Transcript [00:00] I always think of um [00:02] a call I had with him in December 2024. [00:06] We had spoken several times before, in [00:08] person, on the phone, on WhatsApp, of [00:10] course. [00:12] Um but this time would be for 3 hours, [00:14] extending well past midnight. [00:17] And [00:18] uh [00:19] he would call and he would begin that [00:21] call like this, verbatim. He would say, [00:24] "Hello. Hi. I'm going to give you a [00:27] precis of everything that has happened [00:29] in this war because we stand now at a [00:32] crossroads of history." [00:34] And I just thought, "That's Bibi, right [00:37] there. Crossroads of history." You know, [00:39] he's always at a crossroads of history. [00:41] That's how he speaks. But one of the [00:44] things that we show in the book is that [00:45] there's there's also another Bibi, okay? [00:48] And so that people may not be as [00:51] familiar with. You know, how about the [00:53] Prime Minister [00:54] Netanyahu who had to be convinced even [00:57] to invade Gaza [01:00] after uh October 7th, who delayed that [01:04] ground invasion by critical weeks [01:08] while the international media, as we [01:10] know, moved on from October 7th. Uh the [01:15] Netanyahu who turned to Gantz during [01:18] those weeks and asked him, "Is the IDF [01:21] even capable of invading Gaza given what [01:24] he had seen on October 7th?" [01:28] And so I think what what many people [01:31] fail to appreciate is that the course of [01:34] this war was shaped as much, if not [01:37] more, by Israeli caution [01:40] as it was by any Israeli aggression. [01:44] And shaped as much by, you know, [01:46] US-imposed constraints as it was by any [01:50] supposed free rein given from the US. [01:54] >> [music] [02:02] >> A number of books have now been written [02:04] about October 7th. Some of them very [02:07] moving, very fine, even haunting. [02:10] Our conversation today is on a different [02:13] kind of October 7th book. And this one [02:16] is valuable because it is a first cut at [02:18] the history that follows October 7th and [02:21] focuses on decision-making and [02:23] leadership in the war Israel waged [02:26] against Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran. [02:29] We get to see inside the decision-making [02:32] process as the military and political [02:34] leaders of Israel decided who would be [02:36] fought, how, and when. [02:39] And how they argued, maneuvered, and [02:40] bore the weight of those consequential [02:42] decisions. That focus invites, for me at [02:46] least, a particular kind of reading. The [02:49] ancient Greek historian Thucydides [02:51] believed that the war between Athens and [02:53] Sparta, for all of its particularity, [02:56] could instruct statesmen in the future. [02:58] He called his history of the war a [03:00] possession for all time. Thucydides' [03:03] method was to place the reader before [03:06] the speeches and deliberations of the [03:08] main actors as they happened, with [03:11] imperfect information and without [03:13] knowing how any particular campaign [03:15] would turn out. A future general or [03:17] statesman pondering what he would have [03:20] done in that position could use [03:22] Thucydides' account to refine his own [03:24] judgment. Today, we treat the last 3 [03:27] years of Israel's war in a similar way. [03:29] Welcome to the Tikvah Podcast. I'm your [03:31] host, Jonathan Silver. My guests are [03:33] Yona Jeremy Bob, senior military [03:35] correspondent and intelligence analyst [03:38] at the Jerusalem Post, and Elliot [03:40] Kaufman of the Wall Street Journal. [03:42] Their new book, In the War Room, The [03:44] Inside Story of Israel's Fight Against [03:47] Hamas and the Iranian Axis, draws on [03:50] extensive access to Israel's political, [03:53] military, and intelligence leadership [03:55] and to officials in the Biden and Trump [03:57] administrations. We take up three of the [04:00] war cabinet's decisions and try, in each [04:03] case, to understand what kind of problem [04:05] the decision-makers thought they were [04:07] answering. Through these decisions, we [04:09] see the rivalries within the military [04:11] establishment, that establishment's [04:13] struggle with Prime Minister Netanyahu, [04:16] and the ways each side used the American [04:18] alliance against the other. We'll also [04:20] see a Netanyahu that many will not [04:23] recognize, one who began the war [04:25] cautious and only gradually became the [04:27] author of its boldest strokes in Lebanon [04:30] and Iran. If you enjoyed this [04:32] conversation, you can discover more big [04:34] ideas and in-depth analysis on Judaism, [04:37] Israel, America, and the West at [04:39] tikvahideas.org. [04:41] Subscribe to access our full library of [04:43] podcasts, videos, and essays, and join a [04:46] growing community focused on Jewish life [04:48] and the glories of Western civilization. [04:51] You can subscribe to the Tikvah podcast [04:53] on YouTube, Apple Podcasts, or Spotify. [04:55] I hope you leave us a five-star review [04:57] to help us grow this community of ideas. [04:59] I welcome your feedback on this or any [05:01] of our other podcast episodes at [05:03] podcast@tikvah.org. [05:06] And of course, if you want to learn more [05:07] about our work at Tikvah, you can visit [05:09] our website tikvah.org and follow us on [05:13] Facebook and X. Here now is my [05:15] conversation with Yoav Jeremy Bob and [05:18] Elliot Kaufman. Yoav Bob, welcome back [05:20] to the Tikvah podcast. [05:22] >> Glad to be back. [05:24] >> And Elliot Kaufman, welcome back. [05:26] >> Thank you. [05:28] >> So, gentlemen, congratulations on this [05:30] important book, this this really first [05:32] draft of history. [05:34] Um I I'd like to just begin by [05:36] understanding from the two of you, [05:39] first of all, the sourcing in the book [05:40] and how you went out how you went about [05:43] writing it together. [05:44] Um did you know that this was the form [05:47] that it was going to take when you [05:48] started, or is that something that you [05:49] developed along the way? [05:52] >> Yeah, so this uh developed a lot. I [05:55] mean, I can tell you that with every [05:56] book, but especially when you're writing [05:57] current events. [05:59] Um [06:00] for me, [06:01] I start covering the war basically as as [06:04] soon as it starts, you know, they're [06:05] Hamas is shooting rockets at us in [06:07] Israel and they're invading us in Israel [06:09] and I'm working 18-hour days and we I'm [06:14] part of a closed military correspondents [06:17] group. I was the only English speaker at [06:18] the time and we're getting, you know, as [06:21] many briefings in 3 weeks as we normally [06:23] get in 3 years and like all the top [06:26] defense intelligence political officials [06:29] and I'm already looking at this and I [06:30] said I'm like, you know, this is [06:32] probably enough to eventually become a [06:34] book the way it's going [06:36] but initially the book is the Gaza war [06:38] because that's basically what the war is [06:41] for a long time. There's you know, [06:42] there's sort of this side show going on [06:43] with Hezbollah in Lebanon and there's [06:45] nothing going on with Iran and [06:48] then [06:49] basically things start, you know, with [06:51] Hezbollah and you have you know, the [06:53] beepers and explosions and Nasrallah [06:55] being assassinated and suddenly it needs [06:57] to be, you know, the Gaza and Hezbollah [06:59] war [07:01] and then I see this fantastic interview [07:04] that Elliott Kaufman does it's the best [07:07] interview to date [07:08] with Benjamin Netanyahu the prime [07:09] minister in Israel [07:11] most comprehensive interview people, you [07:13] know, super senior people would have [07:15] loved to have gotten that interview but [07:16] Elliott got it and I said, you know, [07:19] this is going to add fantastic material [07:22] and it did [07:23] and the two of us, you know, ended up [07:26] working together and the book keeps [07:28] evolving, you know, we think it's going [07:29] to be the Gaza and Lebanon war and then [07:32] some big thing happens with Iran, you [07:33] know, there's this big attack in June [07:35] 2025 [07:37] and then there's more going on in Gaza [07:38] and then there's a ceasefire and then [07:41] I can tell you we like finished the book [07:43] a few times and kept having to add [07:45] chapters [07:46] so this was absolutely book that evolved [07:49] over and over again and it was fantastic [07:52] to work with Elliott. [07:54] I think, you know, we each have our our [07:57] own perspectives and that I think added [08:00] a lot of, you know, I don't know if [08:02] anybody can get objectivity perfect but [08:04] I I think we got closer to it um [08:06] combining, you know, our our different [08:08] perspectives, you know, in a good, you [08:09] know, respectful, professional dialogue. [08:13] >> Elliot, did you know that this was the [08:15] shape of the book when you started? [08:19] >> Something like this. Although, as Yona [08:21] said, it kept going. I mean, the real [08:24] um [08:25] what was most attractive about the idea [08:28] for me is that [08:30] together [08:32] we can say with all honesty that we are [08:34] bringing you the inside story of the [08:37] war. [08:38] Talking to and with inside material from [08:41] all of Israel's top leaders. And that's [08:44] political, [08:45] military, and also intelligence. And so, [08:49] to be able to do that together uh and [08:53] not just get one side of the story, but [08:56] have both sides of the story from [08:57] multiple people who were in that war [09:00] room and be