Transcript [00:01] In 1939, Neville Chamberlain, new prime [00:04] minister, suddenly says, "Hang on a sec. [00:07] You know, we've just brutally put down [00:09] this Arab revolt in Palestine." But [00:12] actually, are we being mad? There's a [00:15] world war coming and we're going to need [00:17] the Arab world. We're going to need the [00:19] Middle East. And we're risking it all [00:21] for this kind of tiny group of Jews. Who [00:23] should we offend? The Jews or the Arabs? [00:25] We should offend the Jews. So, they [00:27] switch. And in 1939 they offer um the [00:30] Palestinian Arabs a Palestine state, a [00:34] single Palestine state, which they are [00:36] mad to turn down, but they do. And the [00:39] reason they do is because of Islamism. [00:42] And the and the way that Islamism [00:44] combines with nationalism [00:47] and they turn it down because the MUI [00:49] says Palestine is ancient sacred Islamic [00:54] land. And by the way, this comes to the [00:57] essence of why peace is so difficult [00:59] today because this is this is the deep [01:03] belief in much of the community. Not all [01:04] of it, not all of it all the time, but a [01:08] large constituency in the Palestine Arab [01:11] community believes still believes this [01:14] is to be the case. [01:20] All stories about the Middle East are [01:22] about beginnings. Everybody has their [01:24] preferred beginning. Uh so we should [01:26] probably start at the beginning which is [01:27] why on earth made you what on earth made [01:30] you want to do this? [01:31] >> Um thank you and thanks for doing this [01:33] with me by the way. I've read you for a [01:34] long time so it's very nice to to be [01:37] doing be be performing with you and [01:39] thank you very much everyone for coming [01:41] and all the people who made this [01:43] possible and it's great to be back here [01:44] at this lovely synagogue. So thanks [01:46] thanks thanks for being here. Um well [01:49] the cauldron um uh the easiest way to [01:52] tell you is just what what what what [01:54] happened after um October 7th my [01:56] American publishers can said to me um [01:59] would you like to write a short history [02:02] of Israel and I said absolutely not [02:06] because I've written a long history of [02:07] Israel um from the Kingdom of Israel to [02:11] the Republic of Israel and I've and I've [02:14] that's that's I've already done that so [02:16] I'm certainly not going to do it again [02:17] short or long. So, but I said, but on [02:20] the spot I said, but I would like to do [02:23] something. And they said, what? And I [02:24] said, like, I'd like to do something [02:25] called the cauldron. um the making of [02:29] the modern Middle East since 1900 and [02:31] how all the countries came together and [02:33] how they all um how they all interlocked [02:37] um how they were created and really to [02:40] to counter the um the sort of completely [02:44] mythical conspiratorial [02:46] stories um that have become so current [02:50] everywhere. And so I so I suggested that [02:53] and they said actually we that isn't [02:56] what we want him. So then but then a [02:58] year and a half later which is only two [03:01] years ago now um they said to me would [03:03] you you know could you come in and see [03:05] us? So I went to see them in New York [03:06] and they said like you you know you [03:08] mentioned the cauldron would you do it [03:11] now? So I said yeah and so that that's [03:13] how it came to be and the idea of it is [03:16] pretty simple. It's it's it's from Iran [03:19] to Morocco, from Turkey to Sudan and [03:22] Yemen. It's 19 countries. It's from [03:27] roughly 1900. You know, we go back a bit [03:29] further. Um and it's basically just [03:33] explains how we got to where we are now [03:36] from where where it started. Now, when [03:38] it comes to beginnings, um, often the [03:40] date that people have when they're [03:42] talking about the modern Middle East, [03:44] they'll talk go back to 1798 and [03:46] Napoleon's invasion of Egypt or to 1869 [03:49] and the opening of the Suez Canal. Uh, [03:52] but you start in uh well with a tribal [03:54] raid on the fringes of the Ottoman [03:57] Empire around 1900. [03:59] >> That's right. I mean what and why is [04:00] >> I mean you're right and act actually I [04:04] mean as all of you who know you're you [04:06] know who read these sort of books there [04:07] is a sort of weird um there are weird [04:10] kind of um bunchings of books on these [04:13] subjects all the way through history so [04:15] there are millions of books about King [04:17] David there are millions of books about [04:19] the period of Jesus there are millions [04:21] of books about the crusade then they [04:23] sort of jump to the crusades then then [04:26] you really jump all the way to most [04:29] books books on the modern Middle East [04:31] always start after World War I with sort [04:34] of Sykes, Pico, Lori George, Versailles, [04:36] the promises to the Arabs and the Balful [04:38] declaration. So there's an enormous [04:40] number of book and then there's there's [04:41] nothing more till 48 or 67 [04:45] >> and then of course there's just not just [04:47] a bunching of books but an actual moral [04:50] industry on Gazerology and Pal and the [04:54] Palestinians um which is itself a sort [04:57] of weird publishing industry um and is [05:01] is something completely separate and my [05:03] friend Matty Friedman has written rather [05:05] brilliantly on that on that particular [05:07] genre. So, so traditionally the place to [05:11] start is sort of 1917 or 1918. And the [05:14] reason I started back in 1900 was first [05:18] of all um you can't understand the [05:21] Middle East today without understanding [05:22] the Ottoman Empire and that not just the [05:25] sort of collapse of the Ottoman Empire [05:26] but how the Otter Empire worked and all [05:29] the countries that came out of the [05:31] Ottoman Empire which this book handles [05:33] like Syria and Iraq and Lebanon and etc. [05:36] All of them you can really only [05:38] understand how they were created by [05:40] knowing what happened in the Ottoman [05:41] Empire. And you can't really understand [05:45] Erdogan's Turkey or or anything else in [05:49] the region or the all the development of [05:50] Egypt without understanding where these [05:52] places came from. That's that's the [05:54] that's the idea. But I always like to [05:56] start my books um with an exciting [06:00] dramatic cinematic scene, but it has to [06:04] be something that explains the whole, [06:07] you know, explains something essential [06:09] of the history. And Saudi Arabia, you [06:11] know, when Donald Trump went to Saudi [06:12] Arabia at the beginning of his second [06:14] term, he said, "This is the center of [06:16] the world." And that's an amazing [06:18] statement for an American president to [06:20] make. And it really started in 1902 with [06:25] um Abdul Aziz, Prince Abdul Aziz [06:28] al-Saad, Iban Saud as he's known um [06:31] leading in his early 20s a a tribal raid [06:35] as you say Dominic um with with 40 men [06:39] 40 men um of whom many of them were just [06:42] kind of good friends and relatives. [06:45] and they rode out from Q8 down to Riyad [06:49] and they stormed Riyad. Rather, they [06:51] climbed over the wall of Riyad in the [06:53] middle of the night. They crept into the [06:55] governor of Riyad's Harim house. [07:00] They held the women at at gunpoint. And [07:02] when the when the governor got up in the [07:04] morning and walked down grandly across [07:06] the square to to visit his harim, they [07:10] shot him. Um well they they fought with [07:12] him with swords and spears and guns and [07:16] then they killed him and then they [07:18] seized the that they seized the um they [07:20] they seized the the fortress and they [07:23] inaugurated a new Saudi state and it was [07:27] the third Saudi state in fact the first [07:30] one was in the 18th century second one [07:31] 19th century and this is the third one [07:34] and the most successful. [07:36] Now you're saying today there are 19 [07:38] states in the the cauldron region and [07:41] most of them are now dominated by Sunni [07:43] Muslims and of these days 13 are [07:46] majority Arabic speakaking but the [07:49] dominant military powers today Turkey, [07:53] Israel, Iran are not Arabic powers [07:57] and Iran is Shia of course. Now, does [08:00] this fit a historic pattern in the [08:02] region in which the Arabs may have the [08:04] numbers, but the region is shaped by the [08:07] major non-Arab powers, whether they're [08:11] on the rim of the region or even in the [08:13] heart of it or from outside, say, the [08:15] British, the French, the Russians, the [08:16] Americans. Is that is that a recurring [08:18] pattern? Yeah, I mean there hasn't [08:20] really been dominant Arab powers since [08:22] the Arab conquests in um in in the six [08:26] starting in the 630s with with you know [08:28] shortly after the death of of the [08:30] prophet Muhammad and you know for two [08:33] for two centuries or three centuries um [08:36] that was an Arab Empire and it was an [08:37] astonishing phenomenon the Arab Empire [08:40] that you know through three dynasties [08:42] basically the Umiads the Fatimid the [08:45] UmiS the Abbisides and the Fatimids um [08:48] they conquered from uh the Pyrenees [08:51] to the Hindu Kush. Extraordinary, you [08:54] know, it's just extraordinary. And um [08:57] and so the whole Arab world is still [09:00] recovering [09:02] from from the the loss of that that [09:05] amazing story and from the grandeur of [09:07] that story which which really nothing [09:08] can equal. And you think we're having [09:11] postimperial problems with the British [09:13] Empire just a hundred, you know, 100 [09:15] years ago. um they are still trying to [09:19] emulate that amazing record which is of [09:21] course impossible to equal again and [09:24] happen for all sorts of reasons which is [09:26] a story for another time but you're [09:28] absolutely right all the powers after [09:31] that um they were then invaded by Seljuk [09:34] Turks the Seljic Turks took over the [09:36] empire they were not Arabic they were [09:38] Turkish speakaking they created a [09:41] short-lived empire and when the Crusades [09:44] happened u the Seljic Turks [09:46] were dominant, but the whole pl the [09:49] whole Middle East was divided up into [09:51] waring barrenes [09:53] um baicks they called it um that were [09:57] that were fighting each other which is [09:59] why a tiny number of western knights [10:02] from Germany, Britain, France managed to [10:06] storm Jerusale storm Antioch and then [10:08] storm Jerusalem. And you know there's [10:11] some there's some estimates I mean it's [10:12] so fascinating that in 1099 when they [10:15] took Jerusalem there's some estimates [10:18] that there were there were as few as [10:19] 12,000 um you know knights there of [10:23] course they were joined they were joined [10:25] by um Genoies and vian [10:29] Venetian um sailors who brought their [10:32] ships in to help them but it's still an [10:35] extraordinary story. Um, and then you [10:38] have the Mammaluks. Well, the Mammals, [10:40] um, well, you don't have Saladin who was [10:41] a Kurd, [10:42] >> so his empire followed, the Iobid [10:45] Empire. Then you had, then you had the [10:47] Mammals who were kind of Georgian and [10:49] Sarassian. Then you had then you had the [10:52] Ottomans from 1517 onwards. And the [10:55] Ottomans Ottoman was an extraordinary [10:58] empire. It's often presented [11:00] um especially after 911. Weirdly uh you [11:04] know after 911 there was a sort of [11:05] enormous effort. Some people denounced [11:07] Islam and other people launched a great [11:10] effort to show that Islam was the was [11:12] the religion of peace and poetry and and [11:15] song and tolerance. And so people there [11:18] was then a sort of a sort of spate of [11:20] books about you know the great culture [11:23] of the Arab world which which in fact [11:25] was true um about the libraries of [11:28] Baghdad and the House of Wisdom and all [11:30] of that. Um, and then that that the that [11:32] the Ottoman Empire was this [11:34] astonishingly tolerant place where Jews [11:37] and Arabs and Muslims and Christians all [11:40] lived together [11:41] >> like North London, [11:42] >> like North London, like St. John'swood. [11:44] But it it really wasn't like that. Um, [11:48] it it worked for for very short periods [11:51] like that, but essentially [11:54] um but essentially it worked because [11:57] Islam was totally supreme. And if you [11:59] accepted [12:00] Turkish, Ottoman and Islamic supremacy, [12:04] then you were you were permitted to [12:06] exist and if you challenged it in any [12:09] way you were massacred and sometimes you [12:12] were massacred anyway. It was a very [12:14] short period of the 19th century of [12:16] reform tan known as Tanzanat reform [12:18] >> 60s7s [12:20] and [12:21] >> but you know that that was so brief that [12:24] golden age was so brief because even as [12:27] you know in the 1850s that that that [12:29] sparked a civil war in Lebanon Syria [12:32] between the Drews and the Christians and [12:33] the Muslims which led to the massacre of [12:36] 25,000 Christians in Damascus in 1860 [12:40] and led the West back in to the Middle [12:43] East. Um and then and then of course you [12:47] had the still had the Ottoman Empire. [12:48] The Ottoman Empire ended [12:51] um in the 20th century, particularly [12:54] after 1913 and and World War I as a [12:58] protonazi eugenicist [13:02] um social Darwinist [13:04] ultra nationalism and a genocidal [13:07] nationalism that that murdered 1.1 [13:10] million Armenians, 300,000 Pontic [13:13] Greeks, um another 300,000 [13:18] uh Marinites, Assyrians and so on. So it [13:23] ended up as the least tolerant empire [13:25] you could imagine until Hitler and it [13:27] was not a coincidence that Hitler when [13:29] he took power said who now remembers the [13:31] Armenians. So you're absolutely right [13:35] that and then if we go through you know [13:37] then you have the mandate period when [13:40] you know the British and the French are [13:42] in control of much of of much of the [13:44] Arab world of the Middle East the Middle [13:46] East and then you have independence [13:49] after World War II and one you know one [13:52] of the things that is interesting about [13:54] the book because I'm sure you all know [13:57] this and you certainly know this because [13:59] I've read you've written about it but [14:02] you It's amazing the number of times on [14:05] Twitter or social media you see people [14:07] say, you know, my grandmother is older [14:09] than Israel. Um, and they're presuming [14:13] that Israel is a is is a terrifically [14:15] new country while Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, [14:19] etc., etc., are ancient countries that [14:22] have been there for many centuries. And [14:24] in fact, as the book explains in detail, [14:28] they could have had many different [14:29] shapes, but they're very new. They all [14:32] became independent, you know, just [14:34] before just after Israel. And what's [14:39] interesting, and I explain this in the [14:40] book, is that they could have had many [14:41] different shapes. You know, the shape of [14:44] Iraq and Syria and Lebanon now seem set [14:46] in stone, but actually the French, for [14:49] example, when they took control of [14:51] greater Syria, they wanted to have five [14:55] states there. and two Sunni states in [14:57] Aleppo and Damascus, a Drew state, an [15:01] Alawite state, a Marinite state. So, you [15:05] know, it could so easily have looked [15:07] very different than it does. And these [15:11] are the kind of interesting facts that [15:13] give perspective and it's perspective [15:15] that is the tonic for troubled times. I [15:18] hope I think I think you're right. Um, [15:20] Gersham Shalm uh liked to talk of the [15:22] what he called the plastic hour. Uh [15:25] there are moments in history said at [15:26] which um political settlements become [15:30] plastic. They're mobile. They're [15:32] flexible. [15:32] >> I love that phrase. I had no I've not [15:34] heard that phrase. [15:35] >> Well well there's a few plastic hours I [15:36] think you identify in this book. And so [15:39] so I'm going to I'm going to try and [15:41] return to that as we go. And of course [15:43] as as you're saying the the critical one [15:44] is in 1917 and just after where the [15:47] Ottoman Empire is displaced from the [15:50] Levant for the first time in centuries [15:52] and suddenly the European powers are in [15:54] charge and start redrawing the map and [15:56] creating some of the lines which are [15:59] still there today. And the the question [16:01] I would have is how much of what takes [16:04] shape in in the say between 1917 and [16:07] 1929. uh how much of that is shaped by [16:11] the legacies of the Ottoman Empire and [16:13] how much of it is made uh by the [16:15] mapmaking going on in London and Paris? [16:18] That's such a good question. I mean that [16:20] the interesting thing is you got to [16:21] realize when they took first of all um [16:24] the promises to the Arabs and the Jews [16:27] are are the most famous in this period. [16:30] So the promises to the Arabs um became [16:34] one of those one of those definitions of [16:36] the the failure um the betrayal of the [16:39] western powers to the Arab people. But [16:42] in fact the negoti that that is a [16:44] completely false um portrayal of the [16:46] negotiation [16:48] once once World War I started Britain [16:51] and France and later America but [16:53] especially Britain and France couldn't [16:55] think of anything but accept how to win [16:58] the war and they were losing hundreds of [17:02] thousands millions of young men on the [17:05] Western Front and one forgets also the [17:07] Eastern front millions of men were being [17:10] lost. [17:11] how to win this war, how not to lose it. [17:14] And even in 1918, you know, German the [17:17] Ludenorf offensive, the Germans were [17:18] capable of these massive offenses. So [17:20] how to win it? So for example, clever [17:23] imaginative people like Winston [17:24] Churchill were thinking how to turn the [17:26] tables and maybe the Ottoman Empire was [17:28] a way to do that. It was weaker. In [17:31] fact, the Ottoman Empire proved [17:33] surprisingly resilient. And what is it [17:36] often forgotten about the the Ottoman [17:38] Empire is that a million Arab soldiers [17:41] fought from the beginning of World War I [17:43] to the end of World War I loyal to the [17:45] Ottoman Empire. Much many many more than [17:48] fought in the famous Arab revolt of [17:50] Lawrence of Arabia and all that. But the [17:53] British were immediately thinking, how [17:54] do we do this? How do we do this? So [17:57] they made promises to everybody, [17:59] promises they'd never have made in any [18:01] other time. So they promised the Greeks [18:04] that they would have half of what is now [18:06] Turkey andist and and maybe maybe maybe [18:09] other other islands in in the Aian. They [18:12] promised the Italians that they would [18:14] have a whole lot of that per that area [18:16] too. Um they promised the Russians that [18:20] the Russians would have the biggest [18:22] empire that Russia had ever dreamt of [18:24] from Catherine the Great and Peter the [18:26] Great and Prince Petkin who I wrote [18:28] about. um they had always dreamed of [18:31] getting Istanbul, Constantinople and and [18:34] the Straits. Well, in the in the Sykes, [18:38] Pico Sasinov agreement, they were [18:40] promised [18:42] Constantinople, the Straits, [18:45] much of East what is now eastern Turkey. [18:48] And this is the interesting bit, they [18:50] were also promised Palestine and [18:52] Jerusalem. So there was going to be a [18:55] Russian presence in Palestine, [18:57] Jerusalem. Um, of course they had to [19:00] last the war to do that and that didn't [19:02] happen because in 1917 [19:05] the Zar fell and then Lenin took power [19:08] and so that didn't happen. So the [19:10] Russians were out by that point but they [19:12] had already promised um the the the [19:15] Arabs um a large independence and but [19:19] what did that really mean? The Arabs [19:21] were represented by um Hussein of Mecca [19:25] who was had the grandest pedigree in the [19:28] Arab world because he was descended from [19:30] the prophet directly. And by the way, [19:32] these these descents from the prophet, [19:35] if they're if they're carefully um [19:37] chronicled through ages, they're [19:39] probably genuine, you know, but but but [19:42] but by now half the half the Muslim [19:44] world cla you know, Ali Kame, the the [19:48] late supreme leader, also claimed to be [19:50] a Sai and directly descended from the [19:52] prophet. And God knows if that's true or [19:54] not, but people like the Hashemites [19:56] probably are descended from the prophet [19:59] and [19:59] >> with a surname like that. [20:01] >> Yes. Yes, exactly. So, so they um they [20:06] you know they they negotiated with the [20:08] British in secret and at the same time [20:11] by the way they were negotiating with [20:12] the Ottomans for a hereditary kingdom as [20:15] well. But the British made them a better [20:17] offer and the British said you can be [20:18] king of everything. You can be king of [20:20] the whole Middle East. But the British [20:22] understood that they couldn't just give [20:25] this family the whole Middle East [20:27] because [20:29] this family had only ever run Mecca, a [20:32] small but very important holy city in [20:35] the Hijaz. And they only commanded [20:38] about, you know, 2,000 troops. [20:42] So in this negotiation which is the [20:44] famous Mcmman um Hussein negotiations [20:49] both sides knew that they were kind of [20:51] playing games that Hussein of Hussein of [20:54] Mecca knew that he was he was asking for [20:57] an empire that the family would just be [20:59] given by the British and the empire [21:01] would include all of Arabia, all of [21:04] Iraq, all of Syria, all of Lebanon, all [21:07] of Israel just for this one family that [21:10] had no troops. and he was just asking [21:12] for this. So naturally the British um [21:16] you know kind of befogged the issue and [21:19] they said we can give you this but it [21:21] has to be east of this, it has to be [21:22] west of that. It doesn't include [21:23] Palestine. It doesn't include anything [21:25] east of Aleppo. It doesn't include [21:27] anything we've promised