Transcript [00:00] They also insist Riyad must recognize [00:03] them as the legitimate rulers of Yemen. [00:05] The Houthis made the demands after they [00:07] were approached by the Saudis to explore [00:10] ways to end the conflict following [00:12] multiple attacks on Saudi oil tankers in [00:15] the Red Sea and the group's recent [00:16] capture of Mocha in Yemen, a [00:19] strategically important city near the [00:21] Bab al-Manddev Straight. Well, to talk [00:22] more about that, we're joined by Hussein [00:24] Abdul Hussein. He's a research fellow at [00:26] the FDD and the author of the book The [00:29] Arab Case for Israel. Great to have you [00:30] with us, Hussein. So, I mean, Hussein, [00:33] you have to admire the Houthies hutpa [00:35] here a little, don't you? Uh, they say [00:37] they'll stop firing missiles at Mecca [00:39] and Medina if the Saudis hand over not [00:42] 50, but $51 billion. What What is going [00:44] on here? [00:46] >> Well, Laura, look, they won. I mean, [00:49] that's the short answer. uh they took [00:51] the coastal strip that they didn't [00:53] control before this war started, the [00:55] most recent round and the Saudis have no [00:59] way to win it back and now they have the [01:01] upper hand. The Houthis have the upper [01:03] hand and we saw that the Saudis took the [01:05] Pakistanis and the Turks with them as [01:07] mediators to uh to Iran and and begged [01:11] the Iranians. They said, you know, we'll [01:12] give them money. I think the number that [01:14] I heard at the time was 1 billion. The [01:16] Saudis offered the Houthis 1 billion if [01:17] they stopped waring. And I think this is [01:20] where the 51 billion came from. The [01:22] said, "Okay, we'll take it, but add 50 [01:24] billion to it." I think they're just [01:26] making fun of the Saudis. Also, the [01:28] recognition, I think the Houthis are [01:30] there. It doesn't matter whether the [01:31] Saudis recognize them or not. Sooner or [01:34] later, they will take over all of Yemen [01:36] and they'll be the def facto government. [01:38] >> It just appears, Hussein, that the [01:40] Saudis have handled this so badly. Can [01:42] we trace this back uh to uh the moment [01:45] when the Saudis or Muhammad bin Salman [01:48] chased the Emirati backed southern [01:50] transitional council out of Yemen [01:52] because they were actually proving quite [01:54] an effective bull work, weren't you? [01:55] Weren't they against the Houthis? [01:58] >> I think you're exactly right. And this [02:00] happened in December 2025 uh when the [02:03] Saudis felt that they wanted to [02:06] monopolize the uh control over the area [02:09] that the Houthis did not control by [02:11] knocking out the promirati militias [02:14] which were really well organized and and [02:16] and good fighters. Um the you know the [02:19] Yemenes or the the government of Yemen [02:21] the so-called government of Yemen became [02:23] really weak and the Houthies understood [02:25] this and they grasped the opportunity. [02:27] Now, this can be corrected if the Saudis [02:30] swallow their pride and ask the the [02:32] Imiratis to come back and help and and [02:35] if they do that, I'm sure that they can [02:36] push the Houthis back and and retake the [02:39] coastal strip that they lost. But pride [02:42] sometimes uh you know just undermines [02:44] good policy and I think this is what's [02:46] happening and the Saudis have no way of [02:48] digging out of the uh problem that [02:50] they're currently in. [02:51] >> Is there any sign of a refresh between [02:53] the Saudis and the Emiratis? [02:56] Uh there have been signs, senior [02:59] officials from each sides visited the [03:01] other. So now they're on talking terms, [03:04] but uh it doesn't seem to me that they [03:06] agreed on anything whether in Yemen or [03:08] in Sudan or even on how to deal with [03:11] Iran. So all the issues are still [03:14] outstanding. They don't see eye to eye. [03:15] They have two uh very divergent policies [03:18] and as long as this is the case, I don't [03:20] see them cooperating in Yemen against [03:23] the Houthis. Now, the Houthis have [03:25] really been a a thorn in the side of the [03:27] Saudis for many years, haven't they? We [03:29] can trace this right back to 2015, uh, [03:32] when the conflict started. Why is it so [03:34] difficult for Riyad? You know, they [03:36] don't lack the the money. They don't [03:38] lack the weapons. They don't lack the [03:40] partnership with the United States. Why [03:41] is it so difficult for them to defend [03:43] themselves and their very precious oil [03:45] infrastructure? [03:48] >> Well, they lack the fighting force. The [03:51] Saudis are not fighting. uh they don't [03:53] have a a strong standing army, a [03:56] professional force. Um sometimes they [03:59] ask the Sudanis to help by deploying, [04:02] you know, some thousands of fighters. [04:04] Sometimes they try to convince the [04:06] United States that its interest is to [04:08] take on the Houthis, but um there's [04:11] there's no fighting force. And listen, [04:13] the Houthis, the Rakag militia that they [04:16] are, they've proven that they're potent. [04:19] And by the way, the irony is that this [04:21] is how Saudi Arabia came into being. You [04:24] had a tribe that was really fighting [04:26] well and swept the whole peninsula and [04:29] took it over took over the hij including [04:31] Mecca and Medina. And this is how Saudi [04:33] Arabia came to to be Saudi Arabia. I [04:35] think the Yemenes now the Houthis think [04:37] that they can do the same. And mind you, [04:40] Mecca is not really far away from Sada, [04:42] the capital of the Houthis. It's only [04:44] less than 500 miles away. So I'm sure [04:46] that that the Houthi chief is thinking [04:49] that after they take Kean, they have [04:52] their their their eyes their eyes set on [04:55] on Mecca. [04:56] >> Right. And just looking at the broader [04:58] picture in the Gulf, uh Hussein, do you [05:01] think that the Saudis and other Gulf [05:03] Arabs are concerned right now about [05:04] whether President Trump may have lost [05:06] his resolve when it comes to fighting [05:08] Iran following those uh terrible results [05:10] from the Republicans this week? [05:13] I I think they know that the president [05:16] of the United States retains a lot of [05:18] power especially in foreign policy. Uh [05:21] they remember that President Trump [05:23] killed Slemani [05:25] in the few months before he uh was voted [05:27] out of office in 2020 when he had lost [05:30] control over Congress. So they know that [05:33] in foreign policy the president remains [05:35] the uh decisive uh person. Uh so they [05:39] know that the president can do this [05:40] whether they want him to do it, how much [05:42] they want him to do it, or whether [05:44] they're willing to, you know, in the [05:45] case of Saudi Arabia, if you want [05:47] America to knock out the Iranians, at [05:50] least sever your ties and pull out your [05:52] ambassador, which the Saudis have not [05:53] done yet. So they ask America to go [05:55] after Iran and they maintain diplomatic [05:58] ties with the Iranians. So I don't think [06:00] it work this way. If they want the [06:02] United States to come to their support [06:03] against the Houthis and Iran, they have [06:05] to say it out loud and to take the side [06:07] of of America, which will make uh the [06:10] mission of President Trump [06:12] diplomatically much easier. [06:13] >> Yeah, playing both sides hasn't worked [06:15] out for them so well so far, has it, [06:16] Hussein? Thank you so much.