able to piece together what [09:03] what really happened. That uh to me was [09:07] an amazing opportunity, and I think [09:09] that's what makes this a strong book. [09:11] >> So, say something about [09:15] the the self-consciousness [09:17] of the principals that you guys were [09:19] talking to. [09:21] They understood that they were engaged [09:23] in the most serious work [09:26] that national security professionals can [09:28] be engaged in. They're actually fighting [09:30] a war. [09:31] And at the same time, they're [09:34] crafting their own their perceptions of [09:36] their performance for the two of you [09:39] to be recorded in history. [09:41] How when you were talking to we'll get [09:43] into some of the personalities that [09:45] define this Israeli campaign. [09:48] But, can you say something about how [09:51] self-conscious each of them was [09:54] um when they were talking with you about [09:56] the things that were happening? [09:58] >> Um I would say everybody was extremely [10:00] self-conscious [10:02] um because October 7th in and of itself [10:04] was the largest and tragic, but largest [10:07] event that happened in Israel in [10:09] decades. [10:10] And most of the people in power were, [10:13] you know, sort of on the hot seat, so to [10:15] speak. [10:17] Um, you know, as as we we don't blame [10:18] any one individual. We say, you know, [10:20] the blame goes around. The political, [10:22] defense, intelligence, everybody was [10:24] part of, you know, the normative [10:26] framework thinking that thinking that [10:27] Hamas was deterred, Hamas was contained. [10:30] Um, so they're trying to sort of rebuild [10:32] themselves for the future, whether it's [10:34] for legacy, whether it's continuing [10:36] their political careers. [10:38] Um, and I think from day one I'm [10:41] hearing, you know, being very conscious [10:43] about how people are sort of drafting [10:45] that history, so to speak, as you say. [10:48] And so part of what, you know, Elliot [10:50] and I had to do. And by the way, I I [10:51] realized we were only talking about [10:52] Israeli officials, but we also spoke to [10:54] a number of different Biden officials [10:56] and Trump administration officials. Um, [10:59] and I think everybody also in the United [11:01] States is very conscious that this [11:03] event, even though, you know, they [11:04] didn't fail on October 7th, so to speak, [11:06] everybody knows this is a major event [11:07] that's going to frame their legacy. And [11:09] so what we did was a little bit of ping [11:11] pong. We, you know, say, "Well, [11:13] you know, A said, you know, the story is [11:15] really this." And then you go back to B. [11:17] And then B's, you know, "Well, B [11:18] challenges." And we go back and forth, [11:20] back and forth. And it could go on [11:22] forever. At some point we have to say, [11:23] "Okay, we want to get this book out [11:25] without having to update it 5 million [11:27] times and having to rewrite conclusion [11:29] what Elliot maybe like 10 times." [11:32] Um, [11:32] so, you know, we did as much ping pong [11:34] as we thought we could, you know, to try [11:35] to get as close to the truth as uh we [11:38] thought we could. Um, but yeah, I think [11:40] that all everybody was on their guard. [11:41] And one of the only ways that you can [11:43] sort of try to sort of get underneath it [11:46] is by speaking to both sides. And you [11:49] find invariably that there are things [11:51] that they don't tell you the first [11:52] round, that once they realize you know [11:54] more about what happened, they share [11:55] with you later on. [11:58] >> And these are figures who [12:01] uh are not afraid to talk about one [12:03] another. [12:04] We should add as well. And they do that [12:07] to each other. And of course, they do [12:09] that to to press as well. And so they [12:12] are conscious, very much so, shaping [12:17] how the narrative comes out, who looks [12:20] good, who looks bad. On all sides, [12:23] they're playing this game. Even us, [12:25] they're taking very seriously their [12:28] joint and shared mission here. [12:31] I mean, speaking with Prime Minister [12:34] Netanyahu, one thing he's always very [12:36] conscious of is a sense of historical [12:38] mission. You know, he speaks in those [12:40] terms just regularly. [12:43] >> [snorts] [12:44] >> And so, you know, he would see it as [12:47] Israel's first generation of leaders [12:50] born before the creation of the state, [12:53] their historical mission was to [12:55] establish the state of Israel and then [12:57] withstand the onslaught [13:00] of Arab armies. And they did so. But [13:03] just as they succeeded in doing so, that [13:06] torch of Israel's destruction seemed to [13:10] have been handed over to the Iranians. [13:13] And so, what he has seen for many years [13:16] now, [13:17] before many other people saw it this [13:19] way, is that the historical mission for [13:23] that second generation of Israeli [13:25] leaders born after the creation of the [13:28] state, as he is, would be addressing [13:31] that Iranian threat. And so, [13:34] even us, [13:36] he had he and Israel had to fight their [13:38] way back out of Gaza, in Lebanon, and so [13:42] forth. There was still that sense of [13:45] mission with regard to Iran that I was [13:47] hearing from him, [13:49] you know, [13:50] all through 2024 [13:53] before that June 2025 12-day war with [13:57] Iran. [13:57] >> All of these people are human, meaning [14:00] they're all very talented and very [14:02] bright, but they forget things. And so, [14:04] I literally had an instance where [14:07] somebody started telling me what [14:09] happened and then they're like, "You [14:10] know what? I don't think I remember the [14:12] dates and times, right?" And they have [14:14] somebody bring in their diary and [14:16] literally go over their diary to help [14:17] them remember, you know, what was the [14:19] real order, what time did this happen, [14:20] what time did that happen? And I I I [14:22] honestly I was always more impressed by [14:24] the people who did that [14:26] um because it showed that they really [14:28] were being honest about their own, you [14:30] know, in you know, fallibility, let's [14:32] say, in terms of remembering specifics. [14:35] Um anybody who showed me documents, um [14:38] you know, that gave me, you know, sort [14:40] of more to go on than just, you know, [14:41] sort of what they sort of remembered [14:43] offhand. [14:44] >> And these people weren't weren't [14:46] sleeping very much. It's easy to forget [14:49] that now, but especially in the early [14:51] days, but really all throughout. I mean, [14:53] especially I'm often uh speaking [14:56] speaking to them with a 7-hour time [14:58] difference. And it's after midnight [15:00] where they are. And they're still and uh [15:03] they're still doing this working on [15:05] these matters. [15:07] >> Why do you think they trusted you guys? [15:09] >> So, uh I think each of us it's, you [15:11] know, for different reasons, and for [15:12] each person it's also for a different [15:14] reason. [15:15] Um [15:16] you know, so look, there are some [15:18] figures that I knew from the military [15:21] correspondence that like that closed [15:23] group, there are certain top officials [15:25] you just interact with, you know, [15:26] whether it's once every 3 months or 6 [15:28] months. But you you you see people a [15:30] certain number of times. [15:32] Um [15:33] I can tell you at least one of them was [15:35] very impressed when I gave them a copy [15:37] of my passport Target Tehran, and I [15:40] said, you know, you know, my you might [15:41] be in the next book before I was you [15:43] know, getting you know, so that that has [15:44] an impact on people. [15:46] Um and then sometimes it's more of a [15:48] challenge. Sometimes, you know, you sort [15:50] of approach someone say, "Look, um we've [15:52] heard [15:53] um [15:54] that this is the narrative about what [15:56] you were involved in. [15:58] I don't know, I wasn't there. I want to [15:59] give you a fair chance to tell your [16:01] story." You know, so that's it's not a [16:03] threat, but it's you know, a little bit [16:05] of a threat that like if you don't [16:06] cooperate and provide information, well, [16:08] then we'll have to go on the narrative, [16:10] you know, this person who's a competitor [16:12] or I think we put it, you know, there [16:14] wasn't just mistrust between, let's say, [16:16] you know, Netanyahu and Yoav Gallant, [16:19] the defense minister, and Benny Gantz, [16:20] you know, war minister, opposition [16:22] figure. These guys, you know, hated each [16:24] other. They literally had each pushed [16:26] each other out of power and vice versa. [16:29] The entire triangle. [16:30] Um, and some of this unusually also [16:33] happened even with the Israeli military [16:36] and the Mossad people. There were times [16:38] where, you know, people get along great [16:40] and there are times where even those [16:41] people who aren't politicians got in [16:43] some significant fights over, you know, [16:45] how certain major events in history went [16:46] down. [16:48] >> Many of Israel's critics see it as [16:50] nothing more than a perpetrator of the [16:51] most monstrous crimes of the age. And [16:54] many of Israel's friends carry a [16:56] comforting picture of the country, the [16:58] one that they learned about as children [17:00] or came to know in earlier decades. But [17:02] both make it hard to see the place as it [17:04] actually is. [17:06] At Tikvah Ideas, we produce podcasts, [17:08] videos, and essays about Israeli [17:10] society, Israeli