Transcript [00:00] Washington debates the Middle East over [00:02] maps. My guest slept in the terrain. [00:05] This is East to West, a podcast of the [00:08] Jerusalem Center for Security and [00:09] Foreign Affairs. I'm Sarah [00:11] Martinez-Hale, and my guest today is [00:13] Brigadier General Ernest Audino, who [00:15] served 28 years in the US Army. He was [00:17] executive assistant to the Vice Chairman [00:20] of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Deputy [00:22] Director of Operations, Readiness, and [00:24] Mobilization at Army Headquarters. A [00:27] West Point graduate, he is now a senior [00:29] military fellow at the Gold Institute [00:32] for International Strategy in [00:33] Washington. He's also the only US [00:35] general officer to spend a full year [00:38] embedded as a combat advisor with a [00:39] Kurdish Peshmerga Brigade in Iraq. So, [00:42] when he talks about defensible terrain, [00:44] he's not describing a map. He's [00:45] describing where he lived. Today, what [00:48] that year taught him, how the US-Israel [00:50] military relations really works, what [00:52] the Gaza war has revealed about modern [00:54] warfare, and what it will take to deal [00:56] with Iran. [01:03] General Audino, thank you very much for [01:05] joining us. [01:05] >> No, it's my pleasure. Thank you very [01:07] much. [01:07] >> So, this is your second trip to Israel, [01:09] correct? So, welcome to Jerusalem, first [01:11] of all. [01:11] >> Yeah, it's wonderful. I tell you what, [01:13] you know, driving into the office this [01:15] morning, and I saw lots of young ladies [01:17] pushing strollers and older folks [01:19] getting about their business, and I [01:21] thought, "Wow, I feel safer here than in [01:23] New York City." [01:25] >> [laughter] [01:26] [gasps] [01:26] >> Certainly not as not as much traffic as [01:29] in New York City. But, I have to I I [01:31] want to start with [01:33] the most history interesting part of [01:35] your story, in my eyes, is is the fact [01:37] that, like I said in your introduction, [01:39] that you were fighting alongside the [01:41] Kurdish Peshmerga in Iraq. Tell me a [01:43] little bit how you went from the [01:45] Pentagon's highest levels to living and [01:48] fighting alongside a Kurdish Brigade. [01:50] What made you want that assignment, and [01:52] and why is it so rare for a general [01:54] officer? [01:55] >> Well, actually, yeah, I was there when I [01:56] was a colonel, but I was at the National [01:59] War College [02:00] um back in 2002 to 2003. And so, [02:04] the the War College offered [02:05] concentrations, right? So, this was [02:08] right after 9/11. [02:10] >> Yeah. [02:10] >> So, there was no question I was going to [02:12] concentrate in mis- Islam in the Middle [02:14] East, right? So, [02:16] uh that was my chosen concentration. One [02:19] of my professors, however, [02:21] had snuck into Iraq in 1988 after the [02:24] gassing of Halabja and when Chemical Ali [02:27] earned his nickname. [02:28] >> Right. [02:29] >> That's right. Yeah, 5,000 Kurds died. [02:32] 10, 15, 20,000 were maimed, right? My [02:34] safe house, ultimately, was about a half [02:36] an hour from Halabja. Well, anyway, um [02:40] this professor's [02:42] um [02:43] experience became a motivator for me to [02:45] to focus my concentration on Kurdish [02:48] history. So, so I did that. I was [02:49] fascinated by it. And lo and behold, I [02:51] get back to the Pentagon and they tell [02:53] me they're going to embed me in a [02:55] Kurdish unit. Now, this is against all [02:57] army logic because they should have sent [02:59] me to Korea, I said, because it begins [03:02] with the same letter. [03:05] >> And what did a year embedded with the [03:07] Peshmerga teach you [03:09] that years in Washington could never? [03:11] And can you tell me a little bit about [03:13] what that experience was like for you on [03:14] a day-to-day basis? [03:16] >> Well, to answer your first question, [03:18] um [03:20] I think it's extremely important to [03:22] recognize when you're working with [03:24] international partners, especially [03:27] face-to-face on the ground with an [03:28] indigenous group, right? You can't [03:31] simply presume everybody shares all [03:34] interests, right? What they think is [03:36] important might not be what we think is [03:38] imp- is important as Americans or vice [03:40] versa. And so, you have to get deep into [03:44] um your partner's culture. You have to [03:47] get into their mind. You have to [03:48] understand their narrative. How do they [03:50] see themselves in the world? You know, [03:52] how do they see the world? What do they [03:54] think is important in the in and the [03:57] reason why I can't stress that type of [03:59] an approach [04:01] um enough is because you have to remain [04:04] perceptive