Transcript [00:00] This was supposed to be a golden era [00:04] for the Haredi parties. That the [00:06] promises that they were able to make [00:08] their constituents 4 years ago were [00:12] very significant, very impressive [00:15] promises because this government is what [00:17] they call in Hebrew Yamin al-maleh, [00:20] meaning it's a entirely right-wing [00:24] government. There's nobody there that is [00:26] kind of anti-Haredi. There's nobody [00:28] there who is a natural [00:31] um rival or naturally hostile to the [00:34] Haredim. [00:36] And therefore, the expectation was that [00:39] these 4 years would be 4 years of [00:41] achievement, 4 years of of of [00:44] prosperity, you know, 4 years of of [00:46] doing politically the kinds of things [00:49] that before had been impossible or [00:51] exceedingly difficult to achieve. The [00:54] main achievement that was promised was [00:57] that we're going to sort out the draft [00:58] issue. [01:00] And of course, that has, you know, [01:01] crashed and burned. And And that turned [01:04] out to be disastrous. [01:06] >> [music] [01:13] >> As everyone listening to this discussion [01:15] knows, Israelis voted in national [01:17] elections this week. There have been [01:20] dozens of discussions about what they [01:22] portend and what they reveal about the [01:25] country and its future and the [01:26] inadequacy of polling and the person of [01:29] Benjamin Netanyahu and the political [01:32] identity of Israeli Arabs and much else. [01:34] The larger question of who will form the [01:36] next government remains unsettled. But [01:39] there's one conclusion that can be drawn [01:41] definitively from the election. And it [01:43] contains a kind of interesting political [01:45] puzzle. The Haredim of Israel have grown [01:47] and are growing in absolute terms and [01:50] also in terms relative to the rest of [01:52] the Israeli population. You would expect [01:55] that with each election, their political [01:57] power would grow as well. Well, despite [02:00] being for decades one of the most [02:02] durable and most significant forces in [02:05] Israeli politics, the Haredi parties [02:07] emerge from the October 2026 elections [02:10] significantly weakened. How did this [02:12] happen? And what does it reveal about [02:15] the state of Israel's most politically [02:17] interesting demographic? Welcome to the [02:19] Tikvah Podcast. I'm your host, Jonathan [02:22] Silver. [02:23] For our analysis of the Israeli [02:24] election, we're looking inside the [02:26] Haredi block with Rabbi Yehoshua [02:28] Pfeffer, who leads the Eyun Institute [02:30] and chairs the Rabbinic Committee of [02:32] Hatze Gol HaHaredi, one of the four new [02:35] Haredi parties that entered this race. [02:37] Readers of Mosaic will know his [02:39] important essay, Israel's Haredim [02:41] Confront the Burdens of Jewish [02:43] Self-Government, which makes the case [02:45] for his new parties coming into being. [02:47] In our conversation, he explains how the [02:50] Haredi parties went from the kingmakers [02:53] to fixed members of Netanyahu's [02:55] coalition, why Shas lost so much of its [02:58] traditional Mizrahi following to Likud, [03:01] and also to Otzma Yehudit, and why, at a [03:04] moment of such evident disillusionment, [03:07] none of the new parties, his own [03:08] included, were able to gather the votes [03:11] and come close to the threshold. This [03:13] conversation was recorded on October [03:15] 29th before the final results were [03:17] certified and before efforts to form a [03:19] new government have been officially [03:21] announced. If you enjoy this [03:22] conversation, you can discover more big [03:25] ideas and in-depth analysis on Judaism, [03:27] Israel, America, and the West at [03:29] tikvahideas.org. [03:31] Subscribe to access our full library of [03:34] podcasts, videos, and essays, and join a [03:36] growing community focused on Jewish life [03:39] and the glories of Western civilization. [03:41] You can subscribe to the Tikvah Podcast [03:43] on YouTube, Apple Podcast, or Spotify. I [03:46] hope you leave us a five-star review to [03:48] help us grow this community of ideas. I [03:50] welcome your feedback on this or any of [03:52] our other podcast episodes at [03:54] podcast@tikvah.org. [03:57] And of course, if you want to learn more [03:58] about our work at Tikvah, you can visit [04:00] our website, tikvah.org, and follow us [04:03] on Facebook and X. Here now is my [04:05] discussion with Rabbi Yehoshua Pfeffer. [04:09] Rabbi Yehoshua Pfeffer, welcome back to [04:10] the Tikvah Podcast. [04:12] >> Hello Don, good to be back. [04:14] >> So, we're speaking uh just a few days [04:16] after the Israeli election of October [04:19] 2026. [04:21] And I want to focus our conversation on [04:24] Haredi parties' performance, the way [04:27] that other constituencies in the Israeli [04:29] electorate regard Haredim, the question [04:32] of Haredi Israelis and [04:35] this election. [04:36] And I I think it makes sense maybe to [04:37] begin with the basics [04:39] for listeners who know some of these [04:41] names, but are not holding in some of [04:43] the finer distinctions. [04:46] Tell us about uh what should we know? [04:48] What is Shas and United Torah Judaism [04:52] UTJ? [04:53] And um of course UTJ is itself an [04:56] alliance of different factions. [04:58] How do those parts relate to each other? [05:00] Just maybe begin to set the table for [05:02] us. [05:04] >> Okay, so you UTJ is the [05:07] is the traditional [05:09] uh or legacy Ashkenazi [05:12] Haredi party that runs for the national [05:17] elections. I say national elections [05:18] because in municipal election, they [05:20] divide it into two parties. One is Degel [05:22] HaTorah, one is Agudat Yisrael or Agudas [05:25] Yisrael. Agudah is the more Hasidic [05:28] party and Degel is the more Misnagged or [05:32] Litvish. These are different [05:33] orientations within Ashkenazi Judaism. [05:37] I say broadly because there is some [05:39] overlap. There's some Hasidim that go [05:41] with Degel HaTorah. [05:43] I don't know of anything quite vice [05:44] versa, but those are two that come [05:46] together in this joint slate, which is [05:49] called United Torah Judaism for the [05:51] national elections. [05:53] While Shas is a party that represents [05:55] the Sephardi or the Eastern Haredi block [05:59] and that was founded actually under the [06:02] auspices of Rabbi Shach, the [06:04] mythological Haredi leader, both [06:07] rabbinic leader and political leader for [06:09] about 30 years at the end of the 20th [06:12] century. He founded Degel HaTorah, [06:14] meaning he founded this [06:16] Ashkenazi party, which was a breakaway [06:19] from the Agudat Yisrael that represented [06:22] everybody, all the Ashkenazim before. [06:24] And then afterwards, he was instructive [06:27] at the very least in founding Shas. Shas [06:30] was founded under the leadership of [06:33] Rabbi Ovadia Yosef. Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, [06:35] also mythological rabbinic Sephardi [06:38] leader, [06:39] um whose mission was leha'azir atarah [06:42] leyoshnah, meaning to restore the glory [06:45] of old with regard to Sephardi Jews, to [06:49] give them confidence, to give them [06:51] status, to give them a place in which [06:53] they could feel comfortable with their [06:55] own tradition, and they could be on the [06:57] one hand Haredi on a certain level, [07:00] whatever it means to be Haredi, we can [07:01] discuss that later, but on the other, to [07:05] preserve, to preserve their own [07:06] tradition, to not feel that in order to [07:08] be this kind of um [07:11] high-level uh a high-level devotee to [07:15] Judaism, to Torah study, to devotion, to [07:19] high levels in performance of halakha, [07:22] you have to buy into the Ashkenazi [07:24] model. No, you can do that and be [07:25] Sephardi also. [07:27] And the political party that represented [07:30] that restoration project is Shas. So, [07:34] those are the two main parties in the [07:37] general election, Shas on the one hand [07:40] and United Torah Judaism on the other. [07:42] >> Okay, I I don't want to yet get into the [07:45] performance in this last election of the [07:47] parties, but I do want to ask about the [07:50] campaign messages this time around. What [07:53] was UTJ uh the platform occupied with? [07:58] What was Shas promising its voters? If [08:01] you were to read their campaign [08:03] literature, [08:04] what What this election about? [08:07] >> So, UTJ [08:09] in that in their election campaign [08:13] was I would say very focused [08:16] on the right. Their slogan was "Hazchut [08:20] Liot Charedi", the right to be Charedi. [08:23] And that tells you a lot. It's a very, I [08:26] would say, identity oriented campaign [08:29] rather than a policy oriented campaign. [08:33] They almost didn't speak about policy at [08:36] all. In fact, I don't remember any [08:38] policy driven element of their campaign. [08:41] It was all about how we are currently in [08:44] a state and a condition of persecution, [08:47] meaning we are being threatened, our [08:49] right to live as Charedi Jews is being [08:52] threatened, is being undermined by [08:55] Israel's government, by the Supreme [08:57] Court, by the Attorney General, by [08:58] different branches of Israel, by the [09:01] army and so on, by the arrests of [09:03] yeshiva students, everything that's been [09:05] going on over the last few months or [09:08] even couple of years. [09:10] And that became the almost exclusive [09:13] focus of the campaign. We have the right [09:17] to be Charedim and we have to stand up [09:19] for that right. And the way to stand up [09:21] for that right is to give you a vote to [09:23] United Torah Judaism. That was very much [09:26] the focus of the UTJ campaign while [09:31] the Shas campaign was much more varied. [09:34] In fact, a lot of the Shas campaign [09:37] was actually targeted, I would say, at [09:40] the softer Charedim, those who do [09:44] appreciate um soldiers serving in the in [09:47] the IDF, those who do appreciate the [09:50] kind of more traditional Sephardi [09:53] posture, which is a a softer one, a more [09:55] graduated one, one that enables or that [09:59] um empowers a spectrum. You have a [10:02] family, and this is so true of so many [10:05] of the Sephardi families. Yeah, you have [10:07] a family that's, you know, a very [10:09] upstanding Sephardi family. You'll have [10:11] one brother who's in the army, you'll [10:13] have another brother who's at work, [10:14] you'll have another brother who's a [10:15] tourist guide. You have this spectrum. [10:17] It's very common, it's very prominent. [10:19] And a lot of the campaign of Shas [10:22] was targeting, I would say, that kind of [10:25] mindset, that kind of mold of a diverse [10:29] Sephardi family, and to say that Shas is [10:32] a home for all of you. Every one of the [10:35] family members can find its his his or [10:38] her home within the Shas political [10:41] entity. [10:41] >> One of the most famous video campaign [10:44] messages this time around was a Shas ad [10:48] of a [10:49] a Mizrahi family [10:51] um about to sit down at the Shabbat [10:54] dinner table waiting for [snorts] one of [10:55] their sons to come home from the army. [10:58] An an illustration of of that very [11:00] thing. I believe that that ad was [11:02] ordered to be taken down. [11:04] >> It it might have been because you're not [11:06] allowed to make use of active military [11:11] soldiers in [11:13] your campaign messaging. So, it might [11:15] have been I remember there was a [11:16] petition, I don't remember what the [11:17] final conclusion was. But, that is a [11:19] very, I would say, representative ad [11:22] that Shas put out. I I have to say [11:25] from what I saw, I was very impressed by [11:28] the Shas advertising, by their videos. [11:31] They they were good, they were they were [11:33] clean, they were they were the messages [11:35] were, I would say, on the mark for what [11:37] they wanted. I was impressed by their [11:39] campaign. [11:40] >> All right. So, let me just ask one more [11:42] historical context question before we [11:44] enter into the results of what happened [11:46] earlier this week. [11:48] But, um I do reflect that in the history [11:51] of Haredi politics, the Haredi parties [11:54] were traditionally pivot parties or [11:57] swing parties. They were not necessarily [11:59] right-wing parties. Meaning, I I recall [12:02] that Shas [12:04] I recall that Shas sat in Rabin's [12:06] government at one point. And the [12:09] question and but but now, I think the [12:11] context of this election and for the [12:13] past you know, past period of time has [12:16] been just understood that that the [12:18] Haredi parties are part of the [12:19] right-wing block, part of Netanyahu's [12:21] block in some sense. [12:24] And I want to just ask you know, in in [12:26] some sense, the where is Haredim have [12:29] grown as a share of the electorate? [12:31] Have the parties retained the kind of [12:34] political power they had when they [12:36] really were [12:37] uh [12:38] when each side had to bargain with them [12:40] in order to try to pull them over to [12:42] their coalition? [12:44] >> Yeah, so so you're you're raising a a [12:45] valid and a very interesting point. Uh [12:47] Haredi parties used to be what you call [12:50] the tipping point [12:52] of coalitions. And in a certain sense, [12:55] they became the kingmakers. They were [12:57] able to enthrone whichever individual or [13:00] whichever party was trying to form a [13:03] coalition, well, they would be the ones [13:06] that you have to bargain for in order to [13:07] bring them on board to create a [13:09] coalition. And that was true [13:12] especially when we were speaking about [13:15] large parties. You know, like two large [13:17] parties the way Israel used to be was, [13:19] you know, two large dominant parties. [13:21] Whether one of them was, let's say, [13:23] Likud and the other one was Labor, and [13:25] they went through different names. There [13:27] were times when when those two were were [13:29] called by other other names and kind of [13:31] went two different parties or different [13:33] leaders, but they were still large [13:35] parties, and then they could form a [13:36] coalition together with the the Haredi [13:39] additions. I would say that in in the [13:42] last decade or decade and a half, that's [13:46] no longer the case, mainly because of [13:48] Netanyahu. Meaning, Netanyahu was able [13:51] to give the Haredi parties this uh bear [13:55] hug, if you want, and to bring them into [13:59] the right-wing block, so that they [14:02] became an integral part of the right. [14:05] And that's for a a number of reasons. [14:07] One of the reasons is the shift in the [14:09] Haredi population. [14:11] Haredi population didn't used to be [14:13] identified