Transcript [00:00] Netanyahu is accountable, responsible, [00:02] but we are now on the question of could [00:05] it be prevented. So you say that the IDF [00:08] and the Shinbet had warned Netanyahu [00:10] that a war is coming, but they weren't [00:14] alarmed by their own warnings. Now, [00:17] here's the thing. They they warned that [00:19] war is coming, but even though on the [00:22] night of October 6th and 7th, they did [00:25] nothing in order to prepare to a war in [00:27] Gaza. And you're saying that they [00:30] ignored their own warning, but a a phone [00:33] call from MBZ three weeks before would [00:35] have woken them up. I think it's a very [00:38] significant report. It's the first time [00:40] that we've heard that the prime minister [00:41] was warned personally by a head of [00:44] state, no less, as to October 7, and it [00:48] was a specific warning. The buck stops [00:51] with him. There's no doubt about that, I [00:54] think. But there's also a question of [00:56] blame. Was the prime minister negligent [00:59] in the way that he treated threats and [01:02] strategic warnings? And this is a really [01:05] new ball game. [01:18] [music] [01:20] This episode of Call Me Back is brought [01:21] to you by the Jewish Communal Fund, JCF. [01:26] The high holidays are a time to reflect [01:28] on what matters most, including the [01:30] impact we hope to make in the year [01:32] ahead. For 54 years, JCF has helped [01:35] individuals and families put their [01:37] values into action through thoughtful [01:39] philanthropy. As the nation's leading [01:41] Jewish donor advised fund, JCF empowers [01:44] donors to give more strategically [01:47] maximize charitable tax savings and make [01:49] a powerful difference with their giving [01:51] through financial expertise, operational [01:54] excellence, and highly personalized [01:56] service. JCF makes it easier to support [01:59] the causes and communities that matter [02:01] most. Learn more at jcfny.org [02:05] or follow the link in the episode [02:07] description. Jewish Communal Fund, [02:10] strategic giving, powerful impact. [02:15] Amit seel Nadavael, [02:17] welcome back, guys. [02:18] >> Thank you. [02:19] >> Hi. [02:19] >> All right. I want to, as I said in the [02:21] intro, this this bombshell report by by [02:24] Schlomi Eldar and and Ruth Duval broke [02:27] it. They broke the story on Tuesday. I [02:29] think it's in the context of the roll [02:30] out of a book they're publishing making [02:32] this stunning allegation that Netanyahu [02:34] was warned by MBZ just a few days prior [02:37] to October 7th that something big was [02:39] coming and that he kept it to himself. [02:41] Now I want I want to start by asking you [02:44] both how significant is this report and [02:47] what impact did it have in Israel since [02:50] its publication? I'll start with you [02:51] Nadav. [02:53] I think it's a very significant report. [02:55] It's the first time that we've heard [02:56] that the prime minister was warned [02:58] personally by a head of state no less as [03:02] to October 7 and it was a specific [03:05] warning according to what was reported [03:09] by Hararit. H now I I want to be clear [03:12] about this uh from the beginning Dan I [03:15] have not verified this report. For me to [03:18] to sign my own credentials on this, I [03:21] need to have double at least double [03:24] verification. The sort what we we have [03:26] in journalism to say that it is true. It [03:29] seems to be true uh by various reporting [03:33] in Israel of other journalists that are [03:35] saying that they've also had some sort [03:38] of um uh crisscrossing of of this [03:41] information. But is it significant? uh [03:45] it's a it's significant uh because the [03:48] the entire question as to October 7 is a [03:50] question of responsibility and a [03:53] question of blame. Now the fact is that [03:57] Prime Minister Netanyahu has been in [03:58] office since 2009. He has manufactured [04:02] the policy towards Gaza and Hamas. He is [04:06] responsible according to his own [04:08] testimonies in the past for Israel's [04:10] security as the prime minister. the buck [04:13] stops with him. There's no doubt about [04:15] that, I think. But there's also a [04:17] question of blame. Did the prime [04:20] minister was the prime minister [04:22] negligent in the way that he treated [04:25] threats and strategic warnings? And this [04:28] is a really new ball game. the fact that [04:33] uh we have now a story published by two [04:37] very good journalists who are saying [04:40] that he was personally warned by [04:43] Muhammad bin Z who is probably the [04:46] wisest of the regional leaders in the [04:50] Middle East. So this is how he he is [04:52] perceived both I think in Washington DC [04:55] and in many other uh areas in the world. [04:58] Amit, what's your take? [05:01] >> Okay, so um due diligence my uh I I [05:05] really appreciate [05:07] she was my [05:09] professional grandmother. She was the [05:11] editor-inchief of my first [05:13] editor-inchief. Having said that, and [05:15] I'll get immediately to the question of [05:17] reliability, [05:19] I personally don't think that this [05:21] question or this report is very [05:23] significant when it comes to the the [05:26] war. And I want to explain there are two [05:28] parallel channels there. There was the [05:31] information channel prior to October 7th [05:34] and there was what we call the concepts [05:37] prior to October 7th. And as we know [05:39] from history from Stali 1941 that [05:43] doesn't believe that Hitler is about to [05:44] invade until it's too late and from [05:47] Israel in 1973 that Golden Mayor refuses [05:50] to believe that the Egyptians and the [05:52] Syrians are about to initiate a war [05:54] until it's too late. despite warning [05:56] after warning after warning that that [05:58] she got from the Jordanians from right [06:00] >> and information and you knowh uh planes [06:05] you know taking footage of the [06:07] preparations of the Egyptians and [06:08] Syrians alike and the warning from King [06:10] Hussein which is very similar to to the [06:12] alleged MBZ Netanyahu phone call there [06:16] was no shortage of information there was [06:19] shortage of understanding of Kamas's [06:21] abilities and I want to explain it in 30 [06:24] Israel knew Hamas almost from scratch [06:27] from so-called childhood. Kamas was a [06:31] terrorist organization and Israel [06:32] treated Hamas as such until it was too [06:35] late, refusing to understand that Kamas [06:37] had become a monstrous Iranian [06:41] army consisting of two commando [06:44] divisions on our very southern border. [06:47] Thus when when the warning was that [06:50] Kamas was about to do something [06:52] monstrous the conception was okay a very [06:57] a murderous terrorist attack that's why [07:00] on the night between October 6th and 7th [07:03] uh the Shinbet decides to send a um [07:06] tequila squad the the most trained it's [07:10] like FA okay it's like okay if you watch [07:12] FA season 5 you'll know what tequila is [07:15] very trained trained fighters because if [07:18] you have 20 trained fighters you can [07:19] take let's say 40 50 kamas terrorists [07:23] because till then till October 7th the [07:26] largest scale