43] the secretary of state, the secretary of [14:45] war. [14:47] I would think they would know more than [14:48] anybody else. But like, okay, who are we [14:51] talking to? Yeah, you add the CIA [14:52] director into it. So, maybe those those [14:55] primaries. I understand enough about war [14:58] and covered enough wars [15:00] >> Mhm. [15:00] >> for enough years to know how much I [15:01] don't know [15:03] about what are the what's the [15:04] information and which decisions are [15:05] being made from. [15:07] >> Mhm. [15:07] >> Um of course a combination of domestic [15:09] concerns. I mean I whether it's the [15:11] price of gas gets to a point and that's [15:13] a decision point for us. [15:14] Um the the midterm elections and [15:17] international concerns. All the allies [15:19] calling in the global market. There's so [15:21] many variables that people want to again [15:24] reductively [15:26] or deductively what whichever they're [15:27] trying to do just make it real simple. [15:29] Like hey, this is the one the main [15:31] element the straight up for moves [15:33] is or isn't close. Like but there's all [15:35] these other variables. So I think that [15:37] truly those [15:39] that national security primaries not the [15:41] kind of staff and [15:43] and they've done [15:45] throughout the leaks a really good job. [15:47] Although you'll you'll you'll be like [15:49] the meeting at you know Camp David or [15:51] whatever and somebody will get a leak [15:53] and then everybody who is mentioned will [15:54] say that is absolutely not what [15:56] happened. [15:58] Which is frustrating. You asked about [16:00] going going forward American deterrent [16:02] is at risk because if you [16:05] if Iran's able to [16:07] make it so that this didn't matter [16:09] because I believe in also the global [16:11] international order right as much as [16:14] you can't take global common choke [16:17] points and seize them and start charging [16:19] tolls. As much as you can't invade [16:21] countries because you know these this is [16:24] the element that a anti-war person will [16:27] push on you that it's never okay. Like [16:30] if it's never okay then evil regimes men [16:34] people will will take advantage of your [16:37] pacifism giving people what they want [16:40] aspect of in in pursuit of will will [16:43] will lead to a much more violent world. [16:45] >> Do you think the nuclear material comes [16:46] out there without diplomacy? [16:49] >> I think it's possible. I actually think [16:52] if I try to regime which there's an [16:54] element of that of [16:56] this and I wrote this as well like you [16:58] know war is a contest of will. You have [17:00] to put the Islamic regimes what it [17:02] values most at risk. Does it value its [17:05] nuclear dust more than its own survival? [17:08] No. [17:09] It'll it'll it'll trade time right cuz [17:12] they think long term I know China you [17:14] know 100 year plan. I think that you [17:16] could absolutely I think negotiate that [17:18] that part away, but they [17:20] they know what's important to their [17:21] survival. The economic aspect is more [17:24] important to their survival, although I [17:25] don't know if they survive this war in [17:26] general, which is the thing. Iran's won. [17:29] >> Mhm. [17:29] >> I mean the [17:31] the reason they killed [17:33] 30 to 50,000 of their own people wasn't [17:35] because the United States was attacking, [17:36] it's because their economy [17:38] had collapsed, their banks had [17:40] collapsed. You think that they're going [17:42] to come out of this stronger [17:44] economically? [17:45] >> Mhm. [17:45] >> They're going to want to do things, and [17:47] this is why in this memorandum of [17:49] understanding they thought they were [17:51] going to get billions of dollars [17:52] immediately cuz they need it so [17:53] desperately to survive. I think they can [17:56] give the dust away and plan like they [17:58] did [17:59] in front of everybody, a bunch of [18:01] nuclear programs, [18:03] some that nobody had ever heard of, [18:05] >> Mhm. [18:05] >> um [18:06] while they economically try to build [18:08] back their survival because [18:10] even in a [18:12] evil people, they want to survive, they [18:14] want to maintain power, so they're going [18:16] to make decisions, and this is why like [18:19] economic epic fury or whatever it's [18:21] called, economic outcast right now, [18:22] >> Mhm. [18:23] >> is attacking what they care about most, [18:25] which is their survival, which is tied [18:27] to their economic vitality. [18:29] >> Things we've learned that we might need [18:30] to improve on. The missile stockpiles [18:33] are [18:34] allegedly low. As you've pointed out, we [18:35] don't really know exactly. So, tell us [18:38] what do we know and what do we not know, [18:40] and what's your read of the situation? [18:42] >> Sure. So, not glibly, but very shortly, [18:46] we don't know. So, if somebody is [18:47] pushing numbers, they're either leaking [18:50] classified information, which I don't [18:51] appreciate as a veteran, and putting, [18:53] you know, US interests at risk, or [18:55] they're lying based on, you know, it's [18:58] probably legitimate analysis like, you [19:00] know, the fact that you you're supposed [19:01] to send two interceptors at one [19:03] ballistic missile incoming, but some of [19:05] the [19:06] incoming ballistic missiles we actually [19:08] let go by, so there's not two [19:09] interceptors, and there's there's a bit [19:11] of an element here on who's doing the [19:13] analysis and what how they're doing that [19:15] analysis. [19:16] >> Yeah. [19:16] >> Um but it has exposed as much so as as [19:20] the Ukraine war exposed massive [19:23] weaknesses in the United States' [19:25] military industrial complex. We had one [19:27] plant that was producing [19:29] uh artillery shells when you need tens [19:30] of thousands a day on in a land war. We [19:33] had one plant that we know in creating [19:35] these [19:36] cat four interceptors, right? The [19:38] Patriot, the THAAD. Uh we had one plant. [19:41] Um in my line of work, one is none, two [19:44] is one. [19:45] Um [19:46] >> Mhm. Mhm. [19:46] >> But I will say in not in the defense of [19:49] anybody, I really tried to stay out of [19:50] out of politics, is that the US [19:52] administration came into this [19:54] administration already knowing [19:56] thanks to again to the Ukraine war, cuz [19:58] war tests all assumptions. And actually [20:00] having worked in that five-sided [20:02] building of the Pentagon, um you know, [20:04] the idea like we weren't planning on the [20:06] Strait of Hormuz. Like there's been a [20:07] task force planning the Strait of Hormuz [20:09] for 20 years. There were just many [20:11] variables. [20:13] We have plans about war and the the US [20:16] maintains stockpile and maintains [20:18] military industrial complex capability, [20:20] right? To ramp up things. [20:22] This war, [20:24] whether I believe it or not, I believe [20:27] that we only have one plant that pushed [20:28] together uh Patriot missiles and that's [20:30] I don't like that. [20:31] >> How is that possible? [20:32] >> Uh in my line of work, it is a really [20:34] fascinating cuz I do all this war [20:36] research around the war that we were [20:38] talking about, um whether it's in India, [20:40] Pakistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, of course [20:42] the Middle East. [20:43] Um it it tests countries' assumptions [20:46] about the future of war that they bet [20:48] on. [20:49] Right? You know, like Israel, they [20:50] shrunk their military, relied on [20:52] technology. October 7th taught them that [20:54] all those decisions were wrong. [20:56] As much as ours, even being the the [20:59] world's most powerful military, we have [21:01] ideals about We actually have what we [21:04] call defense planning scenarios, which [21:05] are the ones that we will [21:08] really argue about and then take the [21:10] Congress to say, "Here's our worst-case, [21:13] most plausible scenarios. We need to [21:15] maintain a certain size of military and [21:18] advanced capabilities." What happens is [21:20] that the futurists comes in and it's [21:22] called the vampire fallacy. The McMaster [21:25] talked about it as like, "Look, that [21:26] F-35, if you just spend a couple [21:28] trillion dollars into that, it'll make [21:30] war simple, fast, bloodless." [21:34] This is the idea of like 38 days into a [21:35] war against a massive country. Like, [21:37] "Why aren't you done?" [21:38] >> But that would be that's you would say [21:40] Would you say that's fundamentally [21:41] flawed given that our big expensive [21:42] things are getting taken out by their [21:44] cheap, inexpen- or like, you know, quick [21:46] to make like [21:48] 1/10 of a cost drones and you can get [21:50] >> economics of that is is important and we [21:53] saw this coming and again, why did I [21:55] invest so much time studying the 2020 [21:58] Nagorno-Karabakh War because it was [21:59] dubbed as the drone war. [22:01] As in the drones would would solve all [22:03] your problems. And actually, that's the [22:05] opposite of what happened on the ground. [22:06] They needed infantry, tanks, artillery. [22:10] >> They needed the traditional stuff. [22:11] >> They needed All warfare is a combination [22:13] of the old and the new. The problem is [22:15] is when people convince our military, [22:18] our our political leaders that [22:20] you don't need all that old stuff. [22:22] And that's how you get to one plant [22:24] doing artillery, one you know, one plant [22:26] doing anti-tank guided munitions. There [22:28] are technologies that are important to [22:30] have like drones. If you don't have them [22:31] on the modern battlefield, you'll be [22:32] found wanting. You do have to solve this [22:35] cost differentiation that you just [22:37] talked about where, you know, [22:39] if not, and this is why Iran is so [22:40] important, right? This is why if [22:43] maybe I I