Transcript [00:00] What went on inside Israel's command [00:02] center as the Jewish state's leaders [00:04] struggled to cope with the catastrophe [00:06] of October 7th and then fight the war [00:09] that followed? How much of their [00:11] strategies and their policies was a [00:13] function of the shifting conflicts [00:15] between Prime Minister Benjamin [00:17] Netanyahu, the Ministry of Defense, and [00:19] the various heads of the military and [00:21] intelligence branches and the opposition [00:23] leaders who joined the government for a [00:25] time? and how much of what we think we [00:28] know about the war is influenced by [00:30] politics rather than facts. Today on [00:33] Think Twice, we take a deep dive into [00:36] all of this with the authors of an [00:38] important new book, In the War Room, [00:41] [music] the inside story of Israel's [00:43] fight against Hamas and the Iranian [00:46] Access. [01:09] Hello and welcome to Think Twice. As the [01:12] first Knesset elected since October 7th [01:15] and the war that followed the terrorist [01:16] attacks struggles to form a government, [01:19] so much of the conventional wisdom about [01:21] what happened in the last 3 years [01:23] remains a function more a political spin [01:26] than facts. At stake is not just Prime [01:28] Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's political [01:30] future and his legacy. Important [01:33] questions need to be answered, not just [01:35] about why the disaster happened, but [01:38] also whether Israel's undoubted [01:40] victories since the fall of 2023 against [01:43] Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran have [01:45] sufficiently altered the regional [01:47] strategic balance in its favor to [01:50] balance the cost of the diplomatic [01:51] offensive against it and the global [01:53] surge of anti-semitism that followed the [01:55] attacks. No one book can answer all of [01:59] those questions, but there is one new [02:01] volume that does tell us more about how [02:03] the war was fought from the perspective [02:05] of Israel's leaders than any other. And [02:08] we're pleased to have with us today its [02:10] authors. Yona Jeremy Bob is the senior [02:13] military analyst for the Jerusalem Post [02:16] and the author of the 2023 book Target [02:19] Thran and the 2019 Justice in the West [02:22] Bank: The Israeli Palestinian Conflict [02:24] Goes to Court. Elliot Kaufman is an [02:27] editorial writer and member of the [02:29] editorial board of the Wall Street [02:30] Journal. Together, they are the authors [02:33] of In the War Room, the inside story of [02:36] Israel's fight against Hamas and the [02:39] Iranian access. Yona Jeremy Bob and [02:42] Elliot Kaufman, welcome to Think Twice. [02:45] >> Glad to be here. [02:46] >> Thank you. [02:46] >> Well, thanks to both of you for making [02:48] the time to join us today. I want to [02:51] start by asking about a key part of the [02:54] puzzle of understanding what happened on [02:57] October 7th and what subsequently [03:00] happened in the war room. And the [03:02] question is why was the IDF so [03:04] unprepared for what happened on October [03:06] 7th? How broad was the responsibility [03:08] for this mistake in terms of really a [03:11] generation of political leaders, IDF [03:13] generals and intelligence officials? But [03:15] just as important to the narrative of [03:17] your book, though not as widely [03:19] discussed elsewhere, why was the IDF so [03:22] unprepared to wage an offensive into [03:24] Gaza? And was this a function on the on [03:28] the part of um the army leadership or [03:30] there you know that Hamas could be lived [03:32] with and that an invasion would be too [03:34] costly and also that Hamas would never [03:37] be capable of doing anything that would [03:39] make it necessary to attack. [03:41] So, I think I'll take the why wasn't the [03:43] IDF ready defensively and maybe I'll [03:45] pass on to Elliot to take on why the IDF [03:48] uh didn't or how shocking it is that the [03:50] IDF didn't have an offensive plan. Um, [03:53] in terms of defense, uh, we could spend [03:56] an hour just talking about that. The big [03:57] headline is, you know, lack of [04:00] imagination. Pearl Harbor, 911, the [04:03] Yumipur war, October 7th. Now, people [04:07] just thought Kamas was so weak. Kamas is [04:10] so pathetic. They're the weakest chain [04:11] in the Iranian access. You have Iran, [04:14] Hezbollah, probably even the Houthis of [04:16] Yemen, Syrian militias, Iraqis. Kamas is [04:18] the weakest. Are you kidding me? They're [04:20] going to invade us. And the thing that [04:22] they were, you know, worrying about the [04:24] last bunch of years before this was, you [04:26] know, an invasion from tunnels. And an [04:29] invasion from tunnels isn't going to be [04:31] massive. You can't get thousands of [04:32] people coming out of tunnels. You could [04:34] get 10, maybe 50. And that's, you know, [04:37] actually that night when they started to [04:39] see certain SIM cards go on in Gaza that [04:43] signaled that maybe something was up. [04:45] What were they they were worried about [04:46] is maybe 10 guys, maybe 50 terrorists [04:51] are going to try to invade one or two [04:52] villages. And they sent the small [04:54] Shinbet team to sort of help with that [04:56] possibility. But again, it's all sort of [04:58] like within that normal framework. Um, [05:01] that's the biggest one. There's a lot of [05:03] other problems. you know, they didn't [05:05] have unit 504, that's sort of the IDF's [05:08] sort of own Mossad. Um, what hadn't been [05:11] operating in Gaza since I think 2012. [05:14] Uh, they just didn't think they needed [05:16] it. The Shinbet was doing a good enough [05:18] job, they thought. Um, and you know, [05:21] they didn't have reinforcements out of [05:24] half a million soldiers. You know, they [05:26] only had 600 on the border. If they have [05:29] 3,000 on the border, that's probably [05:31] enough or enough to stop most of the [05:34] invasion. And everybody, the the IDF, [05:38] the political echelon were all into the [05:40] smaller, smarter army idea. That was the [05:43] trend all over the world. And it had [05:45] sort of infected Israel, too. So again, [05:48] I could give you a lot more reasons, but [05:50] those are just a few of the reasons why [05:52] they were completely unprepared uh for [05:55] the invasion. [05:56] >> Yeah. And that was that was a consensus [05:59] you know including people like who are [06:01] now you know at you know um you know [06:05] fighting each other in elections like [06:06] Eisenat [06:08] um you know and Netanyahu they all they [06:10] all believed that nobody was against it [06:12] right [06:12] >> Eisenat Netanyahu Gans you know [06:16] Galantilib [06:19] Kha everybody who was prime minister or [06:22] the IDF chief for like the last you know [06:25] 5 years 10 years 15 years arguably was [06:28] part of this, you know, they call it the [06:29] conceptsia, this conceptual framework of [06:32] how to ally Gaza, contain it, deter it, [06:35] manage it, give them more workers [06:37] that'll, you know, sort of keep them [06:39] stable and happy. Everybody was part of [06:40] that. [06:41] >> Thanks for tuning in to [music] Think [06:43] Twice. Whether you're listening to us on [06:45] any of the podcast platforms or watching [06:48] us live on Facebook [music] or X or on [06:50] the JNS YouTube channel, please like and [06:53] or subscribe to JNS. Click on the bell [06:55] for notifications and give us good [06:57] reviews. Also, in addition [music] to [06:59] think twice, there is a Jonathan Tobin [07:01] Daily podcast where I share more news [07:03] and analysis with you about the most [07:05] significant issues we're facing today. [07:08] You can find the daily show under [07:10] Jonathan Tobin Daily on the JNS channel, [07:13] wherever you get your [music] podcasts. [07:15] And now back to today's program. [07:18] Yeah, I want to turn now to another one [07:20] of sort of the narratives that go [07:23] through this really interesting book and [07:25] that's the evolution of the Biden [07:27] administration policy towards the war. [07:30] How much of their shift from, you know, [07:33] in the beginning where Biden makes these [07:36] very tough statements that he supports [07:38] Israel's efforts to basically defeat get [07:40] rid of Hamas to eventually something a [07:43] very different kind of stand. How much [07:45] of that was a function of the shift in [07:48] opinion about Israel among the Democrats [07:50] after October 7th or just pressure [07:53] generated by negative coverage of [07:55] Israel? You know, Biden said he agreed [07:57] that Hamas had to go, but then his [07:59] policies and really efforts to hamstring [08:01] the Israeli effort seemed to indicate [08:03] that they wanted it to survive. What led [08:06] to that? [08:07] You know, it it really felt like it was [08:10] that pressure which built up and built [08:14] on the American campuses in the American [08:18] press from the Democratic Party activist [08:21] base until the Biden [08:23] >> and also members of the administration, [08:25] low-level people signing petitions and [08:27] congressional in the fall of 2023, not [08:31] you know, months later. [08:32] >> So, this is what I'm getting to. it felt [08:34] like it was building toward it and then [08:37] the Biden administration had to bend to [08:40] that pressure and certainly there is a [08:42] lot of truth to that story but I think [08:45] what many people don't realize is that [08:47] even from the very start of the war the [08:52] Biden administration's posture [08:55] was never quite the full support for [08:58] Israel it was after October 7th we're on [09:01] Israel's side but what did that mean? [09:04] Did it mean support for a full ground [09:07] invasion of Gaza? It did not. Did it [09:10] mean support for taking on Hisbala in a [09:13] in a serious way in Lebanon? It did not. [09:17] And that I'm not talking about months [09:19] into this thing once the media [09:21] environment had changed. I'm talking [09:23] about from the very start. And so [09:25] Israel's war room had to confront this [09:28] in those early weeks as they are asking [09:30] themselves, "What should we do about [09:32] Gaza? Should we mount a full ground [09:35] invasion?" And they're having the Biden [09:38] administration and leading American [09:41] generals sent by the Biden [09:43] administration council them against a [09:47] full ground invasion of Gaza. instead [09:51] suggesting you can take on Hamas and [09:54] achieve your goals with air strikes and [09:57] with special forces raids. And to Galant [10:01] and to Netany, this simply wasn't [10:05] convincing. uh for the obvious reason [10:08] they had already tried that on four [10:11] previous occasions, four previous Gaza [10:14] wars and it had left Hamas standing in a [10:18] position to to carry out something like [10:21] October 7th. And so it was clear that [10:24] while the Biden administration wanted to [10:26] support Israel, it didn't necessarily [10:29] support the means that would match the [10:32] end which uh Israeli policymakers had in [10:37] had in mind. Instead, the Biden uh [10:40] administration had some other priorities [10:43] such as containing the war, such as not [10:47] allowing it to escalate to any other [10:50] fronts into bringing it toward a very [10:53] speedy conclusion. Of course, as we [10:56] know, that's not at all what happened. [10:58] >> Did they want to keep Iran out of the [11:00] war? Was that their main thing? because [11:03] that sort of goes with a consistent [11:05] theme of Biden and going back to Obama [11:08] administration policies. Um they they [11:11] wanted to keep them out of it [11:14] >> certainly and I think that also affected [11:16] how they looked at the Lebanon front [11:19] because if you fight seriously with his [11:21] with uh Hezbala, you could end up [11:23] dragging in Iran. And as we saw it, this [11:26] was not an unreasonable concern. [11:29] The war indeed did spread from Gaza to [11:33] Lebanon with huge implications in Syria [11:36] and then bringing Iran into this. Now, [11:38] from the Israeli perspective, [11:41] Israel ended up gaining an incredible [11:44] opportunity to [11:46] take the fight to Iran's regime and [11:49] leave its nuclear program in rubble. And [11:52] so keeping the war entirely contained [11:54] just to this one Gaza front when Israel [11:56] was facing attacks from all kinds of [11:58] fronts and certainly from one Iranian [12:01] access. Uh that didn't make the same [12:04] sense in Jerusalem as it might have made [12:07] in Washington. Right now, getting back [12:10] to inside Israel's war room, there's [12:14] clearly a problem of waging a war when [12:16] more than one person thinks they were in [12:19] charge or thinks they they can give the [12:21] orders. Now, you know, in the United [12:23] States, there's a commander-in-chief and [12:26] however strong the personalities within, [12:28] you know, within his aids or, you know, [12:31] the military, the president is the guy [12:33] in charge. But that's not the case in [12:35] Israel. Inside the war room there was [12:36] Netanyahu, there was defense minister [12:39] Galant, the IDF chief of staff Levy. Um [12:43] what were the personal dynamics among [12:45] that trio as well as between them and [12:48] the opposition leaders who then joined [12:51] the cabinet which included former IDF [12:53] chiefs of staff Benny Gansson Eisenot. [12:56] How did that influence the course of the [12:57] war? And was it ever possible for any of [13:00] the ones not named Netanyahu [13:03] um to you know in with their conflicts [13:06] which shifted at times was that always a [13:08] mismatch between a master of maneuver [13:10] and in the prime minister and people who [13:12] were not his equal in that respect or [13:14] was there ever a chance for you know any [13:16] of the non- Netanyahus to get their way? [13:19] >> So that there's a few questions and then [13:21] I'll try to try to unpack them uh [13:23] separately. Um so number one the you [13:28] know Israeli war cabinet was a mess. Um [13:31] you talked about you know Netanyahu and [13:34] Y Galad who Netanyahu had already fired [13:37] once before the war and then unfired him [13:39] because it was too unpopular. And you [13:41] have Benny Gans who you know Netanyahu [13:45] had you know basically you know told him [13:49] promised him he would be rotating with [13:51] him for prime minister and then broken [13:52] that promise and then later Ben Gans [13:55] helps the government come into power [13:57] which pushes Netanyahu out of power. [13:59] Meanwhile, by the way, Yo Galant and [14:00] Benny Gens don't like each other either, [14:02] right? Benny Gens beat Yo Galant out for [14:05] being IDF chief. And then YoV Galant [14:08] later pushes out Benny Gans for being [14:10] the defense minister. So all three of [14:12] them in multiple directions have every [14:14] reason not to dislike each other [14:16] literally, you know, to hate each other [14:17] and hold each other responsible for like [14:19] the worst