to the French. [21:29] Well they'd promised half the Middle [21:31] East to the French. So that was that got [21:33] them out of that problem. Okay. So that [21:35] was one part of it and they signed the [21:37] deal. And and by the way, the Hashemites [21:39] who still rule Jordan, they understood [21:42] this negotiation was [21:45] um sort of let's say like everyone was [21:48] kind of half you know wearing a [21:49] blindfold or or you know something like [21:52] that and then of course there were all [21:53] these other promises to the Greeks, the [21:55] Italians um and then the then the [21:58] British were also had become champions [22:00] of the new nationalisms. [22:04] So yes, they were imperialists and but [22:07] they didn't see any contradiction with [22:08] also supporting the new nationalism. So [22:10] there was the Arab nationalism we've [22:11] talked about. Then there was the Jewish [22:13] nationalism. They saw no contradiction [22:15] with that either because they were [22:18] promising in 1917 the Balful declaration [22:20] they were promising a homeland not of [22:23] Palestine but in Palestine. What the [22:26] hell did that mean? No one knew but that [22:28] was fine. You can make the [22:29] >> term national home doesn't have a sort [22:31] of legal definition. [22:33] in retrospect at the time it was not [22:35] understood in in in what became [22:37] international law as being a thing [22:39] >> and that international didn't yet exist [22:41] and anyway a homeland in Palestine you [22:44] know we you know we can discuss what [22:47] that meant um so there there's that but [22:50] they were also supporting Armenian [22:52] nationalism u again another people like [22:56] the Jews who had suffered much in [22:58] history and by the way at that point [23:01] very recently I mean the Armenian [23:02] genocide line was a year old, you know, [23:05] and and the the Armenians had been [23:08] absolutely um uh decimated, more than [23:12] decimated, and the Armenian people have [23:14] never recovered [23:16] >> um have never recovered from from that [23:18] massacre, incidentally. And the idea was [23:20] that there would be a Wilsonian, a [23:24] President Wilson of America would create [23:26] a mandate for an Armenian republic in [23:30] eastern Turkey. And then there were the [23:32] Kurds [23:33] >> who who did a lot of the killing [23:34] actually on behalf of the Ottomans [23:36] >> who did a lot of the killing on behalf [23:37] of the Ottoman. Yes. And they in all [23:39] sorts of ways they they um performed as [23:43] sort of Ottoman executioners and [23:44] henchmen. But at the same time they were [23:47] keen for a Kurdish state which they'd [23:50] always longed for and still are longing [23:51] for. And we can talk about that at the [23:53] end because that's so fascinating. So [23:56] they were also promised something. And [23:59] so all of these people were now [24:02] expecting their share in in in what what [24:05] happened in 1918 with the fall of the [24:06] Ottoman Empire. And you've got to [24:08] remember that for the Western Allies, [24:12] the Turks themselves were discredited by [24:15] the massacres because the leadership of [24:17] the Turks under Mustafa Mustafa Keml [24:21] Pashia, [24:22] you know, was were actually had been [24:25] part of that regime. And so the so the [24:27] British and French actually saw no [24:30] reason not to redraw the whole map. [24:34] But what went wrong with this was the [24:36] Greeks tried to conquer the whole of [24:38] Turkey [24:39] and they almost succeeded. They almost [24:42] reached Anchora. But just before they [24:44] reached Anchora, Mustafa Keml Pasha, who [24:46] you will know by the name Ataturk, [24:48] father of Turks, launched an offensive [24:51] back. and he had a complete Ottoman [24:55] fully equipped army intact. And that [24:58] army basically drove back the Greeks and [25:01] then cleansed, purged Turkey of Greeks [25:05] in a massive um ethnic, sectarian, [25:08] nationalist [25:10] um slaughter and then population swap in [25:14] which all the all the Christians went to [25:16] Greece, all the Greek all the all the [25:18] Muslims went to Turkey. [25:21] And so that was the origin of the [25:22] Turkish Republic that we see now. And of [25:25] course, only if you read this history do [25:27] you realize that of course the Turks got [25:30] their republic in the Losan Treaty of [25:33] 1923. [25:34] But they weren't delighted with what [25:36] they got. It wasn't enough. And they [25:38] would really have liked the Mosul [25:41] province of Iraq that went to Iraq [25:43] instead [25:44] and northern Syria and more. And for a [25:49] hundred years they kind of they've kind [25:51] of they kind of held that together and [25:53] now they are openly saying they [25:56] >> back in northern Syria. In fact, [25:57] >> they're back in northern Syria. They're [25:59] back in Somalia. They're back in Libya. [26:02] Um they are saying quite openly that the [26:06] cities of Aleppo and Beirut and [26:08] Jerusalem [26:10] are part of their security. And so it's [26:14] not just neutimism. It's not a sort of [26:16] vague uh it's not a vague nostalgia. [26:20] It is a new mission but this time backed [26:23] with Islamism. And so what Erdogan is [26:26] doing I mean everything in everything in [26:28] the book that's worth saying is worth [26:30] saying because it it echoes today. [26:33] To go back to uh 1917 in retrospect uh [26:36] to us the Balffor declaration is this [26:38] enormous event. Was it received as that [26:41] in the region? I mean perhaps obviously [26:45] Zionists, Jews on the ground [26:48] understood it as an an epical thing. Uh [26:51] the reaction of Arabs in the region is [26:53] is a different matter. But more widely [26:55] was it seen as being this huge hinge [26:58] event that we now talk about it as? um [27:01] not a huge hinge of hinge event but um [27:04] it was a public statement and um if it [27:08] was to come to pass um you know Arabs [27:12] and Ottomans and Turks in the region [27:14] understood that it was it could be of [27:16] huge significance because Britain then [27:20] um was advancing up Palestine and um and [27:25] Lloyd George said you know George made [27:27] this amazing announcement I'm going to [27:29] make a Christmas present to the British [27:31] nation and take Jerusalem. And he took [27:33] Jerusalem. It took him another year to [27:37] conquer the rest of Palestine because [27:39] there was a major the Yilderim lightning [27:43] um Ottoman army group there commanded by [27:45] German uh you know one forgets there [27:48] were German commanders in Palestine [27:50] which is quite bizarre. And there's a [27:53] book of aerial photos that were taken by [27:55] German survey aircraft just before the [27:56] first world war. It's an amazing book. [27:58] >> Yeah. I haven't seen that. But but [28:01] you're absolutely right. I mean, there [28:02] were also there were German troops and [28:05] Austrian troops in Jerusalem, which is [28:07] quite extraordinary. And some of them [28:09] were Jewish, which is even more bizarre. [28:12] So, you had Jewish German troops having [28:15] kind of Passover in in Jerusalem under [28:18] the Ottoman Empire. Um, which is which [28:21] is a kind of brain a brain shaker, but [28:24] um it wasn't seen as that. But the [28:26] moment the British took um took [28:29] Palestine um by the end of it 1918 and [28:32] got the mandate and the mandate was [28:35] given not um by Sykes Pico Sazinoff [28:38] which which is always which is one of [28:41] those kind of names that um always [28:44] provokes incredible fury at the at the [28:47] imperial grandeur of this carve up but [28:50] this pico never happened. So it's [28:53] complete it's a complete sound and fury [28:55] about nothing. What did happen was Sever [28:57] and San Remo in which they divi they [29:00] redesigned the whole Middle East. Did [29:03] they do it well? Probably not. You know, [29:06] probably there were all sorts of um [29:08] flaws in it. It's incredibly hard thing [29:11] to do to redesign a whole region of the [29:15] world um when when it's been ruled for [29:18] 400 years by a single person very badly [29:20] incidentally. And you always think like, [29:22] you know, oh, if only they had experts [29:24] to do it. If only they weren't so [29:25] amateurish. Well, the Ottomans had ruled [29:27] it for 400 years in complete chaos. [29:29] They'd ruined the region. So, they [29:32] hadn't they hadn't done it very well. [29:33] The fact is the Middle East is extremely [29:36] hard to rule and extremely hard to [29:38] govern, extremely hard to organize. It [29:41] was extremely hard for the Ottomans who [29:42] lost control of it, almost all of it, at [29:44] various times. Um and for the and for [29:48] the British and the French who then took [29:49] control of it, the Americans dropped out [29:52] because uh President Wilson who'd been [29:54] very interested in it went back to [29:56] America, tried to sell Congress on it. [29:59] Congress rejected it and then he had a [30:01] stroke. That was the end of his [30:02] presidency and the Americans didn't [30:04] return till 1945 and FDR. [30:09] So um the task then of of running the [30:13] mandate falls upon one Herbert Samuel [30:17] who is a figure I always feel is not not [30:18] enough attention is given to Herbert [30:20] Samuel who who has this astounding [30:22] responsibility as you're saying of [30:24] creating a state out of nothing out of [30:26] out of in a war zone no less [snorts] uh [30:29] he's he's a liberal uh politician not [30:32] much background training but I think he [30:34] he's the first of the European uh vizers [30:37] as I suppose we could call them on the [30:39] ground in the region. How does he do at [30:41] le and and how how do his staff and his [30:43] team do say in the honeymoon period [30:45] between 1917 and the uh the riots of [30:49] 1929? [30:50] >> Well, Herbert Samuel was a cousin of [30:51] mine. [30:52] >> I'm really sorry. [snorts] [30:54] >> He didn't he didn't do badly actually. [30:57] >> I know he didn't do that. I've always [30:59] thought Herb Sam did pretty well, but [31:00] there's a couple of questions I have [31:02] about his uh [31:03] >> but he but he but he also made some [31:05] fatal mistakes probably on [31:08] overcompensating but also really [31:10] behaving in the tradition of British um [31:14] British imperial governors and the big [31:16] mistake he made was appointing Amin [31:20] Al-Hasseni [31:21] and that is a kind of a a a long strain [31:26] um that one sees all the way through [31:28] British British imperial not just in the [31:29] Middle East but in Africa as well. [31:31] >> Was this were they thinking along the [31:33] lines of how Britain had organized its [31:34] affairs in India where they had dealt [31:37] with with what they called comm communal [31:39] politics by appointing hereditary or [31:42] religious leaders as the spokesmen of of [31:44] of communities that would often existed [31:46] but also pushed into a political form in [31:49] order to so that they could speak back [31:52] to them on their behalf. There was a lot [31:54] of that about the appointment of R. [31:56] >> Yes, that's exactly right. And in fact, [31:58] you see it, you know, way into the 21st [32:00] century