don't want us to have a low [22:45] stockpile, but if it was true, [22:47] then [22:48] not quitting now isn't the solution, [22:51] right? This is where people say like, [22:52] "Our stockpiles, we have to quit. We [22:54] have to wrap this up quickly." is what I [22:55] hear in the news. Like, that's the [22:57] conclusion you get from um war testing [23:00] an assumption about the number of [23:02] missiles we need. That's a roadmap for [23:05] any [23:06] enemy of the United States, China, North [23:08] Korea, Iran, Russia. I just need to make [23:11] as many ballistic missiles as I can and [23:14] not attack the United States, attack [23:15] anybody related to, you know, that they [23:18] have a connection to, overwhelm them. [23:20] They won't be able to produce [23:21] interceptors at the right pace. There [23:23] has to be a solution to fix that cost [23:25] deprivation. [23:26] But I don't take the same conclusion, [23:28] right? I I'm not thankful, but look, if [23:31] we all agree there's a low stockpile, we [23:33] used a lot during the war, maybe we did, [23:35] maybe we didn't. [23:36] >> But what is your take? Do you think Do [23:37] you think it's low? I mean, you're [23:39] saying you don't know, but [23:40] >> I think it's [23:40] >> From what we do know. [23:41] >> I think it is [23:44] it it is low again for us. [23:47] Iran stopped attacking Israel. Why did [23:50] they stop attacking Israel? Because it [23:51] wasn't having any success. So then they [23:53] started attacking all these other [23:55] countries who [23:56] >> Kuwait and [23:56] >> who have less of our interceptors. [23:59] >> Right. [23:59] >> Uh so, is it a problem that we had less [24:02] or we just didn't have the right air [24:03] defense? [24:03] >> prepared in the places that they were. [24:05] >> Right, and they took advantage of [24:06] >> Which is which is maybe a critique, why [24:07] weren't we? Why wasn't there more [24:09] interceptors in the place where they [24:11] ended up attacking? [24:12] >> Yeah. Let's say I will agree that it it [24:14] is low. Those cap fours. So, the big [24:17] issue is these cap four interceptors [24:19] that cost millions of dollars, one plant [24:21] that puts them together. [24:23] I also follow this stuff, so I knew that [24:26] the administration came in and said this [24:27] is [24:28] our military-industrial complex, the [24:31] ability to make things at scale is [24:33] wrong. They started allocating billions [24:36] of dollars against that before the Iran [24:38] war. So, [24:39] um and since this was even not even [24:42] leaked information, there was, you know, [24:45] all the primes actually, Lockheed and [24:47] all those were brought into the White [24:48] House and said, "Look, we want you to [24:50] increase production four times what [24:52] you're currently doing." So, even the [24:54] those that are predicting that it'll [24:55] take 3 years to reset our stockpile if [24:58] it is according to their analysis this [25:00] number 50% whatever it is. [25:04] Even before that was all there is this [25:06] meeting to increase it times four isn't [25:08] like that [25:09] we know it we're not doing anything [25:10] about it. Yes, [25:13] just knowing that there's one plant [25:14] you're right like that's wrong. So fix [25:16] it. So this is where Congress says yeah, [25:18] but I'm not going to give you your seven [25:21] your your trillion dollar [25:23] Department of War budget to to fix this. [25:25] I just want you to stop the war. [25:26] >> Mhm. [25:27] >> Like that's where you're taking from a [25:29] an assumption being identified from the [25:31] United States [25:32] that we have we made the wrong [25:34] assumptions about the requirements of [25:36] war and there is an element of allies [25:39] when you have military bases or [25:42] equipment [25:43] we discovered that our allies were not [25:46] investing in their own defense which is [25:48] a part of our basis right whether that [25:50] was in Jordan Syria [25:53] Kuwait you name it and some of these [25:54] places I've been to based on my past [25:56] career. [25:57] >> Mhm. [25:57] >> Fix it all. I want to acknowledge the [26:00] successes even how the war opened like I [26:02] was a military analyst acknowledge the [26:04] way that the war opened [26:06] has never been done in war before. The [26:07] ability to penetrate so deeply into an [26:10] enemy [26:11] nation eliminate its entire political [26:14] and military [26:16] higher echelon to start the war. [26:18] >> Can I ask you a question about this? [26:19] >> Yeah. [26:20] >> Cuz there's two ways people are looking [26:21] at this. [26:22] Some are saying these 40 top political [26:25] let's actually focus on just the [26:26] political ones. [26:28] It was good to take them out because now [26:31] it's hard to strategize if you took out [26:33] the top slate of commanders. [26:36] The other side is looking at this saying [26:37] well you potentially take out 40 people [26:40] that would come to the negotiation table [26:42] and the people who slot in are maybe [26:45] more hardline. I mean that's the way [26:46] people are looking at the situation. Of [26:48] course the response is well there's no [26:49] distinction between hardline and yeah, [26:51] moderate. I'm curious how you fall in [26:53] this debate of were the assassinations [26:55] as fruitful [26:57] as I think, you know, the Trump team [26:59] wants to convey there. [27:00] >> Yeah, I I believe my as objective as I [27:04] can be and what was done at the opening [27:07] of this has [27:08] nobody could have imagined. Napoleon [27:10] couldn't imagine it. [27:12] You Eisenhower, you just imagine what [27:15] war you want to talk about. We could [27:17] push it's not that easy, but could could [27:19] eliminate [27:20] because that's what war is a contest of [27:22] will. If I can convince you that I can [27:26] you they all say they all want to die. [27:28] Like no, they don't want to die. They [27:29] want power. And I do believe one of the [27:32] reasons that we stopped, I think I do [27:34] believe if we would have kept going, but [27:36] I don't know all the variables. [27:38] It's like concerns of a nation who [27:40] relies 90% on desalination plants and [27:43] just got his you know, just got hit and [27:45] is begging for the operation to stop. [27:47] All these variables that I don't know if [27:49] they did or didn't happen. [27:52] I think it was very effective. It did [27:54] put them into chaos. All the things you [27:56] would want to do in a war and I do [27:58] believe [27:59] This is the other point is that in order [28:01] to believe some of these things, you [28:03] have to think that everything that comes [28:05] out of the administration is a lie. [28:07] I don't I'm not there. I do believe in [28:10] you that deception is important in war. [28:12] I do believe in your markets and all of [28:14] these things, but I truly believe there [28:16] were voices from within the Islamic [28:18] regime in Iran that were uncle saying [28:21] they were willing to negotiate. [28:23] And they have acknowledged that and they [28:26] came to negotiations. So if they're so [28:28] hardliners and so strong and so safe [28:32] that the 13,000 targets that we [28:34] destroyed had no impact on them and all [28:37] we did was make them stronger. They [28:38] wouldn't have come to the negotiation [28:39] table and started talking. Of course [28:41] they came with [28:42] demands that were not acceptable to us. [28:44] So I should give you whether you know, [28:46] the administration full credit on Okay, [28:49] you you said you wanted to have a talk. [28:51] Okay, you're not willing to do what we [28:52] do and then it's all off cuz the worst [28:54] thing would be to to make a bad deal. [28:56] So [28:57] militarily [28:59] and from a strategic, everybody says [29:01] it's about tactics. No, this is a That [29:03] was a strategic action to start the war [29:06] and demonstrate a capability [29:08] to eliminate an entire political [29:10] military structure that it did send a [29:13] message [29:14] um and that it was a limited war. [29:16] >> Mhm. [29:17] >> Right? So this is the argument that [29:18] people have is that it was regime [29:19] change. My personal opinion [29:21] by everything that was used threatened [29:24] to be used, this was not a regime change [29:27] war. If it happened as a byproduct, [29:28] great. And they they actually said that. [29:30] >> Mhm. [29:30] >> This was a limited objective war trying [29:34] to force whoever gets left [29:37] >> Mhm. [29:37] >> And you could have continued what you [29:39] call them assassinations targeting [29:41] different words. [29:43] And they do have [29:43] >> Do you think assassination is the wrong [29:44] word? [29:45] >> Yes. [29:45] >> Okay, tell me why. [29:46] >> Uh I believe words have meaning and in [29:48] war, if I'm targeting an enemy [29:50] leadership, I'm eliminating. [29:52] >> But if they targeted Donald Trump, which [29:54] they have [29:55] >> They have? [29:56] >> God forbid, but if they were successful, [29:57] we would call that an assassination, no? [29:59] >> We would call that an attempted [30:00] assassination. [30:01] >> I want to understand why it's different. [30:02] >> Yeah, cuz once a war starts then I think [30:04] you're in you're in in war. [30:06] >> Yeah. [30:07] >> So [30:08] if you reversed it, yeah, it's a great [30:10] question. Would it would it be an [30:11] attempted assassination? Yeah. [30:12] >> To them it would be a targeted killing. [30:14] >> Yeah. [30:14] >> Right? [30:16] >> So where you stand is where you sit. [30:18] >> I understand. [30:19] >> [laughter] [30:20] >> I'm crossing enemy lines by calling it [30:22] assassination. [30:23] >> No, I I just should use a different word [30:25] in the opening of a war, right? [30:27] >> I I didn't think that deeply about the [30:28] word choice is my like honest [30:30] explanation here. [30:31] >> Yeah, but you're right. It is It is If [30:33] you look it up in the Websters, I'm sure [30:34] it