terrorist attack against [07:28] Israel included 25 terrorists so the the [07:33] Israeli mind prior to October 7th said [07:35] okay so world count wars we're going to [07:37] fight 50 60 terrorists no one envisioned [07:41] 1,200 2,000 trained fighters from kamas [07:45] so No matter even had MBZ warned [07:48] Netanyao that something monstrous was [07:50] about to happen and if the Egyptians had [07:53] would warn him had warned him before it [07:55] wouldn't change the thing as long as you [07:57] prepare for a terrorist attack and not a [07:59] military invasion. This this is for the [08:01] significance of the report. Now as for [08:03] the reliability I have to say that I [08:07] highly doubt this report and I would [08:09] like to explain. First of all, uh there [08:12] are many many mistakes in the report in [08:15] Haretss that were refuted quite rapidly [08:18] after the report. I'll give you an [08:19] example. Anthony Blinkin, which is not a [08:21] member of Netanyahu's fan club to say [08:23] the least, uh has just published uh a [08:26] tweet on X saying that the report about [08:30] him was false. And the report said that [08:32] on October 9th there was an offer by [08:34] Kamas. Allegedly, they found a generous [08:37] kamas that offered to release the Bibbas [08:40] family, all the elderly hostages in [08:43] return for nominating a mediator for [08:45] free. All of a sudden, Kamas was willing [08:47] to release [08:48] >> all I understanding is the deal was that [08:50] the Hamas would release all the [08:51] hostages. [08:52] >> No, no, no. Okay. No matter. I mean that [08:54] all of a sudden there is a moderate [08:55] kamas. So I beg to differ. Anthony [08:58] Blicken begged to differ. And President [09:01] Herzog, also not a member of Nataniel's [09:04] Frank Lab, uh denied that MBZ talked to [09:07] him too about the situation in in in [09:10] Kamas generally and specifically about [09:12] an imminent attack. What I'm trying to [09:13] say is that we do not we can't know [09:16] whether there was a phone call or not, [09:18] but all the details around it uh were [09:21] done at least in my opinion in a very uh [09:25] problematic journalistic fashion. And I [09:28] highly doubt whether it happened [09:31] if such a phone call took place. And I [09:33] would like to remind you that Netanyahu [09:36] went the went all the way. He could have [09:39] said, "Okay, MBZ called me on September [09:42] 15th, but it was something general." No. [09:45] Netanyahu denies the very existence of [09:47] the phone call when it's quite easy to [09:49] prove that such a phone call took place. [09:52] Why? because phone calls as the report [09:54] claims are done when there is an [09:57] assistant from the UAE embassy in Tel [09:59] Aviva coming to the prime minister's [10:02] office. So it's something you can track [10:04] quite easily. [10:05] >> So So I want to stay on this for a [10:06] moment because this is important. This [10:07] is an important detail when when the [10:09] when the president of the UAE wants to [10:11] speak to the prime minister of Israel, [10:13] it's not like he just MBZ just picks up [10:15] the phone and calls and calls BB. It's [10:17] that the there's an official a security [10:19] official from the UAE embassy in Tel [10:22] Aviv that literally comes to the prime [10:24] minister's office. My understanding is [10:25] they bring a dedicated encrypted phone [10:28] for that specific conversation. So, so I [10:32] think the point you're making Amit is [10:33] that there's plenty to track here. Your [10:35] point is for the for the prime [10:37] minister's office to say none of this [10:38] happened is a pretty brazen statement [10:40] given how you know um how how quickly [10:43] they could be proven wrong. and more [10:45] than this now you know I do I take [10:48] information for from every journalist be [10:50] it you know pro-Israel anti-Israel [10:52] leftist right-wingers etc however the [10:55] entire story or the entire thesis behind [10:58] uh Schlomi and Ruth's uh report is [11:02] somehow confusing because prior to [11:04] October 7th they claim that Netanyahu [11:07] should have prepared if you know that [11:09] Hamas is about to attack you you must [11:12] strike before they they strike [11:15] On the other hand, on October 9th, their [11:17] perception is that Israel should have [11:20] ended the war and talk to Hamas. So [11:23] there there is no consistency [11:25] whatsoever. So in my opinion, one, it's [11:29] not as important as people think. [11:31] Second, it's not as reliable as people [11:33] think. And third, uh it's quite [11:36] confusing more than people think. [11:38] >> All right. So, so Nadava, uh, I know [11:41] you're going to want to respond to a lot [11:42] of what Amid said, and we we will get to [11:44] that, but I just want to get to the [11:45] story itself. So, 10 days prior to [11:47] October 7th, according to the report, [11:49] Netanyahu receives a phone call from [11:51] MBZ, uh, Shake Muhammad bin Zed. What [11:54] does MBZ tell Netanyahu during this [11:57] 45minute call and where was he getting [12:01] his information from? So allegedly, [12:03] according to the story, the leader of [12:05] the UAE was telling Netanyahu that [12:07] Sinoir is planning, Sinir, the leader of [12:10] Hamas in Gaza, is planning something [12:12] big, is planning an earthquake. And the [12:16] expression used is an earthquake or [12:19] something alike, an earthquake, and that [12:23] it this is imminent. And the reason that [12:27] the UAE would know about this is [12:29] described in the story as a a a senior [12:33] Palestinian. This person is Muhammad [12:36] Dlan, a former Fatak official from Gaza [12:40] who still has great connections in Gaza [12:42] and is living [12:45] under the the hospice of the UAE. Dlan [12:48] and others who had contacts with Hamas [12:51] heard from Sinir himself. So, Sinir [12:54] himself delivered a threat to [12:59] Palestinian sources and they delivered [13:01] that uh through another uh directly and [13:05] through another negotiator to Muhammad [13:08] bin Zed saying that Israel is basically [13:12] going to be attacked and that Sinir is [13:15] dedicated to a mysterious [13:19] enormous strike of sorts against Israel [13:23] and that Sinoir himself according to the [13:25] story is threatening the Israelis and he [13:28] wants this message to be passed to the [13:30] Israelis that he is going to to strike [13:34] and this is one of the key questions [13:35] there why would Simoir want this message [13:38] to be passed to the Israelis and there [13:42] there is a lot of speculation as to that [13:44] but Benzai sends a message to Israel [13:48] through its defense officials we're [13:51] going to talk about that message It's [13:52] it's it's even more important I think [13:55] than the MBZ conversation. And then [13:58] allegedly, according to our the our [14:01] story, when he sees nothing happens, he [14:04] turns into a direct phone call with the [14:07] prime minister. [14:08] >> Okay. Amit, I know you dispute that the [14:12] phone call actually took place between [14:14] MBZ and Netanyahu, but it doesn't sound [14:16] like you're disputing that there was [14:18] some information passed along before [14:21] this alleged phone call. One