with relations with the Muslim [32:03] community in Britain today where you [32:06] where the government is very tempted to [32:09] embrace the most extreme parts of these [32:11] community or extreme parts of the [32:13] community in the hope that they'll be [32:15] frightfully grateful to be given an [32:17] important title by government like you [32:19] know the like as in as happened in [32:22] Palestine, the supreme Muslim council [32:24] that controlled everything. There is a [32:26] continuity there actually. Um many of [32:29] the people who were involved in uh [32:30] security work in the mandate in its last [32:33] couple of years between 45 47 48 um some [32:38] of them went on to do uh security policy [32:40] in Northern Ireland uh in the troubles [32:43] they were they were still serving then [32:45] and those in other words imperial [32:47] methods gradually fed back into the [32:49] British system. Uh, and I and I think I [32:52] mean this is a this is actually [32:53] something I was going to talk more about [32:55] later. The ways in which the Middle East [32:57] over the course of the 20th century goes [33:00] from being this distant place which [33:02] people think of it being about [snorts] [33:04] postcards of camels and palm trees and [33:07] crumbling Ottoman fortifications and so [33:09] on and actually becomes part of of [33:13] European and even American daily life. [33:15] Well, I mean that's that's one of the [33:17] interesting things that happened at the [33:18] end of the cauldron and is very [33:20] important. And what we see now is this [33:23] amazing turnaround. There are various [33:25] times in history when ideas and thoughts [33:28] and think and and and literature and [33:31] philosophy is going from the Arab world [33:33] into the western world. [33:35] for example, you know, during the great [33:37] Abbisid um empire, during the great [33:40] Abbisid Caliphate in the sort of 8th and [33:42] 9th centuries, for example, um there are [33:45] other times when everything in the early [33:47] 20th century seems to be going from the [33:50] from the Western world, from Europe, [33:52] nationalism, fascism, communism, [33:54] socialism, Zionism seem to be going from [33:57] Europe into the Middle East. And now um [34:03] you know in the in the 21st century in [34:05] the last especially in the last 20 years [34:07] or 15 years we're seeing something [34:10] completely different where in all sorts [34:12] of ways high and low um the Middle East [34:16] is coming to the West and um and and [34:20] influencing the West in ways that we can [34:22] only just begin to to um imagine and to [34:27] affect actually affect our societies, [34:29] our culture. [34:30] um our politics. Yeah. And that's one [34:32] part of a of a bigger shift. I mean, [34:34] historians disagree, don't they? I [34:36] should say we. I'm not an economic [34:37] historian, so I'll say they. Nor am I. [34:39] >> Well, good. Fine. Um in that case, I'll [34:41] carry on. Um disagree exactly when it [34:44] was that uh the majority of the world's [34:46] economic exchanges and and and gravity [34:49] shifted from Asia to the west perhaps in [34:52] the late 1700s, certainly by the early [34:55] 1800s. And that goes against the [34:57] historic pattern, the pattern of human [34:59] history. And you have written a book [35:01] about all of it is generally a pattern [35:03] from east to west and and the the [35:06] economic rebalancing as it were that [35:08] we've seen in the last couple of [35:09] decades. Now you know there's a map I [35:11] think the economist might have had it [35:13] running where they tracked where the [35:14] center of world trades were and [35:16] obviously in 2000 it was um New York [35:19] City and it's tracked gradually [35:20] gradually eastwards until last year it [35:22] was cited over Kazakhstan. [35:25] uh and it's clearly tracking back to [35:26] East Asia. Um so we are now obviously in [35:29] in in a um a shift which seems to us to [35:33] be astonishing and almost impossible to [35:36] understand but which in the bigger [35:37] picture you can see these great [35:39] pendulum-like motions and and as you say [35:42] Zionism heading eastwards is what is [35:44] part of the great previous swing. um the [35:47] figure of Bengurion. I mean you as a [35:50] historian you talk about individuals a [35:52] lot and and the way in which critical [35:55] decisions by individuals have a massive [35:57] massive effect. This goes against a lot [36:00] of um I suppose the academic way of [36:02] writing history which tends to talk [36:04] about abstractions or or and and and the [36:07] force of ideas even um but it is how [36:10] most people experience their lives. So [36:12] this figure of Benguran, is he one of [36:14] the first of these kind of I suppose you [36:16] could call them chieftain figures really [36:18] who emerge out? You've got as as people [36:21] have said tribes with flags. Some of [36:23] them don't yet have their flags in the [36:25] 1920s and Bengurian appears to be quite [36:28] fast out of the gate as as one of these [36:30] chieftain figures and he becomes as as [36:32] as we know over the following decades a [36:35] critical figure. [36:36] >> Yes. I mean I think what I what I do in [36:39] my books is to try to um try to cover um [36:45] without fanfare but you know cover all [36:48] the pmics the historiography [36:50] but also all the ideologies the Islamism [36:53] the you know the nationalism the the um [36:56] the communism and you know all fascism [36:58] all the things we talked about Islamism [36:59] that I mentioned at the beginning and [37:01] you know I try and cover all of those [37:03] but I try and because they're not [37:05] palatable on their own for for the kind [37:08] of people I want to read this book which [37:09] is everybody. Um I you know I I do it [37:13] through personalities and it suits the [37:15] way I write. It suits my kind of the way [37:18] I that I enjoy writing these books. So [37:20] yes so Bengurian is one of those [37:22] characters and there are a sort of [37:25] collection of these amazing characters [37:27] in the book. I think, you know, I don't [37:30] think there it's an either or whether [37:32] it's kind of the great man of history [37:34] versus the the the great um convergences [37:37] and divergences of history. I think they [37:39] work together and people work with what [37:41] with what they've got. [37:43] >> They live within frameworks. They live [37:45] within framework of of you know [37:47] resources um you know acu their own [37:50] acumen res that the resources that are [37:52] available to them and their imagination [37:54] their vision um of their of their time [37:57] and what they can actually achieve and [37:59] if you've got very you know if you're [38:01] you know if you're Andy Burnham and you [38:03] know however grand your vision may be [38:06] you know he actually has very limited [38:08] resources his actual acumen is also you [38:12] know we'll we'll find out if you know [38:13] how how how deep that is. But you know [38:17] it's it's you know if you were Katherine [38:18] the Great and you or Peter the Great and [38:21] you have this kind of total control over [38:24] a vast empire you can do massive things. [38:29] You know if you're in a sort of [38:30] budgetary squeeze like we're in [38:31] everything's very difficult. Ly George [38:33] was um sorry Bengurian was one of those [38:36] fascinating characters. You know I call [38:38] them the nation builders in the in the [38:39] book. There's Ataturk. Um there's [38:42] Resashar, the the the father of the Sha [38:45] of Iran. Um and there's there's Zeban [38:49] Saud who created Saudi Arabia. [38:52] Um these are the sort of great creators [38:54] of these new countries. And you know, [38:57] Bengarin is is fascinating because he's [39:00] an auto died act. He's incredibly tough. [39:03] He's incredibly intelligent. He's [39:05] constantly studying. and his studies are [39:08] always based on his political [39:09] opportunity. So, you know, in the early [39:12] 1900s, he starts to study Turkish [39:14] because he thinks that the Ottomans are [39:16] the way that um the Jews will get a [39:19] state. Um and by the way, you know, the [39:22] early Zionists aren't even completely [39:25] convinced that they will get a state [39:26] ever. Well, one of the things that I I [39:28] was astounded by to read actually was [39:30] that as late as 1929, [39:32] uh, Bengurian was saying he would settle [39:34] for a bational state, a a federal [39:38] Palestine, what even a regional [39:41] federation involving Beirut, Damascus, [39:44] and anywhere else. [39:45] >> And in fact, they didn't really change [39:46] that till 1942, [39:49] which is so late officially. [39:51] >> But what really changed their views was [39:55] um Oh, yeah. I was just going to say [39:56] Bengurian. So, first of all, he started [39:58] Turkish. [39:58] >> Yeah. [39:59] >> Um then, you know, then he then of [40:01] course he switched to Arabic when it [40:02] looked like there was going to be an [40:03] Arabic um you know, king over over the [40:07] Holy Land. And then in the end he [40:10] realized it was going to be the English [40:11] that were key and he concentrated on the [40:13] English as had him invitesman the other [40:16] kind of great nation builder and fixer [40:19] of the Zionist movement. Um but really [40:22] you know right up until the Arab revolt [40:25] which is 1936 [40:28] they had believed that um they could [40:30] make some sort of arrangement with the [40:32] Arabs. It could be a you know a bational [40:36] single state and that um the Arabs would [40:39] cooperate with them because they would [40:42] develop the land and um and they really [40:45] pushed that. I mean there were a large [40:47] group of um Zionists who went to see you [40:51] know King Fisizel in Damascus um and of [40:54] course Vitzman had meetings with also [40:56] had meetings with Fisel to discuss this [40:59] and Fisizel's attitude was that we can [41:03] you know providing we all we get the [41:05] whole kingdom which is of greater Syria [41:08] um the can be a Jewish entity within it [41:10] a a canton and um you know some sort of [41:14] federal um presence [41:16] statelet and providing it's under our [41:18] king and actually the Jews were kind of [41:20] quite for that and then what changed it [41:23] all was first of all the 1929 massacres [41:26] which read very like October 7th which [41:30] were essentially in in in Jerusalem but [41:32] also you know the worst atrocities were [41:35] in Hebrron and in Safed and Spat but at [41:39] the same time it's worth noting that [41:42] those who survived were hidden by their [41:44] Arab neighbors [41:46] So, you know, there there's two stories [41:48] there. Um, and that led ultimately to [41:51] the creation of the Urgun [41:54] um and other militias and at a hardening [41:57] of the viewpoints of Jabatinsky and [41:59] people like that who were also major [42:01] figures in the Zionist movement. But [42:03] what was really significant was 1936 [42:07] um Hitler had come to power um and the [42:10] mu the MUI of Jerusalem Ameni [42:14] was cozying up already cozing up to the [42:16] Nazis and receiving funding from [42:19] Mussolini and in 1936 they launched this [42:23] big this big rebellion um that was [42:25] really out of control of the leadership [42:27] in fact um and and the leadership the [42:30] Palestinian Arab leadership had to sort [42:31] of switch to sort of join Ian, [42:33] >> which sounds like a familiar, [42:36] >> but in the middle of it um the British [42:38] produced the peel offer and the peel [42:41] offer, the Peele um partition was the [42:44] first partition idea in Palestine. And [42:48] the idea was that the Jews would get a [42:50] small state around sort of Tel Aviv area [42:53] and the and the Arabs would get the rest [42:55] of it because they were the vast [42:57] majority. And the Jewish community was, [42:59] I don't know, three or 400,000. [43:01] And there was a large part of the [43:05] Palestinian Arab community that [43:07] supported the Nashibi family, not the [43:10] Husseini family. And the Nashibi family [43:12] were much more moderate, much more [43:15] cosmopolitan, [43:16] much less parochial. And they said, "We [43:19] may not like the Jews, but they're here, [43:21] and we should make a deal with them." [43:22] And they said Ra al- Nashibi said I'll [43:25] be prime minister of the Arab state [43:28] under King Abdullah of Trans Jordan. [43:31] Emir Emir of Trans Jordan. And that was [43:34] one of those moments where an eminently [43:37] sensible idea um was was offered and one [43:40] of those moments that you think like you [43:42] know everything would have been [43:44] different if this had worked and it [43:45] could have worked. And in fact I still [43:48] think you know much of the sort of [43:49] future if there ever is a settlement and [43:52] we can discuss that at the end has to be [43:55] some sort of arrangement like that [43:57] involving more than tiny cantons within [44:02] the tiny territory of from the river to [44:05] the sea which is which is too small to [44:07] really support totally independent [44:11] states two independent states. So [44:14] Bengurian accepted that and but you know [44:17] but you're right right before that he'd [44:19] been he'd been discussing all sorts of [44:20] different arrangements that would have [44:22] been federal or autonomous or um parts [44:26] of other states or a state called Judea [44:28] with a state called Abdelia [44:30] um and he discussed that with the MUI of [44:34] Jerusalem's um you know rather [44:37] aristocratic um advisers who with whom [44:40] he got on very well. So but after the [44:43] peel um the peel offer was accepted by [44:47] the Jews and the Nashibis and King [44:49] Abdullah there was there was a kind of [44:52] backlash and there was then the re the [44:54] revolt really surged and what happened [44:57] in that period 1936 to 39 [45:01] was fatal for the you know for what's [45:03] happened since because the British who [45:06] were very keen to make compromises with [45:08] extremists were also incredibly ruthless [45:11] when they were really crossed and they [45:14] sent in General Montgomery later of [45:16] Alamagne fame and he said, "I'm having [45:19] an extremely good time in Palestine. We [45:22] are killing Jews and Arabs exactly as we [45:24] wish." And at the end of the when he [45:27] completely crushed the Arab revolt and [45:29] trained, by the way, the beginning of [45:32] what became the Israeli army, um he [45:34] said, "I've had an extremely good time [45:36] in Palestine and I'm sorry to leave. [45:39] We've smashed everybody. land. So while [45:42] this is before we get to the second [45:44] world war, there are two uh huge forces [45:47] brewing in Arab society. Uh one of which [45:51] has has gone into eclipse and the other [45:53] which is very much not and one of them [45:55] is Arab nationalism and the other is uh [45:58] the Muslim Brotherhood which is is [46:00] founded in Egypt in the interwar period. [46:02] Um how do they fit into the emerging [46:04] politics of the region? Because both of [46:05] these things are not about the states [46:09] that are being built and drawn on on [46:11] maps. They're very much about [46:12] transnational identity. [46:14] >> Yeah. So, so Arab nationalism, pan-Arab [46:18] nationalism rejected the break up of the [46:20] Arab world into smaller countries like [46:22] Syria and Iraq, but embraced an idea [46:25] that they should all be united. [46:28] And by the way, the, you know, the [46:30] British in World War II were quite [46:32] attracted to this idea. And in 1944 they [46:36] sponsored the organ of this which was [46:39] the Arab League which still exists. [46:42] But they hoped that these states or this [46:46] large Arab state whatever it would be [46:49] would be a British client state or a [46:52] British ally. But at the same time in [46:54] the late 20s um Hassan Albanner, a [46:58] teacher in a small Arab town, a small [47:00] Egyptian town, had founded uh the Muslim [47:04] Brotherhood that really believed that [47:07] Islam, not Arab nationalism, was the [47:09] key. But the key to understanding these [47:12] things is they're not stark alternatives [47:15] and each of them contained features of [47:17] the other. Um especially at plastic [47:20] moments as you call it. And so um so in [47:25] Egypt at this time the Arab the Muslim [47:28] Brotherhood was getting stronger but so [47:30] were the forces of Arab nationalism. And [47:33] um at the end of the end of the 30s just [47:36] before World War II um and I should just [47:39] say that you know one of the one of the [47:40] interesting one always has to bear in [47:42] mind is the two original countries that [47:46] existed from ancient times and were [47:48] entities that didn't need western uh [47:51] statesmen to invent them were Egypt on [47:54] one hand and an ancient civilization [47:57] um they they called some sometimes they [47:59] call themselves a feronic civilization [48:01] because they contained elements of the [48:03] ancient world. They had Jewish [48:05] communities from two that were 2,000 [48:07] years old. They had um Lebanese and [48:10] Greeks and Italians and all sorts of [48:12] peoples there. It was a cosmopolitan [48:15] country and it was ruled by a [48:16] non-Egyptian, non-Arab elite, the [48:19] Turkosian nobles and their kings uh like [48:23] King Farooq for example, the last king [48:25] who was a wild character. um uh who was [48:30] a wild cibrite, playboy, womanizer, [48:33] bimic, pickpocket, um swinger. I mean, [48:36] where do I start? Um he was not actually [48:40] was not actually Arab at all. And and in [48:42] fact, he was he was of Turkish, [48:44] Albanian, Sarcassian descent. Um and the [48:48] other kind of the other kind of state [48:50] that really existed from ancient times [48:51] was of course Persia, Iran. And I don't [48:54] know if we'll get time to but in answer [48:57] to your question in 1939 Neville [49:00] Chamberlain new prime minister suddenly [49:03] says hang on a sec you know we've we've [49:05] we've just put down this brut brutally [49:08] put down this Arab revolt in Palestine [49:10] but actually are we being mad there's a [49:14] world war coming and we're going to need [49:16] the Arab world we're going to need the [49:18] Middle East and we're risking it all for [49:20] this kind of tiny group of Jews who [49:22] should we offend the Jews or the Arabs, [49:24] we should defend, we should offend the [49:25] Jews. So they switch and in 1939 they [49:29] offer um the Palestinian Arabs a [49:32] Palestine state, a single Palestine [49:35] state, which they are mad to turn down, [49:38] but they do. And the reason they do is [49:40] because of Islamism and the and the way [49:43] that Islamism combines with nationalism. [49:47] And they turn it down because the mufti [49:49] says Palestine is ancient sacred Islamic [49:54] land. And by the way, this comes to the [49:57] essence of why peace is so difficult [49:59] today because this is this is the deep [50:02] belief in much of the community. Not all [50:04] of it, not all of it all the time, but a [50:08] large constituency in the Palestine Arab [50:11] community believes still believes this [50:14] is to be the case. And even even in [50:16] Junya called large parts of that [50:19] community, that constituency still [50:21] believe this, which is that it can't be [50:24] shared with anybody. And so [50:28] um so they turn it down. They turn down [50:30] a Palestinian state. They turn it down [50:32] again in 1947. [50:34] >> And so in 19 after World War II, we have [50:38] the Atly government. And the Atly [50:39] government is in a massive panic because [50:42] they finished World War II. They've won [50:44] World War II, but the British Empire is [50:47] bankrupt, exhausted. Um, and the world [50:50] is turning against colonialism and you [50:52] know, and the region is becoming harder [50:54] and harder to manage. Um, I was going to [50:56] ask you, I mean, the the picture we have [50:59] of the war in the Middle East here is of [51:00] course very heavily focused on on [51:02] Montgomery, in fact, on on Tbrook and [51:04] Lalamagne and the war in the desert and [51:06] operation torch late in that. But the [51:09] focus that you have is much more on [51:11] things like the the another nationalist [51:13] revolt in Iraq in 1941. [51:15] Um and and the rise of I suppose what we [51:18] would now call an anti-colonial [51:20] nationalism tinged uh with Islam as as [51:22] you're saying. Yeah. So, so one of one [51:26] of the one of the p, you know, parts of [51:28] the book that I think you'll find most [51:30] interesting because it's so little known [51:32] outside historians [51:34] is that World War II, there was a huge [51:37] World War II in in the Middle East, [51:40] which is totally forgotten. And all we [51:42] know is Lalame and General Montgomery, [51:44] though that was a major part of it. But [51:46] another part of it was Churchill [51:49] actually fought three different wars in [51:51] the Middle East that everyone's [51:52] forgotten about. Um, Palestine was quiet [51:55] because that that war was still, you [51:57] know, that the battles of of the Arab [51:59] revolt was still kind of smoking. But [52:02] first of all, the Vichy French had gone [52:04] over to join Hitler. So when he looked [52:08] at Syria and Lebanon, which were French [52:10] mandates, Churchill thought like these [52:13] are now moving over to Hitler and Hitler [52:16] is now very interested in what happens [52:17] in the Middle East. Why? because his [52:20] troops are fighting their way through [52:22] the Soviet Union towards the Caucuses [52:24] where they could plunge down towards [52:26] Turkey into Iraq into into Iran in in [52:30] other words into the heart of the Middle [52:32] East and one forgets how small how small [52:34] the distances are in a way but at the [52:36] same time his fight his troops under [52:38] Romul are fighting their way along North [52:40] Africa from Libya and they break into [52:42] Egypt. So if these two forces if either [52:45] one of them succeeded [52:47] um the western position in the in the [52:50] Middle East would collapse and they [52:52] would join up and there was an Isaten [52:54] group and waiting in Greece to arrive to [52:57] slaughter the entire Jewish population [53:00] the Yeshu in Palestine and that they'd [53:02] been assigned their duties. So this is [53:05] all very relevant to us Jews, but