points in their careers. So [14:20] that's like the starting point. Now you [14:22] ask another question. What about, you [14:25] know, do any of these people have a [14:26] chance against Netanyahu? So in the [14:28] short term, yes, because in the short [14:30] term, Netanyahu did need them especially [14:34] after October 7th, everybody's shaken. [14:37] Netanyahu is especially shaken. And um [14:41] some of the biggest decisions that he [14:43] makes even leans on certain members of [14:45] them against some of the other members [14:47] in order to go to directions he wants or [14:49] to help him deal with the Biden [14:50] administration. [14:52] As the war goes on, once Netanyahu [14:54] becomes the more aggressive member of [14:57] the war cabinet, right, we we also [14:58] explain in the war in in our book that [15:01] at the beginning he's actually the least [15:03] aggressive, the most worried about what [15:05] happens if they do a big invasion in [15:07] Gaza. Galant and Gans ironically have to [15:09] convince him to invade Gaza big time. [15:12] But by March, April 2024, he is the most [15:15] aggressive member of the war cabinet. He [15:17] wants to go into Rafa more. He wants to [15:20] continue after Rafa. He wants to go [15:22] after Hezbollah more later he wants to [15:25] go after Iran more later and eventually [15:27] he you know basically starts to ignore [15:30] Benny Gans enough that Gans realizes [15:32] there's no reason for him to stay and he [15:34] quits and eventually he fires Galant [15:37] this time for real in no November 2024 [15:39] he he actually waits for Trump's [15:41] re-election there's so much news about [15:43] Trump's re-election he figures he can [15:45] fire Galant that no one's going to [15:47] protest as much because everybody's [15:48] following that which yeah you know just [15:50] for whether you think it was a good move [15:52] or not. [15:52] >> True. [15:53] >> Politically, it worked. Yeah. [15:55] >> So, um I I think you know at the [15:57] beginning of the war he does need them [15:59] and they do even though they hate each [16:01] other actually run a lot of things [16:03] together and they make a lot of I think [16:05] balanced decisions. Controversial but [16:07] balanced. And then as the war goes on, [16:09] Netanyahu has his own direction and he's [16:12] able to I think we wrote you know either [16:14] you know outmaneuver or push out or fire [16:17] basically anybody who gets in his way. [16:20] >> Yeah. I guess I'm I I want to drill down [16:22] on that because after October 7th, as [16:24] you just said, the cabinet was divided. [16:26] It was shaken. You you talk about how [16:29] they're all kind of initially shook up [16:31] and, you know, the world is changing [16:33] around them. And initially Netanyahu was [16:36] characteristically cautious because he's [16:38] always been someone who didn't want you [16:41] despite his foreign reputation or the [16:43] reputation in in the American press as [16:46] you know the the the hardliner he he's [16:48] always been cautious about using the IDF [16:50] or or the army other than special forces [16:53] which is his own background and you know [16:56] there apparently he was not entirely [16:59] sure the IDF was up to the task the [17:01] others not. So I guess the question is [17:04] why the shift? I I kind of get why [17:06] Netanyahu changed his mind and became [17:09] dedicated to the idea of continuing the [17:11] war to defeat Hamas, but why did the [17:13] others become more cautious? What's the [17:15] answer to that? And were there political [17:17] considerations [17:19] that impacted both sides of this debate? [17:24] Well, I think you would have to I think [17:26] you would have to start with what is [17:30] what comes right out of October 7th [17:32] itself. So, right out of October 7th, [17:35] there are all kinds of questions for the [17:37] prime minister in particular. Can the [17:39] IDF be trusted? Can it be trusted with a [17:44] mission that it really hadn't been [17:46] trusted with before that full invasion [17:48] of Gaza? Can it be trusted with another [17:52] big Lebanon war? I mean, that hadn't [17:54] gone well in the past. Would it go well [17:56] this time? Uh, could the IDF that, you [17:59] know, whoever is responsible on October [18:01] 7th, certainly the IDF failed on October [18:05] 7th, it failed miserably. Could it be [18:07] trusted to succeed and not walk into, [18:10] you know, a death trap set by Hamas in [18:14] Gaza? And so it takes Netanyahu time to [18:17] see that the IDF has a plan. The troops [18:21] are drilled on that plan. The troops can [18:24] carry out that plan with some success in [18:26] northern Gaza. And he builds and builds [18:28] confidence. You ask about the other [18:31] members of the war cabinet. I think for [18:34] them it it uh had to do not so much with [18:37] the IDF's performance but with the other [18:40] major factors in the war, the hostages [18:43] and the international pressure and [18:46] diplomatic setbacks of the war. Once [18:49] this war is no longer just the quick few [18:53] week, few month Gaza war that maybe we [18:58] are used to. You have to start asking [19:02] questions at that point. Meaning, uh, is [19:06] there an end here on the horizon that we [19:09] can seize or do we just need to make the [19:12] deal to make sure we can get however [19:14] many hostages out? And as that, and Yona [19:17] can certainly say more about this, but [19:20] as that becomes such a uh leading [19:24] domestic issue, as the war itself drags [19:28] on and is clearly of a less decisive [19:31] nature, I think the uh the uh attention [19:35] turns even more so. Well, are we getting [19:38] those hostages? What deal can be made [19:41] for those hostages? Um, and it would [19:44] come to be, you know, someone like Yoo [19:47] Gallant, who is no dove, right? He was [19:49] he was certainly very aggressive in the [19:52] early going, advocating striking north [19:54] against Hisbala. By the time you get to [19:58] August 2024, summer of 2024, he's [20:02] saying, "Maybe we maybe we don't need [20:05] another war right now in Lebanon. Maybe [20:08] we should just take the deal, slow [20:11] things down, take a deal in Gaza, which [20:13] can then quiet Lebanon as well, and then [20:17] later we can try to convince the [20:19] Americans to let the IDF restart the [20:22] fight against Hamas or if necessary [20:25] against Hisbala. Um, but at a certain [20:29] point once this time weighed on, they [20:31] said enough already. We just have to [20:34] make that hostage deal. Is this [20:37] >> I can I can I add a point on this? [20:39] >> Yeah, please. [20:40] >> Okay. I think everything Elliot said is [20:42] good, but I I it all turns on Rafa. Um [20:45] and we have two chapters on Rafa and [20:48] Rafa connects the hostages, the pressure [20:51] from the Biden administration changes, [20:54] right? We Elliot laid out how there was [20:56] some pressure from the Biden administ [20:58] administration from the beginning. But [20:59] the fact is even if they didn't want [21:01] Israel to go in as big to northern Gaza [21:04] and Khanun, they let Israel do it. They [21:06] kept the weapons flowing. It changes at [21:08] Rafa Rafa. They say we draw a line. We [21:11] supported the war for 6 months. We're [21:13] not supporting the war anymore. Don't go [21:15] in. And you know, so there's that [21:18] different level of pressure coming from [21:19] the United States. And there's also the [21:21] Saudi normalization idea. um at the [21:24] beginning of the war, nobody's