way or the [14:23] other, you're acknowledging there was [14:24] some communication between the uh the [14:27] Emiratis and the prime minister. What's [14:31] clear though, whatever form that [14:32] communication came in and whoever were [14:34] the communicators, [14:36] it sounds like none of Netanyahu did not [14:38] disclose this information to his [14:40] security chiefs, to the to the head of [14:41] the Shinbet, to the head of the Mossad, [14:43] to the IDF chief of staff. So why do you [14:46] think he did not disclose this [14:48] information to them? Because he saw it [14:50] as a um a another version of an [14:53] information that Israel has already had [14:55] had already had. I'll explain. The [14:57] information to the UAE arrived from a [15:00] Palestinian mediator between Israel and [15:03] Hamas. Okay. Hamas wanted to shake the [15:06] entire system because it was frustrated [15:08] that the deal the negotiations for a [15:10] deal between Israel and Hamas about [15:13] releasing two mentally ill Israelis and [15:16] two bodies of uh Israeli uh soldiers [15:19] from the castled operation in 2014. The [15:22] negotiations failed. So the threat made [15:27] by Kamas delivered by the mediator was [15:30] interpreted in Israel uh and the Shinbet [15:33] and Netanyahu as an attempt to take over [15:36] another hostage an Israeli named [15:39] Elizabeth Sukov that was that had been [15:41] taken hostage in Iraq in 2023. So the [15:45] idea was that Kamas might take over [15:49] Elizabeth Tukov thus having another [15:52] asset and that's why even there is [15:54] another round of information and maybe [15:57] there is a phone call from MBZ so [15:59] Netanyahu must have said to him okay [16:02] look we already know this information [16:05] look then if someone tells you your car [16:08] is makes some noises and you take it to [16:11] you know to fix it and people and they [16:13] you know the the guy said tells you look [16:16] it's nothing and then another one calls [16:18] you telling MBZ calls you and and tells [16:21] you look your car is in a problematic [16:24] situation you won't be too worried [16:26] because you allegedly already took care [16:28] of the problem that's the that's the [16:30] entire uh environment in Israel in [16:33] September 2023 [16:35] >> okay so Nadav I want to pick up on what [16:37] Abiche said because the information that [16:39] NBZ presented to Nat Netanyahu whether [16:42] it was via phone call or through other [16:44] channels that Sinoir is preparing quote [16:46] an earthquake was similar to the [16:47] information that according to reporting [16:49] the head of Shinbet Ranenbar presented [16:52] two weeks earlier to Netanyahu. Similar [16:54] warnings also again reportedly coming in [16:56] from at the time from Egypt's [16:58] intelligence chief Abbas Kamal. So it [17:01] may be shocking that Netanyahu didn't [17:02] share the MBZ call or the information [17:05] that was passed along with the security [17:08] chiefs. Do you think it would have had a [17:09] material impact on their own assessment [17:12] given everything else that was already [17:14] swirling around? Like do do you honestly [17:16] think that this would have been the the [17:19] kind of gamechanging piece of [17:20] information in changing Israel's [17:22] posture? [17:23] >> I need to go to the time continuum here. [17:25] It's very important. [17:26] >> Okay, [17:27] >> first of all comes the information to [17:29] the UAE. The UAE uh and others turn to [17:34] the Shinbet. The Israeli head of the [17:37] Shinbet conducts a phone call, an urgent [17:39] phone call with the prime minister with [17:42] a military secretary on the line in [17:45] which he says Yakya Sinoir [17:49] is saying something extremely dramatic [17:51] and now it's me saying it's not the [17:53] reporting in ours. The edifet is telling [17:56] Netanyahu Sinoir is saying that he's [17:59] going to do something that will empty [18:02] the Israeli jails from Palestinian [18:06] prisoners held there for security [18:09] violations, offenses, murder, terror, [18:12] etc. Empty the Israeli jails means that [18:15] he is for all intents and purposes [18:18] planning a very big operation probably [18:21] of kidnapping. Uh and that's what uh [18:25] Amit referred to. This conversation is [18:28] not in doubt and it is new and it is [18:31] part of the reporting and nobody's [18:34] doubting it and it's confirmed as far as [18:36] I know. [18:37] >> Yes, but [18:39] reported it on channel 12 years ago. [18:42] This the very same thing exactly the [18:44] same thing that that there was a there [18:46] was a threat from to actually empty the [18:48] Israeli prisons. Now I I'm not saying [18:51] this because I'm playing politics of it. [18:53] I'm trying to blame the prime minister [18:55] or downplay on the Israeli defense [18:57] apparatus because this was at the hands [18:59] of both the prime minister and the [19:01] defense apparatus. According to the [19:03] reporting, this was later enhanced and [19:06] this is absolutely new by that MBZ uh [19:10] phone conversation. I should note now [19:12] that the UAE is not denying that such a [19:15] phone conversation happened. They're [19:17] saying we won't, you know, confirm or [19:20] deny. It's not even a non-denial denial. [19:22] After they said we're not going to talk [19:24] about the conversations of leaders, they [19:26] did say at the end a very, I think, [19:29] meaningful sentence that intelligence [19:32] cooperation or exchange between Israel [19:35] and the UAE continued through the war or [19:38] something like that. The UAE could [19:40] absolutely just say nothing like that [19:42] happened and that would have killed the [19:44] story and they didn't. Now to the [19:48] question, was this meaningful? I'm going [19:52] to surprise you damn. I do not think [19:56] that after knowing what they knew, the [20:00] security chiefs, the fact that MBZ also [20:03] called the prime minister would have [20:05] changed their minds or their assessment [20:07] or the assessment of the prime minister [20:09] himself. I don't think that this would [20:12] have done this. I think and I think this [20:14] is a fair portrayal that Netanyahu if he [20:18] would have said that to them they would [20:20] have gotten stressed, agitated and maybe [20:24] began a process and in that I completely [20:27] disagree with Amit. Amit is basically [20:29] saying this couldn't have be have been [20:32] stopped. We we couldn't have prevented [20:34] it because we were so far down the [20:37] rabbit hole of the conceptia the mistake [20:40] of our perception of Hamas and Gaza that [20:42] nothing would have helped. I think [20:44] process would have helped. So if the [20:46] prime minister would have said for [20:47] instance look I got another warning. [20:49] Could you check again? I'm I'm asking [20:51] you to check again. This could have made [20:53] a difference. Nadav can I can I try can [20:55] I try to convince you? I'll give you an [20:57] example. Okay. In 1973, there was a [20:59] reason why Golden Mayor didn't call all [21:02] the reserveists to come to the front. [21:04] Why? Because it had already happened [21:06] twice in April and May 1973. And the [21:10] cost for the Israeli economy was huge. [21:12] So