culture, and Israeli [17:13] politics. We try to shed light on the [17:15] reality of Israel today, a country far [17:18] more interesting than the most popular [17:20] caricatures. [17:22] Now, I want to invite you to download a [17:24] new ebook, free of cost to Tikvah's [17:26] YouTube community. It collects six of [17:29] our best essays on Israel, the founding [17:31] of the state, the diverse tribes and [17:33] ethnicities that make up Israeli [17:35] society, the meaning of military [17:37] service, and of course, Israel's [17:39] conflict with the Palestinians. [17:41] Israel is one of the great political, [17:43] religious, and civilizational stories of [17:46] the modern age. [17:47] To get your copy, visit [17:48] tikvahideas.com/israelbook. [17:52] That's tikvahideas.com/israelbook, [17:55] or click the link in the show notes [17:57] below. [17:59] >> Elliot, maybe this is the time to [18:01] ask you to just sort of lay out the [18:03] dramatis personae [18:05] that that are the main decision-makers [18:07] in the book and that that the main [18:08] people run the war. Um, Yoav has just [18:11] mentioned, of course, there's Prime [18:12] Minister Netanyahu, there's Benny Gantz, [18:14] and Yoav Gallant. Just tell us a bit, [18:17] you know, in capsule, who each of these [18:19] men is. [18:20] >> Okay. [18:21] Uh [18:22] Benny Gantz, opposition leader who joins [18:26] the unity government right at the start [18:29] of the war. [18:31] And uh [18:32] Gantz would tell me something in [18:34] September 2024 that uh has stuck with [18:38] me. [18:39] Uh so he had been leading the Israeli [18:41] polls for the whole war, seen as the [18:43] sure fire next Israeli prime minister. [18:46] By this point, he's starting to slip [18:48] some, but he's still considered he's [18:50] going to be the guy to unseat [18:53] Netanyahu. And what he tells me is [18:56] Netanyahu [18:58] is a better politician [19:00] than I am. [19:01] Now, as a former IDF chief, Gantz of [19:04] course meant that as an insult. He's a [19:07] politician. [19:08] Even then, though, it seemed to me [19:11] uh [19:12] something was off there because [19:15] you're in politics, I thought. You're [19:17] You're [19:18] You are going beat him in politics. And [19:22] I think [19:24] that Israeli opposition voters came to [19:26] believe [19:28] that Gantz himself never really [19:30] understood that, that he was in politics [19:33] and was going to have to act like it. [19:35] Gantz spoke of his duty to the country, [19:38] not just after October 7th joining that [19:41] government, but also leaving that [19:43] government later on. And even now, he's [19:45] still talking about his duty to the [19:47] country. [19:49] But he's now polling at 1%, maybe [19:52] [snorts] 2%. [19:54] Uh he's talking about his uh his duty, [19:56] but the country no longer wants to hear [19:59] it from him. [20:01] Yoav Gallant, Israel's then defense [20:04] minister, [20:06] was also a military man like Gantz. [20:09] Uh [20:10] but unlike Gantz, who's more low-key, [20:13] uh [20:14] very tall but low-key, uh [20:16] Gallant would point his finger in the [20:19] prime minister's face and yell. [20:22] And [20:23] uh you know, Gallant in many ways was [20:26] the most aggressive early on in the war. [20:30] But, I recall speaking to him August of [20:32] 2024, actually just a few weeks before [20:34] that exploding pager sabotage operation. [20:38] And uh what he would tell me was that [20:41] Israel was rumbling toward a potentially [20:43] disastrous escalation in the north with [20:46] um Hezbollah. [20:48] And that to avoid this, Israel had to [20:51] stop, [20:52] cut a deal in Gaza, and thus quiet both [20:55] fronts, the south and the north. [20:58] He said, uh [21:00] "I'm willing to fight in Gaza forever, [21:02] until all the terrorists are dead." And [21:05] I believed him on that. But, he said, [21:07] "Bring the hostages home first. And then [21:10] after that, I can convince the Americans [21:13] Israel can restart its operation." So, [21:16] Gallant who had argued before anyone [21:19] strike Hezbollah, uh hit them hard, now [21:23] came to argue [21:25] that Israel didn't need another war, [21:28] that it could find a deal um rather than [21:32] take a large risk at that point later in [21:36] the war. And so, if Gantz could be maybe [21:39] the tragic figure of the war room, I [21:41] think you would say that Gallant at [21:42] several different points represented the [21:45] war room's uh [21:47] road not taken. [21:50] And then there's Prime Minister [21:51] Netanyahu, uh the one everyone thinks [21:55] they already know. [21:57] Uh and I always think of um [22:00] a call I had with him in December 2024. [22:05] We had spoken several times before, in [22:07] person, on the phone, on WhatsApp, of [22:09] course. Um but this time would be for 3 [22:12] hours, extending well past midnight. [22:15] And [22:17] uh [22:18] he would call, and he would begin that [22:20] call like this, verbatim. He would say, [22:23] "Hello. Hi. I'm going to give you a [22:25] precis of everything that has happened [22:28] in this war because we stand now at a [22:30] crossroads of history. [22:33] And I just thought that's BB right [22:35] there. Crossroads of history. You know, [22:38] he's always at a crossroads of history. [22:39] That's how he speaks. But one of the [22:42] things that we show in the book is that [22:44] there's there's also another BB, okay? [22:47] And so [22:48] that people may not be as familiar with. [22:51] You know, how about the Prime Minister [22:53] Netanyahu who had to be convinced even [22:56] to invade Gaza [22:58] after [23:00] October 7th who delayed that ground [23:03] invasion [23:04] by critical weeks [23:06] while the international media, as we [23:09] know [23:10] moved on from October 7th. Uh [23:14] the Netanyahu who turned to Gantz during [23:17] those weeks and asked him, "Is the IDF [23:19] even capable of invading Gaza given what [23:23] he had seen on [23:24] October 7th?" [23:26] And so [23:28] I think what what many people fail to [23:30] appreciate is that the course of this [23:33] war was shaped as much, if not more [23:36] by Israeli caution [23:39] as it was by any Israeli aggression [23:43] and shaped as much by, you know, US [23:45] imposed constraints [23:47] as it was by any supposed free reign [23:51] given from the US. And what so many [23:53] critics miss is that this wasn't just a [23:55] Gaza war. [23:57] Israel was fighting the entire Iranian [24:00] axis which had spent decades and [24:03] multi-billions of dollars preparing for [24:06] a fight to destroy Israel. That's what [24:10] That's what these three key figures were [24:13] taking on. [24:15] >> Yona, Prime Minister Netanyahu is such a [24:17] titanic figure looming so large over [24:22] Israel every aspect of Israeli public [24:25] life for a very long time for for the [24:27] memory of most of the people who are [24:30] watching this discussion or listening to [24:31] this discussion, [24:33] um they can hardly think of a a pre-BB [24:36] era in Israeli politics. [24:39] Did you learn anything that surprised [24:41] you [24:42] in about Prime Minister Netanyahu in the [24:46] course of research for this book? [24:48] >> Yes and no. Uh so as Elliot pointed out, [24:51] um Netanyahu, you know, evolves [24:55] um during the course of the war. Um at [24:58] the beginning of the war, he's actually [24:59] sort of, you know, the the dove or the [25:01] restrained member of the war cabinet. [25:03] He's, you know, either afraid or not [25:05] ready or needs more assurances before [25:07] invading Gaza. I can tell you that there [25:09] were people who were telling me on [25:10] October 8th and 9th we're going to be [25:12] invading Gaza on October 10th. And then [25:14] October 11th and 12th, I'm like, "What's [25:16] the deal?" And they said, "Well, there [25:17] is, you know, things we're working out." [25:18] Um so it turns out that things they were [25:20] working out was convincing the Prime [25:21] Minister to go in. And this doesn't work [25:24] with what everybody thinks they know [25:26] about him. Um everybody thinks, "Well, [25:28] he's the most aggressive, you know, sort [25:30] of person pushing the war." That does [25:33] eventually happen, but it's not the way [25:35] things are going not only for northern [25:37] Gaza, but also for Khan Yunis, right? [25:39] That's like the second round of [25:40] invasions in December 2023. So it's [25:43] really only until March-April 2024. [25:47] Um [25:47] and I I knew this about Netanyahu [25:49] because I've been I've been covering him [25:51] for a very long time, [25:52] um that he actually has always talked [25:55] loud, but been very conservative about [25:57] using major force. You know, the four [25:59] major conflicts in Gaza before this, [26:00] 2009, 2012, 2014, 2021, very [26:05] conservative about force. There was no [26:06] major invasion, you know, air strikes, [26:08] little invasions with special forces. Um [26:11] so I knew that about him, but I I don't, [26:13] you know, until we did this book, I [26:15] don't think I had sort of pinpointed, [26:17] you know, the this change I I knew the [26:18] change also had sort of happened. But [26:20] like, when did it happen? How did it [26:21] happen? And so I think we we pinpointed [26:23] to around March-April 2024. [26:26] And basically this is they're discussing [26:28] for 3 months whether they're going to [26:30] invade Rafa or not, right? Israel wants [26:32] to invade Rafa in February 2024, they [26:34] only do it in May, and that's because [26:36] the Biden administration is objecting so [26:38] hard. And so, during that