means to target and kill a an [30:37] individual. [30:37] >> I'm happy to use your word. I'll say [30:38] targeted killing. [30:39] >> Yeah. [30:40] >> Okay, I have another subsequent [30:41] question, which is [30:42] is this a breakdown of an old norm or an [30:44] establishment of a new norm? You know, [30:46] obviously there was these very alarming [30:48] reports about um [30:50] Well, let me take a step back. Even at [30:52] the NATO summit in Ankara [30:54] the whole [30:56] series of events I guess I'll call it [30:58] potential threat on Air Force One where [31:00] Trump was then put into a bar car and [31:01] taken off. I mean [31:03] the threat was allegedly like threat to [31:05] his life. There was the videos of um [31:08] threatening Barron Trump. Right? And so [31:10] I I guess I worry about the slippery [31:12] slope of it all [31:13] of does it make it [31:15] just more common in across the world the [31:17] targeted killings? [31:19] >> I think it's always been a norm, but the [31:22] going back to that Deterrence Theory [31:24] there is only two countries I believe [31:26] have this current capability once a war [31:27] starts. [31:29] Israel and the United States. [31:30] And I I actually wrote this um paper [31:33] that that I believe it is a [31:35] a new capability that should put fears [31:38] in our enemy and we have to protect it. [31:41] I think this was much more than a [31:42] decapitation strike because of whom was [31:45] targeted both during the 12-day war like [31:47] all 13 [31:48] senior nuclear scientists, all the [31:50] generals, and then we pushed it up to [31:53] the political level because they had [31:54] shown between the 12-day war and [31:57] Operation Fury that they weren't going [31:59] no matter what you did they weren't [32:00] willing to talk. Like okay, let's let's [32:02] eliminate echelon of political [32:04] leadership and see if the next guy who [32:06] is sending a message that I'm willing to [32:07] talk. Whether you believe in that [32:09] Ahmadi-Nejad thing. [32:13] >> Why is he still alive? [32:15] I mean it's just like widely reported [32:16] that he's open to I mean there there was [32:19] the New York Times article that he was [32:21] >> considered yeah. [32:22] >> considered as a successor in a regime [32:24] change scenario. [32:26] >> problem is that I would love for the [32:27] program of record [32:28] >> me just let me just clarify what I'm [32:29] saying. Why is he alive at the hands of [32:32] the Iran upper leadership not not us, [32:34] but [32:35] >> Yeah, I mean this is the the the [32:38] the true which is a great study of power [32:41] in some of these places and who has [32:43] power both touchable and untouchable. [32:45] >> Mhm. [32:45] >> Um who has a [32:48] you know, even Putin. I mean, Putin is [32:49] an an individual we all talk about, but [32:51] there are the oligarchs, there are in [32:54] even Saddam was great about maintaining [32:57] powers even with his within his enemies. [32:59] >> Mhm. [33:00] >> Paying his enemies. So, he is a powerful [33:03] individual even when he gets sidelined [33:05] and told, "Look, you're you're out of [33:07] line and you you you put under house [33:09] arrest." Things like that. Clearly, he's [33:11] still a powerful man within the Islamic [33:13] regime. [33:14] >> Mhm. [33:14] >> And that I think that's why. [33:16] >> Mhm. [33:16] >> But to just to finish your question on [33:18] is will this become the norm? [33:20] >> Yeah. [33:21] >> Um political assassinations [33:23] >> Mhm. [33:24] >> by nation-states, which is different, [33:26] right? So, you know, this gets to the [33:27] terrorism aspect of a political [33:29] assassination attempt cuz there have [33:31] been attempts on, you know, US [33:33] presidents [33:34] um by crazy individuals. Sometimes it [33:37] becomes attributable to a nation, [33:39] sometimes a lot of times it doesn't. [33:42] I crossed into the line of when does a [33:44] war start? [33:45] >> Mhm. [33:45] >> And this is is this a war? Of course, [33:47] this is a war. [33:48] So, in Operation Echo Fury, what was [33:49] done [33:51] that can't become the norm because I [33:53] don't want other nations to have that [33:54] capability. [33:55] >> Mhm. [33:55] >> So, I actually view it not as a you [33:57] know, I'm not a warmonger, uh but I view [33:59] it as a capability that's never been [34:01] displayed in the history of war. [34:03] Cuz imagine, you know, starting World [34:05] War II being able to kill Hitler, his a [34:07] successor, Rommel, all of his generals, [34:09] bam. Yeah, they would keep fighting, but [34:11] I'm it would be different. [34:13] >> Yeah. [34:13] >> And China doesn't have that capability. [34:16] Uh Russia doesn't have that capability [34:17] or or it would have done it already. It [34:20] can't even get to Zelenskyy inside of [34:21] Kyiv in the opening moments [34:23] of a war which they are so much, you [34:26] know, on paper dominant. [34:29] Um it's a special capability that we [34:30] have demonstrated we have, we have to [34:32] protect it. The solution can't be to [34:35] stop pursuing the objective because Iran [34:38] started attacking all of our allies. And [34:40] it can't be because they figured out if [34:42] they can develop more cruise missiles [34:44] than we can [34:45] cheaply knock down because that gives a [34:47] roadmap and will cause more war. It will [34:51] it will cause more violations of [34:54] sovereign nations and all of these [34:56] things. It will This is what's really [34:58] hard to convince the anti-war people is [35:00] that [35:01] your stance actually will cause more [35:04] violence in the world than upholding [35:07] international order at times. [35:09] >> If we were pushovers. [35:10] >> Yes. [35:11] >> Essentially is what you're [35:12] >> isn't a strategy. [35:12] >> Yeah. [35:13] >> And though how many world wars do we [35:15] need to convince us of that? [35:16] >> Who do you think is running the country [35:17] right now? [35:19] >> That's a great great question. Um [35:21] whether [35:22] Moshiri is even alive. I think some of [35:25] the the hardliners that we've seen are [35:27] the the power brokers, but they don't [35:29] agree and they're there has been [35:30] infighting. Again, this is the [35:32] when somebody tries has a theory about [35:34] something, but they they they want to [35:37] not address any of the all accepted [35:39] knowing that there are competing from [35:41] the president to the speaker opinions [35:44] and statements showing that there isn't [35:46] unity and strength. [35:48] Uh and I truly believe [35:51] I don't know who was reaching out to the [35:52] US saying please, we'd like we'd like to [35:55] discuss, we'd like to stop this. [35:57] >> Who do you think it was? [35:58] >> I think it's likely more in the the side [36:01] of the president's camp and not so much [36:04] of the IRGC generals who become [36:05] political leaders, right? Because who we [36:07] talking about who wasn't a you know, [36:08] former [36:10] IRGC general, head of intelligence, [36:13] something like that. Those are what I [36:14] would call a hardliner, like you said. [36:16] They're all hardliners. Um [36:19] but there are others who I think care [36:21] about their survival a little bit more [36:24] and are more rational and I think those [36:25] are the people who reaching out. Um [36:28] I I you again not having access to [36:30] classified information, I know what I [36:31] don't know. [36:32] >> Mhm. One thing I'm just a point of [36:34] curiosity is how do we have such um [36:38] like granular intelligence on the ground [36:40] that lets us take out these 40 some [36:43] people? [36:44] Obviously very well sourced in CIA and [36:46] Mossad, but we don't know if Moshtaba is [36:49] in a coma or if he's not. [36:50] >> I wouldn't say that we don't know. [36:52] >> Oh, maybe we do know. [36:52] >> Maybe maybe we do know. [36:53] >> Oh. [36:54] >> Yeah. [36:54] >> We don't know. [36:55] >> But someone knows. [36:55] >> It's a lot easier to collect [36:57] intelligence out out of war than in war [36:59] because once the first round is fired [37:01] and you know, patterns of life change. [37:04] You know, uh [37:05] I I don't know I Do you know how in the [37:07] 12-day war Israel killed a whole meeting [37:11] of generals? [37:12] >> They hacked into the bodyguards' cell [37:13] phones, no? [37:14] >> They [37:14] >> So like none of the pri- none of the [37:16] primaries had cell phones, but the [37:17] bodyguards all had cell phones. Was it [37:18] that [37:19] one? [37:20] >> So Mossad texted [37:21] >> Yeah. [37:22] >> all of the generals that there was a [37:24] meeting at at It's and they [37:27] >> Yeah. [37:27] >> It was Mossad text They thought it was [37:28] each other calling a meeting and they [37:31] sent a missile into the meeting and [37:33] killed like 20 of the senior leaders. [37:34] >> Okay. Maybe I'm thinking of something [37:35] else. There was another thing where they [37:36] were tracking [37:38] >> That's right. [37:38] >> the security guards. [37:39] >> Yes. [37:39] >> Cuz no one was carrying cell phones. [37:41] >> That's right. [37:41] >> But their security guards were you know [37:43] >> That's how you track an individual as [37:44] much as like they're you know, you might [37:45] say like somebody's ordering DoorDash. [37:47] Like the primary's not, but his [37:50] bodyguards are. [37:51] >> Sure. [37:52] >> This one though is so fascinating is [37:53] that they were so in so penetrated into [37:56] the IRGC system. As much as how did they [37:58] kill Hamas's leader in the president's [38:01] home? [38:03] You know, the combination of human [38:04] intelligence with Israel [38:07] but the fact that they were able to send [38:10] IRGC generals a text believe and they [38:12] thought it was themselves to have a [38:14] meeting and they sent a have the [38:15] capability as well, which isn't as easy [38:17] as it sounds to send a missile into that [38:20] to start the war. [38:21] >> Mhm. What's been missing