there was a thinking that it's just [21:16] an attempt of Egypt and Syria to destroy [21:18] Israel economy by making, you know, [21:20] false flag attacks. On the other hand, [21:24] the cost for the Israeli taxpayer in [21:26] order to prepare and prevent a Hamas [21:28] full-scale attack was 20 cent. Just call [21:32] him, make a phone call to each and every [21:35] military base around Gaza, say wake the [21:38] up and be prepared at 5:30 before [21:43] before dawn. And no one did it. Neither [21:45] Netanyahu nor the head of the Shinbet [21:48] nor the head of the the IDF chief of [21:51] staff, etc. What I'm trying to say that [21:53] when you are deep in the rabbit hole as [21:55] you said you just don't do the necessary [21:59] things and the fact that very smart [22:02] people like Netanyahu bar Halevi Khaliva [22:07] and every other person around refused to [22:11] do the simple thing the simplest thing [22:14] actually represent a fact and the fact [22:16] says that no one envisioned or [22:18] conceptualized such an attack. I I agree [22:22] completely. But the question is, could [22:24] they have conceptualized if they had [22:26] enough information and and just to give [22:28] an example to the people listening in, [22:30] what does it mean when the Israeli [22:32] intelligence decides to investigate [22:34] something? Because they get agitated [22:36] because they get orders from above. You [22:38] know, the prime minister is interested, [22:39] right? Someone picks up the phone and [22:41] says, you know, the prime minister wants [22:43] more information about this. Immediately [22:46] this gets many many people in many [22:49] places in a huge apparatus uh beginning [22:53] to I'm I'm translating literally from [22:56] Hebrew to to open abilities okay to to [23:02] use certain abilities of the Israeli [23:04] intelligence electronic abilities mo [23:05] mostly and start directing them. It's [23:08] all a question of priorities and this [23:11] could have absolutely happened the night [23:13] before and I do blame for instance uh [23:16] the intelligence chiefs for not doing [23:18] that after they knew what they knew in [23:20] that night. I need to give another [23:22] example. When the prime minister is [23:23] warned in at least four different [23:26] letters by the intelligence branch [23:28] saying that the summer of 2023 that the [23:33] enemies of Israel see this as a historic [23:37] opportunity to possibly attack Israel. [23:40] Netanyao as a prime minister had one job [23:43] to have a meeting about that and then [23:46] another meeting another meeting [23:49] demanding answers from these [23:50] intelligence chiefs. Maybe like his [23:53] supporters are saying it was all [23:54] political to stop the judicial overall. [23:56] I don't know but to start a process and [23:59] if he would have started a process we [24:01] might have not been in the same place. [24:03] Nadav Nadav look look Nadav listen to [24:05] what you are saying you say that [24:07] Netanyahu is responsible and I I I agree [24:10] he's accountable responsible but we are [24:13] now on the question of could it be [24:15] prevented so you say that the IDF and [24:18] the Shinbet had warned Netanyahu that a [24:21] war is coming but they weren't alarmed [24:25] by their own warning. So Netanyahu and [24:28] Netanyahu told them look believe [24:30] yourself war is coming. They would have [24:32] noticed. Now now here's the thing. They [24:35] they warned that war is coming. But even [24:38] though even though on the night of [24:41] October 6th and 7th they did nothing in [24:43] order to prepare to a war in Gaza. And [24:46] you're saying that they ignored their [24:48] own warning but a a phone call from MBZ [24:52] 3 weeks before would have woken them up. [24:55] I I refuse to believe it. I think we [24:57] were deep in the conceptia, the press, [24:59] the IDF, the Shinbet and first and [25:01] foremost Netanyahu and that's why [25:03] nothing would have shaken it and history [25:05] is full with examples and full with [25:08] stories about you know eyes wide shot. [25:10] >> Okay. I I I want to ask you a meet about [25:13] a security meeting on October 1st, which [25:15] was just day a few days after this [25:17] alleged call uh between Netanyahu and [25:20] and MBZ. And this was a a security [25:22] meeting in which the head of the Shinbet [25:25] recommended to the prime minister an [25:27] operation targeting senior Hamas [25:29] officials including Sinoir. Again, this [25:31] is October 1st. [25:34] Now, that operation never took place. [25:37] What can you tell us about this? Okay. [25:39] So I I I want to share with you a story [25:42] about Nadav and myself. Uh somewhere in [25:45] 2024 or 2025, I got a phone call from a [25:49] source. It was Thursday night and they [25:52] offered me amazing protocols showing [25:55] that the head of the Shinbet was blind [25:58] uh to the danger from Gaza that a few [26:01] days before he wrote in an on an [26:03] official document I think it was October [26:05] 3rd or 4th that the high holiday the [26:08] Jewish holidays uh ended are about to [26:11] end peacefully [26:13] in spite of the provocations from the [26:14] Jewish and the Palestinian side alike. [26:18] he was blind to the danger that he [26:19] offered more, you know, economic [26:22] measures uh in order to to appease [26:24] Hamas. And I knew because it was [26:27] Thursday evening that it was a an [26:30] attempt to shut down to intercept a [26:34] story on the other side and I woke up on [26:37] Friday morning to see Nadav's story [26:39] about the very same from the very same [26:41] protocols. Everyone leaked what was [26:43] convenient for them. What I'm trying to [26:45] say is that the protocols between [26:48] September 27th and October 6th are full [26:51] with stupidity, misunderstanding, [26:54] uh misreading of the entire situation [26:56] both from the side of Ronenbar [26:59] Herzvi and Benjamin Netanyao. He got [27:03] calls from the head of the Shinbet to [27:05] assass to to kill and he refused or the [27:08] other way around that Netanyahu insisted [27:10] on doing something and Ronenbar thought [27:12] that is for love and peace. Those are [27:16] half pictures and I think the full [27:18] picture consists of what Nadab reported [27:20] and I reported alike. Ronbar did think [27:23] that nothing is going to happen in Gaza [27:26] and he did believe in the idea that [27:29] economy will actually ease the tensions [27:32] in the Gaza border refusing or to see [27:35] the situation and Benjamin Netanyahu [27:38] held the same very same positions. So [27:41] I'm not going to get into the question [27:44] who was 2% more aware of the situation [27:47] because they were far far behind in [27:49] understanding the monstrous way or the [27:51] monstrous war that was about to erupt. [27:53] >> So I just want to say that um you know [27:57] hearing what Amit is saying the question [27:59] is what's so why do we elect prime [28:02] ministers? They're just sitting in a [28:05] bunch with a bunch of other security [28:07] officials in the room. They all think [28:09] the same and the prime minister is just [28:12] everything happens around him but [28:14] nothing happens because of him. I and I [28:18] think that's that's a