from an ideological [14:16] perspective with the right or with the [14:18] left. Very often, the Haredi rabbinic [14:21] leadership and certainly the political [14:24] leadership would say, "We're not right [14:26] or left. We follow our rabbinic [14:29] instruction and we don't have anything [14:31] else to do with Israeli politics other [14:33] than to follow the rabbinic instruction [14:34] and [14:36] overall, broadly speaking, to ensure [14:38] that we get whatever resources, whatever [14:41] allocations, whatever funding we need to [14:44] achieve for our internal needs. But, [14:46] otherwise, we're not right or left. We [14:48] don't get involved in those kind of [14:50] political struggles or issues over [14:52] what's going on in Israel." [14:54] Over time, that has shifted concerning [14:56] the meaning with with regard to the [14:58] Haredi electorate, the population [15:01] itself. The Haredi demographic has [15:03] become very much identified with the [15:05] right, not just [15:08] the way of Shach said at the beginning, [15:10] "We go with the right because the right [15:12] is more traditional or more respectful [15:14] of halakha or rabbis or tradition as [15:17] opposed to the left, which is, let's [15:18] say, [15:20] more free-thinking and more disdainful [15:23] towards tradition. Today, there's a much [15:26] stronger ideological identification, [15:28] affiliation with the right and with [15:31] right-wing ideas. And that's one reason [15:35] why this [15:36] um why this partnership of the Haredi [15:40] parties with the right has become much [15:42] more embedded, um much much much harder [15:45] uh to break. The The other reason is [15:47] because [15:48] the [15:49] parties or the way that coalitions are [15:51] formed have become much more, you know, [15:53] there's there are many more small [15:54] parties. [15:55] You know, [15:56] um [15:57] the Haredi parties are small parties, [15:59] but there are many others. [16:01] And therefore, to create this jigsaw [16:03] puzzle [16:04] in which you have to be able to form a [16:06] coalition meant that there there would [16:08] be a stronger there would there would be [16:10] this less of a potential to be the the [16:12] kingmakers and more of, "Well, how do we [16:15] we together this jigsaw puzzle to ensure [16:17] that somebody's going to, you know, be [16:19] able to have a a block and that created [16:22] us the stronger kind of a technical [16:25] affiliation of the Haredim with the [16:27] right. You know, in today's election [16:29] results like the equivalent for [16:31] kingmakers would be the Arab parties [16:34] that received, we don't know exactly, [16:36] but 18 or 19 seats and of course they [16:39] would in theory go into this place of [16:42] being the kingmakers except that there [16:43] are other issues that might prevent or [16:46] perhaps ought to prevent the Arab [16:48] parties from filling that position. But [16:50] the Haredim are no longer in that [16:52] position. There are [16:54] however, I would say wistful or [16:57] nostalgic um thoughts about going back [17:00] there especially from uh UTJ. United [17:04] Torah Judaism [17:06] is definitely projecting, I would say [17:09] right now, a a a voice [17:12] that says we could be the ones that [17:16] helps the left-wing coalition [17:19] center-left um of Eisenkot and his [17:21] friends to form [17:24] uh uh a coalition of of to get over the [17:26] 60 or 61 uh seats that you need to have. [17:30] Uh I don't think that's realistic, but [17:31] there are voices that are trying to [17:33] express that. [17:34] >> Many of Israel's critics see it as [17:36] nothing more than the perpetrator of the [17:37] most monstrous crimes of the age and [17:40] many of Israel's friends carry a [17:42] comforting picture of the country, the [17:44] one that they learned about as children [17:46] or came to know in earlier decades. [17:48] But both make it hard to see the place [17:50] as it actually is. [17:52] At Tikvah Ideas, we produce podcasts, [17:54] videos, and essays about Israeli [17:56] society, Israeli culture, and Israeli [17:59] politics. We try to shed light on the [18:01] reality of Israel today, a country far [18:04] more interesting than the most popular [18:06] caricatures. [18:08] Now, I want to invite you to download a [18:10] new ebook free of cost to Tikvah's [18:12] YouTube community. It collects six of [18:15] our best essays on Israel, the founding [18:17] of the state, the diverse tribes and [18:19] ethnicities that make up Israeli [18:21] society, the meaning of military [18:23] service, and of course Israel's conflict [18:25] with the Palestinians. Israel is one of [18:28] the great political, religious, and [18:30] civilizational stories of the modern [18:32] age. [18:33] To get your copy, visit [18:35] tikvaideas.com/israelbook. [18:38] That's tikvaideas.com/israelbook, [18:41] or click the link in the show notes [18:43] below. [18:45] >> Right, except the the [18:47] one of the organizing [18:50] ideological goals of the left-wing [18:52] coalition is to undermine the very [18:56] promise that UTJ makes to its its uh [18:59] constituents. [19:00] So so um [19:03] if they were to join the government, one [19:05] of the conditions for joining a [19:06] left-wing block must be uh conscription. [19:11] Can [19:11] So So explain how how UTJ thinks through [19:14] that puzzle. [19:16] >> Because UTJ make the assumption [19:18] Again, it's not the whole of UTJ. It's [19:21] voices within UTJ that are making the [19:24] assumption [19:25] that for this left-wing coalition, the [19:28] primary objective is to replace [19:30] Netanyahu. [19:32] And to achieve that primary objective [19:36] any price [19:37] that they'll pay to the Haredi parties [19:40] in terms of conscription, in terms of uh [19:43] the the investment into the IDF will be [19:46] worth it, and will also be a good sell [19:49] to their constituents. So [19:51] that's the underlying assumption, that [19:55] uh it's not Bibi is going to be [19:57] sufficient [19:58] to give that exemption. Now, I I would [20:02] add to that and say that I think there [20:04] is more space for this actually on the [20:06] left than there is [20:07] on the right, because there are many on [20:09] the left that are actually afraid, at [20:12] the very least reticent, reluctant to [20:15] think about the entry on mass of Haredim [20:19] into the IDF. [20:20] The entry of Haredim into the IDF will [20:23] change on some level the character of [20:26] the IDF. If the Haredim get their act [20:28] together and actually go into the army [20:31] in whichever units, accommodations, you [20:34] know, food, davening, whatever you need, [20:37] you know, male only units, that will by [20:40] definition [20:41] >> of command and and who can be an officer [20:43] in command which troops? [20:44] >> Correct. That will by definition [20:47] create a tension with a lot of the I [20:50] would say left- leaning agendas that [20:53] have been prominent in the IDF for a [20:55] number of decades. And the left of [20:58] Israel, the secular left of Israel, is [21:00] afraid of that or at the very least [21:03] is in tension. On the one hand, we need [21:05] the Haredim in the IDF. On the other [21:06] hand, we're afraid of what this might do [21:08] to the IDF. We have enough trouble, [21:10] again, if I'm speaking from a secular [21:11] left perspective, we have enough trouble [21:13] with the religious Zionist soldiers [21:15] while