time period is [26:41] when it happens. I I believe what [26:43] happened was Netanyahu saw how effective [26:45] the IDF was in northern Gaza and in Khan [26:49] Yunis. And as they're negotiating with [26:52] the United States about how they're [26:53] going to do the invasion, he sees, you [26:55] know, that you know, the invasion [26:57] becomes more and more careful in, you [26:59] know, all sorts of ways. [27:01] Um and he's, you know, basically becomes [27:03] convinced that, you know, the IDF knows [27:05] really knows what it's doing is [27:07] really successful against Hamas. They're [27:09] going to take them out. Um and then that [27:11] only grows, you know, after that, then [27:13] they get to Hezbollah in it's September [27:15] 2024, and there he's really rolling the [27:17] dice because there were always concerns [27:20] that Hezbollah could fire 5,000, 6,000 [27:22] rockets in a day [27:24] against Israel, and that's, you know, if [27:25] they get that number of rockets off, you [27:27] can see Haifa being destroyed, large [27:30] parts of Tel Aviv being destroyed, Ben [27:32] Gurion Airport, large parts of the [27:34] energy grid. Um and Hezbollah never gets [27:37] off more than 200, 300 rockets in a day. [27:39] Uh but that's a that's a that's a gamble [27:41] once you go after Hezbollah at any [27:43] point. Um we we we do talk about uh some [27:46] point we'll probably get into it that [27:48] Israel almost went after Hezbollah a [27:51] year earlier, only 4 days into the war. [27:53] But even when they go after it a year [27:55] later, people are still terrified of [27:57] what the consequences could be. Um but [27:59] his his confidence has really grown from [28:02] seeing what the IDF has done in Gaza. [28:04] And the the one other thing that I'll [28:05] point out that everybody's forgotten [28:07] about is in August 25th, 2024, Hezbollah [28:11] tries to get off over 1,000 rockets at [28:13] Israel. Israel learns about it a little [28:16] bit in advance, does a mini preemptive [28:18] strike, and reduces Hezbollah also to [28:20] only a few hundred rockets. And that's [28:22] when they know that they can really take [28:25] Hezbollah out, and it only it basically [28:27] takes them about a week and a half in [28:28] September 2024. [28:30] >> It's astonishing, actually, um [28:33] that [28:34] the main operations against Hezbollah [28:36] were so effective in such a short period [28:39] of time. [28:40] It really is hearkening back to a kind [28:42] of Six-Day War, 1967, [28:46] pace of operations. [28:48] And it's it's one of the astonishing [28:49] campaigns. [28:51] What I'd like to do, gentlemen, is [28:53] something a little different, because [28:55] um, [28:56] everyone who's listening to this should [28:58] buy a copy of your book. You should read [29:00] it with as much profit and interest as I [29:02] have. But, what I'd like to do is [29:04] actually turn our attention to students [29:07] who may be listening to this [29:08] conversation. [29:09] And the template that I have in mind [29:12] is going to sound a little startling, [29:15] but let let me explain. [29:17] In ancient in antiquity, Thucydides [29:20] wrote this history of the war between [29:22] Athens and Sparta, the Peloponnesian [29:24] War. [29:25] And he thought that that work could [29:27] instruct statesmen for all time. [29:30] The methodology that he would use is he [29:33] would put readers [29:35] in front of the speeches and [29:37] deliberations in real time. [29:40] And ask them to consider how they might [29:42] make decisions if they were in the shoes [29:44] of some of the key statesmen who were in [29:47] Athens and Sparta then. [29:49] And then, only knowing the only having [29:53] the imperfect information that they had [29:55] at the moment, [29:56] and seeing how things would eventually [29:57] turn out, would you have a kind of [30:00] educate a manual for statesmen, an [30:02] education in prudent decision-making. [30:06] And what I'd like to do is see if we can [30:07] put our listeners now [30:10] in front of, I don't know, two, three, [30:12] four key decisions [30:14] that the war room had to confront at the [30:16] time that they had to confront them. [30:19] Um, people who've made it to the end of [30:20] your book know how things turned out. [30:23] But, of course, this is always the [30:24] challenge of putting yourself back in [30:26] the history. Of course, if you're in [30:27] that room, you don't know how things are [30:29] going to turn out. You don't know how [30:31] reliable the intelligence coming in to [30:33] you who at any given moment. [30:35] And I think that that was particularly [30:37] acute in in the one of the first major [30:41] decisions, Yona, that you've already [30:43] alluded to, which was where to where to [30:46] attack first. [30:48] So, let's go back to October 2023. [30:52] October 7th has just happened. The IDF [30:55] at great cost and great effort and great [30:57] heroism has finally gotten control of [31:01] the western Negev once again. [31:03] And now the decision confronting this [31:05] group is [31:07] where do we go on the offensive? [31:10] So, can I just ask you guys to kind of [31:12] lay out the the question that they [31:15] thought they were answering at that time [31:17] and what that debate was really all [31:19] about. [31:20] >> Um Gallant and the IDF high command, [31:22] certainly the majority, are saying, [31:24] "Let's take out Hezbollah now." [31:26] Um now this is a big gamble. I mentioned [31:29] a minute or two ago that Hezbollah was [31:31] believed to be have the capacity to fire [31:33] 5,000 to 6,000 rockets a day. That is [31:36] not something that Israel could shoot [31:38] down. Could shoot down part part of it, [31:40] but a lot of it would have gotten [31:42] through. [31:43] And so, why would you take that risk [31:45] when, you know, your priority would seem [31:47] to need to be [31:49] get the hostages in Gaza, beat Hamas in [31:52] Gaza, you know, Gaza. That's That's, you [31:54] know, how the war starts. And so, what [31:56] you need to understand is the biggest [31:58] concern of the top Israeli defense [32:00] officials at that moment is actually not [32:02] Hamas. [32:03] They know, already after a couple of [32:06] days, that they're turning Hamas back, [32:09] and they know that once they bring their [32:10] full forces forces to bear, they're [32:13] going to cream Hamas. Um they don't know [32:15] for sure, you know, how many Israeli [32:17] soldier casualties that they thought the [32:19] Israeli soldier casualties in Gaza would [32:20] be higher than it was. It It turned out [32:23] to be lower, but they know they're going [32:24] to win against Hamas once there's no, [32:26] you know, element of surprise even as [32:28] for Hamas. They're thinking, "What about [32:30] the rest of the Middle East? If Iran and [32:33] Hezbollah and militias in Syria and Iraq [32:36] and nobody I think was thinking about [32:37] the Houthis in Yemen, but let's say, you [32:39] know, they were. Um if all of those [32:41] parties see that Israel could be beat by [32:44] the weakest of the axis, Hamas was the [32:46] weakest of all of the parties I just [32:48] named, then won't they all think that [32:51] they can actually destroy Israel? Won't [32:52] they try? [32:54] Um you know, won't Iran start shooting [32:56] hundreds of ballistic missiles? Won't [32:58] Hezbollah start shooting thousands of [33:00] rockets? And so they they say, you know [33:02] what? [33:03] Hezbollah didn't go after us on October [33:05] 7th, they blanked. So clearly they're [33:08] sort of trying to figure out what to do. [33:10] Let's hit them now. If we hit them now, [33:12] and we didn't know then, but we know now [33:14] that they were already booby trapped [33:17] beepers, not as many as there would be [33:18] later, but there were. There were [33:20] already booby trapped walkie-talkies [33:23] from over a decade, and so all of that [33:26] they could bring to bear. And if they [33:27] can beat Hezbollah then, [33:30] then the whole war is different because [33:31] suddenly Hamas is going to look at them [33:33] and say, "Oh my god, what did we get [33:35] ourselves into? Look what they did to [33:37] our big brother who has 150,000 rockets. [33:40] We only have 15,000. Who trained us? If [33:44] they could beat Hezbollah like that." [33:45] And Iran is going to say, "Oh my gosh, [33:47] Hezbollah was our big insurance policy [33:49] that, you know, we know that Israel is [33:51] stronger than us, but we have Hezbollah [33:53] right on their border, and if Hezbollah [33:55] is out of the game, Israel can go after [33:57] us. You know, maybe we can't hit Israel [33:59] at all." And so that's what they wanted [34:01] to do. They wanted to shift the dynamic [34:03] in a matter of days from [34:05] Israel is super vulnerable to Israel is [34:08] the gorilla in the jungle who you don't [34:10] want to mess with. [34:11] >> So if I can boil that argument down, [34:13] that's the Gallant argument. And I'd say [34:15] to to boil it down is to say the reason [34:18] why we go Hezbollah first is Iran [34:21] deterrence. That's the logic of the [34:24] Hezbollah first argument. [34:27] >> Yeah, and where in Herzi Halevi put it, [34:29] he said, [34:30] I think quoting [34:32] some version of Clausewitz, that if you [34:33] have two sort of enemies, you you hit [34:36] the first one the the stronger one [34:38] first, and then the weak you know, the [34:39] weaker one sort of backs off. [34:42] >> Elliot, what's the How's the Prime [34:44] Minister thinking about that? [34:46] >> You know, it's so interesting because on [34:48] both sides, the argument