so far in our [38:24] conversation about the conflict with [38:25] Iran? [38:26] >> I mean, I think that the one thing that [38:28] we miss again with [38:30] it trying if you just want to cuz for [38:34] for if you're Israel, you have your own [38:35] lens on. They're safer today than they [38:37] were on October 7th with the proxy ring [38:39] of fire. Um Iran's growth uh [38:44] uh [38:44] where Iran had built a Shia ring of fire [38:47] around Israel. Now there's basically a [38:49] Sunni ring of power around Iran. If you [38:53] go back to the Trump administration's [38:55] um trade deals with all the Gulf states [38:58] were like in the in the in the [39:00] trillions. [39:01] I think that's one part of the that [39:04] you know, deterrence matters and and [39:07] going back to what we started with, [39:08] American deterrent deterrence is in [39:10] that the ripples of that not just in [39:12] real powers and countries will believe [39:14] they can do things with without [39:15] consequences to include members of the [39:17] UN Security Council. If if you look at [39:19] Russia and China, others, [39:22] it matters economically, right? China is [39:24] is probably the biggest loser in all of [39:26] this. I I honestly believe this and I [39:27] wrote that. The biggest loser in all of [39:29] this is China who was the investments it [39:32] had made in Iran, but also in the Gulf [39:34] states and the promises and the all of [39:37] these things that [39:39] it it's grand planned for the region and [39:42] for the world are get upset. [39:44] So, I think they're the biggest losers. [39:46] >> Just one on China. [39:47] >> Okay. [39:48] >> Cuz it would be crazy for us not to [39:49] mention it. Of course, the big question [39:51] is Taiwan. [39:52] You know, I was looking at these [39:54] satellite images of these replica models [39:56] of our warships that are being [39:58] constructed in the Chinese middle of [40:00] nowhere, you know. [40:02] How concerned are you about China as the [40:04] pacing challenge and [40:07] our [40:08] um [40:09] focus being directed elsewhere. Not that [40:11] it shouldn't be directed elsewhere, but [40:12] just of that being the reality. [40:14] >> Yeah. [40:16] I'm definitely concerned. Um and I and [40:18] if I was anybody else that wants to be [40:20] concerned, read [40:21] the national security strategy. [40:23] Um so, it sets our priorities. [40:26] The the problem, not the problem, but [40:29] the [40:30] the burden of being the world's only [40:32] superpower is that you have [40:34] you have to maintain many [40:36] interests and priorities. [40:39] Of course, China being the greatest [40:40] threat to the American way of life, [40:43] not just in war, not just in [40:46] great power competition around the [40:48] world, not just in like we talked about [40:50] rare earths, but in information, their [40:52] attack of our society in information [40:54] warfare of [40:55] you know, the ridiculousness of people [40:58] marching for terrorists. There is a [41:00] China [41:02] touch on that. [41:03] Um [41:04] I'm very concerned about it. I believe [41:06] it should be a priority, but I also know [41:08] that [41:09] we're the world's only superpower for a [41:11] reason. We can do more than one thing at [41:12] once, and it's all connected. [41:14] >> We can. [41:15] >> Okay. [41:15] >> Um it costs. [41:16] >> Bridge, Colby, and sort of his, you [41:18] know, camp would say like, "I don't [41:19] know." Right? [41:21] >> You have to have priorities, of course, [41:22] but it's all connected. [41:24] >> Okay. [41:24] >> So, this is right, the Iran strategy is [41:26] not disconnected from the US strategy to [41:30] roll back China's growth and its vision [41:33] for the future of the world. [41:34] >> Mhm. [41:35] >> It's all connected. And that's why [41:37] again, Panama, Cuba, Venezuela, Western [41:40] Hemisphere is connected to Iran. [41:42] >> Mhm. [41:43] >> Iran was China's gas station. [41:46] It There are reasons I think that are [41:48] beyond that that are worth fighting for. [41:50] All interconnected. China is [41:52] legitimately our biggest threat to our [41:55] way of life, but there are others. As [41:57] much as [41:58] the [42:00] the different is radical ideas, whether [42:03] it's is you know, radical [42:06] fundamentalist Islam, [42:09] you know, just the [42:10] I try not to do politics, but it's hard [42:12] not to Um the belief that [42:16] we are the bad guys. All of this, it's [42:18] all connected. And the beauty of our [42:20] system is there are duties and [42:21] responsibilities of these active branch, [42:23] the legislative branch, and judicial [42:25] branch. [42:26] And that check and balance is again [42:27] traveling the world and what you should [42:29] get out of my book is that I get an [42:31] amazing perspective of why America is so [42:33] great. [42:34] >> Yeah. [42:34] >> We are not perfect. We make mistakes. [42:37] Administration's going like I I [42:39] believe in foreign policy insanity. It's [42:41] just kicking a can of a threat that is [42:43] rising to the region, to the world. Just [42:46] kicking that down. [42:48] But I also believe that we have to have [42:50] priorities and that's why documents like [42:52] the National Security Strategy, whether [42:53] it's Colby's document or his his [42:56] statements and [42:58] are as important I believe that there's [43:00] also opportunity. Right? So in I I just [43:03] got back from India. India is a rising [43:06] power. I believe would be a great [43:08] continued interest. They they are an [43:10] ally group great continued interest. And [43:12] these are the unsettlings where we and I [43:15] I'm not that old, right? I'm not [43:17] I've lived through times where less was [43:19] happening. Although it the news will [43:21] make so that it tells you that [43:23] everything is a crisis. [43:25] >> Mhm. [43:26] >> We're living in through a time of great [43:28] change [43:29] in the world. Um where things are being [43:32] put to the test like we talked about in [43:33] the beginning war assumptions, but also [43:36] rules of nations the great nations [43:40] actually is being put into the test. So [43:42] are we going to allow somebody to write [43:44] rules kind of in the periphery [43:47] like buying up you know ports to have [43:49] influence to unseat the American way of [43:52] life. Um [43:54] we elect people that care about these [43:56] things and I [43:58] I personally want people to prioritize [44:00] because if everything is important, [44:02] nothing's important. [44:03] >> Let's pivot to the other hotspot which [44:05] is Ukraine. November of last year, [44:08] 28 point peace plan was put forward, [44:11] backed by the US. Many critics thought [44:13] it was too pro-Russian. It's since been [44:15] revised into a 20-point peace plan um [44:19] that Zelensky presented in December. [44:22] The core tension remains. Do you feel [44:24] like it's been too pro-Russian? Do you [44:26] think Ukraine has been too ambitious in [44:29] terms of wanting to keep control of [44:30] certain areas of Crimea and Donbas? [44:32] Where do you fall in that line of [44:34] debate? [44:35] >> I [44:36] I fall into, of course, the history of [44:38] the region. [44:39] >> Mhm. [44:40] >> And again, I believe in sovereign [44:41] borders. [44:43] Uh I think John we lost so much in John [44:45] McCain where he was an ally like he took [44:47] parts of Georgia, he did nothing. [44:49] >> Mhm. [44:50] >> He took Crimea, he did nothing. He took [44:52] portions of Donbas, he did nothing. What [44:54] do you think he was going to do next? [44:55] >> Mhm. [44:56] >> Appeasement is not a strategy. So, um [44:59] what I but I also believe in democracy [45:01] and what um what I've seen President [45:03] Zelenskyy say um for Ukraine, you'll [45:05] never hear Putin say this. [45:07] >> Mhm. [45:07] >> Like I I'm willing to listen to any deal [45:09] and I will take it to the Ukrainian [45:11] people. [45:11] >> Mhm. [45:12] >> He said he will give it isn't his [45:13] decision, unlike Putin, although he's [45:15] going to make a decision based on the [45:17] power um and all that you know, people [45:19] that can predict war, the fact that a [45:22] former Putin's former cook [45:25] formed a private army and made a run at [45:28] Moscow, nobody could have predicted [45:30] that. So, those that can say they can [45:32] predict what's going to happen in Russia [45:33] and Ukraine, we you probably shouldn't [45:36] be interviewing them if they if they [45:37] tell you that. I can't tell you where [45:38] it's going to go. Where I find where I [45:40] sit is that um the international [45:43] community identified the borders between [45:45] Russia and Ukraine, and it isn't about [45:48] who speaks Russian and who speaks [45:50] Ukrainian as if you know the history [45:52] that you know, Russia the Soviet Union [45:54] outlawed the language. [45:55] >> Mhm. [45:56] >> I believe in sovereign borders because I [45:57] know the ripple effects [45:59] that well, I I contest that, right? So, [46:01] I can use this excuse of those are my [46:03] people. I don't like where this border [46:05] was drawn. I don't want to take it to [46:06] the international community. I'm just [46:08] going to invade. [46:09] >> Mhm. [46:10] >> Um I believe that the consequences of uh [46:13] pushing Ukraine to give up land [46:16] uh would never be acceptable in any [46:18] other situation. So, that's that double [46:19] standard of [46:20] >> Mhm. [46:21] >> with the countries that just we just [46:22] need to get this over with. Too many [46:23] people are dying. Yes, too many people [46:25] are dying. [46:26] >> Mhm. [46:26] >> Um and there should be consequences to [46:28] violating [46:30] all of the international order that was [46:32] established after World War II to [46:33] prevent world wars from starting, right? [46:36] This goes back to the appeasement of [46:38] Hitler. He You know, he's going to take [46:39] Czechoslovakia. That's all he wants. [46:42] Um