it's [53:07] also um it's also strategically [53:10] important. And the key thing here is [53:12] that the British position is often [53:15] criticized, the French position is often [53:17] criticized, but actually for Britain, [53:19] the Middle Eastern mandates paid off in [53:22] in World War II. I was going to say I [53:24] mean uh Chamberlain's thinking and the [53:26] thinking generally of the political [53:28] class in Britain in the late 1930s is is [53:31] the beginning of the concept I think of [53:32] a war for oil which would become very [53:35] controversial years later and when you [53:37] and when you look at the German strategy [53:38] that is a a war of resources which is [53:41] one part of a huge war like that. [53:43] >> Yes. So that's exactly right. So so what [53:45] happened was first of all Churchill [53:47] invaded Syria and Lebanon and he retook [53:49] it. That's where Mosher lost his eye [53:51] famously. Um then he had to look at [53:54] 1941. A regime actually actually kind of [53:58] inspired and controlled and directed by [54:01] the MUI of Jerusalem from Jerusalem was [54:04] now in Baghdad and they were about to [54:08] ally themselves with not with Nazi [54:10] Germany and Hitler was already sending [54:13] them troops sending them troops and [54:14] planes and everything. Churchill said [54:17] this can't stand. So he invaded Iraq [54:20] incidentally with Jewish troops help [54:22] assisting Jewish militias um like the [54:25] Urgun assisting. So they had to have an [54:28] Iraq that was the British Iraq war which [54:30] we've all forgotten about. At the same [54:32] time Resar Palavi the self-made king of [54:37] Iran and the father of the sha that we [54:40] know of our time um he had he was one of [54:43] the amazing nation builders of our story [54:46] isn't he? Yeah. And then I was just [54:48] going to ask about him because these two [54:49] major historical powers, Turkey and [54:51] Iran, both neutral in the war [54:55] and h how do they emerge from it as [54:57] regional players? Because the British [54:59] and the French have lost their footing. [55:01] Turkey and Persia are still there. The [55:03] Americans and the Russians are hovering [55:05] but not yet clearly committed. Well, the [55:08] is for the Turks um they are they are [55:12] walking a tight rope between the [55:14] Soviets, the Americans, the British and [55:17] and Hitler. And Istanbul is one of the [55:20] great spy cities of the World War II [55:22] because it's neutral. It's filled with [55:24] Nazi spies, Soviet spies, British spies, [55:27] and so on. Um and they remain neutral, [55:30] just and the fact that they remain [55:32] neutral is one of the is is quite an [55:34] achievement for the allies. Um, so then [55:38] you got Iran and you've got this amazing [55:40] self-made king. He's 6'7. [55:42] He is a peasant who joins the the sh of [55:47] Iran's the sh of Persia's Kossac [55:49] regiment which was trained in Russia and [55:52] he rises up it and he becomes an expert [55:55] at machine gunning. So he's known as re [55:57] Maxim resza for firing the the Maxim [56:01] gun. And then he and then in in 1919 [56:04] he's backed by the British and in 1925 [56:07] he actually becomes the new sha of a new [56:10] country Iran which he he renames Persia [56:13] Iran and he's an amazing reformer in all [56:16] sorts of ways. a really astonishing [56:18] character who starts off rather [56:19] wonderfully ends up as a bit of a [56:21] murderous autocrat. But in 1940, 1941, [56:27] he tries to balance between Nazi Germany [56:30] and the allies, which is a fatal mistake [56:33] because Churchill and Stalin are not [56:35] going to take a risk with Iran. And so [56:37] Stalin and Churchill invade Iran. And [56:40] this is the Iran the the Anglo-Sietviet [56:44] Anglo-Sviet Iranian war. and they invade [56:46] it and they defeat the Iranian army and [56:49] they take Thrron and they overthrow him [56:52] and they let his young son who no one's [56:54] interested in become nominal Sha and [56:57] later he becomes one of the major [57:00] figures in the in the region. He is [57:03] rather like his father but more [57:04] sophisticated. His father was was wild. [57:07] He used to walk around with a walking [57:08] stick or and a riding crop. And when he [57:11] had cabinet meetings, if people [57:13] disagreed with them, he'd swi swat swat [57:16] them across the face with his riding [57:17] crop or literally just beat them to the [57:19] ground with his walking stick. So his [57:22] method of governing was somewhat [57:24] unorthodox and you didn't want to cross [57:26] him, but um but he was he was an amazing [57:31] personality. but he was overthrown and [57:34] then Iran was partitioned from 1941 [57:37] until 1945. At that point, you asked [57:40] about the Soviets and um and Turkey and [57:43] and Iran. Well, at the end of 1945, [57:46] Stalin, a Marxist Leninist to his bones [57:49] um also wants to have an empire. So, he [57:52] demands an empire in in Libya. He wants [57:55] a colony in Libya where he can keep his [57:57] navy. He wants the dinardels around [58:00] Istanbul and he wants the oil in Iran. [58:04] And so he sets up two republics, sort of [58:07] client states in in northwestern Iran. [58:12] And really the Americans have to force [58:14] him to leave. And that's really the [58:16] beginning of the Cold War. [58:19] Um the [58:21] pivotal event certainly from the [58:23] perspective of of the Europeans and a [58:25] tipping point in the regional balance of [58:27] power is is the Suez crisis of 1956. [58:31] >> Um I was once talking with Michael [58:33] Oruren and and he said to me, why did [58:37] Eisenhower do what he did? Surely um he [58:41] he should have realized that uh America [58:44] was better served by propping up British [58:47] and French interests rather than [58:48] overthrowing them, you know, on on on a [58:51] promise from from a colonel which is [58:53] effectively what what Eisenhower poorly [58:55] advised by the Dallas brothers went on [58:57] to do. That's exactly right. I mean it's [59:00] one of the kind of it's it's regarded um [59:03] in the present historical cultural war [59:06] that we're in at the moment. It's [59:08] regarded as an understood that Britain [59:09] was completely wrong in 1956. But you'll [59:12] find in the book lots of cases where um [59:15] conventional wisdoms are sort of a ch [59:17] gently challenged and this is one of [59:19] them because of course um the Americans [59:22] thought that they were [59:23] anti-colonialists, [59:24] anti-imperialists, though in fact they [59:27] were very imperialists themselves in [59:28] their own way. And so they thought [59:30] everyone would understand that they were [59:32] for the they were they were for Arab [59:33] nationalism and the British didn't [59:35] understand anything. Um but in fact [59:39] their analysis was completely wrong and [59:41] they believed that Gamal Abdonasa would [59:45] be a great ally of of the Americans and [59:48] he really tricked them. And that brings [59:51] us on to NASA, who is another of these [59:53] amazing characters. And NASA was [59:56] determined to destroy Israel. [59:59] But he was also an extraordinary figure [60:01] that now with distance we can [60:02] appreciate. He was he was tall, he was [60:05] handsome, he was a brilliant speaker. Um [60:08] when he faced an assassination attempt [60:11] um in Alexandria, um he didn't miss a [60:14] beat. He just continued talking. the man [60:17] that the assassin was dragged away after [60:19] firing I think five shots at him and [60:22] without missing a beat he just said you [60:23] know now we are all Gamal Abdamasa and [60:25] he gave this amazing speech that changed [60:28] the whole of Arab history. Um he was [60:30] also having played everybody, the [60:33] Americans, the British, um the the the [60:37] Muslim Brotherhood and pretended to [60:38] everybody that he would support them. He [60:40] then embraced pan-Arab nationalism and [60:43] Nasserism [60:45] and he was extremely ruthless. He set up [60:48] a secret police state that then that [60:50] really became the sort of basis for all [60:53] the Arab states right until this day. um [60:56] >> the Muhabarat Muhab the Muhabarat state [61:00] and um and we see that you know in [61:02] Saddam Hussein in Gaddafi in Syria under [61:05] the Assad everywhere um and he was the [61:08] one who really created it um and that is [61:10] not to his credit you know he had [61:11] concentration camps for opponents but he [61:14] really cracked down on the Muslim [61:15] Brotherhood and there's one amazing [61:16] speech which you must look up if you're [61:18] ever wasting time on on in Google [61:21] >> as I often do [61:22] >> as we all do where [61:24] >> I call it research But yes, where where [61:27] Gal Abdalasa is sitting in black tie [61:30] because it's the 50s amazingly in Cairo [61:32] and the whole crowd a huge crowd they're [61:34] all in black tie too and still some of [61:36] them are still wearing fezes and he's [61:39] talking about the Muslim Brotherhood and [61:42] he's mocking the wearing of the hijab to [61:45] a huge you know um huge theater full of [61:49] people all of whom are just roaring of [61:51] laughter at the thought that that you [61:53] know women could be made to wear the [61:55] hijab and he's he calls it a very rude [61:59] word which no one would survive in you [62:01] know in our period if anyone said it [62:03] aloud but it's something like [62:05] handkerchief and he also says you know [62:08] how could the head of the Muslim [62:10] Brotherhood expect me to impose the [62:11] hijab on our women in Egypt when his [62:14] daughter is a medical student in Cairo [62:16] and he can't even get his own daughter [62:18] to put to wear the hijab so the crowd [62:20] roars in laughter and you just realize [62:23] how different the Middle East has how [62:25] much it's changed. [62:27] >> I think in uh with Sue as you're into uh [62:29] the the the postc colonial era in which [62:31] you're seeing these two two flows of of [62:34] of behaviors like you're describing [62:36] there which is effectively [62:39] uh a modernizer mocking [clears throat] [62:41] uh traditions [62:43] as if he's a western liberal and these [62:46] traditions are being revived with the [62:47] radicalism of modern western politics. [62:51] >> That's right. And so you have this one [62:53] of the themes of the book which again is [62:54] sort of against the sort of conventional [62:57] wisdom is that you have the that modern [63:01] Islamism as it develops starting really [63:04] in the in the 50s and 60s with Cook and [63:07] others [63:08] who was very influenced by his trip to [63:10] Colorado where the mixed dancing [63:13] >> the mixed dancing um you know [63:16] African-American music and the [63:19] incredible shock of seeing [63:21] young men and women of all all of of [63:24] white and black women dancing to um it's [63:27] cold outside um the the you know the the [63:30] Tom Jones song um which he was horrified [63:34] by and wrote about and he writes in [63:36] detail about the gorgeous bodies of the [63:38] um American women dancing and he comes [63:41] back and he writes a series of books [63:44] that really create modern Islamism and [63:47] it's a modern invention that really [63:49] created in the 60s developed [63:51] through other thinkers but um he's later [63:54] hanged by NASA but the effect um [63:58] influences everybody as bin Laden [64:00] Islamic State everybody but you're [64:03] absolutely right the key point about it [64:04] is it's a merger it's it's not it it [64:08] presents itself and modern Islamism [64:10] presents itself as a return to the [64:13] purism of the seventh century and salah [64:17] you know the the original salafism hence [64:19] its [64:20] Um but actually it's a totally modern [64:23] creation importing nationalism from [64:27] Europe, fascism from Europe, bits of [64:30] socialism [64:32] and it's a totally new idea and it [64:34] changes the world particularly after [64:36] 1967 [64:38] and and one of the things that um [64:40] probably is not u discussed enough these [64:43] days um is the uh the Algerian civil [64:45] war, the French withdrawal. Um I once um [64:48] read that Ariel Chiron and Yasa Arafat [64:51] had both had the same book on the [64:53] bedside table not in the same room but [64:57] um they independently [64:58] >> that would be a story [64:59] >> they were independently both uh close [65:02] readers of Alistister Horn's a war of [65:04] savage peace which is one of the [65:05] masterpiece [65:07] >> we all read as as young people didn't we [65:09] and I knew him very well I'm Alistister [65:12] Horn and he was an amazing character but [65:15] you're absolutely right That book was [65:17] read by everybody as a how-to uh guide [65:20] to decolonization. And it shows [65:22] something about Ariel Cheron's mentality [65:24] as a figure in this age of decolonial [65:26] politics and nation building not so [65:28] different actually to the way that [65:29] Arafat was conceiving of his position or [65:32] even of the FLN's people in Algeria. And [65:35] in particular, um, it seems to me that [65:38] the the population movement out of North [65:41] Africa of both pedoars and also Algerian [65:44] Muslims into Europe is is probably the [65:47] first moment um since the Armenian [65:49] genocide of 1916 when you you get a [65:53] large population coming from the Middle [65:55] East into Europe that this is another [65:57] one of those um watershed moments to [65:59] which this distant region suddenly gets [66:01] a lot closer. [66:02] >> Yeah, that's the start and you're [66:03] absolutely right. I mean, first of all, [66:04] there's two things to say about it. One [66:05] is that the Algerian war, you know, of [66:08] of 1956 to 63 is the moment when um a [66:14] new narrative is created of um [66:17] anti-western radicalism. And of course, [66:19] it's it's an incredibly brutal war, [66:22] hence savage war of peace. But it it's [66:25] incredibly brutal. the massacres, um the [66:27] use of civilians by both sides, by both [66:30] the French and the FLN who were the [66:32] Algeria nationalists. And in the end, D [66:34] Gaul withdraws as we know and um [66:37] narrowly survives assassination. Uh see [66:40] the day of the jackal movie and all of [66:43] that. um and huge numbers, a million um [66:47] French, ethnic French return to um [66:50] France, but so do massive numbers, as [66:53] you said, of Algerian Arabs who form the [66:56] beginning of a massive political [66:58] cultural change in France itself, which [67:01] when they're joined by more Muslim [67:03] people from um French Africa, um [67:08] completely change French society and [67:10] culture and Paris itself. [67:13] in all sorts of ways that we're not we [67:15] haven't yet seen. And um the second way [67:18] it really changes the region is that it [67:22] creates this narrative that is really [67:25] believed by people like for example [67:27] Nazallah of of of Hezbollah. It it [67:30] creates the idea that they believe [67:33] strongly which is a key fault in their [67:36] really their world analysis that the [67:38] Israelis or you know who who who create [67:41] this new Israeli nation, this new Jewish [67:44] nation can go somewhere else and are [67:47] like the Algerian Pen Noir, the French [67:49] who can just go back to some metropole [67:52] um and are are not indigenous and this [67:56] kind of this this false con this false [67:59] belief [68:00] is is really fatal to their world view [68:03] and again again they're completely kind [68:05] of confounded by the fact that of course [68:07] the Isra the Israeli strength as gold [68:09] may said was that we have nowhere to go [68:12] the I'm going to move quickly through [68:14] the war of 1967 and 73 because I think [68:16] everyone's familiar with this and um it [68:19] these two wars between them do set in [68:22] train a parallel track of radicalization [68:26] among Jews and Arabs. [68:28] >> Yes. I mean, you know, to be very quick, [68:29] 67 is the is the key change. Um, for [68:33] Arabs, it means the failure of [68:34] panarabism, the failure of um NASA's [68:38] kind of dream of creating this kind of [68:40] single pan-Arab republic and destroying [68:43] Israel. And to be fair to NASA, there's [68:46] amazing tape which is leaked been leaked [68:48] very recently which I I've put in the [68:50] book where Colonel Gaddafi, his young [68:53] his young protetéé who's literally 29, [68:56] um goes to see him in Cairo and says, [68:58] "Kernel Assa, you know, brother, we can [69:00] now let's go to war again and destroy [69:02] the Israelis." And NASA says, "What are [69:05] you talking about? You and what's his [69:07] name? Who's head of the PLO?" And then [69:09] he goes, "Who?" He can't remember [69:11] Arafat's name. And he says, you know, [69:13] you with all those Iraqis and Saddam [69:15] Hussein and whoever's taken power there, [69:18] you can all go to fight the Israelis for [69:20] Egypt, we're now going to make peace [69:22] with the Israelis. And of course, it's [69:24] so interesting from NASA. And of course, [69:26] if NASA had done it, you know, he would [69:29] have had such prestige. It's a shame [69:31] that he died at that point and Sedat did [69:33] it. And Sedat had much shallower support [69:36] and was assassinated. So that's one part [69:39] of it. on the Jewish side as you would I [69:42] think which is your real point here is [69:44] that the success was in a way fatal for [69:48] a certain conception of the Jewish state [69:52] >> because the excite secular liberal [69:54] >> the secular liberal state because the [69:56] this incredible miracle of not only [69:59] founding a state in 50 years since [70:02] Herzel mentioned it in his book in in [70:05] 1896 [70:06] but then to take Jerusalem and unite the [70:09] Holy Land and apparently [70:12] um was beyond was beyond the dreams of [70:16] realism. It must be God's favor. And [70:19] therefore out of that grew a millinarian [70:24] messianic um new religious nationalist [70:28] Zionism that was really as new as the [70:33] political Islamism that we talked about. [70:36] >> It's interesting. I mean you you [70:37] describe a um an almost simultaneous if [70:40] you look at the shifts in Israeli [70:42] politics in the 1970s leading up to the [70:44] election of 77 when and began the [70:46] misrain basically become the the balance [70:49] point and replace the old labor Zionist [70:51] secular founders. Um, simultaneously in [70:55] Iran you have the development of of of a [70:58] of a parallel movement which culminates [71:00] in in the revolution and I mean u Fukco [71:03] of all people acclaimed the Iranian [71:06] revolution as the last great revolution [71:08] and I think what he meant by that um was [71:10] the last one that we could understand in [71:12] the sense of how we would understand [71:14] what revolutions had been in the west [71:16] and that there were lots of people [71:17] shouting for a change of political [71:18] system. But of course the ideology that [71:20] came to power was was it was something [71:22] that most people in the west still [71:25] cannot conceptually get to grips with. [71:28] It's good we we're getting up to sort of [71:29] modern times in Iran and and and I think [71:32] that you know Kmeni [71:34] looked like a fire brand um and people [71:38] thought of him as a as a sort of [71:40] throwback to um you know the middle ages [71:43] or or 7th century. Um but in fact you've [71:47] got to understand and this is one of the [71:48] themes of the book that the 17 the 19 [71:51] the 1979 revolution was one of those [71:53] incredibly significant revolutions like [71:56] like 1789 like 1917 that is essential to [72:00] understand. It's it's a it's a it's a [72:02] tipping point of the of the modern world [72:04] but Kaini was was a revolutionary [72:07] statesman [72:09] like a Stalin or a Mao or a Lenin. Um [72:13] and and the idea he had of was an [72:16] Islamic republic that would be ruled by [72:18] a scholar in power um which he an idea [72:22] that he'd invented completely out of [72:24] nothing in 1970 just seven nine years [72:28] earlier um and even his own Islamist [72:31] followers thought it was unlikely to [72:33] happen and it was kind of a fantasy and [72:35] of course everyone knew that it was him [72:36] he was thinking of but in fact he [72:40] managed to sell himself and in in a kind [72:43] of cunning brilliance, he understood [72:46] that the West as Hamas do now and and [72:49] perhaps it's obvious what kind of what [72:51] kind of um gullible fools we are to [72:54] everybody else because he like Hamas in [72:57] in in our own period in the last few [72:59] years understood that the West could be [73:01] easily played and all you needed to do [73:05] um was talk about suffering and talk [73:08] about justice and keep your real views [73:11] to self and General de Gaul always said [73:14] that that you know the essence of [73:16] politics is silence and Kamei understood [73:19] that brilliantly and he understood that [73:21] he could pull together an amazing [73:24] coalition of all of Iranian society that [73:26] included you know liberals and democrats [73:30] um is you know Islamists and Marxist [73:33] Leninists and or and moderate [73:35] socialists. He held it all together [73:37] because he said nothing. And he also [73:39] tricked the western powers particularly [73:41] America of course who large numbers of [73:44] the American bonaw [73:47] liberals believed that he was a new [73:49] Gandhi and even the US ambassador said [73:53] you know he could be the new Gandhi. Um [73:55] but he also to be fair to that poor [73:58] ambassador he's been lot misqued [74:00] frequently. Um but the point is that um [74:04] he tricked everybody and then when he [74:06] came to power he immediately just took [74:09] power set up set up his own he he [74:12] appointed a kind of prime minister who [74:14] wore a suit and tie and looked kind of [74:16] like a western um a sort of moderate [74:18] Islamist but he in fact set up in a [74:21] skull school a committee that included [74:25] his basic extreme henchmen including Ali [74:28] Kame who ruled until February this year [74:32] and they set up um the new Islamic [74:35] State. They got through with helped by [74:38] external events including Saddam's in [74:40] invasion and the Iran Iraq war which was [74:44] a huge war that that also changed the [74:47] region but helped by these crisis he [74:51] launched a murderous purge of all [74:54] opponents killed many of them