is about [34:50] managing risk. [34:52] So, Gallant says, "The greatest risk to [34:54] Israel at this point is that Hezbollah [34:57] strikes first. Strikes hard first, okay? [35:00] Cuz it has launched It had launched some [35:02] rockets October 8th, but uh a few dozen. [35:06] Uh not the 5,000. [35:08] Uh So, whoever is going to strike hard [35:10] first is going to have this huge [35:12] advantage, and whoever doesn't strike [35:15] hard first is going to suffer [35:17] tremendously." And that was true. That [35:19] was true then in the early days, and it [35:21] was also true later on. Uh from Prime [35:25] Minister Netanyahu's perspective, [35:27] though, [35:28] uh [35:30] he is being asked not just to preempt a [35:34] risk, but he is being asked to bring on [35:37] huge risk onto Israel. Because, [35:41] as he saw it, [35:42] Hezbollah [35:43] hadn't attacked, hadn't gone [35:47] into an all-out war. [35:49] So, why, at Israel's moment of greatest [35:53] vulnerability, confusion, disorder, [35:56] should it [35:57] start that war, that all-out war, if it [36:01] didn't have to? [36:03] And I think [36:04] we can often forget, and we need to put [36:06] ourselves into that time period. Whoever [36:10] you blame [36:11] for the October 7th attack succeeding, [36:16] it doesn't matter. Everyone is looking [36:18] at the IDF and saying, [36:20] "The IDF did not perform as it should [36:23] have. It failed miserably. Israeli [36:25] intelligence did not perform as it [36:27] should have. It failed miserably on that [36:30] day." [36:31] And therefore, [36:33] can Prime Minister Netanyahu trust [36:37] his military, his people, with an even [36:41] greater challenge, with an even greater [36:43] risk, just 4 days afterward, is it up to [36:47] that task? You know, Lebanon wars, [36:50] historically, haven't gone so well for [36:53] Israel. A Lebanon war is almost a [36:55] synonym for a quagmire, a disaster, [36:58] misconceived, it didn't go the way you [37:00] thought it was going to go. [37:02] That could have happened again. [37:04] And so, he's looking at that. [37:07] Looking at the immense risk, and also [37:10] throwing into this equation [37:14] the views of the Biden administration in [37:17] the United States, [37:20] which has one abiding objective from the [37:23] start to the finish, and that's to [37:25] de-escalate. That's to contain the war [37:28] to Gaza, rather than expand it. Prime [37:32] Minister Net- [37:33] Netanyahu, knowing that the Biden [37:36] administration is there, actually works [37:39] and maneuvers to bring the Biden [37:42] administration into that Israeli war [37:45] room conversation, [37:47] so that it can be a sort of veto player [37:50] against the Gallant-Halevi [37:53] IDF plan in Lebanon. And so, he's [37:57] looking at it from that point of view. [38:00] Um [38:01] he's looking at it from the military [38:04] risk point of view, [38:06] and he's worried not just about bringing [38:09] on even more devastation, you know, [38:11] dwarfing what uh [38:14] Hamas did on October 7th, he's worried [38:16] about losing American support for the [38:18] war effort before Israel had even begun [38:22] in Gaza. [38:24] The The last thing I think we can [38:26] mention here, which really is with the [38:28] benefit of hindsight, has to do with [38:30] Israeli munitions shortages. [38:33] Uh we know how quickly that became a [38:36] factor, even when Israel was only really [38:39] fighting in Gaza. If it had tried to do [38:42] both Gaza and and uh [38:45] Lebanon, or even just go on all out in [38:47] Lebanon [38:49] uh while losing American support, can it [38:52] get rearmed in the way it needs to be [38:55] able to fight in Gaza? That becomes a [38:58] question. So, what [39:00] uh Prime Minister Netanyahu was telling [39:02] me was one intensive front at a time. [39:06] That's how Israel had to fight, and that [39:08] could be a reflection on the change in [39:12] the IDF over time that it wasn't this [39:15] Six-Day War or Yom Kippur War, we're [39:18] going to fight on both fronts like that. [39:20] It was one at a time. [39:22] >> At Mosaic, we had been publishing [39:24] writing about the Lebanon Hezbollah [39:27] threat in the in the period of time [39:30] leading up to October 7th, just like [39:32] many other people were. At the time, um [39:35] if one were to sort of survey and do a [39:37] threat assessment of the Iranian proxies [39:41] in the circle of fire, one would have to [39:44] acknowledge that Hezbollah was the most [39:46] potent, most serious, most dangerous of [39:50] the threats that could be activated [39:52] immediately. [39:53] And I think that um that just to put [39:56] ourselves back in the mind space before [39:58] October 7th, um [39:59] you would be right to be on high alert [40:02] that at any moment all of those rockets, [40:04] all of the munitions which had been [40:06] carefully surveilled by the Israelis, [40:09] um posed a very serious threat. [40:12] Now, [40:14] again, you you guys detail this very [40:15] carefully in the book, but if I recall [40:17] correctly, Gallant, one of the first [40:19] things that he did at that moment was to [40:20] ask intelligence services [40:23] to uh assess the extent to which [40:26] Hezbollah was spoiling for a fight. They [40:29] came back and said, "Actually, we don't [40:30] see a lot of evidence that they're [40:32] they're ready to roll. We think that [40:34] it's likely that they want to contain [40:36] the conflict themselves for the time [40:39] being." [40:40] And and this is this is my point about [40:42] as an exercise for students, [40:44] put yourself in Yoav Gallant's shoes at [40:46] that moment. Would you be able to trust [40:49] the very intelligence services that had [40:51] just missed the catastrophe [40:53] that uh Hamas had unleashed on the [40:56] Western Negev if they came back with [40:58] that assessment? [41:00] Did he reflect on that to either of you? [41:03] >> Um yeah. [41:05] And I think [41:07] he felt at the time [41:10] that he wanted all of the information he [41:12] could get. He actually had both the [41:14] serving intelligence body He he had a [41:17] red team, right? A red team is the [41:18] concept of somebody outside who's sort [41:20] of outside of the chain command um [41:23] giving him a different, you know, [41:25] evaluation. Um but everybody basically [41:28] came up with uh we don't see Hezbollah [41:31] doing a big invasion now. We don't see [41:32] them going big. As Elliot pointed out, [41:35] they, you know, they fired rockets [41:37] unprovoked on October 8th, but we're [41:38] talking about, you know, a few dozen, [41:39] you know, we really symbolic [41:41] participation at that point. Um so he [41:45] wanted all the information he could [41:46] have. said at the end of the day, I'm [41:48] I'm going to sort of going to have to go [41:49] with my experience and somewhat my gut [41:52] um because we don't know right now, and [41:55] you know, everybody was just surprised. [41:57] And so, you know, I I think he and the [42:00] majority of these Israeli uh military [42:02] high command were worried enough about [42:05] Hezbollah hitting first that they, you [42:07] know, that that what that's why their [42:08] clear recommendation was to hit back [42:11] first. And then to this day, they still [42:13] think that it was a mistake not to [42:15] because of the, you know, the 80,000 [42:16] Israelis who weren't able to live in the [42:18] north for an entire year. I mean, [42:20] basically Israel gave away sovereignty [42:22] of northern Israel. Um and it's not a [42:25] part of Israel that's, you know, under [42:27] dispute before the UN. Everybody agrees [42:29] that it's part of Israel. Um so to this [42:32] day, they think it was a mistake not to [42:34] attack, but they do say we we we do [42:36] understand, you know, why Netanyahu took [42:38] the other position, and Ben Gvir took [42:40] the other position. You know, I don't [42:42] think anybody thinks that it was an easy [42:43] call. [42:45] >> And the the one thing which maybe has us [42:47] exit the statesmanship seminar [42:51] is [42:52] how Netanyahu maneuvered [42:55] to get his way in this. [42:57] And and by that I mean [43:00] not answering Gallant's phone calls, not [43:03] having his aides hand him the phone, [43:05] leaving, you know, Gallant, his defense [43:08] minister, amid a war and a crisis, [43:10] leaving him in the waiting room. Okay? [43:13] And then when it came time um [43:16] maneuvering further, like I said, by [43:18] bringing in the United States, but also, [43:21] and this people may not realize, [43:23] bringing in Benny Gantz and Gadi [43:26] Eisenkot before he had to confront [43:29] Gallant's argument. [43:32] Why would that help him? Because Gantz [43:34] and Eisenkot were viewed as more [43:36] cautious. Prime Minister Netanyahu was [43:39] confident that they would be on his side [43:42] of that question, and they were. So so [43:45] that when the war room really came to [43:48] argue this question, have it out, there [43:51] was in effect a stack deck of the three [43:53] voting members of the war cabinet, [43:56] Netanyahu and Gantz could outnumber [43:59] Gallant even if he had that IDF high [44:03] command support. Uh their prestige had [44:07] been tarnished in the preceding week, to [44:09] say the least. [44:10] Um [44:11] and so Netanyahu [44:13] uh maybe that's more Machiavellian than [44:17] Thucydidean. [44:19] You can tell me, but uh part of getting [44:22] his way was maneuvering in that way, not [44:24] just having the better argument. [44:27] >> This this is going to be a very deep [44:28] cut, [44:29] but Elliot you'll appreciate, I