enough to identify where [04:06] those interests coincide because at that [04:09] point you can move mountains. [04:11] >> To that point, what did you learn about [04:13] the the Kurds specifically here in the [04:15] Middle East as you mentioned, an [04:16] indigenous group that is native to the [04:18] Middle East who do do not have their own [04:21] their own independent state. They have [04:22] been wanting [04:23] that self-determination for for a long [04:25] time now. They do control some areas of [04:28] northern Syria. [04:30] I want to hear you know what has been [04:31] your experience and what you learned [04:32] about the Kurds specifically. [04:34] >> Well, you know, they faced years of [04:37] repression. [04:38] Um attempted genocide. Of course, that [04:40] was Saddam Hussein's Anfal operation. [04:43] Um the Kurds in northern Iraq were hit [04:45] with chemical weapons 48 times. 46 of [04:48] those strikes were in my base area up in [04:51] the Kurdish north. Most people don't [04:53] realize that Saddam Hussein had [04:55] established numerous concentration camps [04:58] for Kurds [05:00] where he had established so-called [05:02] forbidden zones. No human being [05:05] specifically no Kurds could live there. [05:09] People were uprooted, moved into the [05:11] concentration camps which he called new [05:13] Saddam cities. In the end [05:15] 220 250,000 Kurds were killed in the [05:19] Anfal operations over the years and [05:22] the Kurds today I'll put it this way. [05:24] They've seen the worst in humanity. [05:27] They are absolutely determined not to [05:29] return to that. They try to make today [05:32] better than yesterday and tomorrow [05:33] better than today. The black flag of [05:35] ISIS for example, even though Kurds are [05:37] overwhelmingly Sunni [05:39] has never flown on an inch of Kurdish [05:42] soil. They're very proud of their [05:44] approach to coexistence. So when I was [05:46] there, there Kurdish Christians, Kurdish [05:49] Jews, pre-Christian religions still [05:52] being practiced. [05:53] And it was everybody identified as Kurds [05:56] first. I could go to church there as an [05:57] American. I I I suspect I was the only [06:00] American in Iraq who could go to church [06:02] in town. [06:03] >> Yeah. [06:04] >> By myself. [06:04] >> An interesting um fact that you may not [06:07] know uh uh Jerusalem is one of the uh [06:10] biggest population areas of people that [06:12] are Jews that are originally Kurds, [06:14] which our viewers I don't even know if [06:16] they know what Jewish Kurds are. [06:19] Um [06:19] even for me having to Jerusalem, that [06:21] was one of the the most interesting [06:23] things to to discover. Amazing food, [06:25] I'll tell you that. The Kurds were among [06:27] America's most reliable partners against [06:29] ISIS as you mentioned, yet they often [06:31] feel let down by Washington. I'm curious [06:33] to hear your take on that. [06:35] >> Where to begin? [06:36] Um [06:38] Well, back during the Algiers Accord, I [06:39] think was the first disappointment. [06:42] Uh was a dispute over the Shatt al-Arab. [06:44] And at the time, we were United States [06:47] was supplying the Peshmerga through [06:49] Iran. [06:51] And uh of course, this was before the [06:53] revolution. But the dispute over the [06:55] Shatt al-Arab between Iraq and Iran [06:57] persisted, and eventually the resolution [07:00] was that we would stop funding the Kurds [07:02] through Iran, and Iraq would cede the [07:06] Shatt al-Arab to Iran. [07:08] Um and overnight the Kurdish [07:11] revolution, let's say, Kurdish uprisings [07:15] stopped. And that was really the first [07:17] big disappointment for the Kurds. [07:19] And you know, back then we go to 2017 [07:22] after the Kurdish referendum. Now, that [07:24] wasn't the first Kurdish referendum on [07:26] independence. First one was in late [07:28] 2005, just before I arrived in Iraq. Uh [07:32] And the question was to all of the [07:34] Kurdish populated areas in the north, [07:38] do you prefer outright sovereignty? [07:41] Do you prefer to remain an integral [07:44] piece of Iraq, a contiguous Iraq? Or do [07:47] you desire some type of special status? [07:50] Overwhelmingly, 98% voted, of course, [07:53] for an independent sovereign state of [07:55] Kurdistan. So, they voted, and nothing [07:57] happened. You know, it was just a [07:58] non-binding sense of the people. There [08:01] was no Iranian proxy invasion. There was [08:04] no crushing of Kurdish aspirations by [08:07] Baghdad necessarily. But when the same [08:10] question was extended in 2017 [08:13] after American troops had withdrew [08:15] had withdrawn. [08:17] The same question and by the way, that [08:19] question this time didn't just stop at [08:21] the Kurdish populated areas. It extended [08:24] into the so-called disputed