working their way up the chain of [21:16] command in the IDF. And there's davening [21:19] and there's all kinds of things that are [21:20] going on in the army and there's [21:22] objection to female [21:24] soldiers in units that will become mixed [21:27] units, but there are observant and and [21:30] Orthodox uh soldiers there and therefore [21:32] that's an affront and there's a lot of [21:33] tension over these issues. [21:35] The last thing we need is the entry of [21:37] thousands of Haredi soldiers that will [21:39] just exacerbate that issue. So, there's [21:42] perhaps more [21:43] of a possibility to get concessions on [21:48] the issue of conscription from the left [21:51] than there are from the right. The [21:53] right, which is more, let's say, the [21:54] religious Zionist space, that's say, [21:56] "Hey guys, we need you. You know, we're [21:58] doing this alone. We need you as a [22:00] Haredi. We're brothers. We We We should [22:02] be brothers in arms as well as brothers [22:04] in in in religion and in in devotion to [22:06] to Hashem, to God." And therefore [22:09] there's there's perhaps less that the [22:11] Haredim will be able to get from a [22:13] right-wing coalition in this space than [22:16] they can get from the left. That's part [22:18] of the thinking perhaps that's going on. [22:20] >> Okay, so tachlis, how do the two parties [22:23] the two main parties do? We'll come to [22:25] to I I do want to spend some time in a [22:28] in a few minutes talking about Hadassah [22:30] Haredi, the new party which you've had a [22:33] role in inspiring and galvanizing and [22:36] shaping. But but it staying with the two [22:39] main parties of Haredi politics, [22:41] how did they do this week? [22:44] >> Um so what we'll find out we we're still [22:47] before the final result. They should be [22:49] out like now or coming out soon with all [22:51] the army votes. I haven't seen the [22:53] latest. [22:54] But overall what we can say is that Shas [22:58] had something of a crash, meaning Shas [23:00] descended [23:02] from 11 seats [23:04] to seven or perhaps even six [23:07] seats. And that is a a massive [23:10] decline. So Shas did not do well [23:13] at all. While UTJ [23:16] I would say maintained their power more [23:19] or less. They didn't get quite as many [23:21] votes as they did last time and not [23:23] getting as much as last time is a [23:24] decline because the population has grown [23:27] significantly. You know, it's 4 years [23:30] and every cohort of Haredim that become [23:33] 18 is approximately 30,000 men and [23:36] women, young men and women. So in 4 [23:38] years it's another 120,000. You'd expect [23:42] there to be a a significant increase [23:45] in the number of votes and and it it did [23:47] not increase. It stayed more or less the [23:49] same. And in terms of [23:50] >> We'll just pause pause right there Rabbi [23:52] Fefer for a minute cuz this is so so [23:54] important for listeners to understand. [23:56] The number of natural constituents [24:00] who who just in tribal terms [24:03] you might think would have voted for [24:05] each of these two main Haredi parties [24:08] has expanded and expanded and expanded. [24:11] And the share of votes that they are [24:13] able to receive has either declined or [24:16] stayed steady. [24:18] >> Yes, that that would more or less be the [24:19] case. Yes, it's and I I should emphasize [24:23] the expansion is both in terms of [24:25] absolute numbers, right? How many people [24:28] there are, and also in terms of the [24:30] share of the population, right, every [24:33] year the share, the Haredi share of [24:35] Israel's population also increases [24:37] because the Haredi birth rate is [24:39] significantly higher than the non-Haredi [24:42] birth rate in Israel. And nevertheless, [24:45] we have not seen a parallel increase in [24:48] the numbers of votes or in the numbers [24:50] of seats. At the same time, it hasn't [24:52] been the kind of decline that we've seen [24:54] for Shas in in UTJ. UTJ, I think the [24:57] projection the last time I saw was to [24:59] get seven seats. At one stage they had [25:02] eight even, but I think it's gone down [25:03] to seven, and I imagine that's where it [25:05] will end. And that means that they'll [25:07] retain the number of seats they had last [25:10] time. Last time they had seven [25:12] or the time before it was seven, and [25:13] before that it was seven. They've been [25:15] on on a stable seven for several [25:18] election cycles. The one thing you can [25:19] say about UTJ is that it has good [25:22] stability. By contrast, Shas is always a [25:26] bit of a roller coaster, but they've [25:27] never been this low. [25:29] I don't I don't remember them being this [25:30] low ever, and I don't think they've ever [25:32] been beneath UTJ. That's remarkable, and [25:37] I heard today, [25:38] again, I I I didn't follow this up, but [25:40] somebody mentioned to me that there was [25:43] talk of Aryeh Deri contemplating [25:46] resignation. [25:47] This is dramatic for Shas. This is not [25:50] >> is the storied leader of Shas, you know, [25:53] for for a long time. [25:55] It's an It's impossible to imagine Shas [25:57] without him. I mean, this is [25:58] >> It is from inception. From inception [26:00] Aryeh Deri at the time he was a young [26:03] man, [26:04] remarkably talented, you know, a [26:06] politician par excellence, and nobody [26:09] would deny that. [26:11] Um and and also a very bright, a very [26:13] brilliant individual, brilliant [26:14] strategist. And he has led Shas almost [26:17] continuously. [26:19] Yeah, he did some time [26:21] um when when he was he was in prison for [26:23] a short time, was unable to lead Shas. [26:25] Um and there was some power struggles [26:27] between himself and a political rival [26:30] for Shas, Eli Yishai, but he won that. [26:33] He won that struggle and he's been the [26:35] undisputed leader [26:37] politically of Shas for for since [26:39] inception, meaning for a good, three [26:42] decades. So, this is this is very much a [26:46] uh [26:47] I would say an earthquake in terms of of [26:49] Shas and and we'll see we'll see where [26:52] where where that ends and and indeed [26:55] where where that would lead them. It [26:56] does mean that the that the power the [26:58] combined power [27:00] of the Haredi parties has declined [27:03] significantly you know, from 18 seats [27:07] the last time round to something like [27:09] 13, 12 or 13 seats this time round, [27:12] which is obviously a a significant [27:14] decline altogether in the combined power [27:16] of these Haredi parties. [27:18] >> So, do you have a theory about what [27:20] explains this performance? Was it the [27:23] leaders, the campaign, something deeper? [27:26] >> It has to be said that the last [27:28] 4 years have been a very turbulent time. [27:33] Turbulent for Israel, of course, but [27:35] especially turbulent for the Haredi [27:37] parties. [27:38] This was supposed to be a golden era [27:43] for the Haredi parties. The the promises [27:46] that they were able to make their [27:47] constituents 4 years ago were [27:50] very significant, very impressive [27:53] promises because this government is what [27:56] they call in Hebrew Yamin Al Maleh, [27:59] meaning it's a entirely right-wing [28:02] government. There's nobody there that is [28:05] kind of anti-Haredi. There's nobody [28:07] there who is a natural [28:10] um rival or naturally hostile [28:13] to