think, [44:31] from Nietzsche's perspective they are [44:32] one in the same. [44:34] Machiavellian and and Thucydides. And [44:37] even so, [44:39] to come back to the to the matter at [44:40] hand. Um I do want to just point out [44:43] additional technique which you have [44:44] alluded to, but is worth just [44:46] underscoring. [44:47] Yes, of course, the Americans are [44:49] involved in every which way, and indeed, [44:52] as we as we go on in our discussion, [44:54] we'll see even more pressing examples of [44:56] constraint and restraints that the the [44:59] bear hug of the [clears throat] American [45:01] Alliance [45:02] is just part of this whole dynamic. [45:05] But what you have [45:06] already pointed out to us, Elliot, is [45:09] that that fact could be a manipulated by [45:13] Prime Minister Netanyahu to his [45:15] advantage. [45:17] And when he himself had come to the [45:19] conclusion that he wanted to go to Hamas [45:22] confront Hamas first, he was able to [45:24] marshal arguments from the outside and [45:27] make it appear as if the Americans were [45:30] putting such strong pressure on him that [45:32] he was prudently conceding to this [45:35] external external accommodation, [45:38] even though it it is what he had decided [45:40] already. As a technique in the war room [45:43] negotiation, that's one of the tools he [45:45] had. [45:47] >> Absolutely right, and it's so [45:48] fascinating because [45:51] Gallant would call him on this, okay? I [45:54] at that point and later on, but then [45:57] fast forward in the war to when they're [46:01] debating taking out Hassan Nasrallah, [46:03] they're you know, arguing over should [46:06] they inform the the [46:08] United States in advance of the [46:10] operation. Gallant argues yes, and it's [46:13] Netanyahu who who, you know, by that [46:16] point, the war room has flipped in a [46:18] way. Prime Minister Netanyahu says, [46:21] Gallant, you're just using the you [46:25] United States here as a veto. Okay, [46:28] you're sort of asking them to veto the [46:30] operation. Now, Gallant would say that's [46:32] not fair, just as Prime Minister [46:34] Netanyahu would say in the first case, [46:36] it's not fair. But on all sides, they [46:39] were able to use the United States, use [46:42] public opinion, [46:44] the stakes were so high, they had to use [46:47] whatever they could [46:49] grab hold of. [46:51] >> This conversation is brought to you by [46:53] Tikvah Ideas, our online platform for [46:55] people who want to think seriously about [46:57] Jewish history, the Jewish intellectual [47:00] tradition, Jewish literature, Israel, [47:02] America, and the West. Tikvah Ideas is [47:05] the home of Mosaic, where we publish [47:07] major long-form essays. [47:09] It's the home of a growing podcast [47:11] network and a series of online video [47:13] courses that tackle the big questions of [47:15] Jewish thought and Jewish life, ancient [47:18] and modern. [47:19] Right now, our YouTube viewers can get [47:21] 20% off an annual subscription, full [47:24] access to everything that we publish. Go [47:26] to tikvahideas.com/youtube [47:29] or click the link below. [47:33] >> You know, our our first decision point [47:35] was [47:36] who to fight first. I now want to go to [47:39] the next question, which is how to [47:42] fight. And here, I would say that that [47:44] um that a kind of debate is framed [47:49] between uh Gallant on the one side and [47:52] General Petraeus on the other. [47:54] And I wonder if you can uh [47:56] explain [47:58] the two different perspectives of this [47:59] debate, and we can sort of see [48:02] the case for both of them. [48:05] >> So, [48:06] I'm going to actually say three [48:09] different perspectives. [48:11] Um I think the two you're referring to [48:15] are whether you sort of do temporary [48:17] penetrations and exits versus uh taking [48:21] over territory and and holding it. Um [48:24] and Israel initially went with the [48:26] penetrating territory and then leaving. [48:30] Why did they do that? There's it wasn't, [48:32] you know, sort of like [48:34] an [48:35] it wasn't something that they hadn't [48:36] thought about. They basically wanted to [48:39] avoid Israeli casualties. Israeli [48:41] intelligence had said, "If you do a deep [48:42] invasion of Gaza, we could lose a [48:44] thousand soldiers in a matter of days. [48:46] So, if you do longer, you know, [48:48] thousands and thousands of soldiers." It [48:50] didn't happen partially because they [48:52] used this tactic, partially because they [48:54] had improved the [48:56] um personnel carriers to to them highly [48:57] armored. There was an armored personnel [48:59] carrier that I was in in Gaza where they [49:01] told me it had been hit by an RPG seven [49:03] times and was still rolling. [49:06] Um [49:06] so, you know, that that's what that's [49:09] why they did that, but um you know, the [49:13] The Namer, exactly, yeah. So, um but the [49:17] alternate would have been what they [49:18] ended up doing in 2025, which is you [49:20] take territory, you hold territory, and [49:22] you corner Hamas into smaller and [49:24] smaller areas, um and that allows you [49:27] also maybe to get closer to the hostages [49:30] cuz they'll have fewer places where they [49:31] can um hide them. [49:33] Um so, those are sort of I think the two [49:35] that you were referring to. The third [49:37] one that I was going to toss out is [49:39] instead of doing a long war where you do [49:42] northern Gaza first, then a few months [49:43] later Khan Yunis, and a few months later [49:45] Rafa, you go into all of Gaza at once. I [49:48] think in retrospect it would have been [49:50] smarter. The whole war might have been [49:52] resolved in like a month. Now, what [49:54] would have gone wrong? Probably more [49:56] Israeli soldiers would have died. [49:58] Probably more hostages would have died. [50:01] Um although in the end, 80 hostages die, [50:04] and according to some people, 40 of them [50:06] maybe {quote} unnecessarily. [50:09] Um [50:09] so, that's debatable, but probably more [50:13] hostages would have died. Um probably [50:15] more Palestinians would have died in the [50:17] short term, but fewer Palestinians long [50:19] term, right? Because even if more [50:21] Palestinians died in that 1 month, [50:23] because the war went on for 2 years, so [50:25] many more Palestinians were killed um [50:28] over time, and I'm not you know, [50:30] have this whole separate conversation [50:32] about the 70,000, you know, Palestinian [50:35] number. 25,000 of them are Hamas. 3,000 [50:38] to 5,000 of them anecdotally are [50:40] probably Hamas killing their own people. [50:42] Um [50:43] but that number probably is smaller [50:47] um if you do the whole war in a month. [50:49] But like I said, uh the risks were very [50:51] high to Israeli soldiers, to the [50:54] hostages, and to Palestinian civilians, [50:56] and I think they were afraid of losing [50:58] legitimacy if they went in too fast, um [51:01] too hard. Ironically, I think what [51:04] happens is because the war is so long, [51:05] they lose legitimacy. [51:07] Um, and so that's in retrospect, I think [51:11] you know, if they could have [51:12] capitalized, they actually had, people [51:13] forget, they had sympathy from almost [51:15] the whole world in October 2023. It [51:18] starts going down fast, but if you do [51:20] that all in a month, I don't think they [51:22] lose that sympathy. Um, so I think that [51:24] was a mistake, but, you know, again, [51:26] with all of those risks they were up [51:28] against, um, I understand why they did [51:30] it that way. [51:31] >> So, so again, I I I want to I want to [51:33] resist reading back with the benefit of [51:36] what we learned throughout the course of [51:37] the war, but if you put yourself in that [51:40] war room in October 2023, and you're [51:42] confronted with these three different [51:44] options. [51:45] One is to send in raiding teams of [51:47] command, I'm I don't know if this is [51:49] exactly the language that they use, but [51:50] the I'll describe it like this. To send [51:52] in raiding teams of special forces [51:54] commandos to kill bad guys and then [51:57] leave. [51:58] Option two, what I'll call the and I'll [52:00] call that the Gallant option. [52:02] The Gallant strategy. The The Petraeus [52:05] option is to go in and hold territory [52:08] and try to build up something better [52:11] so that you can then try to win over the [52:13] population, the non-Hamas Gazan [52:15] population. [52:17] And then and then you know now what [52:19] you've just laid out for us, option [52:20] three, don't go in with with raiding [52:23] commandos, but go in everywhere all at [52:26] once, rip off the band-aid, try to [52:27] finish the entire thing in one joint [52:30] massive operation. [52:33] So, I I want to just like hear the the [52:35] strongest case for each of those. [52:38] >> Okay. [52:40] Uh, and uh, I may frustrate you by [52:42] adding yet a fourth option to this. [52:44] >> let's hear it. [52:45] >> Which was President Biden's option. [52:47] >> Okay, so hold on one second. This is [52:49] important because, um, [52:51] again, put yourself sitting in that room [52:54] in October 2023. [52:56] Um, of course there's more options than [52:57] that. There There's no one's handing you [52:59] like the a workbook that says it's A, B, [53:01] or C. [53:02] So, of course you're you're absolutely [53:04] right. Elliot, go on. [53:05] >> So, [53:07] Yohana made the case effectively, I [53:09] think, as it was thought of for that [53:11] initial raid and leave strategy. [53:15] Um protect Israeli soldiers. Uh