basic mistake [28:19] about the power and what is the power of [28:21] the prime minister and here's my answer [28:23] to this. Uh Netanyahu warned the [28:27] security chiefs warned them that he is [28:31] in a process that might lead to [28:32] normalization with Saudi Arabia. He and [28:35] this is re recorded. He warned them [28:38] again and again that he doesn't want the [28:40] Gaza Strip to to change. He doesn't want [28:44] a new paradigm in the Gaza Strip. How do [28:48] we know that? Because they were in their [28:50] position for a year or two. All of these [28:51] people and he was in his position since [28:54] 2009. This was his policy towards Gaza. [28:58] Now, I'm not saying that he has full [29:00] responsibility [29:02] uh you know just himself for the [29:03] failure. Of course, the Israeli entire [29:06] defense system that we built for war and [29:10] for intelligence, it failed miserably. [29:12] And I published many of these stories. [29:15] But let me say it this way. If the head [29:17] of the Shinbet calls you in July and he [29:20] tells you, I am now issuing you a [29:22] warning as to war, which is the highest [29:25] thing that any security branch official [29:27] can tell the prime minister. and he says [29:29] that to him, the very least that the [29:32] prime minister needs to do then is to [29:34] start a process of checking. Now, it's [29:37] true that they were completely mistaken. [29:39] They didn't think it's going to come [29:40] from Gaza. They didn't think it's going [29:42] to happen in this kind of trajectory or [29:44] in this date, but they thought [29:46] something's going to happen. Nadav, can [29:48] you please tell me? Okay, I understand [29:50] that all of them misunderstood Kamas and [29:53] Gaza. Could you please tell me? And I [29:56] asked Yav Galante and he didn't have any [29:58] answer. [30:00] Was there an a one additional [30:05] soldier in the northern border prior to [30:08] October 7th? Because if you might agree [30:11] with me that they they conceptualized a [30:14] war against or something like this. Was [30:18] there any special forces brought to the [30:21] northern border prior to October 7th? [30:24] Let's say that they they saw they they [30:26] saw that Netanyahu ignored their [30:29] warnings and they know that war is [30:32] coming. [30:33] If I were the IDF chief of staff, I [30:36] would have insisted or I would have [30:38] called more units to come to the [30:40] northern border. So even today in 2026, [30:44] I still believe that this warning was [30:46] highly politicized. And proof number [30:49] one, exhibit A, is the fact that they [30:52] ignored their very own warning both in [30:55] the south and in the north. And that's [30:57] why I I refuse to accept the idea that [31:01] they really meant it. I think that [31:04] Netanyahu bears full responsibility as [31:06] prime minister. But it's a different [31:08] question because the perception now [31:10] according to which I mean the military [31:13] apparatus [31:14] had warned time and again the war and [31:18] Netanyao ignored it and they pushed for [31:20] fighting and Netanyahu was an aisent [31:23] ignores the mere fact that they were in [31:26] the same on the same page with [31:28] Netanyahu. praised him for years for [31:30] being very soft in operating power that [31:33] he was very moderate and it's not that [31:36] they wanted to destroy Gaza and [31:38] Netanyahu because of the normalization [31:40] said hold your horses I wish there were [31:43] more wild horses around but there were [31:45] none not in the prime neither in the [31:47] prime minister's office no in the IDFG [31:49] for stuff look I I am in the distinct [31:51] rare position am I in which I can answer [31:54] a question that even Y of Galant didn't [31:57] know how to answer you. So, let me try [31:59] and answer that. The IDF isn't such a [32:03] huge army and the way that it operates [32:05] is according to intelligence all the [32:07] time. If you really believe that four [32:10] letters sent from the chiefs of [32:13] intelligence in the summer saying that [32:17] Israel's deterrence in the region is [32:19] crashing, that Israeli enemies are [32:21] seeing this as a historical opportunity. [32:24] If you believe that the head of the [32:25] shein bet calling the prime minister and [32:27] then going to the chairman of the [32:28] opposition by the way saying I am [32:31] warning from war. This is all because of [32:33] the judicial overhaul and their attempt [32:34] there. I think that you at least need to [32:37] to bring some hard proof beyond assuming [32:40] their political affiliations. But let [32:43] let me answer about the the because [32:45] you're saying if they believed something [32:47] is coming why didn't they put the army [32:49] under alert? So, so I I think it's a [32:53] wonderful question for the the National [32:57] State of Commission and I'm not dodging [32:58] your question. I really think that they [33:01] are responsible and I think that this is [33:04] a really good question and what is the [33:06] answer [33:07] >> to the question as to the north and let [33:10] me tell you something that people don't [33:11] usually know. Israel's uh intelligence [33:14] model for warning as to an attack, an [33:18] ensuing attack in the south failed. [33:22] Hamas attacked and we knew nothing. [33:24] Israel's warning model as to the north [33:27] and his didn't fail. The Israeli [33:30] intelligence and army said Hisbala is [33:32] not planning an attack. It's not [33:33] coordinated with Hamas. It wasn't [33:35] coordinated with Hamas. and he joined [33:37] the war a day later in a very kind of uh [33:41] baffled way because it didn't know and [33:43] we know this we it didn't know about the [33:45] timing. So they operated according to [33:48] the intelligence that they had. Now it's [33:50] true that this entire time is is rigged [33:54] with all kinds of informations coming. [33:56] But here is the thing. Do you believe [33:59] that the head of the Israeli system has [34:02] power to change? [34:05] If you just listen to what Netanyahu [34:06] himself said after the second Lebanon [34:08] war, a different government, he said [34:10] it's on me. It's on the prime minister. [34:12] Everything related to security. He is [34:14] the commander-in-chief. This is how he [34:16] sees it. And and there, you know, it's [34:18] it's really a question. But anything I [34:20] say right now, it sounds like I am [34:22] defending the security chiefs and you're [34:25] defending Netanyahu. I I am not [34:27] defending the security chiefs and I hope [34:29] you're not defending Netanyahu. [34:30] >> You don't have to hope. You know, I'm [34:32] not defending Netanyahu. All I'm trying [34:34] to say is that the attempts to depict as [34:36] if there was one side that warned and [34:38] the other side that didn't. One side [34:41] that was uh um you know on watch and did [34:45] everything and one side that neglected [34:46] it. It's wrong. It's wrong when it's [34:48] said on channel 14 about the prime [34:50] minister and the as as the as the good [34:51] guy. And it's wrong when it's said in on [34:53] other channels as on everyone else as [34:55] the as the good guys and the bad guy. [34:57] Here is the grim fact. Mulan