the Haredim. [28:14] And therefore, the expectation was that [28:17] these 4 years would be 4 years of [28:20] achievement, 4 years of of of [28:23] prosperity, you know, 4 years of of [28:25] doing politically the kinds of things [28:28] that before had been impossible or [28:30] exceedingly difficult to achieve. The [28:33] main achievement that was promised was [28:36] that we're going to sort out the draft [28:37] issue. [28:39] And of course, that has, you know, [28:40] crashed and burned. And and that turned [28:43] out to be disastrous. And because of the [28:46] the [28:47] And again, I I don't think it's fair to [28:49] place all of the blame on the Haredi [28:52] political parties or political [28:56] representatives. Of course, they they [28:58] had objective difficulties. [29:01] There was a war. [29:02] And there was the issue of the Supreme [29:04] Court and the Attorney General and the [29:06] spirit, meaning the the atmosphere that [29:08] they had to work with [29:09] within [29:10] government and within Israel. It's not [29:12] like they didn't have challenges. But [29:13] the bottom line, you know, excuses [29:16] aside, was that this was a colossal [29:18] failure. It was a colossal failure to [29:21] protect Torah students, which they say [29:24] explicitly, our main effort in [29:27] government, the main purpose of why [29:28] we're here is to protect Torah students, [29:30] to allow them the privilege of of of [29:33] being in Yeshiva, of learning full-time. [29:36] That's what we care about more than [29:37] anything else. And in that there was a a [29:40] a very profound [29:42] failure to the degree that we reached [29:45] unprecedented [29:47] events of of of arresting Yeshiva boys, [29:50] which has never happened before in the [29:52] annals and history of the state of [29:54] Israel. And the Haredi politics was was [29:57] unable [29:58] to fend that off or to reach any kind of [30:02] of of real achievement. They had, you [30:04] know, on paper, they were able to pass a [30:06] law, you know, a basic law of Torah [30:08] study. [30:09] But that's good on paper. [30:11] In the field, on the ground, it didn't [30:13] have any impact. And therefore, there's [30:16] a lot of resentment, disappointment, [30:18] disillusionment concerning the Haredi [30:21] parties. And it's not just because of [30:24] the the draft issue. There's a lot that [30:26] was affected by the draft issue, whether [30:29] it's funding for the Yeshivas, whether [30:31] it's the payment for daycare, the kind [30:34] of subsidies that that Haredi young [30:36] families would get for their child care [30:39] and and so on. All kinds of other issues [30:41] that were also deeply affected. [30:44] And because of that, there's just a lot [30:46] of disillusionment. [30:48] Together with that, [30:50] there's also been a lot of [30:54] just kind of infighting within these [30:56] parties. [30:58] Now, in the past, you know, before the [31:00] internet age, before the digital media, [31:03] these kinds of internal struggles would [31:06] be hidden from the camera. They'd be [31:09] hidden from the public. All we would [31:12] know about is what's published in the [31:14] official newspaper of these parties, [31:17] whether it's Yated Ne'eman for Degel [31:19] HaTorah, Hamodia for Agudah, and so on. [31:22] And and that's how we would get our [31:24] information. But today, because of this [31:27] this this [31:28] I wouldn't just call it freedom, but [31:30] this this [31:32] intense [31:33] um [31:34] and constant feed of information, and [31:37] often from what's going on behind the [31:39] scenes, not just what we what we're fed, [31:42] but what's going on behind. [31:44] So, a lot of these internal struggles [31:46] become popular knowledge, and they're [31:48] very unseemly. They they don't they [31:50] don't [31:51] unfortunately, they they they don't do [31:53] good for the for the dignity, for the [31:55] honor, not of the rabbinic leaders, not [31:58] of the party mechanisms and machinery, [32:01] not for the representatives themselves. [32:04] So, in in Shas, we had this ugly spat. [32:08] It's much more than a spat, a real [32:09] struggle between Rabbi Yitzhak Yosef and [32:13] Aryeh Deri, and some of the other rabbis [32:15] that got involved, and it just became [32:17] very [32:18] very ugly, very unseemly. It didn't do [32:20] any good for the for the you know, the [32:22] the the representation, the image, [32:25] right, of the party, of the relationship [32:27] with the rabbis. [32:28] And even in UTJ, we had recently this [32:30] firing, if you were [32:32] following that, of two of the most [32:34] senior [32:35] Knesset members, [32:37] both Moshe Gafni [32:39] and a slightly less senior but still [32:43] impressive and and much loved Knesset [32:45] member called Machlev Uri Machlev. And [32:48] this was done in a [32:49] in a manner that was undignified and [32:53] and and harsh. One rabbi uh [32:57] I would say a impressive rabbinic figure [33:00] told me that how how sad it is that [33:03] Ahmed Tibi [33:05] of the [33:07] um [33:08] Arab parties in in the Knesset mentioned [33:11] you know, as a as a kind of remark he [33:15] said, you know, we would never treat our [33:17] Knesset members like that. He said they [33:19] got rid of them like dogs. Like we [33:20] that's inappropriate. You don't treat [33:22] your Knesset members like that. And he [33:24] said how shocking that we need to take [33:27] mussar, we need to take, you know, [33:29] rebuke about the values and the way we [33:31] realize them from Ahmed Tibi. So, [33:34] I'm just giving these as examples that [33:36] there are other episodes of friction and [33:40] the the the intervention of all kinds of [33:44] what we call askanim [33:46] meaning the kind of [33:47] I mean, maybe in in America we'd call [33:49] this lobbyists, but it's not exactly [33:51] lobbyists. It's people who are deeply on [33:53] the inside. Sometimes it's people in the [33:55] in the in the court of these rabbis who [33:58] do a lot of um intervening and [34:03] you know, who who makes the [34:04] appointments, who gets to set the the [34:07] boundaries or set the rules and [34:09] it's a very messy business. [34:11] And so, I think that was also part of [34:13] the the the the decline in the power [34:17] specifically of of Shas, of course, [34:19] but also the the the the lessened appeal [34:23] of UTJ in in the eyes of many voters. [34:26] >> So, let's let let's drill into Shas in [34:28] particular, Rabbi Feffer. Where did the [34:30] Shas voters go? [34:32] Not only the ones who had previously [34:34] supported Shas, but the ones that you [34:35] might expect given the population [34:38] increase that we've been discussing. [34:40] I I've read that that some senior Shas [34:43] officials have speculated that they lost [34:46] voters to not only to UTJ in some cases [34:50] on the one side, but to Otzma Yehudit on [34:52] the other to to Ben-Gvir's party. [34:55] Um [34:57] that and and and I'm sure that there's [34:59] some that were lost to Likud as well. [35:01] To me [35:03] to to to me that suggests that there is [35:04] a question of [35:06] the the extent to which Haredi voters [35:09] who otherwise might have supported Shas [35:11] are being normalized into Israeli [35:13] politics [35:14] and the other issues that they care [35:16] about as pull factors and the uh the uh [35:20] inadequacies of the performance of Shas [35:23] in the last couple of years as push [35:26] factors suggest that there could be a [35:28] normalization happening. [35:31] >> Yes, so two points on that. First of [35:33] all, this is not something new from this [35:35] election cycle, meaning [35:37] we see that over the last couple of [35:39] decades [35:40] generally speaking, the share, the [35:42] election the share of seats that the [35:44] Haredi parties are getting has not grown [35:47] in proportion to their growth as a [35:50] proportion of Israel's demographic of [35:52] Israel's population. Meaning you would [35:54] have expected, let's say, now Shas is a [35:56] little bit more erratic a little bit [35:58] more volatile, but think UTJ, which is [36:00] the stable. So, over the last few [36:03] election cycles, they've had six and [36:05] then eight and then just sevens. Seven [36:08] seven seven seven and now also it seems [36:10] that they're going to get seven seats. [36:12] And and the question is, so where are [36:14] all of those new voters? Where are all [36:17] the surplus voters, right? Every few [36:19] years we have another, you know, 50 [36:21] 100,000 voters coming in, potential [36:25] voters. I mean, [36:26] maybe that's a [36:27] Again, I'm I'm not being precise with [36:30] with the numbers, but but obviously [36:32] there's a growth [36:34] in the numbers of voters and also in the [36:35] share in the electorate. So, where are [36:38] those voters going? And the answer is [36:40] they're going to other parties. They're [36:42] going to [36:43] um you you mentioned Ben-Gvir or Otzma [36:46] Yehudit and and and they could I I would [36:48] hazard that a lot of those voters also [36:51] go to Smotrich, to the Religious Zionist [36:55] party [36:56] alongside Otzma Yehudit. Yes, Ben-Gvir [36:59] does have appeal [37:01] with Haredi voters and and some go to [37:03] other parties, I'm sure. [37:05] This is not something that we have good [37:07] research on to really know exactly where [37:09] those voters are going. I would assume [37:10] most of them are on the right, but some [37:13] not. And and so that phenomenon [37:16] of Haredim voting outside of the [37:18] traditional Haredi parties is not a new [37:20] one from the 2026 elections. That's been [37:23] around for you know for for years. [37:27] I I would say that in the case of Shas, [37:30] we have to remember that Shas voters are [37:32] not only what we would call Haredim. [37:35] Shas voters include the appeal of Shas [37:38] traditionally has gone beyond the [37:40] boundaries of Haredi society to include [37:43] a lot of traditional or religious [37:46] families, Sefardi families. [37:48] >> It's what you're saying before that [37:49] there's a a Shas family sitting at a [37:51] table and one of the sons is a Torah [37:53] student and one of the sons is working [37:55] and one of the sons is serving in the [37:57] military. [37:57] >> That's right. And those and those sons [37:59] grow up and then they establish their [38:00] own families in different styles and [38:02] some of them might send to Religious [38:04] Zionist education, some of them will [38:06] send to Haredi education, some will send [38:08] to the Shas education, but they're not [38:11] you know, if you see them on the street, [38:12] you wouldn't say, "Wow, that's a Haredi [38:14] guy." He's a traditional guy, of course, [38:16] he's a observant on on on on the [38:19] spectrum, you know, on on different [38:20] levels. And and still they felt that [38:22] Shas was a a home. They felt that Shas [38:26] was giving the the the due respect, was [38:30] raising the stature [38:33] of the Sefardi families, of Sefardim in [38:36] Israel generally, and therefore they [38:37] felt pulled to vote for Shas. In the [38:40] heyday of Shas, towards the end of the [38:43] of the 20th century, 1999, I think Shas [38:46] got 19 seats or something. And [38:48] obviously, those 19 seats were not from [38:50] Haredim. [38:51] You know, that we don't have, you know, [38:53] in the Haredi space, we don't have that [38:54] many people. Uh certainly not in 1999. [38:57] Rather, they were able to attract a much [39:00] broader reach among the kind of Sephardi [39:02] traditional [39:04] uh electorate. [39:05] And therefore, [39:07] part of the decline, not all of it, but [39:09] part of the decline would will certainly [39:12] have come from that wing of Shas, from [39:15] the more traditional rather than [39:17] strongly Haredi families. And they say, [39:20] "Well, the kind of the new Shas, not the [39:22] Rabbi Ovadia Yosef Shas, but rather the [39:25] Shas of his son, Rabbi Yitzhak Yosef, [39:28] is a much more narrow [39:30] party. It It caters for the Haredi [39:34] sector alone, and it doesn't have that [39:36] breadth of mind. It doesn't have that [39:39] inclusivity. It doesn't speak that [39:41] language. Smotrich is really Rabbi [39:43] Ovadia Yosef was very supportive, [39:45] always, of army of army service of boys [39:49] serving in the IDF. While his son, Rabbi [39:52] Yitzhak Yosef, is much more fire and [39:55] brimstone against the army. He has said [39:57] that nobody must go to the army, even [39:59] boys who are not learning at all mustn't [40:01] go into the army, and so on. And of [40:03] course, that does not [40:05] uh [40:07] That That That goes against the grain or [40:09] against the moral fiber of a lot of [40:11] these less Haredi in the narrow sense, [40:14] the more traditional families. And And [40:16] they And they would have left Shas for [40:19] uh [40:20] among other reasons, for that reason. [40:22] And then, yes, where did they go? They [40:24] would go to Bengvir. They would go to [40:25] Likud. Right? Likud, you know, certainly [40:28] some of the uh Likud gains in this [40:31] election were from Shas, right? Shas [40:34] went down five seats. [40:35] So, [40:37] four or five seats, but I think five, [40:39] I'm not sure. [40:40] Um so, some of those seats would would [40:42] would certainly have gone to Likud. Uh [40:44] and others were spread in somewhere in [40:46] the right-wing bloc. This didn't make [40:48] the bloc. The right wing block didn't [40:49] grow because of this. [40:51] It's internal migration within the the [40:54] Gush Emunim, within the right wing [40:56] block. Uh but, you know, I don't think [40:58] any of those voters would have gone over [40:59] to the to to a left wing block, but I [41:01] think, you know, that this would have uh [41:03] migrated into one of those other [41:05] parties. [41:06] >> This conversation is brought to you by [41:08] Tikvah Ideas, our online platform for [41:11] people who want to think seriously about [41:13] Jewish history, the Jewish intellectual [41:15] tradition, Jewish literature, Israel, [41:17] America, and the West. Tikvah Ideas is [41:20] the home of Mosaic, where we publish [41:22] major long-form essays. [41:24] It's the home of a growing podcast [41:26] network and a series of online video [41:28] courses that tackle the big questions of [41:31] Jewish thought and Jewish life, ancient [41:33] and modern. [41:35] Right now, our YouTube viewers can get [41:36] 20% off an annual subscription, full [41:39] access to everything that we publish. Go [41:41] to tikvahideas.com/youtube [41:45] or click the link below. [41:48] Okay, but in a period of flux like this [41:50] one, [41:51] where the institutions that have [41:53] structured Haredi politics are now um [41:58] not meeting the needs of Haredi voters [42:01] and their allies in the same way. The I [42:03] don't and I and I want to