talking [21:26] about Saudi normalization and then the [21:27] Biden administration rolls out and say, [21:29] "Hey, you can get the hostages back and [21:31] Saudi normalization and all you have to [21:33] do is not go into Rafa." And all of that [21:36] combined shifts a lot of other people in [21:39] the war room to being less aggressive. [21:41] And Netanyahu makes a strategic [21:45] decision. You could say he's right. You [21:46] could say he's wrong. You could say it's [21:48] also political decision to stay in power [21:50] because of his partners. But he makes a [21:51] decision. The war must continue. We have [21:54] to go into RAFA. Even if we don't get [21:56] normalization, even if we butt heads big [21:59] time with the United States, even if [22:00] there's a delay on the hostages, the [22:02] most important priority is to take apart [22:05] Hamas and we're not far enough along. [22:07] >> Yeah. Was, you know, at the heart of [22:09] this is is there just a basic [22:11] contradiction between the two war aims [22:13] that Israel spoke of at the time, which [22:15] was defeat Hamas, get the hostages back. [22:18] You know, I I think Israel, you know, [22:20] Israeli leaders tended to always stick [22:23] to the line that we can do both, but it [22:26] was there was, you know, there was a [22:28] belief that there had to be a choice and [22:32] was was the war room divided on which [22:34] was more important at that point. [22:37] >> Absolutely. And and it was it was almost [22:39] never true that you could do both. What [22:41] happened was we got this, I would say, [22:43] incredible deal. Three weeks into the [22:47] invasion in mid- November, Israel has [22:49] already destroyed Kamas's best 10 10 out [22:53] of 24 battalions are destroyed in three [22:55] weeks in northern Gaza. And so Kamas is [22:59] in deep trouble and they give back 100 [23:01] hostages in three weeks. And so [23:03] everybody thinks, hey, the, you know, [23:06] destroying Kamas and getting hostages [23:07] back really works. And it was a complete [23:10] misunderstanding that was sort of like a [23:12] one-timer from kamas to get Israel to [23:14] stop. But there were go there was it was [23:17] I thought it was evident from the [23:18] beginning that there would be a point [23:20] where kamas would say if you don't end [23:22] the war we'll kill hostages or you'll [23:25] have to kill us and the hostages [23:26] together. That that was apparent. I mean [23:29] I think not just to lots of people. Um I [23:31] was shocked that we got as many hostages [23:33] back in the end as we did. So, uh, call [23:35] me cynical, but um, I think those two [23:38] war aims were always in contradiction, [23:41] but because of that initial success, [23:43] people were allowed to sort of pretend [23:45] that they weren't in contradiction for [23:47] longer than they might have otherwise. [23:50] >> Yeah. And I think part of the dynamic is [23:51] what's going on inside Israel. I mean, [23:53] anybody who, you know, spent a Saturday [23:57] night, um, you know, outside the Tel [23:58] Aviv Art Museum, which became known as [24:00] Hostage Square and listened to the [24:03] speeches at the weekly rally, which, you [24:06] know, generally seemed to be the tone [24:08] was as if the hostages had been taken by [24:11] Netanyahu and he was hiding them in his [24:13] basement. um that that created a [24:16] political dynamic [24:18] that kind of on the one hand boxed in [24:20] it, you know, made his sort of political [24:24] opponents um you know, sort of make a [24:26] choice there too, didn't they? [24:28] >> I think to a large extent, but I think [24:30] they were also [24:33] uh swept up in it as well. I mean, this [24:36] uh this really was something genuine. uh [24:40] the sense that uh it's now or never for [24:45] the hostages and that now or never could [24:48] be sustained for many months. It turned [24:50] out um but that uh these lives were on [24:54] the line and that they could be anyone's [24:56] children in Israel. Uh now [25:01] at that time that argument was made very [25:05] harshly, right? uh the argument was made [25:08] that Netanyahu is just putting his own [25:10] politics ahead of the lives of the [25:13] hostages, ahead of the interests of [25:15] Israel. And this line was heard abroad. [25:18] Believe me, uh the sort of uh you know [25:21] liberal journalists in uh in America [25:25] would know of Israeli liberals are [25:28] making this are you know making this [25:30] argument and so the war itself, what's [25:32] it being fought for? It's being fought [25:34] for BB. Right? that idea was out there [25:37] and there was a time in the middle of [25:39] the war where I think [25:43] you could make that argument and it [25:45] would be tough to answer. At this stage [25:48] I think it has become much more [25:50] difficult to make that argument. That [25:53] argument has not aged well. In other [25:55] words, and I say that for two main [25:58] reasons. one because as has uh as has [26:02] been mentioned, Israel actually did [26:04] return many many more hostages than most [26:08] people thought, including in the IDF [26:10] high command, by the way. Uh but number [26:13] two, because of the accomplishments of [26:16] the war in that second half of the [26:19] fighting when it was supposedly just [26:22] fighting for nothing, instead after that [26:25] summer of 2024, what did we see? We saw [26:29] the success against Hisbala in Lebanon [26:32] devastating it. Once Hisbala is knocked [26:35] out of the fight, the Syrian Assad [26:37] regime falls. You see the 12-day war in [26:40] Iran, which leaves its nuclear program [26:43] in rubble. Uh, and you see those final [26:46] Gaza offensives, which did pressure [26:49] Hamas and did have something to do [26:51] ultimately with that final release of [26:54] the hostages. Now, extending the war had [26:57] real costs, diplomatic costs, [26:59] humanitarian costs, you can, you know, [27:01] look at it many different ways. But to [27:03] say that there was there was nothing to [27:06] accomplish, it was only politics, I [27:09] don't think that appears very credible [27:11] anymore at this point, [27:13] >> right? [27:15] Are you dreaming of owning a home in [27:17] Jerusalem? The Dream Rapple is giving [27:20] you a chance to win a brand new $1.3 [27:23] million luxury apartment in the heart of [27:26] Jerusalem. And right now, you can get [27:28] two for one tickets. Don't miss out. [27:31] Click the link below and get your [27:34] tickets today. [27:36] One of the key questions that the people [27:38] inside the war room faced that you write [27:40] about was whether to deal with Lebanon [27:42] first rather than to concentrate on [27:44] Hamas and Gaza or to leave Lebanon for [27:47] later. Um, tell us about that and also [27:50] was this debate about Lebanon a function [27:53] of the fact that it it sort of seems [27:55] from the outside and indeed maybe in [27:58] part from your reporting that the IDF [28:00] and especially the intelligence services [28:02] were seemingly more interested in or [28:05] just better prepared to fight Hezbollah [28:07] in Iran than they were Hamas. And is [28:10] there an answer to the question of why [28:12] Hezblah didn't choose to go to war uh to [28:14] go all out against northern Israel to [28:16] support Hamas in October 2023 when that [28:18] would have done so much more harm rather [28:21] than as it turns out just wait to be [28:22] attacked? So they definitely were much [28:26] better prepared, the IDF and the Mossad [28:28] to go after Hezbollah to go after