were [35:00] guarded on October 7th in the morning by [35:03] two platoon against eight commando [35:06] battalions of Kisbala. No one can [35:09] convince me that you can warn against [35:12] war and then do nothing in order to [35:16] strengthen the protection on Metulan [35:19] which were the main front uh uh the [35:22] northern front against. You can you can [35:25] call you know some reserveists. you can [35:27] do some things. They did nothing. And [35:29] I'll tell you why I still suspect that [35:32] it mixed politics with security. Because [35:34] I have another example, and it's not a [35:37] conspiracy. The governor of the Bank of [35:40] Israel warned that the Israeli economy [35:42] in 2023 will collapse or deteriorate [35:46] because of the judicial reform. The fact [35:48] was that the Israeli economy kept [35:51] prospering even in 2023. So if you're [35:54] prime minister Netanyahu and your [35:57] perception is that you're fighting the [35:59] deep state be it in the IDF or in the [36:01] bank of Israel or in the academy or in [36:04] the of course the judicial system. So [36:06] you might take such warnings with a [36:08] grain of salt especially when you see [36:11] that nothing is happening on the ground [36:12] with the IDF. That's why I highly [36:15] suspect those warnings general warnings [36:18] when you you should give me details who [36:21] is going to fight us who is going to [36:23] where they're going to fight us what [36:25] should we do but Amit it doesn't work [36:27] like this in strategic warnings [36:30] sometimes you get just everybody wants [36:32] all the information this is in the [36:34] perfect world but but I want to explain [36:37] something something that Israeli [36:38] listeners even Isra madam [36:40] [clears throat] put your soldiers when [36:42] your mouth is Not that put your soldiers [36:45] put your soldiers somewhere [36:47] >> but you're presenting a picture as [36:50] though the IDF was celebrating in Tel [36:52] Aviv. The IDF has limited resources. It [36:56] doesn't have enough a lot of runs. The [36:58] reason that [36:58] >> only for one platoon in Kilachuna, one [37:01] platoon in Matula, two platoon in but we [37:04] are not that limited. [37:05] >> Uh I I think that the IDF is extremely [37:07] limited or was limited before October 7 [37:10] and we saw that was a smaller army. We [37:12] can discuss why, but the truth is that [37:16] they weren't headed to a different [37:18] front. So this wasn't done, you know, [37:21] because of of negligence. This was how [37:24] it was for years before that. And and I [37:27] think that one of the key aspects of it [37:29] that people don't understand when the [37:31] head of the Shabbach calls and he says, [37:33] "I'm warning you as to war." People [37:36] think that this is the end of it. Then [37:38] he shuts down the phone and he says, [37:39] "Thank you very much, Mr. Prime [37:41] Minister. It's up to you. No, there is a [37:44] specific intelligence that I cannot [37:46] share here that leads him to that [37:48] several pieces of intelligence. When the [37:52] intelligence branch warns the prime [37:53] minister in in that uh summer then it [37:58] has very sophisticated intelligence [38:02] uh electronic human others that are [38:05] telling now when you see the [38:07] intelligence itself if you see it you [38:09] understand that it's material. Now the [38:11] prime minister saw it and he can see it. [38:13] Now it's true everything was political [38:16] back then. But this is the reason that [38:18] you choose leaders. [38:19] >> Absolutely. I agree. [38:21] >> So I am not going to sit here and and [38:24] again portray this as though they were [38:27] uh you know only they they only wanted [38:30] to take out Sinoir. But there's a lot of [38:32] generalizations here because you're [38:34] talking on the one hand on one person [38:36] Netanyahu. This is the structure of this [38:38] entire conversation. And then there's [38:40] the defense chiefs. They all come from [38:42] the same politics and same approach. [38:43] Nadavar Gaman, the former head of the [38:45] Shabbach told the prime minister, the [38:48] Shabbach, the Shinbet objects to [38:51] transfer of money from Qatar to the Ham [38:53] to Hamas. Nobody denies it. [38:55] >> It he objected to it. He was against it [38:58] and he wanted to kill Yaka Sinir. He [39:00] thought it was very dangerous. [39:02] this head of the Shabbak Ron Nenbar [39:05] >> offered to assassinate Sinir more than [39:08] four times. [39:09] >> The reason that the prime minister [39:11] didn't want it, by the way, it's it's a [39:13] very significant reason. The prime [39:14] minister thought that he's on the way to [39:16] normalization with Saudi Arabia and he [39:19] thought this might blow everything up [39:20] and he didn't want to occupy Gaza. We'll [39:22] be right back after this short message. [39:26] The high holidays invite us to look back [39:28] on the year behind us and consider the [39:30] future we want to help build. For 54 [39:33] years, Jewish Communal Fund, JCF, has [39:36] helped individuals and families [39:38] transform their values into meaningful [39:40] philanthropy. As the nation's leading [39:42] Jewish donor advised fund, JCF [39:45] simplifies charitable giving while [39:47] providing the expertise, stewardship, [39:50] and personalized support that help [39:51] donors give with confidence. JCF is [39:55] about more than where you give. It's [39:57] about having a trusted partner who [39:58] understands what matters to you. Whether [40:01] you're supporting the Jewish community, [40:03] Israel, education, healthc care, the [40:05] arts, or any other cause close to your [40:07] heart, JCF helps turn generosity into [40:11] lasting impact. Learn more at jcfny.org [40:16] or follow the link in the episode [40:18] description. Jewish Communal Fund, [40:20] Strategic Giving, Powerful Impact. [40:25] And we're back with Nadav and Amit. [40:27] Separate from the conversation we're [40:28] having about this MBZ communication with [40:31] Netanyahu. What you're raising here is [40:33] Renbar at the time, the head of Shinbet [40:36] had been advocating according to reports [40:38] and it sounds like your own very direct [40:40] sourcing. He had been advocating for [40:43] Israel to take out Ya Sinir. This is [40:45] weeks before October 7th. So I just want [40:48] to make sure I just want to establish a [40:50] baseline here. Am do you dispute that [40:52] that bar renb bar was advocating for [40:54] taking out cenomar? We'll get into [40:56] whether or not it made sense to do it or [40:57] not but I just want to do you do you do [41:00] you acknowledge that that happened okay [41:02] so I think it was one of the options [41:04] presented to prime minister Netanyahu I [41:07] don't think from what I know that there [41:09] was one side around the table that said [41:11] let's take him now and said no I want [41:14] Gaza to be peaceful and quiet. The idea [41:18] was about taking the as far as I [41:20] understand on October to take uh to to [41:24] actually kill the guy in Kamas in charge [41:27] of the terrorist activity in the West [41:29] Bank in Juda and Samaria. Not more than [41:31] this and not something operative. By the [41:33] way, Nadavan Nadav mentioned