and the idea that Putin made a run in [46:44] 2022 at capturing all of Ukraine and [46:47] failed. [46:47] >> Mhm. [46:48] >> And that if you just give him that [46:49] little piece that he's talking about, [46:51] whatever what depending on what its [46:53] economic importance is to Ukraine and [46:56] Russia, that it will just end there. Uh [46:59] I'm a [47:00] as more of a a longer view, you think [47:01] that that is horrible. [47:03] >> I guess the opposing side is someone who [47:04] would say, "Well, it's obviously gone [47:06] like pretty poorly for him in Ukraine to [47:08] the extent of like I don't think he [47:09] expected to be four and a half years on [47:11] still there." And so, why would he go [47:13] after Estonia or Latvia or any of these [47:15] places? Like I think maybe that's how [47:18] people are thinking about it. I'm [47:19] curious how you respond to that. [47:20] >> Uh I get it. I'm a I'm a simple man. [47:23] >> Mhm. [47:24] >> That's not what history has shown. [47:25] >> Mhm. [47:26] >> Uh if you just give him that if you just [47:27] uh [47:28] this is about NATO. [47:30] Again, if this is about the expansion of [47:32] NATO on Russian, then this is the [47:34] greatest strategic blunder in history [47:36] because now [47:38] uh Putin has doubled his borders with [47:39] NATO with Finland and Sweden. [47:41] >> Mhm. [47:41] >> Uh it isn't This is about a [47:44] uh [47:45] which happens in history. [47:47] >> Mhm. [47:48] >> Uh a leader comes to power based on [47:50] aggrieved [47:52] deep-seated um [47:54] wanting to redo history, right? So, he [47:57] has said he views himself as Peter the [47:59] Great. He wants to rebuild the [48:01] and he views it the greatest historic [48:03] travesty, the fall of the Soviet Empire. [48:05] And he wants He wants to rebuild the [48:07] Soviet Union. So, you think his plan is [48:09] that just involves Ukraine? [48:11] >> Mhm. Do you think NATO membership should [48:13] be off the table for Ukraine? [48:16] >> So, one it was never on the table. It [48:18] was It was discussed. Again, this is [48:20] gets to the whole again, comedians [48:23] trying to rewrite revisionist history or [48:26] be revisionist history. [48:27] >> reason I bring it up cuz in a lot of [48:28] these, [48:29] you know, 20-something point peace [48:30] plans, a clause is no NATO membership. [48:33] And so, that's why I'm just curious if [48:35] you think that that's directionally [48:36] wrong. [48:37] >> I don't think you should tell any [48:38] country that [48:39] they'll never I mean, that's a a [48:41] decision for Understand how hard it is [48:43] to get into NATO. [48:45] I mean, [48:46] again, the Turkey conversation we could [48:47] have. My personal thoughts, um [48:50] I don't think any country should be told [48:52] that they can't. Um [48:53] but nobody ever told them that they [48:55] could be. [48:56] Um it was about the European Union and [48:59] go all that that element of it. Do I [49:01] think it should be off the table? [49:04] Let's say in a fictitious that maybe [49:07] that was on the table and Russia would [49:09] adhere to [49:10] Ukraine's international borders. [49:12] >> Mhm. [49:12] >> Um [49:14] what's going to stop them from doing if [49:15] that was the deal that was made? If you [49:17] know what happened in the Budapest [49:18] Agreement when Ukraine gave up its [49:20] nuclear weapons and the United States, [49:21] Russia, and others wrote into the [49:22] language about nobody will invade you. [49:25] You know, it wasn't an Article 5, you [49:27] know, like kind of like this mega [49:28] agreement we were talking about, but [49:29] nobody would invade you. You'd have [49:31] security assurances. And history showed [49:33] So, it's like I don't have an insanity [49:35] approach to history of [49:37] just trying something again even though [49:40] it didn't work very recently and and I [49:42] deal that we're making an agreement now [49:44] um with especially with administrations [49:46] that change and Putin's not going to [49:47] change. [49:48] >> Until he dies. [49:49] >> Right, until he does. Right, this is the [49:50] you know, whether you know, these 80, 90 [49:53] year old people that are in charge in [49:55] anytime soon. And again, I listen to [49:57] what they say [49:59] not what I want them to say. [50:01] Um [50:02] I don't think that's the big factor. It [50:04] never was. So, Ukraine wants security [50:07] agree [50:07] assurances. [50:09] Now, how do you give them security [50:11] assurances? Of course, having been to [50:13] Ukraine and seen them fought for their [50:15] freedom and paid in blood. Um where why [50:18] are Russian soldiers dying? Nobody's [50:20] threatening Russia's [50:23] the motherland. This wasn't about NATO. [50:25] It wasn't about moving missiles near [50:27] closer to Russia. All of those are gone. [50:30] So, why are they continuing? I know why [50:32] Ukraine continues to fight. I know why [50:34] Ukraine wants security assurances and [50:35] NATO just want to [50:37] That's one of the reason [50:40] why is Russia soldiers dying in Ukraine? [50:43] >> Putin's pride, ego. [50:45] >> Yeah. [50:46] >> He obviously This is This is his hobby [50:48] horse. [50:49] >> His interests. [50:50] >> Yeah. [50:50] >> It sunk cost fallacy. I don't think [50:52] that's actually a problem. He [50:54] Um but it's out of interest, right? So, [50:56] it in this chessboard of his play, if he [50:59] gets a little bit more, moves that line [51:01] a little bit more, gets closer, [51:04] um learns from his mistakes, which [51:05] Russian military [51:07] um going back to the assumptions, made a [51:09] lot of assumptions about his military [51:11] that were put to the test. It used to be [51:12] I used to sit in meetings where Russia [51:13] was the you know, this is the second [51:15] most powerful military in the world. [51:17] It's not even the second most powerful [51:18] in Ukraine at this point. [51:21] >> Do you think [51:22] Trump's desire, let's get a deal done, [51:24] let's get this done, has made [51:27] his team's approach to negotiation too [51:30] pro-Russian? [51:32] >> No, I think we saw an ebb and flow of [51:34] that in in the beginning. I think there [51:35] was genuine interest um and it and then [51:37] it faced the Putin reality. I wasn't [51:41] Zelensky despite that horrible oval oval [51:44] office meeting that we wish that [51:45] wouldn't have happened. Um the [51:47] his interest for his country are pretty [51:49] clear. I think the difficulty um, I [51:52] don't mind talking to Russia about that, [51:55] but [51:57] I don't think it's [51:58] there were as ebbed and flowed and what [52:00] belief what the realm of possible is. [52:02] And this is the aspect I'm not saying [52:04] that a diplomatic agreement negotiation [52:07] table isn't the the possibility, but [52:10] usually in a war like this, they all are [52:12] different. Actually, the greatest [52:14] article I've ever read my entire study [52:16] is the use and abuse of military [52:18] history, which says you have to [52:20] understand each one in its own context [52:23] is that a war like this will end [52:25] suddenly [52:27] in some way, but not usually the way [52:28] that people think it it will. This is [52:31] again, understanding all that I don't [52:33] know about [52:35] Putin's strength at this point, his [52:37] concerns. [52:38] Um, manpower is not his concern. [52:41] But, there is the economic aspect of [52:43] this as as it gets revealed as in, you [52:45] know, European countries are still [52:46] buying Russian gas, things like that [52:47] where it's the threat [52:50] to Europe as much so as it upsets global [52:53] economy. People want to talk about gas [52:55] prices like what did the price of gas [52:57] what it did do to the price of gas when [52:59] Russia illegally invaded Ukraine in [53:01] 2022? It sent it soaring for a long [53:03] time. And everybody didn't go, "Well, we [53:05] just need to get step in and make sure [53:06] this stops." No, everybody's like, "Ah, [53:08] it's not our business." [53:09] >> Do you think the US has done enough to [53:10] help Ukraine? [53:11] >> No, absolutely not. [53:13] >> Okay. What would you like to see happen? [53:15] >> Personally, and again, this is not one [53:17] administration. I remember back to the [53:19] Biden administration as a war analyst [53:21] and they were giving Ukraine four [53:23] artillery pieces at a time or saying we [53:25] can't give them tanks, that will cross [53:27] the line, right? Going back to those [53:29] where do we think the lines are? [53:31] Um, [53:32] that appeasement strategy, that fear of [53:35] nuclear [53:37] which it should be a fear, but when [53:39] nuclear threats, which is what Putin [53:42] does, so going back to why is Iran [53:43] important? [53:44] >> Mhm. [53:45] >> Every time Putin [53:47] does what he wants to do and somebody [53:49] says they don't like it, he rattles his [53:50] nuclear saber. And in a in a crafty way, [53:52] whether it's having a meeting or, you [53:55] know, raising a DEFCON or something like [53:57] that. This is the reason non-nuclear [54:00] preparation matters so much. [54:01] >> Mhm. [54:02] >> I believe, of course, we had such [54:06] political [54:08] fear and risk aversion, which is not a [54:11] way to lead [54:13] as the the world's only superpower. Of [54:15] course, there are rules, there are you [54:17] know, there is risk. But, the amount we [54:20] left Ukraine, although I'm very I'm very [54:22] proud of what we did send, but at [54:24] different moments, the calculation and [54:27] political calculations of we can't give [54:29] them tanks, that'll that'll make Putin [54:32] go nuclear. [54:33] This is why all of this has been the [54:35] greatest test of the multi-international [54:37] system, [54:38] Putin's invasion of of Ukraine, to be [54:40] clear, the greatest test of the [54:42] multinational system that was built [54:44] after World War II that's ever occurred, [54:46] and it was shown to not be