Iran. [28:31] And they had spent, you know, 10 years, [28:34] in some cases 20 years of huge amounts [28:37] of resources and intelligence investment [28:40] to be ready for judgment day, so to [28:42] speak, which they hadn't done with [28:43] kamas. And we now know later, and you [28:45] you get you're talking about chapter 1. [28:47] You come to chapter 10, it turns out it [28:49] wasn't just, you know, invasions. It was [28:51] the beepers and the walkie-talkies and [28:54] all of these things that we saw play out [28:55] later they could have done 4 days into [28:58] the war. Less of the beepers there there [29:01] were some beepers. There weren't as many [29:02] but there were beepers and you know the [29:04] walkie-talkies were already in play. Um [29:07] so yeah they definitely wanted to use [29:09] that. Um there is a famous saying from [29:12] Clausowitz that if you have two enemies [29:14] you hit the stronger one first and that [29:15] sort of sets the tone for everything. So [29:17] that was their attitude also that [29:18] basically they had lost deterrence [29:22] not just for kamas but when everybody [29:24] saw that kamas could beat Israel only [29:27] for a couple days but at all they said [29:29] if we don't restore deterrence in the [29:31] region everybody's going to think they [29:33] can beat us. So if we clobber Hezbollah [29:36] that will not only restore deterrence [29:39] with kamas but it will restore [29:40] regionwide deterrence. People be like, [29:42] "All right, Kamas got lucky, but look [29:44] what they just did to bullet. We don't [29:46] want to mess with this gorilla. There's [29:47] still the gorilla in the jungle." Um, [29:50] and the other question you said, "Why [29:52] didn't Hzbollah go in?" It's a great [29:54] question. Israeli intelligence has [29:57] concluded, uh, there are a couple [29:59] reasons. Uh, first of all, Nasallah, [30:03] like Israel, was sort of used to the way [30:04] things were. He was taken by surprise. [30:07] Now, you know, Yakya Sinir had talked to [30:10] him about, you know, the possibility of [30:12] like a joint front, but he had not [30:14] expected anything of this size. He [30:15] hadn't expected it then. And so, he was [30:18] just gathering information. And by the [30:20] time he starts to consider if he would [30:23] go in or not. And by the way, if he goes [30:25] in, he does much worse to northern [30:28] Israel than what Hamas did to southern [30:30] Israel. He had way more weapons. I saw [30:31] it myself embedded with the IDF in the [30:33] villages. I saw, you know, what they had [30:35] in the houses. Wasn't like hand gods. [30:37] It's like boxes of anti-tank missiles [30:39] and RPGs and grenades. So, but he [30:42] hesitates long enough that while we're [30:45] talking about the IDF sending [30:47] reinforcements to the south, the same [30:49] time they're sending reinforcements to [30:51] the north. And by the time he might have [30:53] concluded, oh, I do want to invade, the [30:55] IDF already has three times as many [30:57] forces on the northern border. At that [30:59] point, it's too late for him. He really [31:01] needs to decide to do it in the first [31:05] hour, maybe four hours. After already [31:08] four hours, the IDF is already sending [31:10] tons of reinforcements to the north at [31:12] the same speed or even faster than to [31:15] the south. [31:17] >> That's that's important. Now, we've [31:19] talked about the fundamental [31:21] contradiction between the two war aims [31:23] of getting back the hostages and [31:24] defeating Hamas, [31:26] but I guess you know obviously from the [31:29] perspective of now 3 years later and [31:32] everything that happened and as you said [31:34] in the second half of the war by [31:35] surviving [31:37] has Hamas in the long run can they [31:40] consider that they they won the post [31:42] October 7th war? [31:45] >> I think we'll probably both want to [31:46] weigh in on this one. Who wants to go [31:48] first? [31:48] >> Go ahead. [31:50] >> Sure, I'll go first. I think in the [31:52] bigger picture, [31:54] no, they cannot say that they won. On [31:58] their own front, they can say they won. [32:02] Okay. On their own front, they can say [32:05] October 7th was as big a victory as they [32:09] will ever get. [32:11] And what happened after? Okay, they lost [32:14] half of Gaza. a little more than half of [32:16] Gaza, [32:18] tens of thousands of fighters of people. [32:21] Not that they care about the civilians, [32:24] but uh but they're still there ruling [32:28] all 2 million of the Gazins with the [32:31] with the uh future uncertain. [32:35] They may take that. Okay. But what Yah [32:39] Sinoir [32:41] could not have seen coming on October [32:44] 7th was everything else that that attack [32:47] would set into motion. The devastation [32:51] of Hisbala, which had 150,000 missiles [32:56] and rockets that it held over Israel's [33:00] head, it now has something like a tenth [33:03] of that. [33:05] and without its southern Lebanon [33:08] uh you know uh border without that elite [33:12] Radwan invasion force ready to deal [33:16] Israel an even stronger blow that has [33:20] been lost as I said Syria's Assad regime [33:23] falls costing the entire Iranian axis [33:27] its critical supply hub and then you [33:30] look all the way to Iran where not only [33:33] is the nuclear lear program [33:36] uh you know at its weakest point in two [33:40] decades without any enrichment going on [33:44] instead of being on the precipice of a [33:46] nuclear breakout they're two years away [33:49] and and with Israel and the US watching [33:52] to you know keep them from shortening [33:54] that time but Iran itself is under a [33:58] full US naval blockade they did not see [34:01] that coming on October 6th 2023. And so [34:05] those immense regional costs I think [34:09] tell you that Hamas didn't win or let me [34:13] actually rephrase that. The Iranian axis [34:16] didn't win the larger war. [34:19] >> Right. Right. I I think Ellen makes a [34:22] lot of good points. Um and I would just [34:25] sort of like split it up into military [34:27] and diplomatic. On a military basis, [34:30] Israel won on every front. Israel [34:33] reduced Hamas's power by 90 or more [34:36] percent. Israel reduced Hisbala's power [34:38] by 90%. Israel reduced Iran's nuclear [34:42] power, ballistic power, overall [34:44] industrial military complex by huge, [34:47] huge magnitude. Diplomatically, Israel [34:50] lost um strategic, diplomatic, [34:53] long-term, we don't know yet. Maybe [34:57] Israel lost in Gaza because Kamas is [35:00] still there. If the Trump plan starts to [35:04] work, we don't know. They signed it a [35:06] year ago. Hamas basically hasn't [35:08] implemented their side. ISO hasn't [35:10] implemented its side. Um, so if that [35:14] plan starts to get implemented and Kamas [35:16] starts to have to give up some of its [35:18] political power, that might start some [35:21] ripples that we can't see yet. So, right [35:23] now, diplomatically, Israel lost and it [35:26] lost big time in the United States, [35:28] right? because you have now large [35:31] portions not only of the Democratic [35:33] party but also increasing portions of [35:35] the Democrat uh the Republican party the [35:38] statements by JD Vance uh were really [35:40] problematic from my perspective um over [35:43] the last week and so when you when you [35:46] put that together again you can win [35:49] militarily and so Israelis feel [35:51] physically more secure now but where [35:54] will Israel be in 2029 [35:57] will Israel still