Netanyahu. [41:36] Natav Algaman and Ronbar offered Bennett [41:39] as well to take to kill Sinir and it [41:43] didn't happen. Why? Because when [41:45] probably when you're prime minister [41:48] uh between 2009 to 2023, most of the [41:52] time it was Netanyahu, but not all of [41:54] the time, you prefer Gaza to be a a [41:58] problem that can be managed rather than [42:01] a war that might lead in your opinion to [42:03] nothing because no one then would have [42:06] agreed to Israel taking over the Gaza [42:08] Strip. It wouldn't. I mean, the public [42:10] wouldn't allow it. The world wouldn't [42:12] allow it. The United States wouldn't [42:13] allow it. and and so forth. [42:16] >> I agree with Amit. I I want I want to [42:18] say that I totally agree. I you know the [42:20] Shinbet can make recommendations to [42:23] assassinate Sinir and that's a keen to [42:25] saying let's open a new war and let's [42:28] try to open this war by killing the [42:30] leader of Hamas then what happens and [42:32] this is where you need to have the prime [42:34] minister but but nobody can deny that [42:37] this was the position of the Shinbet. [42:39] They thought that this entire idea of [42:42] transferring money from Qatar to Hamas [42:44] Qatar who supports the Muslim [42:46] Brotherhood is a mistake. These people [42:49] who who [42:50] >> the shin bets basically the shin right [42:51] not all the IDF thought that but the [42:54] Shinbet thought that and they also [42:56] thought that the idea which is the [42:58] Netanyao conceptia and nobody can deny [43:00] it that better to have Hamas in Gaza [43:04] than to have the Palestinian authority [43:07] controlling both Gaza and the West Bank. [43:09] And this was the Netanyahu directive. [43:12] And Netanyahu himself spoke about this [43:14] in in many ways including in front of [43:17] the Likood members of Kesset but his [43:19] supporters spoke about this in many ways [43:22] that Hamas and I quote is an asset. This [43:25] was not only said by you know people in [43:28] the media that support Netanyahu. This [43:30] was said by Betan Smrich at the time and [43:32] he was explaining this as a PR thing. [43:34] Okay, to be completely candid about his [43:36] reasoning, but but Hamas is an asset was [43:40] an expression and the Israeli defense [43:42] apparatus was saying no, that's not a [43:45] good idea. At least the Shinbet was [43:47] saying that. Again, I want to be [43:48] absolutely clear. There were parts of [43:50] the IDF that thought, you know, Gaza, we [43:53] can't do anything with Gaza. So, and I [43:55] agree with the bottom line that Amid [43:57] just said. If the Israeli prime minister [43:58] would have come to the world and I said [44:00] that to you Dan a year ago and would [44:03] have said, "Look, I have just learned [44:04] about a terrible plan to invade Israel [44:08] to murder 1,200 people to kidnap [44:12] hundreds of Hamas and therefore I am [44:15] launching a preemptive war against Hamas [44:18] in Gaza." What would the world have said [44:20] about Netanyahu? they they would have [44:22] said he's completely nuts and he's crazy [44:25] and he's a wararmonger and they would [44:27] have sanctions against Israel because it [44:29] didn't happen. Two things. One, I'll [44:31] just quote from the report uh from [44:34] August 2024. Ronbar wrote uh resuming [44:38] the understanding theou between Israel [44:40] and Kamas will allow to preserve [44:44] stability for a very long term. Kamas [44:47] continues with the strategy of Sinoir [44:49] promoting the goals of the organization [44:52] without getting into a war. That was on [44:56] October 1st. Okay. And the last remark I [45:00] said on October 8, 2023 on air that [45:03] there is enough guilt for everyone. So I [45:06] think uh the I mean our listeners should [45:09] not take our conversation as if Nadav [45:12] thinks that only Netanyahu is to be [45:14] blamed and I think that Netanyahu is you [45:16] know is is sacred and the entire [45:19] military apparatus is to be blamed. No, [45:20] I think we all agree on the fact that [45:23] they made grave mistakes, all of them. [45:26] And I think Nadav is irritated by the [45:30] fact that Netanyahu hasn't paid the full [45:32] price like the head of the Shinbet and [45:36] the IDF chief of staff and that is still [45:37] running for office. While I think from [45:40] my democratic [45:43] u you know point of view that there is a [45:46] difference between the you know the the [45:49] the officers and a politician. Officers [45:53] should resign because there is someone [45:55] that nominate them and we the public [45:58] nominate our politicians. So in 47 days [46:02] from now, the public will decide whether [46:04] Netanyahu can go on or not like they did [46:07] with Golden Mayor in 1973. [46:09] >> I need to respond to that. Uh I I'm not [46:12] irritated by Netanyahu not retiring. The [46:16] fact is that Netanyahu has not assumed [46:19] responsibility. By the way, if I would [46:21] have advised him politically, I would [46:23] have told him I think Amit would have [46:25] said that too. Uh take full [46:27] responsibility from day one. Absolutely. [46:31] >> He could have said, "Look, I take full [46:32] responsibility. I'm leading this [46:34] country. This tragedy falls under my [46:37] responsibility." He didn't do that. What [46:40] he's been doing for the last 3 years is [46:42] litigating the case as a lawyer, not as [46:45] the leader of the country, responsible [46:46] for everything that happens, who has [46:48] absolute power in terms of security. [46:51] Informally, it's the prime minister who [46:53] knows everything, who can get everything [46:56] done. And suddenly he's from a different [46:58] story. And this is something that is [47:01] remarkable. These people that we're [47:03] speaking about, they assumed [47:05] responsibility. They resigned. But it's [47:07] not about them being in that position or [47:09] that position. But it's about them [47:11] saying, "Look, I made a a huge error, a [47:14] grave mistake, and they did that." And [47:16] Netanyahu has not done this, and he's [47:18] running for office again. And there's a [47:21] huge media machine that tries to [47:23] explain, unlike this nuance [47:25] conversation, that the entire issue is [47:29] that the security chiefs maliciously [47:32] didn't wake up Netanyahu that night. [47:35] Maliciously. [47:36] >> You never heard it from me, of course. I [47:38] I would just like to say that I I I [47:42] don't believe in those, you know, [47:43] conspiracy theories. And on the other [47:46] hand, I don't see Nataniel as the devil. [47:48] I think by the way it's something more [47:49] general about the Israeli society. There [47:52] are people in Israel who really believe [47:53] that Netao can make no wrong and there [47:56] are people in Israel who really believe [47:58] that Israel's entire problems emanate [48:00] from the fact that Netanyahu is the [48:02] prime minister. And I have some news for [48:04] Israelis. The failure of October 7th [48:06] would have happened in my opinion with [48:08] other prime ministers because they all [48:11] made the same mistakes and the same [48:13] perceptions about the Gaza Strip. And [48:15] the weather is in Israel is still going [48:17] to