working. [54:49] >> Mhm. [54:50] >> Because being a member [54:53] Russia getting the Soviet Union's seat [54:55] on the UN Security Council, [54:56] it believes it has tested the system. [54:59] >> Yeah. [55:00] >> So, now it believes it can continue to [55:01] do what it wants with minimum [55:04] repercussions. [55:06] So, that's that nuclear saber and why [55:07] Iran's so important, because if it gets [55:09] it, we're looking at more instability, [55:12] as much so as when we [55:14] >> Mhm. [55:14] >> were politically risk averse and said, [55:16] you know, Ukraine's got to demonstrate [55:17] they they want to fight for themselves, [55:18] and they did. [55:19] >> They have. [55:20] >> They they have. [55:21] >> Yeah. [55:21] >> And I believe in Europe has stepped up. [55:23] I love that. I'm proud of [55:25] the effort the what we did give, but I [55:28] also was there when we were giving [55:29] nothing for false [55:32] risk aversions, [55:34] because we need leaders to make strong [55:37] decisions. And And again, not political. [55:40] I believe a strong decision was made [55:42] about Iran because we were getting to [55:43] the point where it would be too late and [55:45] we were going to lead to a much more [55:47] violent world and our decrease of [55:51] everything. [55:52] >> We're going to jump around the world a [55:53] little bit. You obviously were in Gaza [55:56] during the war in the tunnels. Can you [55:58] give us sort of more on just the big [56:00] picture of the status on the ground? [56:02] >> Sure. So, I was just there a couple [56:03] weeks ago for my seventh trip deep into [56:05] the Gaza. [56:06] More trips into Gaza than anybody other [56:09] than the IDF. [56:10] >> Well. [56:10] >> Um [56:11] I believe Gaza is where the truth has [56:13] gone to die. No matter how many times I [56:15] went there, [56:16] what I would see would be the opposite [56:18] of reality. No matter how much [56:19] you know, everybody would say, "It's [56:20] just you, John. Why do you only you have [56:22] this opinion?" No, actually there were [56:24] um high-level military groups that were [56:26] going in going, "This is crazy. What the [56:28] IDF are doing to protect civilians, [56:30] feed, vaccinate, [56:33] all these things." Um [56:35] It's really been and it's really [56:37] dangerous again if I'm an America [56:40] Firster guy, it's really dangerous for [56:41] the US military that there can be a [56:44] situation where the opposite of truth is [56:46] what the world believes and tries to [56:48] constrain [56:50] a democratic nation from actually [56:52] defending itself and going to get its [56:53] hostages back. [56:54] >> Yeah. [56:55] >> Uh it's so dangerous for us and this is [56:58] why I've been so vocal. It's another [56:59] book that needs to be written. It's just [57:02] I mean it has so many tentacles of the [57:04] lies of the the statistics to the [57:07] Now we're seeing, you know, years later [57:09] when it doesn't matter about the famine [57:11] and like all this stuff. [57:13] What's the play on the ground? [57:15] Um I do believe the [57:18] you know, of course the the genocide lie [57:20] is still circulating despite the [57:23] insanity of the reality, trying to [57:26] redefine words. The quote that I stand [57:29] by the most that is still true [57:32] is that Israel implemented more measures [57:34] to protect civilians than any military [57:36] in history. [57:37] Period. You could add urban warfare at [57:39] the end of that because that's what I [57:40] specialize in specialize in and I had to [57:42] go in so many times and that's where the [57:44] book starts is one of those trips in [57:45] December of 2023 [57:47] to uh not just listen to what the [57:49] political leaders are saying are the [57:50] missions but to watch them um battle [57:54] in Gaza. [57:55] >> And you're saying measures like um [57:57] dropping pamphlets from the air that [57:59] say, "Please leave this building." [58:01] >> Yeah, they call that no- [58:02] >> that. [58:02] >> notifications but also [58:04] um the 400 days of daily pauses to allow [58:07] civilians to to move or aid to come in. [58:10] >> From civilians. [58:11] >> daily pauses for over 400 days of uh 500 [58:14] day of high-intensity combat. Pauses [58:16] every day announcing, "We will not move [58:19] for these next 4 hours." To handing out [58:21] their own maps, to use of facial [58:23] recognition, the use of uh [58:26] precision-guided munitions. Uh [58:28] it's a whole list. There's actually 20 [58:30] items. The notifications are the most [58:32] famous. Nobody does that, right? We all [58:34] drop flyers but nobody [58:35] does millions of voicemails, text [58:38] messages, tracks civilians by their cell [58:40] phones, restricts movement into those [58:42] areas. Like this is the whole all eyes [58:44] on Rafa [58:46] where because of the lies about Israel's [58:50] true measures to protect civilians, they [58:51] were told they can't go into Rafa where [58:54] the American Israeli hostages were being [58:55] held, where Yahya Sinwar was, all these [58:58] elements. It's not how you fight a war. [59:00] It's a double standard that that I rail [59:02] against as an American because I've [59:04] actually seen the same attempts happen [59:06] for American forces. They didn't stick [59:08] as much [59:09] >> in Iraq. [59:09] >> In Iraq. Yeah, after the like the second [59:11] battle of Fallujah during the battle of [59:13] Mosul. All these all the lies about [59:15] false numbers, false actions, this false [59:19] targeting of civilians, all of this. [59:22] It's really dangerous for the United [59:23] States. [59:24] You asked me what the play of the play [59:26] on the ground is. This So, Israel had [59:28] success despite [59:30] the double standard, the demonization, [59:33] and the attempts to delegitimize their [59:35] just stop aspect. Kind of like Iran, [59:37] just stop. Like it's just bad. [59:40] Like but there is a legitimate goal to [59:41] go get my hostages, to remove Hamas from [59:44] power, to demilitarize them. Those are [59:45] legitimate goals. Yeah, but you just [59:47] need to stop. And that's that [59:48] delegitimizing their right to to to [59:50] fight. Which if you put it all together, [59:52] the only explanation for it Gaza, cuz [59:54] I've never seen it in my the history of [59:56] war, is because it's Israel and it's [59:58] it's that anti-Semitism, the three D's. [60:01] But Israel was successful [60:03] thanks to again a new a different US [60:06] administration because there's one [60:07] there's some general rules about war, [60:09] but um [60:10] one is if you allow your enemy to [60:12] believe that they're going to win, [60:14] then they're going to continue to fight. [60:16] So, if you give an enemy a sanctuary, [60:18] even if it's in Gaza City, then he's [60:20] going to keep fighting. [60:21] Uh so, the 20-point peace plan worked. [60:25] Um but also Israel's change of their [60:28] willingness to go into [60:30] um certain areas in Gaza that they never [60:32] went into, and all the hostages came [60:33] home. [60:34] Hamas agreed to something that people [60:36] said that they would never agree to. [60:38] They brought [60:39] >> But do you believe them? [60:40] >> No, I don't believe them. Of course, [60:41] they're going to pursue things of their [60:43] interest. [60:44] >> Yeah. [60:45] >> Uh I believe what I've seen on the [60:46] ground. [60:47] >> I guess I'm trying to work out the [60:48] tension between like the peace plan [60:49] worked, but do we believe anything Hamas [60:53] says? And like their dishonesty or, you [60:55] know, potential dishonesty undermines [60:57] the whole plan is what I'm getting at. [60:58] >> It does, but this gets to the [61:01] what was I I don't want to quote people [61:03] that I don't want to quote, uh but the [61:05] alternatives, right? There was a [61:07] different strategy to implement in Gaza [61:08] that I would have if I would have been [61:10] the strategist to it. You [61:12] seize [61:15] the ground, right? This is the occupy [61:17] Gaza aspect that everybody said you [61:18] can't do that. Like I would a nation was [61:20] just attacked, invaded by thousands of [61:23] military forces, [61:25] hundreds [clears throat] of hostages [61:26] taken. Of course, they they can seize [61:29] that ground and take the power. So, the [61:32] guys with the guns have power. So, [61:34] that's the only reason I care what Hamas [61:36] says because right now, in that 40% of [61:39] Gaza where nobody is for many political [61:42] reasons, to include Egypt, I'll never [61:44] let Egypt off the hook. The number one [61:46] country that owns the most blood on his [61:48] hands is Egypt because it had the [61:49] ability to open its gate and create a a [61:52] humanitarian zone outside of Gaza, like [61:56] I've seen in almost every other country. [61:57] Doesn't They didn't have to let them [61:59] into [62:00] into Egypt, but just create a [62:01] humanitarian zone so Hamas couldn't use [62:04] the human sacrifice strategy. [62:06] But, you asked, do I trust Hamas? Of [62:08] course not. Um I trust, though, what I [62:11] viewed, and I said this publicly again, [62:13] without politics of it, that the [62:15] 20-point the Trump 20-point peace plan [62:17] was the only plan I've ever seen [62:19] actually in the region that was [62:20] conditions-based. [62:22] The saying that, okay, you're going to [62:23] give the hostages back. You're going to [62:25] disarm before reconstruction. You're [62:28] going to set up this alternate [62:30] government. It actually if you read the [62:33] plan, now we can talk about [62:34] implementation in this non-war way that [62:37] everybody wants, which is going to be [62:39] difficult. So, I Yes, I have to meet [62:41] with the guy with the gun for now [62:43] um as we implement this very [62:45] conditions-verification-based [62:48] strategy that we've seen in the news [62:50] right now, and haven't been there, [62:51] right? The the the sheer scale of the [62:54] task is