um in asking [42:06] this question adopt the larger Shas [42:08] conception of what a [42:10] including the periphery of of uh Haredi [42:13] voters. [42:15] In such a moment as this, one would [42:17] imagine that a new party [42:20] would be poised to do really well. [42:23] And I want to ask you about the we you [42:26] know, readers who are interested in [42:27] this, of course, should read the [42:29] definitive case that you make laying out [42:33] uh [42:34] why such a party was needed in Mosaic in [42:37] October 2026. [42:39] But, I want to ask in general [42:42] um why this moment was the right moment [42:46] for you to be one of the the the [42:48] founders of Hadash Uman Yisrael, the [42:51] reform party that you have have put [42:54] forward in this election. And [42:57] how you analyze what happened this past [43:00] week with Hadzibur Haredi? [43:02] >> Yes, I just to clarify I was not among [43:05] the founders of of the party. I was [43:07] >> One of the intellectual fathers of the [43:09] party one would say. [43:10] >> was that [43:12] okay. [43:13] If if you want to put it that way, [43:14] absolutely. And [43:16] the [43:18] No, the case [43:19] for the party was absolutely to give [43:21] representation [43:23] to so many who felt unrepresented. [43:27] Meaning to those that were not a part of [43:30] at the very least that felt that the [43:33] current Haredi political parties were [43:36] not giving them the representation that [43:38] that they wanted. Um [43:40] like I said, this is not a new [43:41] phenomenon. It's been going on on for [43:44] for a while. And also, it's important to [43:47] mention that in the current election [43:49] cycle, were actually four [43:52] new Haredi parties. Hadzibur Haredi was [43:54] one of four, which indicates this [43:56] zeitgeist. Meaning Hadzibur Haredi was [43:59] not the only party that came up with [44:01] this insight that this would be the [44:04] right time for a rival entity, a rival [44:08] political entity. Ahki was a Sefardi [44:11] one. [44:11] It was a Sefardi party. They dropped out [44:13] the day before the election. But they [44:15] set up a political party to rival Shas [44:18] because they appreciated the weakness, [44:20] the current weakness of Shas with so [44:23] many disillusioned voters. And they [44:26] said, "We need an alternative." And they [44:28] set up a an alternative called Ahki. [44:30] There was another [44:32] I guess Ashkenazi oriented party called [44:36] Hakahal that also came up with the same [44:39] idea. Messaging that was not very [44:42] different, you know, similar messaging. [44:44] And they said, "Wow, this is a time [44:46] where there's a lot of disappointment [44:47] and disillusionment. And we have to [44:49] provide an alternative." And there was [44:50] also an extremist Haredi party called [44:54] Color Black, Tzav Hashahar, [44:57] that they say with all of this [44:58] disillusionment with the mainstream [45:00] party, this is an opportunity for an [45:02] extremist party that says, "We're not [45:05] interested in Israel. We're not [45:06] interested in coming to an agreement. We [45:08] don't want to law. We want nothing. Not [45:12] a single Haredi boy is going to go to [45:13] the army, come what may. And and and [45:16] we're we're willing to go to war on [45:18] that." So So, clearly, this whole space [45:22] has become a um [45:24] has become something of a a cauldron of [45:27] activity over the last few months. [45:31] Given this political weakness of the [45:33] traditional Haredi parties, [45:36] and and nevertheless, at the end of the [45:39] day, none of these parties were able to [45:41] make an impact. Meaning, two of them [45:44] dropped out, [45:46] and the two that ran to the end, each [45:48] one of them got approximately 10,000 [45:51] votes. The extremists on one side, and [45:53] that's Yibaneh Haredi on the other. [45:56] Does that mean that this is a [45:58] a a failure? Yes. In in electoral terms, [46:02] of course, that that is a failure. [46:03] 10,000 votes is [46:05] not a dent in in in in electoral terms. [46:10] At the same time, both of the parties [46:12] were able to, and let's speak on the [46:14] half of the Tzibur Haredi, was able to [46:16] project a new voice. [46:18] Was able to project a voice that says [46:20] that we need to be able to take [46:21] responsibility for ourselves, for [46:23] Israel. We need to see ourselves as [46:26] partners in what's going on here in the [46:28] country, and we have to do better for [46:31] the shared future of Israel. [46:33] At the ballot boxes, [46:35] at the end of the day, that did not have [46:38] enough sway. [46:39] And there are a number of reasons for [46:41] that. Some of them relate to mistakes [46:45] that were made as part of the [46:46] campaigning, mistakes that were made in [46:49] planning the party, [46:50] um and [46:52] whether those mistakes were flagged at [46:53] the time or not is immaterial now. It's [46:55] not interesting. But certainly, there [46:57] were mistakes that were made and I think [46:59] that there'll need to be a lot of [47:01] soul-searching and a lot of [47:03] you know, time invested in in uh [47:05] in uh in thinking about what went right [47:08] and and what went wrong and then [47:09] thinking about the future. [47:11] The Hatikvah Hadit [47:13] was initiated as a political party, but [47:16] it's it's a movement much more than it [47:18] is [47:19] a party. It doesn't have to be engaged [47:22] in uh national politics. It can [47:23] definitely find engagement in other [47:26] arenas, but [47:27] either way, mistakes were made. At the [47:30] same time, there were also other [47:32] factors. The fact that it was clearly [47:35] not passing the threshold was a very [47:38] significant consideration because don't [47:40] forget that many of the voters that are [47:43] not voting for the traditional Haredi [47:45] parties, they care about Israel. They [47:48] care about the right-wing bloc. They're [47:49] right-wing. They care about the bloc and [47:52] they're afraid to waste their votes and [47:54] by the way, so were we. I mean, we as in [47:57] the the the Hatikvah Hadit leadership [48:00] was definitely afraid of the potential [48:03] wastage of votes. I can take you through [48:06] some of the internal thinking of why [48:07] they didn't pull out before the end, but [48:09] there were different voices uh concerned [48:11] with what was the right thing to do and [48:13] therefore many refrained from voting [48:15] because of that concern. [48:17] And also, there was a uh there was a [48:20] powerful campaign from the traditional [48:22] parties against Hatikvah Hadit which [48:25] yeah, fair enough. You know, they [48:26] campaigned strongly against Hatikvah [48:28] Hadit and they used very [48:29] >> Even even beyond the bounds of of [48:31] propriety when it comes to to uh [48:34] democratic speech and campaigns, one [48:36] sees uh images and videos on social [48:39] media of harassments um [48:42] on election day in Modi'in [48:44] of um of to Hatikvah Hadit uh Hadit [48:49] promotion materials. [48:50] >> Um yes, I mean, Modi'in Illit happens to [48:53] be a stronghold. A a Illit stronghold. I [48:56] I would not personally have set foot in [48:58] uh you know, I would I wouldn't have put [49:00] the the stuff there in the first place. [49:01] But yes, this this is unusual. We we're [49:04] not used to to seeing such a uh such [49:07] measures. [49:08] >> So, but Rabbi Fefer, where