have you So, I'm not [35:59] talking about military e. Will Israel [36:01] still be able to buy full price F-35s [36:04] and F-15s from the United States? I [36:06] don't know the answer to that. And that [36:07] was not a question I thought it would be [36:09] asking. So, militarily, Israel won [36:12] across the board. Diplomatically, it's [36:15] lost a bunch of things. I'm hoping that [36:19] things will improve so that that will [36:21] look better in 2029, but it it could be [36:23] it could be worse. [36:26] >> Right. One more question sort of about [36:27] Gaza um about the details of the war and [36:30] I guess it's always I I'm curious why [36:34] didn't you know when it began the ground [36:37] invasion you know weeks after October [36:39] 7th why didn't the IDF attack the [36:42] Philadelphia corridor you first and cut [36:45] off Hamas from its Egyptian supply lines [36:48] um rather than just let that stay open [36:51] for so long and why was the IDF so slow [36:55] to take up a counterinsurgency approach [36:58] as some Americans urged where you know [37:01] they would hold ground rather than [37:03] giving it up as they did in the first [37:05] part of the war and then having to [37:06] constantly retank it. [37:07] >> So Philadelphia quarter um they always [37:11] go into northern Gaza first. Um northern [37:14] Gaza is where the main kamas [37:17] headquarters was. They had headquarters [37:19] in Kanunus but the biggest headquarters [37:20] was in northern Gaza. The best [37:22] battalions were in northern Gaza. Um, [37:25] Gaza City is, you know, the capital of [37:27] Gaza. Um, and so you want to smash that [37:30] first. Um, if you can smash that, you've [37:33] made a statement that if if we can beat [37:36] you in Shaya and Jibalia, these are some [37:39] of like the toughest neighborhoods in [37:41] northern Gaza, we can beat you anywhere. [37:43] If if we've destroyed you there, you [37:46] don't stand a chance when we get to [37:47] Kunis, let alone Rafa. So that's why [37:50] they go there first. Now the interesting [37:52] thing about the Philadelphia corridor, [37:55] right? That's in Rafa on the border with [37:57] Egypt and that's where uh some of the [37:59] weapon smuggling was going on. What I [38:02] will tell you and this is a [38:04] controversial debate but when I I was in [38:06] Rafa in the largest tunnel that they at [38:10] some point had used, you know, trucks [38:12] could literally go through the tunnel. [38:13] It was, you know, much higher than the [38:15] ceiling of the room I'm in. Um, and they [38:18] said they haven't been using this tunnel [38:21] for a while. There was some earlier [38:23] point where they were afraid that the [38:26] IDF would find it or the Egyptians would [38:28] find it and so they blew up parts of it [38:30] so it would be disconnected so that if [38:32] somebody found it, they wouldn't be able [38:34] to find the rest. So they were [38:36] definitely using at some point. But I [38:38] think in terms of, you know, in October, [38:40] November 2023, did they think that the [38:43] uh kamas was going to be able to succeed [38:45] to smuggle lots of new weapons across [38:47] Philadelphia quarter at that specific [38:50] moment? Um, I think the answer was no. [38:52] And so I don't think they felt it was [38:54] like a pressing thing that they had to [38:55] do then. I think when Netanyahu was [38:57] saying that he wanted to hold on to the [39:00] Philadelphia quarter, he was thinking [39:01] more about the future in the long term [39:03] that if they gave it back to Hamas, that [39:06] at some point when people start pay stop [39:08] paying attention, that's where they [39:09] would be able to smuggle the weapons [39:10] again. [39:12] >> And you know what? I love this question [39:15] of yours because I think it gets us to [39:18] the heart of the matter and really [39:20] perhaps the biggest uh mistake Israel [39:23] made in this war. Now, when Yona and I [39:26] were giving our assessments of the [39:29] larger war, so I was saying not enough [39:31] accomplished in Gaza, Yona was saying [39:34] the real diplomatic costs. Um, in a way, [39:39] they're a function of the same thing. [39:42] And that is the way Israel fought in [39:45] Gaza and how long it took. Okay. In the [39:49] end, what did it produce? this 2-year [39:53] fight in Gaza at immense diplomatic cost [39:56] and with Hamas still in charge of the [39:59] Gazans. Okay. So, clearly something was [40:01] not done right. Uh and I think that you [40:05] have pin I think that you have [40:07] pinpointed it and it is that Israel [40:11] employed this raid and leave strategy [40:14] for so much of the uh of the war. indeed [40:18] most of the war and uh certainly while [40:21] the Biden administration was in control [40:24] and it didn't do it for no reason. Okay, [40:27] there are real legitimate reasons such [40:29] as protecting Israeli soldiers as one. A [40:34] second is uh a real worry from the top [40:39] of the IDF that the Biden administration [40:42] if it would see Israeli troops staying [40:45] in one area staying in Khan ununice [40:49] let's say in holding that territory well [40:51] what is that that is the start of an [40:54] occupation and ah at an occupation the [40:57] Biden administration would cut off all [40:59] support for the war effort in Gaza and [41:02] so they could say that it was actually [41:04] much more difficult to do anything else. [41:07] But what what ultimately resulted from [41:11] this inconclusive fighting in Gaza? [41:14] Beating Hamas in one neighborhood only [41:17] to have it return afterwards. So they [41:19] would have to fight it again in the same [41:21] neighborhood and do this two or three [41:22] times or four or five times. And that's [41:25] part of the reason why you see the [41:26] immense destruction in some of these [41:29] neighborhoods of Gaza because there [41:31] wasn't just one battle. They had to [41:32] fight it over and over again. And there [41:36] was, I think, a real reluctance to hold [41:39] territory, to do anything that smacked [41:42] of an occupation. The IDF itself wasn't [41:45] interested in that uh in that kind of [41:48] thing. But what it meant was that for [41:51] the whole first half of the war, [41:54] Hamas was moving around, was being [41:57] pushed around, but it wasn't quite [41:59] losing territory. it was hanging on. And [42:03] so when I say that the fight for Gaza [42:06] went on too long, the costs were too [42:08] great, sometimes people think I mean [42:10] they should have cut it off halfway and [42:12] not done that second half. Really, I [42:15] mean what was happening for the first [42:17] half of the war? Not enough was being [42:19] accomplished in those crucial early [42:23] months of the war before all of the [42:26] diplomatic costs had been incurred. [42:31] right now. How different was the Trump [42:33] approach to the war and after he [42:35] returned to office um and then pushed [42:38] for a hostage deal and then the current [42:40] agreement which we've already referenced [42:42] which will supposedly lead to a change [42:44] in Gaza but which in effect has [42:46] maintained a ceasefire with Israel in [42:48] control of much of the strip but Hamas [42:50] still in charge of the population. [42:52] Do either of you think there is any [42:54] reason to believe that that will lead to [42:57] a peaceful resolution of the conflict? [42:59] um or Hamas disarming. [43:02] >> Let's let's uh divide, you know, [43:06] some sort of progress with reducing [43:09] Hamas's power politically from a [43:11] peaceful