massive because it was forced on [62:58] Israel, [62:59] the world. So, actually figuring this [63:01] out to get to this [63:03] implementable [63:05] the fact that they have stood up the [63:06] INCAG, this alternative government. So, [63:09] that's not Hamas. [63:11] Um they have started to clear areas of [63:14] They've started to fill tunnels. There's [63:16] no weapons getting in. [63:18] So, it's going to be a it's a little [63:19] easier to disarm somebody if they don't [63:21] have a highway of resupply like [63:23] Hezbollah did through Syria, which it [63:25] doesn't have anymore. [63:26] >> Right. [63:26] >> So, [63:27] there are a lot of positives that people [63:29] don't see that I see visiting Gaza so [63:31] much. There's uh like 20 new schools [63:34] with that have a deradicalization [63:36] curriculum that we want to protect and [63:38] increase because deradicalization is as [63:40] important as disarming. Hamas is an [63:43] ideology. [63:44] >> It can be defeated. I I railed against [63:46] that since day one as well. [63:47] >> It can. [63:47] >> Can, absolutely. You can defeat an [63:49] ideology. There's proof of it. There [63:51] it's happened across the world. [63:53] >> Sure. [63:53] >> Um [63:54] >> Nazism. [63:54] >> Yeah, Nazism. [63:55] >> To some extent, there's some as we're [63:57] seeing now. [63:58] >> Even you know, Saudi Arabia's issues [64:01] with um radical Islamic [64:04] Wahhabism. There's a way to do it. If [64:05] you control and if you have more [64:08] control, which is what we have and [64:10] Israel is right to say that we're not [64:12] leaving this line until the things that [64:15] everybody's agreed to. [64:16] I see a lot of positives. Now, but [64:18] everybody wants their 30-second cake. [64:20] They want to as much as in Iran, they [64:22] want 38 days. This is a quagmire. Like, [64:25] what are you talking about? [64:27] It took [64:28] 30 years or or more for Hamas to [64:31] radicalize every bit of and they still [64:34] didn't have success. There's still [64:36] tribes in Gaza that don't believe in [64:38] Hamas's they they don't love Israel, but [64:40] they don't believe in Hamas's we all [64:42] have to die to achieve our goal to kill [64:45] all the Jews on the planet. [64:48] I don't believe Hamas I don't even [64:49] listen I listen to Hamas when they say, [64:51] you know, [64:52] what they say, but I actually care about [64:54] what's happening on the ground. [64:56] The actual security that has now been [64:58] brought, the fact that hostages that you [65:00] know, bodies that were there for years [65:02] have been brought home. That every day a [65:04] tunnel is filled, destroyed, whatever [65:07] and there's no more weapons going in and [65:09] it's going to take time. But, there's [65:11] nobody [65:12] This is why I like um the Jared Kushner [65:14] meeting, which I think was a very big [65:16] positive, is in [65:17] despite all that's going on in the [65:19] Middle East, this mission is still [65:21] there's a vision, a strategy, and [65:22] somebody's actually pushing it forward. [65:25] And whether it's the the school [65:27] curriculums, that there's like all these [65:29] kids that are getting a [65:30] de-radicalization [65:32] curriculum, they're actually graduated [65:33] like high school students in Gaza who [65:35] have gone through this not non-UNRWA [65:38] Hamas [65:39] jihadist [65:41] curriculum. So, I see positives. [65:43] >> What do they do about the holdovers, the [65:45] people who are Hamas, but they're in [65:46] civilian clothes and they have arms that [65:48] they're hiding, I don't know where, in [65:50] the floorboards, who knows? How do they [65:52] handle? [65:53] >> Yeah, this is the the Again, it's I [65:55] mean, I fought in a in a neighborhood of [65:57] Baghdad that was bigger than the [65:59] population of Gaza, right? I saw I [66:00] fought in the Battle of Sadr City, which [66:02] had over 2 million in a small [66:03] neighborhood of Baghdad, which is a city [66:05] of 6 million. It isn't that it's [66:07] impossible, there but there's also a [66:08] reconciliation process that has to [66:10] happen. [66:11] Um, this is and I wrote about this [66:14] doing it by by by and I think that's the [66:16] strategy that I see, you know, the the [66:18] peace board and others doing it. Even [66:20] the international stabilization force, [66:22] right? There's a hierarchy and we've [66:23] learned this. Now we're getting into [66:24] post-conflict [66:26] strategies. And and lots of academic [66:30] and history and research on how you do [66:31] that, piece by piece, right? You have to [66:33] have clear an area of of all that [66:36] militarization, rebuild something, [66:39] um, [66:40] you you do reconciliation process with [66:42] old members of depending on what they [66:44] were. I do believe there should be [66:45] accountability for those involved in in [66:47] October 7th, period. [66:50] How do you like get that level of [66:53] demilitarization that you're talking [66:54] about where only the people that you [66:55] want have the guns? [66:57] >> Yeah. [66:58] >> Because this is such a controlled [66:59] environment, you can do it. It won't be [67:01] fast. By and and [67:04] there is a lot of destruction, not all [67:05] of Gaza is destroyed, but there's a lot [67:07] of destruction. [67:08] It's though it wouldn't be my number one [67:10] concern to be So, the IEDs are would be [67:14] the tunnels and the leftover explosive [67:17] ordinance that Hamas [67:18] uses as its supply of weapons cuz it [67:20] collects them all up. [67:21] >> Yeah. [67:22] >> I Last time I was in Well, actually when [67:24] I was in Gaza City right before the the [67:26] peace board was called, there was a a an [67:29] IDF tank that had hit a 2,000-lb bomb [67:31] that Hamas had gathered that didn't [67:33] explode and put into the ground. [67:35] Luckily, all the IDF survived it, but [67:37] that's a bigger concern for me the UXO [67:40] and IEDs than the AK-47. [67:43] >> That's interesting. [67:44] >> Which is a part of the process, [67:45] absolutely, but there's [67:46] there is a way to do it incrementally. [67:48] >> Yeah. [67:49] >> Um I don't believe in the I don't [67:51] believe the status quo can continue, [67:53] right? That there is this [67:54] Hamas-controlled area, [67:55] non-Hamas-controlled area. Although, you [67:57] can build and show the world like the [68:00] schools, but also even in structures, [68:03] what um development looks like. [68:06] >> Mhm. [68:06] >> And that's the challenge with these [68:08] negotiations. They want to get to even [68:10] in the green areas or the yellow areas [68:12] building and [68:14] deradicalizing and they've already [68:16] demilitarized that area, but the sheer [68:19] task of the tunnels that have to be [68:21] That's why they ask one of the ask of [68:23] disarmament is give us a map of the [68:25] tunnels. [68:26] >> Mhm. [68:26] >> We should tell the world like we still [68:28] don't know where some of the tunnels [68:29] are. [68:30] >> Well, here's a question. You know, [68:31] what's a part of the world that you feel [68:32] like we're not paying enough attention [68:33] to? [68:35] >> So, we being maybe the the mass [68:38] population. [68:40] I think you know, I'll I'll have a book [68:42] coming out about India and Pakistan. [68:44] >> Mhm. [68:45] >> Because if you if you go into Asia, then [68:46] you have you know, the things that are [68:48] happening with in with Pakistan in of [68:51] itself and how many times it's had to be [68:53] bailed out um by the IMF, which we [68:55] actually donate a lot of money to. [68:57] That whole region of China, [69:01] Bangladesh, [69:03] India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, although [69:06] we don't want to hear about Afghanistan [69:08] anymore. There's a lot going on over [69:10] there. Um this four-day war, I think was [69:13] a strategic shift in the region that [69:15] will have ripples uh where India [69:17] demonstrated dominance over Chinese uh [69:20] backed military of Pakistan. That that [69:22] will be a big reason why I'm spending so [69:23] much time writing this book cuz I think [69:25] it was something that was a blip and [69:27] actually what the world took from it was [69:29] ridiculously about supposed Indian [69:31] aircraft being knocked down when what [69:33] they didn't take it was that India is a [69:34] rising power that has a strategic vision [69:38] that we should be a really big part of [69:41] as a massive democracy with one of the I [69:44] think the third largest Muslim [69:45] population [69:47] um that has our shared values, which is [69:50] as much as Israel is our greatest ally [69:52] in the Middle East, shared values, [69:54] shared [69:54] India [69:55] >> billions of people [69:56] >> billions of people [69:58] >> a lot. [69:58] >> um and that it's you know, what China's [70:01] what China was trying to do in that [70:02] region in of itself. I'm not saying [70:04] there are people [70:06] We had We had an ambassador there [70:07] recently. Um [70:09] He He made a comment that I I actually [70:11] believe in, but [70:12] it's an area that just gets in the news [70:14] less that I I think it shouldn't. [70:17] Again, this is we're the world's only [70:20] superpower and it's not it's for many [70:22] reasons from culture [70:24] to values, to GDP, population, all these [70:28] things. And it it just but it won't stay [70:31] that way if we don't fight for it. [70:32] >> What keeps you up at night? You know, [70:34] there's advanced AI risk, bioterrorism, [70:38] man-made or not man-made pandemics, [70:40] nuclear war, there's like you know, [70:43] asteroid, who knows? You know, like what [70:44] what are you most worried about? [70:46] >> So, I'd love to to make use the Mattis [70:49] quote, but I'm not in that position. The [70:51] I don't [70:52] I don't lose sleep at night. [70:54] >> Oh, good. [70:55] >> My enemies lose sleep at night. [70:57] >> Okay. [70:58] >> But I'm a I'm a researcher, so how can I [70:59] say that? But I I actually don't. My [71:02] biggest concern because as as you know [71:04] in the book, I have many identities. I [71:06] love my work um [71:08] in studying war. [71:09] >> Mhm. [71:10] >> My biggest concern is for my children um [71:13] who [71:14] and and it was it was a great [71:16] opportunity but my 12-year-old son at [71:18] the beginning of the war came home and [71:20] said, "Is Dad is Hamas the good guys?" [71:23] Um and [71:23] >> think he picked that up? School? [71:25] >> Yes. No, I know I know. And he doesn't [71:26] have social media. [71:27] >> Wow. [71:27] >> Um [71:28] >> Another kid? [71:29] >> Another kid. [71:30] >> Parroting their parents. [71:31] >> Or their social media. [71:32] >> Oh, wow. [71:33] >> So, the the ability to attack the United [71:37] States from within, [71:39] the China, the Qatar, the the [71:43] radicalness [71:44] of our higher institutions that are [71:47] producing anti-American, anti-Western, [71:51] we could get into the socialist, [71:52] communist aspect of it. Doesn't keep me [71:54] up I sleep pretty good. Um it gives me a [71:56] lot of concern for my children and being [71:59] a parent and guiding them through that. [72:01] But also even the critical thinking [72:03] skills that if everybody gets their [72:05] information from X, how do you know [72:07] you're not even asking the question of [72:09] how did what I saw, how did that person [72:11] know that and what is the [72:14] veracity of the claim, that aspect of [72:16] it. It gives me a lot of concern, so I [72:17] spend a lot of time with my children and [72:19] I wish a lot of other people did because [72:21] there's a stemming of it. But that's [72:23] while China was buying up everything, [72:26] that aspect of our academic [72:29] institutions, our [72:31] cultural algorithm-driven aspect of it [72:34] is gives me a lot of concern. [72:36] >> Mhm. [72:37] I want to tell people about some of the [72:39] situations you encountered in the book [72:40] or not that you encountered in real life [72:42] that ended up in the book. [72:44] Getting swarmed by killer bees in [72:46] Panama, getting lost, almost dying of [72:48] heat exhaustion. Sounds terrible. [72:51] Getting your ear bitten off in a street [72:53] fight with Pepper. [72:54] >> Yep. [72:55] >> I think the camera could pick it up. I [72:56] hope it's okay, people. I hope it's okay [72:58] that I'm pointing it out to the people. [72:59] >> don't. [73:00] >> Um exposure to gas leak at an abandoned [73:02] Iraqi oil facility, getting T-boned, not [73:05] by an enemy, just by a reckless driver, [73:08] encounters with IEDs, and [73:11] there's so many more. As I was reading [73:13] this book, I was thinking to myself, I [73:14] was like, why do you keep going into [73:16] these situations? Like, I I really [73:18] wanted to understand that more. And so, [73:20] now that you're here in front of me, why [73:21] do you keep going back? [73:23] >> I love my job. [73:24] >> Mhm. [73:25] >> So, and I know how few people have the [73:28] opportunity. So, I know I'm grateful and [73:30] I [73:31] I'm blessed. [73:32] Some people might look at you didn't, of [73:35] course, um [73:36] view me as unfortunate of having those [73:38] experiences and like just stop. Like, [73:40] stop cuz I'm still having them. And I [73:41] was just [73:42] >> Mhm. [73:42] >> in in Lebanon a couple weeks ago and and [73:45] somebody soldiers were wounded very near [73:47] where I was. [73:49] I love that part of my job. [73:52] Um [73:54] And I'm not I love I love the pursuit, [73:58] the study of the history of war. That's [74:00] why I do it. And I love my children [74:03] understanding that I love what I do and [74:05] that it does take character to keep [74:06] doing it because I I've had to like, why [74:09] am I going to do it? So, I've had to [74:11] answer that, as you know, in the back of [74:12] the book. Like, [74:13] I'm going to collect as much as a [74:15] journalist does, but I do it in my own [74:17] war scholar aspect um [74:19] awareness of these situations and then [74:22] spread that knowledge because with great [74:24] knowledge comes great responsibility. I [74:26] try to lead by example for my kids. [74:29] >> Yeah. [74:29] >> Um I do believe that [74:32] it still tests me [74:33] >> Mhm. [74:34] >> in the job that I do and in the pursuit [74:36] of that. So, I do believe doing hard [74:39] things. It isn't easy getting into some [74:41] of the places I go to. [74:42] >> Yeah. [74:43] >> It actually makes you better as as Of [74:45] course, you gain from it, but you give [74:47] to others as well. [74:49] So, there's a lot of reasons why I keep [74:51] doing it. [74:52] I Sometimes I learn that don't do that [74:55] again. [74:56] You know where I'm going. Like like in [74:58] the Ukraine story where we We didn't [75:00] need to get that close to Chernobyl. [75:02] Um I didn't know we were doing it and [75:03] that [75:04] >> But the signs were down, right? [75:05] >> The Some of the signs were down and then [75:07] >> Which which they took down strategically [75:08] so Russians would sort of like [75:09] haphazardly walk in. [75:10] >> Brilliant. [75:11] >> Yeah. [75:11] >> Yeah. And it actually worked. [75:13] >> Yeah. [75:13] >> You can learn more in the book. [75:14] >> [laughter] [75:15] >> They actually It actually worked and [75:16] people That's one of those simple things [75:18] that people just don't understand like [75:19] >> Yeah. [75:20] >> Um and [75:21] >> simple take the signage down. [75:22] >> That's right. In dense urban areas [75:23] especially like even actually if you go [75:25] back to the invasion of Iraq 2003 [75:28] >> Yeah. [75:28] >> I I [75:29] I with my podcast interviewing soldiers [75:31] who were looking for the signs to [75:32] Baghdad [75:33] >> Mhm. [75:33] >> and they used that to help do the drive [75:37] to Baghdad at they they conquered this [75:39] city of 6 million with like 3,000 [75:41] soldiers and they were following Baghdad [75:43] Airport this way. [75:44] >> They could have just taken the other [75:45] side could have just taken the signs [75:46] down. [75:46] >> have just taken the signs down. [75:47] >> Wow. Yeah. Well, it's interesting in the [75:49] book too in the sense of everything is [75:50] like glass half full in a way where it's [75:52] like this taught me humility or this [75:54] taught me that retreat is not a failure. [75:57] And I'm wondering if that was a quality [75:59] that you feel like you learned from your [76:01] childhood or like who taught you to like [76:03] look at a situation where [76:06] you have a whole group of men almost [76:07] like drive off the road into like a [76:09] fatal accident and you're like I'm going [76:10] to take away that like retreat is [76:13] >> Not [76:13] >> Not failure. [76:14] >> So, I learned I took some values [76:16] you know, I joined the military at 17 [76:18] from We were in survival mode [76:20] almost my entire [76:22] upbringing homeless at one point you [76:24] know [76:25] barely ever seen my mom working three [76:28] jobs me and my sisters. I mean I took [76:31] hard work and the option that my mom [76:33] never had which which isn't in the book [76:34] she shouldn't have an option to quit. I [76:36] took that in with me. [76:38] But when I entered the military service [76:40] as a young man, you know, that first be [76:42] in the face aspect. I think some of that [76:45] was my pre-civilian life of, you know, [76:46] quitting is not an option here. Um [76:49] >> Do you still tell yourself that quitting [76:50] is not an option? [76:51] >> Yeah. [76:51] >> Yeah, and I've been put to the test, [76:53] especially in [76:54] like reporting on Gaza and everything [76:56] where like at this point like people are [76:57] like, "Dude, you're putting your [77:00] your livelihood at jeopardy." [77:01] >> Mhm. [77:02] >> I like, "Yeah, but I [77:03] if if who am I if I'm not a man of [77:05] character and I'm going to stand up for [77:07] the truth?" [77:08] But a lot of this is what the book is [77:10] about, having going all across my, you [77:13] know, from 17 to 50 [77:16] is some of these were very influential [77:18] in developing my character and some of [77:20] them were very influential in testing my [77:22] character. [77:22] >> Mhm. [77:23] >> And I believe we all have to live by a [77:25] code and and you know, I I developed one [77:27] for my kid. I put it in the back of the [77:28] book to share with other people. [77:30] Uh and we'll use it a lot. [77:32] >> Mhm. [77:32] >> Uh [77:33] but the book is about development of [77:36] that, not what I brought in and [77:38] fortunate to have an amazing military [77:39] career. Some of these were [77:41] taught me hard lesson like the the [77:43] getting my ear bit off. [77:45] Totally wrong and I hope somebody learns [77:47] >> Yeah. [77:48] >> what not to do based on that story is [77:50] that you don't have to fight for honor. [77:53] >> Ego, yeah. [77:54] >> Yeah, ego, respect. Nobody can [77:55] disrespect you at that aspect of it. But [77:58] I didn't bring most of that into the [78:00] military with me. It it was I was lucky [78:01] and and still am lucky to get my [78:03] character put to the test and it's still [78:05] developing me. And I still learn I still [78:08] learn. I think learning is living. So I [78:10] look you know, whether it's I'm learning [78:12] from your questions in this interview or [78:13] I'm learning from the next near death [78:15] experience I'm in. [78:16] >> Where are you going to go next? [78:18] >> Um I'm still got to finish uh the book [78:21] on India. So I have a book on [78:22] Nagorno-Karabakh where the the [78:24] Azerbaijan-Armenia Karabakh war coming [78:26] out in October. India [78:29] um [78:31] I there's so many interests. Uh [78:34] I believe understanding the [78:37] the terrain of Taiwan is really [78:39] important. Uh as much as now people are [78:42] waking up to like what is the Malacca [78:43] Straits? [78:44] >> Right.
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