now, [53:19] Gallant takes his war plan before Israel [53:23] executed it to General David Petraeus, [53:27] okay, retired, uh and asks him, "What do [53:31] you think?" [53:32] Petraeus agreed with the [53:35] idea that Israel had to do a full ground [53:38] invasion of Gaza, but what he said was, [53:42] "You're going to fight in one area. [53:44] Hamas will leave that area, then you'll [53:46] pull out your troops, and then Hamas [53:48] will go right back into that area, and [53:50] you'll be playing whack-a-mole the whole [53:52] time for months." [53:54] And that's pretty much what happened. [53:56] And so, Israel would end up not just [53:58] fighting one battle for a neighborhood [54:01] of Gaza, but two battles, or four or [54:03] five battles, or in certain cases, five [54:06] or six battles for the same [54:08] neighborhoods, which became an immense [54:10] frustration, not only demoralizing for [54:13] Israelis, Israeli troops, policy makers, [54:16] the public, but did more damage to these [54:19] areas of Gaza. If you have to win the [54:22] battle for them again and again and [54:25] again. [54:26] Petraeus was advocating in Iraq-style [54:29] civil-military counterinsurgency [54:32] operation. And what Gallant told him [54:35] about that is, [54:36] "But we've never done that before. [54:38] We don't have a counterinsurgency [54:40] manual. Uh we don't know how to do [54:44] this." And what he didn't tell him, but [54:46] may have been saying privately, is, "I'm [54:47] not sure we want to do Iraq 2.0, if [54:50] that's really the model that we want to [54:52] pursue here." And I remember, for [54:54] instance, speaking later on in the war [54:56] to uh Benny Gantz's chief of staff, who [54:59] told me something that I think a lot of [55:01] Israelis could relate to, which he said [55:04] is, [55:05] "I don't want my sons to die dealing [55:09] with the sewage [55:10] in Gaza. [55:12] Uh taking over responsibility for the [55:15] food, the schools, all the civil [55:17] elements of governance. They're [55:19] soldiers, let them be soldiers. [55:21] Uh [55:22] And so [55:24] that was a totally different vision [55:27] for an Israeli uh [55:31] taking responsibility for Gaza. And not [55:34] only would that have been unpopular with [55:36] the Israeli public, I think it was the [55:38] IDF most of all that didn't want to do [55:42] something like that. [55:44] Uh didn't want to [55:46] uh [55:47] have its soldiers all of a sudden be [55:49] leading what inevitably would be called [55:52] a new occupation. [55:54] Now, not the West Bank, Gaza. 2 million [55:58] Palestinians, IDF soldiers in charge of [56:00] every aspect of their lives. They didn't [56:04] They didn't want that, and they and they [56:06] worked hard to avoid that sort of [56:09] situation. Um the option of invading [56:13] Gaza from the north and the south [56:16] is I think very appealing in hindsight, [56:18] especially cuz the invasion that we saw [56:20] starting at the top, working your way [56:22] down to the um the bottom, it was not [56:26] imaginative, you uh you might say. But [56:29] what we might not realize is that [56:32] you would have to ask, did the IDF have [56:35] the troops? Especially when it had to [56:37] leave so many on the northern front. Uh [56:39] worried about an escalation with [56:41] Hezbollah, which they were waiting for [56:43] and had to be ready for at any point [56:46] during these months. So that So [56:49] um that too would have involved greater [56:52] risks, and at the time caution really [56:55] was the order of the day. [56:58] Let me just bring in the Biden [56:59] administration here because what they [57:02] argue is that Israel should not do a [57:04] full ground invasion of Gaza at all. And [57:07] they sent top American generals to [57:10] Israel to make this case in detail to [57:14] Israel's war cabinet, arguing that [57:17] Israel could lose. Not just [57:19] strategically or in the PR sense, but it [57:21] could lose the battle on the ground for [57:25] northern Gaza. [57:26] Uh they could be walking into a death [57:28] trap precisely because Hamas had [57:30] prepared that territory for 15 plus [57:33] years, 400 miles of tunnels, and so [57:37] forth. And that Hamas could bleed the [57:39] IDF until it would have to withdraw. [57:42] Now, that's a serious argument, but what [57:44] did what was their alternative? They [57:46] said, "Air strikes and special forces [57:49] raids, and that will be enough." Would [57:52] it be enough to defeat Hamas, though? [57:54] Prime Minister Netanyahu at some point [57:56] had to say, [57:58] "But we've already tried that." Four [58:00] previous times in those four previous [58:02] Gaza wars, and that's what led Israel to [58:06] this point of uh uh of Oc- October 7th, [58:09] and of this immense threat from Hamas. [58:13] Uh and I would just say the final point [58:16] to consider here [58:18] uh [58:19] is that would were Israel to have left [58:23] troops in areas of Gaza and held those [58:26] areas and started building or not [58:28] started building, but just held those [58:30] areas of Gaza during the Biden [58:34] administration, [58:35] that would be called an occupation, and [58:38] that could lead, Israeli military [58:41] leaders believed, to a full cut off in [58:45] Biden administration support for the war [58:47] effort. So, those were the stakes. There [58:50] was no easy option. Of course, you leave [58:53] troops and you do everything else the [58:54] same. No, that could have changed [58:56] everything. [58:57] Um so, you have [58:59] uh [58:59] you have options here, and I think in [59:02] hindsight, we can say it wasn't that [59:04] necessarily that Israel went too far [59:07] with its aim in Gaza or its fight in [59:09] Gaza, but what really cost Israel [59:11] diplomatically was going on for so long. [59:14] And so if there was a faster way, that [59:17] probably would have been preferable. Um [59:20] but it came with very difficult risks [59:22] and trade-offs at the same time. [59:24] >> So you you Yona has has said that if he [59:28] were sitting in the war room with the [59:30] responsibility for the defense of the [59:32] state, [59:33] he [59:34] knowing what he knows now, okay, would [59:36] would have argued that in retrospect the [59:39] comprehensive invade all at once in [59:42] order to minimize the amount of time in [59:45] which this engagement took place would [59:47] have been the best option. Elliot, what [59:49] would you have said if you were there, [59:50] do you think? [59:51] >> I agree with him. You just have to [59:53] understand the risk that is being taken [59:55] on the northern front. The only area I [59:58] would differ is that I think [60:01] the world was turning on Israel's war [60:03] effort within 10 days, within 2 weeks, [60:05] and would have turned all the same. [60:08] Uh perhaps I'm more pessimistic on that [60:11] score, but I think it still would have [60:13] helped to have uh [60:15] to done this much more quickly. [60:17] >> One point that I just wanted to throw [60:19] out and again, we have all this [60:20] retrospective, you know, help that we [60:23] know it happened, but as you said, you [60:24] know, if we're being sort of students of [60:26] history, what could they do at the time? [60:29] I think the single biggest factor that [60:31] made a lot of these other strategies [60:32] that they didn't do like just not [60:34] doable, I think they just wouldn't have [60:35] done them, is the Israeli mentality [60:37] about hostages. And it's easy to forget [60:40] that now cuz the hostages have not been [60:41] part of the story for an entire year. [60:44] But for Israelis, [60:46] a majority of Israelis, the hostages [60:48] were the biggest issue. And if you want [60:49] to talk about statecraft, who had come [60:52] up with a plan for what to do if 250 of [60:55] your people are suddenly taken all at [60:57] once? Nobody had a plan for that. There [60:59] was no phil- philosophy, policy. People [61:02] had lots of plans in Israel for if one [61:04] hostage is taken, two hostages. Um [61:07] but 250 hostages all over a foreign [61:09] territory, nobody had a plan for that [61:11] and everybody was terrified that if they [61:13] went in too fast that Hamas would kill [61:15] hostages. And so, I think going in slow [61:19] and in stages was probably what was [61:21] going to happen because that factor was [61:23] so strong in [61:25] Israeli minds. [61:26] >> I want to now move us again ahead in [61:28] time to September 2024. [61:31] For 11 months, [61:34] fire and threat from Hezbollah have [61:36] displaced [61:37] tens of thousands, nearly 100,000 [61:40] Israelis from the cities and towns of [61:42] the north of Israel. [61:44] Um [61:45] the the war room knows that some 5,000 [61:49] booby-trapped pagers are in the hands of [61:52] Hezbollah operatives. And the question [61:54] is, do you go [61:57] and do you go with this mission? [61:59] And I want to hear from you guys what [62:02] the arguments were, what they knew at [62:03] the time, what the how they dimensioned [62:05] the risks at the time, and lead us [62:08] through the decision-making process. [62:11] >> So, it's around uh 5,000 booby-trapped [62:14] pagers and around 15,000 booby-trapped [62:17] walkie-talkies. [62:19] And it is an agonizing decision. Uh [62:22] Benny Gantz is pushing for the for [62:24] Israel to do it in June 2024, and he [62:27] might not have left the cabinet if [62:29] Netanyahu had agreed to do it in June. [62:31] Why does he want to do it in June? Cuz [62:33] the Israeli school year starts in [62:34] September, and he believes at that point [62:37] that they can do it fast enough that