areas. [08:26] They're really not disputed. These are [08:28] historic Kurdish areas that Saddam had [08:31] just refused to relinquish after 1991. [08:35] Kirkuk being one of those areas. In [08:37] either case, that question was extended [08:39] to the Kurds and those living in the [08:42] disputed areas, which had been [08:43] ethnically cleansed over the years of [08:45] Kurds. And you know what? The result was [08:48] 93.7% [08:51] still preferred a sovereign independent [08:55] state. But what did that happen What did [08:56] that earn them? [08:58] An invasion by Iranian proxies, Hashd [09:00] al-Shaabi, and Qassem Soleimani himself [09:04] entered Iraq and based his operations [09:06] out of a town called Tuz Khurmatu, which [09:09] was close to the Iranian border, which [09:11] incidentally was just on my southern [09:14] edge of my base area when I was there. [09:16] And the Hashd al-Shaabi was began to [09:19] infiltrate that town then. [09:21] And despite our efforts and my argument [09:24] that we needed to put people there, [09:26] specifically Peshmerga, we were never [09:28] allowed to do that. The rest was [09:30] history. [09:30] >> Iraq is often cited as a a cautionary [09:34] tale against American involvement in the [09:36] region. What do you think people get [09:38] right and wrong about that lesson? [09:41] >> Cautionary tale about American involve [09:43] Well, they should be um [09:45] just like any any other nation with a [09:47] democratically elected government, [09:49] right? They've They've got to be [09:50] cognizant that that government can [09:52] change. [09:53] Ultimately, however, the [09:55] the staying power is one of what are our [09:58] vital national interests because [10:01] those don't necessarily change [10:03] fundamentally all the time. Um and [10:06] rational nations will secure, promote, [10:09] or seize those vital national interests. [10:13] The The trick, I think, is making sure [10:16] that the American public [10:18] understands what's at stake. What They [10:21] have to understand the dynamic in terms [10:24] of their self-interest. As unseemly as [10:26] that sounds, [10:28] that's rational behavior, isn't it? All [10:29] right? [10:30] >> Yeah. [10:30] >> So, articulating what's that vital at [10:33] national interest that's at stake, [10:35] making sure all Americans understand it, [10:37] and under- stand the high value to it, [10:40] that connects us more consistently to [10:42] what's happening in the Middle East. [10:44] >> I I think you you touched on a very [10:45] important important point there, which [10:47] is that [10:48] a lot of Americans today, especially in [10:50] this um you know, [10:52] both on the right and on the left, this [10:54] uh concept of America first, right? And [10:57] I think that's something that a lot of [10:59] Americans don't seem to understand is [11:01] that Middle East security is very much [11:04] tied to America first. Middle Eastern [11:06] security means an American safe a safe [11:09] America. And I'd love to get your your [11:11] take on that, especially, you know, [11:13] within the context of of Israel and the [11:16] gods of war. [11:17] >> Well, let me say this right up front. [11:18] Humanitarian [11:19] reasons are supremely important, aren't [11:22] they? All right? [11:23] But, they're also unlimited. [11:25] Uh but, our resources are limited. So, [11:28] nations, all nations, [11:30] have to focus first on those vital [11:33] national interests, right? That's the [11:34] discipline. As As humans have, you know, [11:36] our our [11:38] capacity for compassion is unlimited, [11:41] but we can't do everything, [11:42] unfortunately, right? So, we've we've [11:44] got to be able to make some decisions. [11:48] You know, and that and that guides us. [11:50] In the Middle East, there's no question [11:53] the world's economy, not just the United [11:55] States, [11:56] depends on the energy that flows out of [11:59] the Middle East, okay? [12:01] Humanity depends on peaceful coexistence [12:04] between those nations in the Middle [12:05] East, as well. They're both connected. [12:09] Unfortunately, [12:11] we've suffered from narratives [12:13] in the West [12:15] that are confusing the issue on energy. [12:18] People seem to seem to have less of a [12:22] positive reaction to that argument, [12:24] probably because it sounds selfish and [12:27] unseemly. But again, that's rational [12:29] behavior. [12:30] >> Before we we jump into the conversation [12:32] related to Israel, I do want to ask you [12:34] and you touched on it a little bit [12:36] before, but Iranian-backed militias [12:38] operated in Iraq throughout your time [12:39] there as you mentioned. Can you tell me [12:41] some of the the the stories the things [12:43] that you saw firsthand about how Iran [12:46] builds influence