resolution of the conflict. I I [43:14] don't think anybody is envisioning a [43:16] peaceful resolution of the conflict. [43:18] Certainly not with Hamas. Um some of the [43:22] other people in the region, who knows? [43:23] Um but certainly not with Kamas. So I I [43:27] think what everybody is hoping is that [43:29] the Trump plan, if it's implemented, if [43:32] you can get international peacekeepers [43:34] and Palestinian technocrats, the kamas [43:37] is just constantly getting killed. I [43:40] mean on a daily weekly basis, their [43:43] midlevel officials, sometimes their [43:45] higher officials are getting killed. And [43:47] if they just want to stop getting killed [43:49] for a temporary period of time, so they [43:51] give up, you know, who's in charge of, [43:53] you know, trash collection, who's in [43:55] charge of education if education is [43:58] happening and who's in charge of these [43:59] other civil duties. What's the big deal? [44:02] They can be like Hezbollah and be the [44:04] puppeteer behind the scenes. They'll [44:05] still have power. Um, and you know, [44:08] that's how they could r. So yeah, I [44:10] think I could see Kamas doing something [44:11] like that and giving up, you know, let's [44:14] say they had 15,000 rockets and they [44:16] have 50 left. So what? They give up 50 [44:18] rockets. What strategic value is 50 [44:20] rockets? Um but that would be useful [44:24] because it would reduce the threat and [44:26] it might eventually lead to Palestinians [44:29] being able to replace them if that [44:31] lasted for long enough, you know, and in [44:33] the meantime they would be less of a [44:35] threat because they would have, you [44:36] know, zero rockets instead of 50. Um, [44:39] but a peaceful resolution. Again, [44:42] they're fanatical Islamists. They were [44:45] ready to have their entire Gaza Strip [44:48] basically destroyed. They could have [44:51] given up the hostages at any point [44:53] during the war and ended the war and [44:57] they would have probably, you know, [45:00] their top top leaders maybe would have [45:01] had to go out go to Qatar, but most of [45:03] Kamas could have stayed in power if [45:05] they'd given it up. You know, that's [45:07] that's what a lot of the war room [45:08] wanted. That's what the Biden [45:09] administration wanted. And if they had [45:12] said, you know, in December 2023 or [45:14] early 2024, here's all the hostages. [45:17] Yakimo will go to Qatar with Muhammad, [45:20] Netanyao probably would have had to say [45:22] yes. So, peaceful resolution, uh, I [45:25] don't know about that, but reducing the [45:28] threat in a measure, I think it's [45:29] possible. Is it likely? I I don't know. [45:35] >> All right. Well, [45:36] Let's turn to something that obviously [45:38] has gotten a lot of interest among [45:40] American Jews. Um, what were the [45:42] measures the Israeli government could [45:45] have done to influence foreign reaction [45:48] and press coverage that it failed to do? [45:50] From your book, as well as much else, I [45:52] get the impression that everybody at the [45:54] top in the war room was focused on [45:56] everything, including the political [45:58] rivalries and arguments other than that. [46:01] Why didn't they think that they could do [46:04] something about it? especially someone [46:06] as savvy about United States and the [46:08] press as Netanyahu take a greater [46:11] interest in it. Is it because he thought [46:12] it was a hopeless task? [46:16] >> H [46:17] not hopeless, not quite hopeless, but [46:20] never going to fully succeed. I mean, I [46:23] I I really think there was a real [46:26] understanding that [46:29] so long as Israel is at war in Gaza [46:34] and of necessity [46:36] is has to kill Palestinians, it is going [46:39] to be losing that diplomatic that public [46:43] relations exchange. And yet your point [46:46] still stands. Uh you can lose it by this [46:48] much or you can lose it by that much. [46:50] Right? Uh now, Prime Minister Netanyahu [46:55] has certain messages at different parts [46:58] of the war that he you know sought to [47:02] get across. And so right after October [47:04] 7th, his message understandably is Hamas [47:09] is ISIS or rather Hamas is worse than [47:12] ISIS or it's uh al-Qaeda and it's worse [47:14] than al-Qaeda. Um, and this I think uh [47:20] was an effective message initially [47:23] reflecting what had just happened, but [47:26] over time, you know, Hamas, al-Qaeda, [47:29] ISIS, it sort of made it sound like like [47:32] this was the war on terror all over [47:34] again. [47:35] >> And Americans have come to take a dim [47:38] view of the war on terror and its [47:40] success and its ultimate prospects. And [47:42] so maybe that wasn't exactly the right [47:46] message there. I mean, he would shift to [47:49] Israel is fighting uh for Western [47:53] civiliz uh civilization against the [47:56] barbarians. And there's a lot of truth [47:58] to that. And yet that is a message that [48:02] like it or not codes very conservative, [48:05] very right-wing. And so under the Biden [48:08] administration and you know if you're [48:10] trying to keep up liberal support uh [48:13] again not the most effective message [48:16] what is what Israel [48:18] >> the truth is that a lot of the people [48:19] bashing Israel are not so big on western [48:21] civilization. [48:22] >> Exactly right. Exactly right. And and [48:25] and I think that was part of the [48:27] problem. And so what Israel comes to the [48:30] the line, the message that really works, [48:34] but works in a very interesting way is [48:36] the hostages. Hamas is holding our [48:40] hostages. Therefore, Israelis can say, [48:43] "How can we stop? How can we stop [48:45] fighting while they're still holding our [48:47] hostages?" And this was an effective [48:49] message with the Biden administration, [48:52] certainly President Biden at the top of [48:54] it, uh, and with a lot of people, but in [48:58] linking the war so exactly and so [49:02] entirely with the hostages, I think it [49:05] created certain other vulnerabilities. [49:08] So once that argument gets out there [49:10] that h there's an easy hostage deal [49:13] available, if only Netanyahu would take [49:15] it, just pay the rent. But once that [49:18] argument can be made, if it's all about [49:19] the hostages, well, you've just been [49:21] disarmed rhetorically in that uh in that [49:25] way. And so I think Israel having [49:27] started by focusing on the need to [49:29] destroy Hamas would shift from that and [49:32] put everything on the hostages, which in [49:34] a way left the military aims them uh [49:39] themselves a little unmed. So that's [49:41] what I would point to. Actually, [49:44] >> I'm going to add I think Elli made a lot [49:46] of good points. I'm going to add a [49:47] couple of points which all come down to [49:49] it Bengir. Um so if you decide that [49:53] you're going to continue the war, not go [49:55] for Saudi normalization, not try sort of [49:59] all out for a hostage deal in summer [50:01] 2024. Could there have been in summer [50:03] 2024? Maybe, maybe not. Uh maybe Kamas [50:07] wouldn't have done a deal anyway. But we [50:08] know that Netanyahu didn't necessarily [50:10] go to sort of the farthest points uh [50:13] which would have forced Kamas to call [50:15] the you know to call Hamas's bluff so to [50:17] speak. Um so at that point if you get [50:20] rid of it Bengir then you can control [50:24] the problem of some of the extreme [50:27] Jewish violence in the West Bank which [50:29] you know top fans of