massacred [74:57] many in prisons uh where they were kept [75:00] and got through the creation of the [75:02] Islamic Republic which had a was a [75:04] hybrid. It had a sort of democratic [75:06] structure with a parliament and a [75:08] presidency and a premiership but [75:10] actually was ruled by a sacred king who [75:13] was appointed for life and that was him [75:15] and he he he ruled till ' 89. In ' 89 he [75:18] chose his successor who was K&A who [75:21] ruled for 37 years as dictator. One of [75:24] one of these strange things about about [75:27] um writing history is that um things [75:29] change significance in retrospect. Um [75:32] it's very clear now that the Iranian [75:34] revolution has has had uh a more shaping [75:36] influence on the politics in the Middle [75:38] East than say the Oslo process or [75:40] something and it's and its fallout which [75:41] has occupied um so many column inches [75:44] and so much attention in the west. Um I [75:47] I think we're about to go to questions [75:49] and I think a lot of those questions are [75:51] going to be about the last few decades [75:53] because we are talking about a reason [75:54] where a region where the past isn't even [75:56] the past. Um but one question I would [75:59] simply ask is is this um how is it that [76:03] the the reaction uh to the 9/11 attacks [76:07] uh which are the the next great [76:08] watershed after Oslo launched by a Sunni [76:10] terrorist group with roots in the uh [76:13] Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. How is it [76:16] that that leads to the rise of an [76:18] Iranian empire in effect that reasserts [76:21] its historic uh ambition to rule the [76:23] cauldron? [76:24] >> That's fascinating. That's my last [76:25] question to you. That's your last [76:26] question and I'm going to answer it in a [76:28] very short way because it's time for [76:29] questions and then we need to have a [76:31] glass of wine. Um, you need a glass of [76:33] wine. I've had my glass of wine. Um, but [76:36] in a very in a very short answer, [76:38] America chose to fight that war against [76:40] the wrong enemy. They they chose a [76:42] weaker power which was Saddam's Iraq [76:45] which was already completely hobbled and [76:48] um and they were then tied down they [76:51] were then tied down and entangled in a [76:53] brutal insurgency backed by Iran. And [76:55] after 2003, Iran was able to create [76:59] really the most powerful Iranian Persian [77:02] empire since Nadir Shar in the 18th [77:04] century or even the Cisanians in the se [77:06] the 7th century when they ruled the [77:08] whole Middle East. Um and they created [77:11] um the six armies um strategy which [77:15] meant that they would fight and defend [77:17] Iran using Arab armies on Arab soil and [77:20] they used proxies and allies. the [77:22] Assad's in Syria, Hezbollah captured [77:26] Lebanon. Um the popular mobilization [77:29] units captured Iraq and they had the [77:33] Houthis and they had um Hamas of course. [77:38] And so that lasted for 20 years and [77:40] until one of their proxies [77:44] um exceeded orders [77:46] >> and jumped the gun [77:47] >> and jumped the gun slightly. I mean just [77:49] to finish because this is a good place [77:51] to finish. Um Hamas was backed by the [77:54] Iranians. It had permission to launch [77:56] such an attack. Um it but but the [78:01] Iranians and Hezbollah leadership under [78:03] Nazalla. Nazalla was was regarded as a [78:07] co-commander of Iranian interests. Um [78:11] really a kind of viceroy of of the Arab [78:14] world. And so he was the vice, if you [78:17] think of him as a viceroy, it needed his [78:19] approval for a date and a plan. But [78:22] Sinoir of Hamas [78:24] um quite rightly didn't trust Hezbollah [78:28] or the Iranians. He believed that they [78:29] were infiltrated by the Israelis, which [78:32] of course they were. He was absolutely [78:34] right. So he he reserved the secret plan [78:38] that he had to launch October 7th [78:41] presuming that they would all join in [78:43] even though they had told him many times [78:45] that they had to approve of the plan. So [78:48] hence when he launched October 7th it [78:50] was much more successful than anyone [78:52] could have dreamed and could only have [78:54] been successful because of outrageous [78:57] stupidity, hubris um blindness and [79:01] self-absorption by the Israelis and um [79:05] and was much more successful. Had [79:08] Hezbollah intervened at that point um [79:12] the state of Israel would have been in [79:14] real jeopardy. So we begin the as we [79:16] ended with a tribal raid. Um so Fury, [79:21] thank you so much. [applause] [79:31] [applause] [79:33] >> I I can see some hands already. [79:34] >> I feel we shouldn't have too many [79:36] questions just because it's 9:00. Did we [79:38] start at 7:30? [79:39] >> No, little we were a little late. [79:40] >> Yeah, but but I think we should have one [79:42] or two. I people [79:44] >> let's keep them short and to the point [79:45] like Gitsak Shamir uh the gentleman at [79:48] the back there there there are trained [79:49] professionals handing out the [79:50] microphone. [79:52] >> Absolutely fascinating talk. You've done [79:54] a whistle stop tour through the Middle [79:55] East. The one country you've not [79:57] mentioned that appears to be coming up [80:00] very quickly on the uh the inside track [80:02] is the influence of the Qataris. I [80:04] wonder if you can just spend a couple of [80:06] minutes talking about how the Qataris [80:08] have got to position where they they [80:10] appear to be the spider at the center of [80:12] quite a complicated web at the moment. [80:15] >> Yeah, that's a very good question. I [80:17] mean, one of the interesting phenomenums [80:19] today are what I call the boutique the [80:21] boutique powers which are tiny Gulf [80:25] powers of of of historic wealth [80:30] with their own programs and projections. [80:34] um internationally and these powers like [80:37] Qatar are now ex exerting power in a way [80:41] that I think is literally parallel to [80:45] you know the great the great Arab [80:47] empires at their height and they have [80:50] immense power lobbying in in America for [80:53] example. So, forget the Isra the famous [80:56] Israeli lobby of the 70s, 80s, and 90s. [81:00] Um, the Qataris, you know, now have [81:03] amazing um uh power and sway in the [81:07] Trump administration, for example. So, [81:10] we're in that era when, you know, these [81:12] these small Arab powers that seem small [81:15] can have almost neoimperial [81:18] um projection of power. And that's just [81:22] part of the game now. And we're in a new [81:24] era where these smaller new powers [81:28] um can have enormous influence in all [81:31] sorts of areas in education particularly [81:34] in America you know where they they are [81:36] spending billions on in American [81:39] universities and influence operations [81:42] sports um arts and and of course in [81:46] politics as mediators [81:49] um which is the modern way of small [81:52] powers. [81:53] in exerting influence on mega powers [81:57] that need their help in the region. And [81:59] you see it Pakistan is the other example [82:01] of this right now where Pakistan has [82:04] finally after trying for almost 80 years [82:07] to to exert influence in the Muslim [82:10] world in the in the Arab world has [82:13] finally managed it through Trump's [82:15] mistake mistaken conduct of the of the [82:18] um war in Iraq in Iran. So, so we're [82:22] seeing the rise of the of totally new [82:24] intercontinental [82:26] neoimperial powers. The UAE is another [82:29] example. [82:31] >> Should we have one more? [82:32] >> One more gentleman at the back. It's [82:34] first out the gate. [82:37] >> Um, thank you very much both of you for [82:39] a fascinating conversation and for your [82:40] wonderful books. Um, contemporary [82:43] Palestinian academics often cite the [82:46] animus towards Jews in the 40s as being [82:48] a function of the great injustice of the [82:51] partition plan of 47. But everything [82:54] else we see in Al Husseini's [82:56] relationship with Hitler and about 5,000 [82:58] years of prior history say that there [83:00] was a deeper anti-semitism at play that [83:03] we predates that. But it is the strong [83:06] argument behind the kind of belief at [83:09] the moment that a one-state solution can [83:11] work. somehow. So, I'm just wondering, [83:12] do you know much about that period of [83:14] history? What is the truth about the [83:16] kind of history of anti-semitism in that [83:18] period? [83:19] >> In which period? [83:20] >> Um, well, that's a very big one, but I I [83:22] think we can also ask about the the [83:23] general. You remain an optimist despite [83:26] all the loaings and hatreds of of [83:29] >> I remain an optimist because it's it's [83:30] it's it's deeply ingrained in my [83:32] character. um but sometimes against [83:36] overwhelming um overwhelming evidence. [83:38] But you know I mean the answer to your [83:41] question is there is there is a long and [83:43] deep strain of anti-Judaism [83:47] um you know in the Islamic world which [83:50] but there's also a a very deep um strain [83:54] of coexistence of recognition of the [83:57] people of the book and both these things [83:59] exist together in in World War II as you [84:02] said um you know the leadership of the [84:05] Palestinian Arab movement um under under [84:08] the MUI al-Hassani you know totally [84:11] embraced um Nazi Nazi national socialist [84:16] racial ideology and they kind of merged [84:19] that with their version of Islamism and [84:21] and and panar and Arab nationalism [84:25] that didn't work but it remained a very [84:28] very strong part and you see it for [84:30] example in the Hamas charter and in [84:34] Hamas ideology and the sort of stuff [84:35] they're reading so it's still there. Um, [84:40] you know, key part of this is education [84:42] and I think this is maybe a good place [84:44] to, you know, good place to end because [84:48] the education on both sides is actually [84:51] very much against peace. If you look at, [84:53] I'd also say call out Israeli education [84:56] now and its presentation of the Arab [84:58] world. Um but much more severe, much [85:02] more um much more grievous and egregious [85:05] is the education that is now regularly [85:08] served up in the Arab world um that [85:11] presents the Jews as um with all the [85:14] sort of anti-semitic tropes that come [85:16] from Nazi tropes and don't belong in the [85:19] pre-Nazi period, which is just a sign of [85:22] how modern it is. Um, one good little [85:26] sign is I don't know if you saw the [85:27] other day that the Saudi Arabians have [85:29] just updated their textbooks to take out [85:33] some of this stuff, which is very [85:34] interesting because that sort of thing [85:36] can only be made that sort of decision [85:38] can only be made from the very top. And [85:41] it's interesting, but maybe that's a [85:43] little hopeful glint there. And there [85:44] are glints, [85:46] >> but not many. [85:47] >> I I don't I could happily sit here all [85:49] evening, but I'm I think we should get [85:50] downstairs and have a glass of wine [85:52] again. Thank you. Simon Cont. Thank you. [85:56] [applause]