where in your [49:09] own analysis in your own thinking [49:12] and maybe you don't have hard data, but [49:13] you may have some uh suspicions. [49:17] Where do you think the 10,000 who did in [49:19] the end support Hadassah [49:22] Haredi, [49:23] where did they either come from or where [49:24] might they have uh gone had they not um [49:27] had they not put your Petek into the [49:30] into the envelope? Do you think that [49:32] these were [49:33] people who otherwise might have [49:35] supported Smotrich, who otherwise might [49:37] have supported Shas? Where do you think [49:39] they came from? [49:41] >> In generally, yes. Generally, I would [49:42] assume that the people that voted for [49:44] Hadassah Haredi are not the traditional [49:47] UTJ voters. [49:49] UTJ has a very stable [49:51] and um you know, the [49:54] again, looking at the numbers, [49:56] right, they got the same numbers as they [49:57] did last time, which means that they [49:59] lost some because there's a uh [50:02] a large cohort that turned 18. That [50:05] cohort adds numbers and therefore they [50:07] lost some numbers. So, perhaps some of [50:10] them are are from there, but but again, [50:12] the the the alternative [50:14] for people who voted for us would [50:16] probably not be UTJ. These are people [50:19] who are thinking about the good of [50:21] broader Israel, not the narrow good of [50:24] the um Haredi Ashkenazi space seen in [50:27] the UTJ sense. And therefore, they're [50:29] thinking, "Okay, where do I cast my [50:32] ballot?" They're not just going with [50:34] rabbinic instruction. There's a you [50:36] know, the the the the Gedolei Torah, [50:39] meaning the great luminaries who are the [50:41] appointed heads of these parties. So, [50:44] for many, whichever word they say, if [50:46] they say to vote came or you have to [50:48] vote for UTJ, then that becomes a almost [50:51] halakhic imperative. So, those who go [50:54] with that are not thinking of voting [50:56] outside of UTJ, neither for Hadassah [50:58] Haredi nor for any other party. [51:01] Those who are voting for United Torah [51:03] Judaism would probably be thinking, [51:05] "Okay, if it's not United Torah Judaism, [51:07] then" And I would say that not all of [51:09] those 10,000 votes were from Haredi [51:11] families or individuals. [51:13] I would say there's a certain [51:14] percentage, maybe 20, maybe 30, I don't [51:16] know the percentage, but there's a [51:17] percentage of those votes that are also [51:19] coming from people outside of the Haredi [51:22] space who are saying, "You know what? [51:24] This issue is a defining issue, an [51:26] existential issue, a crucial issue for [51:28] the future of Israel. I'm willing to [51:30] cast my vote, my ballot for this party [51:33] because I I appreciate or I understand [51:37] just how [51:38] uh important, crucial, existential it is [51:41] for the future of Israel." Clearly, or [51:43] nothing Not enough of those uh [51:46] individuals to create a a really uh you [51:49] know, a significant number of of votes. [51:51] 10,000 is 10,000, but it's not 50,000 or [51:54] 100,000. We have to be a a very much um [51:59] We have to We have to be forthright and [52:01] and and honest and say that electorally, [52:03] this was much less than what United [52:05] Torah Judaism aimed to achieve. [52:08] And uh there needs to be some good, you [52:10] know, soul-searching about that. [52:12] >> What What does Haredi politics in Israel [52:14] look like over the next couple of years? [52:17] Where do you think this is going now? [52:19] >> Huh, that's a very good question. The [52:21] The [52:22] the kind of promises that were not [52:24] delivered [52:26] in the previous cycle, in the previous [52:28] in the 25th Knesset, [52:30] are the same ones that are going to be [52:32] given towards the 26th Knesset. Meaning, [52:36] it's the same issues. [52:38] And [52:39] if there'll be a [52:41] another round of trying to create a [52:44] draft law, of trying to figure out the [52:48] contours of this very tricky equation [52:52] between the Torah students and between [52:54] those who serve in the IDF, if we're [52:56] going to have another excruciating round [52:59] and and and perhaps a a deadlock in in [53:02] that space, [53:03] I really don't see how this is going to [53:06] you know, progress forward. It's it's [53:08] really become such an intractable issue [53:11] and [53:13] even though I I don't know what's going [53:15] to happen and I've never tried my hand [53:16] at prophecy, certainly not about the [53:18] future. I I would uh that's Churchill or [53:21] something. But uh but but [53:24] what what I would assume [53:27] could happen here [53:28] is that there'll be a government [53:31] without Haredim. [53:35] And even if the Haredim could be in the [53:37] government, even if they're formally [53:39] part of the coalition, it's possible [53:41] that they'll drop out voluntarily [53:44] so as not to be involved in this issue. [53:47] I think that it's [53:49] in Hebrew we say gadol aleihem. [53:51] It's it's too much for them because the [53:54] the the internal conflict between on the [53:57] one hand [53:59] we need a law. [54:00] We can't have tens of thousands of boys [54:02] being illegal. It's like a banana [54:04] republic. It's not tenable. It's it's [54:07] it's an untenable situation. And on the [54:09] other hand, the Haredi parties are in a [54:11] true catch-22 situation because they'll [54:14] feel if if they agree to a compromise in [54:18] which real significant numbers of of [54:20] boys will end up serving in the IDF, [54:23] they'll feel that they're betraying a [54:25] significant part of their electorate. [54:28] And so and and playing into the hands of [54:30] extremists will say we told you so. [54:33] Don't trust, you know, the the the the [54:35] Haredi legacy parties. They are going to [54:38] sell you out to the army. [54:41] And therefore for the Haredim, the most [54:44] convenient place to be [54:46] is to actually be outside of government [54:48] for a period of time [54:50] while this issue is sorted out as it [54:53] were with without us with without the [54:55] Haredim. How exactly that will happen is [54:57] is a good question. It's possible that [54:59] we'll have a unity government. [55:02] I think there are many in Israel [55:03] that would like to see Eisenkot climb [55:06] down from his, you know, tall uh [55:10] place of uh [55:11] you know, come down the ladder. He made [55:13] a promise not to sit with Netanyahu. [55:15] Okay, you know, that promise was made in [55:17] different circumstances. If you need the [55:19] rabbi to do hatarat nedarim, [55:21] I I volunteer. You know, to to [55:24] to undo his his oath or his promise. I'm [55:27] saying, perhaps he'll he'll climb down [55:29] from that ladder and he'll say, you [55:31] know, this is a time to take [55:32] responsibility. We need a unity [55:34] government. Now, that unity government [55:37] won't need [55:39] a charidem. And maybe that's a [55:41] convenient place for them to be. [55:43] Because they'll say, you know what? We [55:44] can't really impact this draft law [55:46] because we're not needed. So, we'll join [55:48] but not for purposes of the draft law. [55:52] This is conjecture, John. I I don't [55:54] know. I'm speculating. [55:57] >> This conversation was recorded on [55:59] October 29th, 2026. [56:02] Rabbi Pfeffer, thank you for joining us. [56:04] >> Thank you, John. Always a pleasure.