be unbearable in July and August even [48:19] if Bennett Eisenot or Liberman are going [48:21] to be prime ministers. And on the other [48:22] hand, Israel is not going to be hell on [48:25] earth if only Netanyahu uh uh is toppled [48:28] and and then the opposition takes [48:30] office. And I think and I hope that the [48:34] conclusion from this election is going [48:36] to be uh something else something more [48:39] sober about the very nature we should [48:42] make Israel uh Israel's political system [48:44] more sane to say the least. [48:47] >> Okay. So so all right but it it's it's [48:51] not sane. So let's just live in the [48:52] world in which it's not sane. And I want [48:53] to talk about the next 48 days. Do I'll [48:56] start with you Nadav and then come to [48:57] you Amit. What impact do you think this [48:59] this quote unquote bombshell report will [49:02] have on the election, if any? [49:05] >> I'm not sure it's going to have uh any [49:07] bearings on the elections. And by the [49:09] way, uh, Channel 12 just published a [49:11] poll this evening that showed that it [49:14] practically did not have any I don't see [49:16] any change and I don't think that [49:18] there's going to be any change because [49:20] this is the project of this election [49:22] that has been lasted for 3 years and the [49:25] project is try to politicize everything [49:27] that relates to October 7. If someone [49:30] wants a national [49:32] state commission, you know why national [49:34] state commission? We should have a state [49:36] commission that isn't led by a Supreme [49:39] Court judge because Netanyao doesn't [49:41] trust the Supreme Court. We always had [49:43] national state commissions with previous [49:45] prime ministers left and right including [49:48] Manakim begging and gold mayor and [49:50] others and Robbing and Eud Barak. But [49:54] this time it's this machine that tells [49:57] you it's it's impossible. You talk about [50:01] the responsibility and you write things [50:02] like I write uh you know that the [50:05] security chiefs are are responsible for [50:07] a dire tactical uh failure. A prime [50:10] minister is responsible for the entire [50:12] policy for 15 years and what you get [50:15] back usually is people who support the [50:18] prime minister was saying no it's only [50:20] them that are responsible because they [50:23] he they didn't wake him up at night etc [50:26] etc. So to your question Dan because [50:29] it's so tribal and it's politicized and [50:32] it it you know truth or stories it makes [50:36] no bearing on on the real elections and [50:38] and I think this is a testimony to how [50:41] tribal uh politics became that people [50:44] simply don't believe stories if it's not [50:46] comfortable to them and I think that uh [50:48] just uh to to what Amid said which is [50:51] basically talking about the the Netanyao [50:53] derangement syndrome and and and all [50:56] that you know a person has been in [50:57] office since 2009. We are in 2026 uh [51:01] besides one year. Uh so many people hold [51:05] him responsible for many things. I think [51:08] it's not only natural but it is the [51:10] process of democracy and it's true that [51:13] Israel will have huge problems and [51:15] challenges after and it's not all [51:17] related to to Netanyahu and some things [51:20] may get worse or get better. I I don't [51:23] know. Amit, now tell me your your your [51:25] view on the impact on the election. [51:27] >> So, okay, I I think it damages [51:30] Netanyahu, but in a different fashion [51:31] that people think elections are usually [51:34] about setting the agenda. So far, and [51:37] we're still 48 days from the election, [51:39] 47 days. Netanyahu has failed in what [51:44] was his best skills in the past to set [51:47] the agenda. So far, Netanyahu hasn't [51:49] initiated a single agenda issue, a [51:54] single issue on the agenda since the [51:56] election campaign has begun some 70 days [51:59] ago. Nothing. The opposition talks about [52:03] October 7th. He responds. The opposition [52:05] talks about uh the, you know, the the [52:08] draft dodgers, the alto draft dodgers. [52:11] He responds. He failed devastately. And [52:14] the results in the polls uh um can be [52:18] explained by this. If Netanyahu fails to [52:20] change the agenda, I think he's going to [52:23] face a failure. Now, he has some [52:26] problems. In 2019, for instance, two [52:28] weeks before the election, President [52:30] Trump recognized Israel sovereignty over [52:32] the Golan Heights. I'm not sure the [52:34] relationship between Trump and Netanyahu [52:35] is that good these days that Trump will [52:37] actually um schedule you know major [52:41] announcements a week before Trump hasn't [52:45] even supported Netanyahu hasn't even [52:47] endorsed Netanyahu so far in the [52:49] election. So if I were Netanyahu I would [52:53] be quite worried about losing the skills [52:56] that portrayed me in the past and about [52:59] losing the control over the agenda in [53:01] the Israeli election. I I think Amit is [53:03] being much too harsh with Netanyahu. [53:05] Much too harsh with [53:08] I think that he managed to the fact that [53:11] the Li could still polling the way that [53:14] it's polling and that the both of the [53:17] blocks have narrowed their margins. I [53:20] don't want to say significantly. It's [53:22] not significant yet, but it's on in the [53:24] road to the significant. [53:26] >> Statistically, it's statistically [53:27] significant. Yes. [53:28] >> Okay. I So, I think that's meaningful. [53:30] uh looking uh in into the future and I I [53:34] agree that in terms of October 7, I [53:36] think it's it's sort of an October [53:38] surprise [53:39] that what we're seeing only in September [53:42] that October that we thought [53:45] somehow that the war is not going to [53:47] dominate the new cycle of the elections. [53:50] I don't know why we thought that but in [53:53] the last two weeks it's it's it's not [53:54] the case. uh and and and it's it is it [53:59] changing people votes? I I don't think [54:01] so because I think they already [54:03] litigated the war and they're very [54:05] entrenched in that sense. But Amit might [54:07] be right and his pessimism as to this or [54:10] is somewhat pessimism as to this as to [54:12] Netanyahu chances in that regard might [54:15] be proven right. [54:16] >> All right, gentlemen. Uh I'm not sure if [54:19] we've we've reached a a consensus in [54:21] this conversation, but it was definitely [54:23] spirited. so spirited that I got to kind [54:25] of just step back and let you do most of [54:27] the work for the mo for most of this [54:29] conversation which was always a nice [54:30] reprieve for me and I want to wish you a [54:33] meaningful shatva [54:37] >> and uh we we'll be we'll be in touch [54:39] before yum kipur which will give you [54:42] plenty of time to apologize to me and to [54:44] each other and seek forgiveness for your [54:46] sins. So we have [54:47] >> I'm apologizing for you because I'm [54:48] sitting in your office in Washington [54:49] right now. [54:50] >> This is true. This is true. [54:52] All right, guys. Thank you. [54:54] >> Thank you so much. Bye-bye. Bye-bye. 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