in a neighboring state? [12:49] >> That's an excellent question. That's the [12:51] Lebanon model you're really referring [12:53] to. Yeah, that's where That's where [12:56] Iran, the Islamic regime, honed this [12:58] technique, didn't they? And you know, [13:02] I'm just going to make an aside. Iran's [13:04] ring of fire, if that's not an attempt [13:07] to gain strategic depth, I don't know [13:10] what it is, right? [13:11] >> Right. [13:11] >> That extends thousands of miles from [13:13] Tehran. But back to the specific [13:15] question, because the southern 60% of [13:18] Iraq is overwhelmingly Shia populated, [13:21] right? Co-religionists with with the [13:23] regime. [13:24] >> IRGC Quds Forces have been stimulating [13:26] and operating within this community for [13:28] a long time. Um when I was there, [13:32] starting I think it was February when Al [13:35] I had called it up to that point, [13:36] February 2006, [13:38] I had almost referred to our the war to [13:41] that point was our splendid little war. [13:44] But in February 2006, Al-Qaeda in Iraq, [13:47] Zarqawi's guys, intentionally bombed the [13:50] Golden Mosque in Samarra. [13:52] A Shia mosque. [13:53] >> Mhm. [13:54] >> The war went overtly [13:57] jihadi after that. It became a sectarian [14:00] war, and Iranian proxies began flooding [14:03] into Iraq or became they were supplied [14:06] and and energized by the IRGC and the [14:08] Quds Forces. Groups like the Jaysh [14:10] al-Mahdi I had already already [14:12] mentioned. [14:14] The worst part of it, however, was that [14:16] in 2011, December 2011, President Obama [14:18] decided to pull most US combat power out [14:21] of Iraq. Nature abhors a a vacuum, but [14:24] so does national security and foreign [14:26] policy. Once that occurred, the stopgap [14:30] was opened and Iranian proxy activity [14:32] exploded inside Iraq. Shortly after that [14:35] in [14:36] 20 [14:37] 14, I know 2015, I believe. 2014 [14:42] um [14:44] Ayatollah Sistani signed a fatwa, issued [14:46] a fatwa [14:48] authorizing the expansion of the Hashd [14:51] al-Shaabi, the Shia militias inside [14:53] Iraq. 2015-16, [14:56] somewhere in there, the Iraqi Parliament [14:58] formally incorporated the Hashd [15:01] al-Shaabi into the Iraqi security [15:03] forces. [15:04] >> That [15:05] reminds me, like you said, very much of [15:06] the Lebanese model, where we've got [15:08] Hezbollah very much embedded within the [15:11] Lebanese Parliament, making decisions, [15:13] being part of of the the the the [15:15] government [15:16] policy. [15:17] >> Yeah, most of the ministries, I would [15:19] guess 95% of the ministries are now Shia [15:22] dominated. [15:23] Am I right? [15:24] >> You've said that terrain matters. Now, [15:27] how did Kurdistan's [15:29] geography shape the way that the [15:31] Peshmerga fought? And what can Americans [15:34] learn from it about Israel's own [15:35] security geographically? [15:37] >> Well, you know, the Peshmerga are [15:40] not unlike many other militia-based [15:43] organizations. You know, even in the [15:45] American tradition, you know, our nation [15:47] was founded on colonial militias. [15:49] And militias are inherently regionally [15:53] based, geographically based, right? They [15:55] They arise where the citizens live. [15:58] Okay? Unlike a federal army. You know, [16:01] in a in a militia construct, [16:04] you bring the army [16:06] to the soldiers, so to speak, all right? [16:08] Right where they live. [16:09] >> The people's army. [16:10] >> In a federal army, you bring the [16:12] soldiers to the army. That's it. It's a [16:14] different construct. So, they're they're [16:17] inherently regionally based inside Iraq, [16:19] and people fight most tenaciously [16:23] for their own terrain. [16:24] >> I'm hearing a lot of of similarities [16:27] between your experience with the Kurds [16:30] and [16:31] at least our experience here in Israel. [16:34] Um [16:34] we're talking about two indigenous [16:36] groups that are that are native here to [16:37] the Middle East who one unfortunately [16:40] did not get their sovereignty, one who [16:42] did, and whose enemies are not across an [16:45] ocean, but they're very much at their [16:47] doorstep. [16:49] I'm curious to hear from you, um [16:51] and you touched on this a little bit in [16:53] our conference hosted by the Truman [16:55] Center for Security and Foreign Affairs, [16:57] talking about Israel's strategic terrain [16:59] here in the region and the importance of [17:03] of the being able to defend those [17:06] borders. I I want to get your opinion on [17:09] specifically on the northern frontier [17:12] between Israel's border between Israel [17:15] and and Lebanon and Syria, as well as [17:18] Israel's border with Gaza. [17:19] >> Well, let's take Gaza first. [17:22] There's it's [17:24] it's going to be tough to establish [17:26] adequate depth there. [17:29] Um [17:30] Gaza's what? 7 km, 10 km wide? I guess [17:34] that's something like that. And a um [17:38] and a mortar a mortar round a simple [17:40] mortar round that ranges 3 km. How can [17:43] you effectively establish um [17:46] a a sufficient border? You have to make [17:49] the attempt. You have You've got to chip [17:51] away the range on these types of weapon [17:53] systems to give yourself enough time to [17:56] respond cuz it's really about time. The [17:58] distance is a is a function, yes, but [18:01] it's the time that it provides an active [18:03] response, an ability to respond. Um and [18:06] also I would say this, in the 21st [18:08] century, as the character of war has [18:10] been changing to more and more hybrid [18:13] threats, the character of war always [18:14] changes. It's how we fight. Back during [18:16] the agricultural age, you know, [18:18] thousands of years ago, people fought [18:21] with axes and and spears and swords, the [18:25] things they used to work the earth, [18:27] let's say. Then in the industrial age, [18:29] we began to to [18:32] to mechanize warfare, um and we had [18:35] tanks and machine guns, repeating [18:37] weapons, aircraft. We fought with [18:40] ultimately atomic weapons, right? [18:42] But now we're into the 21st century, the [18:44] information age. Information itself [18:46] becomes a weapon. [18:48] All right? So [18:49] >> And could not have been more true than [18:50] this war here in Gaza. [18:51] >> Correct. Hybrid threats can exploit [18:54] that. Now, hybrid threats run the gamut. [18:57] It's almost an infinite spectrum, [18:59] okay? But tactical events, something [19:02] that would have been completely tactical [19:05] 30 years ago, now can have strategic [19:07] effect. Once it goes viral in our [19:11] information age, [19:13] it's taking the horror of that moment [19:15] deep into another population, let's say. [19:18] And um [19:19] it terror- terrorizes them, horrifies [19:21] them. All right. So So yeah, you're [19:24] going to need at least some way to [19:26] mitigate against those that that mortar [19:29] threat and those those those drone [19:31] threats and those rocket threats coming [19:33] out of Gaza. Uh the same thing applies [19:35] up in the the north with Lebanon, except [19:39] the Hezbollah presence had grown so [19:41] large after the Israeli withdrawal, [19:43] right? [19:44] So large and [19:46] Iranian [19:48] M-46 tubes, 130 mm, I believe. Their [19:52] range is about 27 km. With [19:54] rocket-assisted projectiles, wraps, it [19:57] extends out to 40. The newest variants [19:59] of Katyusha rockets, their range is 35 [20:03] to 40 km or so, right? The bulk of them [20:06] around 10 km. This has to be taken into [20:09] a into account. [20:10] >> As the military professional, uh because [20:13] we touched upon uh the war in Gaza, [20:15] which is [20:17] top of the headlines, and and the the [20:19] the terminology surrounding this war has [20:21] been [20:22] so uh so much disputed and many people [20:26] are very passionate about this topic who [20:28] don't necessarily know what they're [20:29] talking about. So as a military [20:31] professional what is your assessment of [20:34] of how Israel has conducted this war in [20:35] Gaza and how should Americans judge it [20:38] against the standards of urban warfare [20:40] like you mentioned earlier? [20:41] >> I think [20:43] more Americans need to have upfront [20:46] close [20:48] access let's say [20:50] to how the Israelis are prosecuting [20:52] their operations inside Gaza. [20:55] They will see extreme measures taken to [20:58] separate combatants from non [21:00] non-combatants. In fact, to extremes [21:02] that I personally not even experienced [21:04] on the battlefield, right? The IDF is [21:08] establishing safe quarters for the [21:10] withdrawal of non-combatants, civilians, [21:12] right? [21:14] They are notifying families via phone [21:17] calls. [21:18] Specific people via phone calls, text [21:21] messages, leaflets of [21:24] warning of upcoming operations. [21:27] That's a risk right there, isn't it? [21:29] Ordinarily you would want to maintain [21:31] that the secrecy of your operations. [21:34] But now they're disclosing an upcoming [21:35] operation in specific areas. The IDF is [21:38] assuming a certain amount of risk by [21:39] doing that. But what they're doing is [21:41] they are separating those non-combatants [21:43] from the combatants. Rules of engagement [21:46] have been very precise and very adaptive [21:49] again to preserve the non-combatants. So [21:52] yeah, I [21:53] all of that is inconsistent with these [21:56] popular claims of genocide. [21:58] >> I want to get your take here. I'm going [22:00] to push back a little bit because [22:02] there's a new documentary film that's [22:05] been come out that has made headlines [22:06] around the world. They got a 25-minute [22:08] standing ovation at the Venice Film [22:10] Festival and I'm talking about Naza [22:12] which in Hebrew means collateral damage. [22:15] It was produced by two Israelis two [22:17] Israeli [22:18] journalists you could call them and here [22:21] in Israel it it's it's sparked a a of [22:23] anger and backlash for basically [22:26] claiming that Israel the Israeli [22:27] military uses [22:29] um [22:30] AI to carry out their their precision [22:32] strikes in Gaza [22:34] and does not have any sort of human [22:35] verification when it comes to those [22:37] strikes [22:39] and leading to very high casualty [22:43] um [22:44] tolls. I want to get your take on that [22:47] and your response to that film which um [22:50] the documentary in itself from from from [22:53] my understanding and I haven't watched [22:54] the film to to be to be clear um [22:58] does interview Israeli military members [23:01] anonymous of course. There's also no [23:04] understanding of what their rank is. [23:05] >> Well, I haven't seen the film either, [23:07] right? But the notion of artificial [23:09] intelligence AI enabled operations is [23:12] nothing new. [23:13] Okay. [23:14] The question is is there the term has [23:17] been man in the loop. Is there man in [23:18] the loop? All right, at that final kill [23:21] chain decision and [23:25] we may never get completely comfortable [23:26] with that. That notion that [23:30] maybe a man on the loop is the way to do [23:32] it. That's the debate. It's not just [23:34] here, but [23:36] I'm [23:37] confident that the [23:40] man [23:41] that the judgment of the IDF [23:44] is the best you can get under these [23:46] circumstances [23:48] and that their employment of AI is [23:50] actually establishing [23:53] um [23:54] best practices for the future. [23:57] And I suspect we are going to learn [23:59] we're going to look to the IDF [24:00] operations in Gaza [24:03] for lessons learned just as we did when [24:05] we re-professionalized [24:08] the American war fighting doctrine air [24:10] land battle in the mid-70s into the 80s [24:13] based on the lessons that came out of [24:15] the war 67 and 73. [24:17] >> I think it's really important to to [24:19] mention that the war in Gaza has been [24:21] one of the most I'm sure you can attest [24:23] to that one of the most compli- complex [24:25] cases of urban warfare in the 21st [24:27] century, um especially with Hamas [24:30] embedding itself within the civilian [24:32] population and underground and using [24:34] these civilians as human shields, um [24:37] both on a tactical level and as within [24:39] the the cognitive warfare that you [24:41] mentioned earlier, which has really [24:43] become that eighth front here in Israel [24:45] at least. How should the US military's [24:48] own experience in Mosul and Fallujah [24:51] inform how we think about this war? [24:53] >> So, there was a teaching point that came [24:56] out of the second battle of Fallujah, [24:58] which in many ways [25:01] was the turning point, and that was [25:02] 2007. [25:05] So, Fallujah was largely Sunni-dominated [25:08] Al-Qaeda in Iraq, Zarqawi's guys. This [25:10] was their heartland. [25:12] And it was very difficult there, and [25:14] Fallujah was a mean and nasty fight, no [25:17] doubt. [25:18] That was the first battle of Fallujah. [25:20] But by 2007 [25:22] or so, [25:23] things began to change because the US [25:26] military on the ground there [25:27] had established very good understanding [25:30] of the indigenous population. [25:33] And as I mentioned earlier in one of [25:34] your first questions, they began to [25:37] understood how they saw each other, how [25:38] they saw themselves, and what motivated [25:41] them. And eventually, some of the [25:43] tribes, the sheikhs from some of the [25:45] tribes who were supporters of Al-Qaeda [25:47] in Iraq, [25:49] their own operations, their own [25:52] financial wherewithal was being [25:55] jeopardized by [25:57] Al-Qaeda operations. [26:00] And it culminated in the death, the [26:02] shooting, [26:03] of a the son of one of the sheikhs. [26:07] And then a refusal by AQI [26:09] to return the body to the family. [26:12] This [26:13] just ignited a hatred amongst those [26:16] Sunni tribes. And they realized that [26:20] their interests coincided with those of [26:22] the United States. Within about 5 days, [26:25] 40 tribes signed up to conduct counter [26:28] Al-Qaeda operations, and Al-Qaeda was [26:30] pushed out. [26:31] >> I I want to zoom out here for a second [26:33] because we focused a lot on on the war [26:35] in Gaza, but I want to hear about more [26:37] about that US [26:38] US-Israel military cooperation. And from [26:41] your time on the joint staff and at Army [26:43] headquarters, what does that cooperation [26:46] look like in practice, you know, beyond [26:48] the headlines about aids aid and [26:50] weapons? [26:51] >> Well, there's no substitute for [26:53] face-to-face coordination and um [26:56] professional ongoing [26:58] uh cultural exchange uh cultural [26:59] exchanges, officer exchanges between IDF [27:02] and the US military. And that's [27:04] invaluable. The the the rigid uh or [27:07] rigid, the rigorous after-action review [27:10] process shared with partners, shared [27:12] with allies, the sharing of [27:14] intelligence, even the sharing of [27:16] targeting data, there's just no [27:18] substitute for that. [27:19] >> Some critics argue that Israel's a [27:22] strategic burden, while supporters call [27:25] it a a force multiplier, specifically [27:27] here when it comes to stabilizing uh the [27:30] the region, the Middle East. Where do [27:31] you come down, and what is the strongest [27:33] evidence in your view? [27:35] >> I come down as [27:36] to the words as spoken by George [27:39] Marshall [27:41] of the Marshall Plan, General Marshall. [27:43] You don't fight unless you have to. [27:46] You don't fight for long. [27:48] And you don't fight without partners. [27:50] Okay? [27:51] It's all connected. You want capable [27:54] partners in a in a in a war, in any war. [27:57] Not only that, it's not a charity case. [28:00] Alliances are not charity cases. You [28:01] don't become a charity an alliance [28:04] member just for the benefits. You You're [28:06] You're an alliance member because you [28:08] can come in and deliver a punch. You've [28:10] got the capability to do that. Right now [28:12] in the Middle East, who does it better [28:14] than Israel, right? [28:16] That is an absolute essential ally and [28:19] partner of the United States as we [28:22] protect and secure our own vital [28:24] national interests. [28:26] >> Readiness and and mobilization were your [28:28] portfolio. What can the US military [28:31] learn from Israel, and what can Israel [28:34] learn from the US alternatively? [28:35] >> For one, you cannot separate your [28:38] military operations from the civilian [28:40] population. You can't sterilize it, so [28:42] to speak. We attempted that during [28:44] Vietnam, and I think that was at the [28:46] wrong decision. [28:48] Because the war becomes something on TV. [28:50] It It's It doesn't involve the US [28:53] population, and I think you would make [28:55] that decision to separate them or [28:57] attempt to keep them preserved from the [28:59] operation if you weren't entirely [29:01] confident of what you were doing. If you [29:03] were confident in the White House of [29:05] what you were doing, that you would [29:06] ensure that you call up [29:08] reserve units, and that Army National [29:11] Guard units, Air National Guards. They [29:13] get included in the fight because that [29:15] brings the stakes and your success or [29:18] failure directly into every hometown in [29:21] the United States. [29:22] >> What would credible deterrence against [29:24] Iran look like, and [29:26] does the US have it today? [29:29] >> Oh, I'm not a great fan of [29:31] I don't have a lot of confidence in the [29:33] ability to deter the Islamic regime. You [29:35] see, [29:36] we understand war in the Western [29:38] Hemisphere from a certain perspective. [29:40] And Carl von Clausewitz stated it well. [29:42] You know, he's the most influential [29:44] theorist on warfare in the Western [29:45] Hemisphere. War is politics by extreme [29:47] measure. Meaning, politics is a rational [29:50] process. It is. It's our non- It's our [29:53] world system for non-violent conflict [29:54] resolution. Where we expect everyone to [29:57] act reasonably, meaning act in their [29:59] best interest. And when the cost exceed [30:01] whatever you're arguing about, you cede [30:03] the point and you go on with your life. [30:06] And the same is on the battlefield. It's [30:07] just that's that's politics by extreme [30:09] measure. At some point reasonable [30:11] reasonable debate reaches its limits, [30:13] and the first bullet flies. Now you're [30:15] trending towards war if not open war. [30:18] And you are now fighting over an issue [30:20] in dispute once the cost exceed that [30:23] value, [30:24] somebody gives up, hey, it's not worth [30:26] it anymore, and the war ends. [30:28] But how does that explain holy war? [30:30] How does it explain a holy warrior, [30:32] right? Who's waging war on the basis of [30:35] a faith. [30:37] a faith that at its rock bottom you [30:39] can't concede. You know, it's waged on [30:42] your status. You can't concede your [30:45] status. [30:47] And so costs to the Islamic [30:49] Revolutionary Guards Corps [30:52] really are immaterial. You