if [62:39] they start in June, they can send the [62:41] school uh school children in the north [62:43] back to school in September when the [62:45] school year starts. Um and Netanyahu [62:47] wants to completely finish Gaza, and [62:49] he's not confident yet about Lebanon, [62:52] and that's why I referred to August [62:54] 25th, 2024 is sort of a dress rehearsal [62:58] for a big war between um Israel and [63:00] Hezbollah. And when Israel sees that it [63:03] completely wipes out Hezbollah's attempt [63:06] to do a major attack on August 25th, [63:09] that's when they gain confidence. They [63:10] say, "Okay, we can do it." [63:12] And then the agonizing is there's a big [63:15] fight. Should they do it in September [63:17] 2024, or should they do it in October [63:19] 2024? And [63:22] the [63:23] Mossad wants to do it earlier. [63:27] Uh partially because there's concerns [63:29] about whether the beepers could be [63:32] revealed. The Mossad doesn't say that [63:34] they would have been revealed, but Iran [63:36] is looking carefully at the beepers for [63:38] Hezbollah, and that's of concern. The [63:40] IDF wants to wait until October 2024 to [63:43] sort of because the the the big thing [63:45] with the beepers isn't by the beepers by [63:47] themselves, it's the beepers plus a few [63:49] days later they dropped 1,300 bombs in [63:52] one day. [63:53] Um and so it's that combination. And so [63:56] the IDF says we I don't we don't know if [63:58] we can do if we can take advantage of [64:00] the beepers properly now. We maybe need [64:02] to wait until October. Everybody wants [64:04] to do it, but there really are a lot of [64:06] fights about this. Netanyahu ends up [64:07] going with the Mossad recommendation. [64:10] Um and to this day, uh again, the top [64:13] IDF and Mossad officials will debate in [64:15] quite a bit about this, you know, what [64:17] would have been, you know, the would it [64:18] could it have gone even better um in [64:20] October. It's hard to imagine that it [64:21] could have gone better because they [64:22] basically beat Hezbollah in a week and a [64:24] half. But those are some of the [64:25] considerations that everybody is [64:27] thinking about at the time. [64:28] >> And I think Yona's right to also look at [64:31] not just the beepers and that whole [64:33] saga, which we detail in the book. Uh [64:36] you can go back 10 years, you can go [64:37] back more than 10 years about how they [64:39] built this up, the front companies um [64:42] getting Hezbollah to pay for the [64:44] privilege of placing explosives, you [64:46] know, on its fighters. Uh [64:49] just uh tremendous intelligence work [64:51] there. But looking just past it, because [64:54] sure, you can you can do this tactic. [64:57] Um but if the next day Hezbollah rains [65:00] down 5,000, 6,000 rockets on Israel, [65:04] uh you don't look so clever. In fact, [65:07] you've you've, you know, initiated the [65:09] greatest harm on Israel [65:11] of anyone. [65:12] Um and so that and so those were the [65:15] stakes, really. [65:16] And it and it was precisely because [65:19] Prime Minister Netanyahu had gained the [65:22] confidence that Israel could preempt [65:24] Hezbollah's rockets, take them out in [65:27] the individual homes in which [65:30] in which they were stored. They would [65:31] actually take over Lebanese television [65:34] in order to get the civilians out from [65:38] those individual homes so that Israel [65:40] could strike the missiles stored within [65:43] them. And then when the pagers explode [65:47] and the walkie-talkies afterward and the [65:49] missiles are [65:51] are taken out, Hezbollah can barely [65:54] muster a response. That was the crucial [65:58] fact that I think clinched it and [66:00] clinched the success of what really [66:03] becomes a turning point of the whole [66:05] war. Uh you can then look just past that [66:09] to the assassination of Hassan [66:12] Nasrallah, um which [66:15] you would think surely doing something [66:16] like that, taking him out, uh [66:18] Hezbollah's legendary leader in a [66:20] targeted strike, that would set off uh [66:23] you know, the ultimate fight. And yet [66:25] even there Hezbollah could barely muster [66:28] a response. [66:30] The debate, as I mentioned, was about [66:32] informing the United States in advance. [66:35] You have a very complicated, contested [66:38] argument on this question. Um Israeli [66:42] defense leaders make the argument that [66:45] the the uh Biden administration is going [66:48] to want to help Israel with the [66:49] targeting because Nasrallah has so much [66:51] American blood on his hands, uh [66:54] responsible for the deaths of so many [66:56] American soldiers. [66:58] Uh [66:59] Prime Minister Netanyahu, in the end, [67:01] after this very difficult argument, um [67:05] uh says in the war room, "140% [67:10] they won't approve the US." [67:13] Uh he says that uh [67:16] senior Biden administration officials [67:18] will jump out of their skin if they hear [67:21] that Israel is going to do this. And [67:23] that's even after 10-11 months of [67:27] Hezbollah rocket fire on Israeli towns, [67:30] the Biden administration still didn't [67:32] want any Israeli escalation, uh didn't [67:36] want anything that could expand the war, [67:40] uh and believed that diplomacy had to be [67:43] given even more time to solve that [67:46] question. [67:47] >> Wars like this are a string [67:50] of hundreds and hundreds of discrete [67:53] decisions. We have only looked at a [67:55] couple of them. [67:56] Um for readers who want to to continue, [68:00] I I I I uh encourage and endorse and um [68:04] and I encourage people to to get this [68:06] book. [68:07] Um but if you would sort of take a step [68:09] back, Elliot, [68:11] and look overall, [68:13] who do you think bore up under the [68:15] pressure the best? Who do you think, [68:17] looking at the the different people that [68:19] you got to see up close, [68:22] was in the end had the most to teach as [68:25] a decision maker under this kind of [68:27] pressure? [68:28] >> It's a fantastic question. I'm not sure [68:30] I can give uh a one-name answer here. [68:35] But to me, I see so much of the story of [68:39] this war [68:40] uh [68:42] prime [68:43] being Prime Minister Netanyahu's [68:47] uh you would say progression, his [68:49] progress, [68:50] uh from real caution [68:53] in the days and weeks and even the [68:55] months after October 7th, [68:58] to then outlasting [69:00] his war room rivals in his determination [69:03] to keep the war going and make uh [69:08] really the the uh boldest and the [69:11] riskiest and ultimately the most [69:13] successful [69:15] decisions of the war in Lebanon in that [69:18] 12-day war in Iran in June 2025. [69:22] So, for the good and the bad, I would [69:25] look to Prime Minister Netanyahu and [69:28] study that. I mean, on the 12-day war in [69:31] Iran, for instance, to be able to [69:34] initiate that and have the confidence [69:37] precisely because he knew that Israel [69:40] was prepared for it and had been [69:43] preparing for it for not just for one [69:45] decade, for two decades, for this kind [69:47] of operation and then have this stunning [69:49] sequence of strikes one after another to [69:52] own the skies over Tehran. [69:56] And even know that that itself was not [69:59] enough. But they would have to be so [70:01] successful that they could then make the [70:04] case to the Trump White House that you [70:07] have a generational opportunity to leave [70:11] the Iranian nuclear program in rubble. [70:14] And that's exactly what Israel would end [70:16] up doing. As we recount in the book, [70:19] there's a tremendous, [70:21] uh, sort of final phone call briefing, [70:23] maybe, uh, between IDF Chief General [70:27] Zamir [70:28] and, um, J.D. Vance, in which Zamir [70:32] tells Vance not only do US planes have a [70:36] straight shot to the Iranian nuclear [70:39] site at Fordow now, [70:42] uh, a path cleared by Israel, and I [70:44] would actually be shown a map a day [70:46] before the US would join, a map of [70:49] Israeli strikes in Iran, [70:51] uh, which paved that path right to [70:56] Fordow. Not only that, but Israeli [70:59] planes are on top of the site right now, [71:04] and all they need [71:06] are these mega bunker buster bombs, [71:08] which only you have and only you can do. [71:11] So, don't miss this generational [71:13] opportunity. And then you would have [71:15] Vice President Vance [71:17] take that message to President Trump and [71:20] just a few hours later American bombers [71:24] take off for Operation Midnight Hammer. [71:28] And so, there are so many other [71:29] instances that we could [71:32] um [71:33] cover here. [71:35] Uh in Syria, I think there are [71:36] particularly fascinating decisions made, [71:41] both mistakes made that led to the [71:44] larger war with Iran going from a proxy [71:46] war to a direct war, and also taking [71:49] advantage of real opportunities. [71:52] Uh but, to see the good and the bad, I [71:55] think you focus in on the prime minister [71:58] and his [71:59] and his journey from that um [72:02] from a real sense of caution and a real [72:06] awareness of what Israel's limits were [72:08] to a flowering sense of just how much [72:11] Israel could accomplish militarily on [72:14] the different fronts. [72:15] >> In The War Room: The Inside Story of [72:17] Israel's Fight Against Hamas and the [72:19] Iranian Axis was published by Yossi [72:22] Jeremy Bob and Elliot Koffman. Elliot, [72:24] thank you for joining us. [72:26] >> Thank you so much. [72:27] >> Yossi, thank you for joining us. [72:28] >> Thank you.