know, the [30:54] accumulated costs. What they care about [30:57] though, cuz they're operating like a [30:58] mafia in control of Iran, in control of [31:01] the people, [31:02] they they care that they lose their [31:05] ability to control the population. [31:06] That's what they care about. [31:08] >> Is that the secret to toppling down the [31:11] regime in Iran? [31:12] >> I think it is. You see the the [31:13] population, if you look at the history [31:15] of irregular warfare, there's a tipping [31:17] point. It's a psychological tipping [31:19] point. There's a point where, if it gets [31:21] to this point, the population realizes [31:25] that their defeat, their ongoing [31:27] repression is no longer inevitable, you [31:30] see. They get to the point where they [31:32] realize that the regime's continued [31:36] existence is no longer inevitable, [31:39] right? And the regime itself has a [31:41] similar tipping point, that their [31:43] continued survival is no longer [31:46] inevitable. This is an important point. [31:49] Look, the citizens in Iran did it in [31:51] 1979, didn't they? And they didn't have [31:53] the world's superpower behind them. [31:56] This time [31:57] they potentially have Israel and the [31:59] world's superpower behind them. But [32:02] they've taken to the streets previously, [32:04] they were slaughtered, they're [32:07] understandably not excited about taking [32:10] to the streets again, but the conditions [32:12] are getting so bad [32:15] economically inside the country, they [32:17] can't be comfortable with the status [32:19] quo. So, they're not going to take back [32:22] to the streets until the military [32:24] conditions are set for that. I'll [32:26] explain that in a second. They're not [32:28] going to do it without closer support [32:31] once they take to the streets, [32:33] and they won't do it until they hear [32:36] Washington say toppling the Islamic [32:39] regime is our objective and we have to [32:42] mean it. Right? [32:44] Then we're going to see some people take [32:45] to the streets. Now, what are those [32:46] military conditions that have to be set? [32:49] The levers of the regime, those [32:50] repressive levers, those have to be [32:52] destroyed. Now, [32:54] they're between the Basij, which are [32:57] basically the morality police, and the [32:59] Pasdaran, the IRGC, [33:01] those that are purposed for internal [33:03] repression, those are the IRGC land [33:05] forces, and the Basij, together it's [33:08] about 1.6 million troops. They're spread [33:10] out over 11 commands across the Iran. [33:14] Iran's got about 30 provinces, I think, [33:16] so roughly three provinces per command. [33:19] That's the responsibility of that [33:21] command for repressive operations. 1.6 [33:24] million. How many Iranian citizens are [33:26] there? [33:27] Over 90 million. [33:29] Even if we assume a large portion of [33:32] them don't take to the streets, there's [33:33] still plenty to grossly overwhelm those [33:37] 1.6 million troops on the ground. Even [33:39] if we assume, I don't know, a quarter of [33:41] the population still supports the [33:43] regime, the numbers are still [33:45] disproportionately in favor of those who [33:48] would be uh benefited by toppling the [33:50] regime. To me, [33:52] I, you know, a guy who grew up during [33:54] the Cold War, my military career began [33:56] in 1979, [33:58] we began focusing on the Red Army [34:00] threat. We studied the Red Army [34:02] doctrine, its history, its order of [34:04] battle, its leaders, its tactics. We [34:07] prepared for this. This was our whole [34:09] reason for existence almost. [34:12] And then we had 9/11. Then we had not, [34:15] we had 1979 takeover of of of of the [34:19] regime in in Iran, right? Islamic [34:21] revolution. [34:21] >> Red green alliance coming together? [34:23] >> Correct. And so we began simultaneously [34:26] focusing on that, too, right? So my [34:28] generation of war fighters, we grew up [34:31] preparing for these two monumental [34:34] threats. I tell you this, when the [34:37] Islamic regime in Tehran is toppled, [34:41] that's going to feel as momentous to us [34:44] as did the collapse of the Soviet Union. [34:46] >> Brigadier General Ernie Audino, it it's [34:48] been a pleasure getting to speak to you. [34:50] And speaking to someone who not only [34:52] understands the military perspective, [34:54] but truly understands deeply the [34:56] cultural and religious aspect of the [34:58] Middle East. You know the Middle East [35:00] like the back of your hand, and it's [35:01] been a pleasure getting to hear more and [35:03] more stories and anecdotes from you. [35:06] Um and a pleasure to have you here in [35:07] Jerusalem. [35:07] >> Uh no, it's my privilege. Thanks [35:09] everybody that helped make this [35:10] possible.