you know Israel in [50:33] the United States Mike Huckabe has [50:35] called out lately and I mean look people [50:39] who want to say that's the same as [50:40] Palestinian terror it's not. Palestinian [50:42] terror is 10 times you know higher in [50:45] volume. There's something like a [50:47] thousand attempted Palestinian terror [50:49] attacks a year and the number of you [50:51] know Jewish you know violent attacks is [50:53] much smaller compared to that. But if [50:55] you're going to continue a war in Gaza [50:58] in the face of huge opposition you need [51:00] to have everything else be super clean [51:03] and what was going on the west bank of [51:05] Juju was not only not super clean it was [51:07] getting worse. If you get rid of it Beng [51:10] you can get that under control. If you [51:12] get rid of it, Bengier, then a lot of [51:15] the Israeli legal officials had [51:17] information that about, you know, things [51:19] that we did well, but things that we did [51:22] well are sometimes like we showed [51:24] restraint and about mistakes that we [51:26] made. And that would be like, well, [51:28] these are mistakes that we made. They [51:30] weren't war crimes. They were mistakes, [51:32] but it bang doesn't want them to do any [51:34] of that. So, they're afraid to put some [51:36] of that information out because they'll [51:38] be attacked by it bangir. I'm [51:40] simplifying it. It's not just Bengavir. [51:42] There's other pieces. But I, you know, [51:44] you can hear from the Trump [51:45] administration. You know, let's say [51:46] Netanyahu holds on the power. They want [51:49] Bangir out of the way. He is, you know, [51:51] very very loud and, you know, disliked [51:54] in the United States by pretty much [51:57] Democrats and Republicans. And so by not [52:00] cleaning, [52:02] you need everything else clean if you [52:04] want to push this war in Gaza, which is [52:07] hoo hugely unpopular. [52:10] All right. Well, I'm I'm not sure that [52:13] you compare all of that responsibility, [52:15] but that's a certainly it's a point and [52:17] certainly it resonates with with a lot [52:19] of Israel's critics. Um I think in the [52:22] end, um you know, these are political [52:24] questions judging, you know, whether is [52:27] Israel should have taken a deal sooner [52:29] or not. Um, in the long run, do you [52:32] think um, Israelis will judge that their [52:36] victories over Hezbollah and the damage [52:38] done to Iran after 2024 were worth it? [52:42] And, you know, that that was worth it [52:44] waiting for a hostage deal that it got [52:46] in 2025 with Trump's help rather than [52:49] the one they might have gotten in 2025. [52:53] And has on the whole that strengthened [52:56] Israel's strategic position or worsened [52:57] it because of the greater international [52:59] isolation? [53:01] >> We need to see what happens in 2029. [53:04] Um because if [53:07] Israel is still getting weapon sales [53:11] from the United States, even if the [53:13] military aid is gone, and even if [53:15] there's criticism, and even if there's [53:16] pressure from the United States on this [53:18] front or that front, then Israel is [53:21] militarily able to continue being a [53:24] regional power. If those weapon cells [53:28] completely dry up, that'll be a new kind [53:30] of crisis that Israel hasn't faced in [53:32] decades. And I don't know what that will [53:34] mean. But let's go back to the the [53:35] positive case. Let's say Israel is able [53:38] to keep weapon sales with whoever is [53:40] running Washington in 2029. In that [53:43] case, I think Israelis will eventually [53:46] say yes, militarily it was worth it and [53:50] we would have been worse off. I think [53:53] it's hard for people to think about that [53:54] way today because everything now is [53:56] about yes, Netanyahu, not Netanyahu. But [53:58] once you take the 10, you know, he's 77. [54:01] He's not going to be running the [54:02] country, you know, in five years or 10 [54:04] years. Historians will look back on it [54:05] and they'll give him credit. [54:07] >> Tell him that, but we'll see. [54:09] >> Yeah. He they'll give they'll give him [54:11] credit or, you know, or criticism for [54:13] this or that. I I I do think that people [54:15] will look back eventually and have to [54:17] admit that militarily there were [54:19] tremendous successes in the war. And as [54:21] long as the diplomatic cost isn't higher [54:24] than the military gains, I think they'll [54:26] have to say that overall was worth it. [54:28] If in 2029 that dynamic changes, that [54:32] could change the answer to the question. [54:35] >> I mean, so much of the answer, I think, [54:38] rests on [54:40] what lasts and what will prove [54:44] ephemeral. And you can really make the [54:46] case either way in terms of the military [54:49] gains and those diplomatic setbacks. I [54:52] mean, I could tell you, okay, Israel did [54:55] this and that to his uh his uh Hisbala, [54:58] but of course it can't solve Lebanon. [55:00] You know, even the Lebanese can't do [55:02] that. So, uh Hisbala is just going to [55:05] rebuild. And so, forget about everything [55:07] Israel did in Lebanon. And I can tell [55:08] you the same uh in Iran. But I can say [55:12] those, you know, diplomatic losses that [55:15] will never change. That is set in stone. [55:17] People have made up their minds and they [55:19] will never rethink Israel again. And and [55:21] some people do see it that way. But I [55:24] could just as easily make the exact [55:26] opposite case to you and say you have to [55:29] think about this in terms of existential [55:31] threats. Hisbala's missile arsenal had [55:34] become an existential threat. Certainly [55:36] Iran's nuclear program existential [55:38] threat. Iran's missile program [55:41] existential threat and point to those [55:44] three right there existential threats [55:47] lifted by this war and what that does [55:50] for Israel strategically and everything [55:53] else is secondary to uh to that and then [55:57] looking at the public opinion question [56:00] and say you know America has been in the [56:04] grips of a and you know so much of the [56:07] western world has been in in the grips [56:09] of really a um moral hysteria [56:12] about Israel because this has gone on [56:15] for 2 years, for three years. It's been [56:18] non-stop flooding people's social media [56:20] feeds, all the rest of the media. Uh and [56:23] say, but there will be other issues. [56:27] >> There will be other moral hysteras on [56:29] questions that have nothing to do with [56:31] Israel. Uh some other area of American [56:35] politics, some other area of the world. [56:37] and people will look elsewhere and [56:39] public opinion about Israel, maybe it [56:42] won't go back exactly where it was, but [56:44] it'll revert to the mean and the [56:46] underlying interests of the USIsrael [56:49] relationship will reassert themselves [56:52] because the US has a need for a [56:54] high-tech defense tech superpower like [56:57] Israel as an ally and doesn't want to [56:59] throw that away or throw that to its [57:02] adversaries potentially. So you can look [57:06] at this really either way and I think so [57:09] much is going to matter of what do [57:11] Israel and the US do in the coming [57:14] years. Do they allow Hisba to rebuild as [57:17] if nothing happened? Do they look away [57:19] while uh Iran keeps working on the [57:21] nuclear program? Uh I don't think either [57:24] of those are particularly likely. But I [57:28] think you know Israel has real agency in [57:31] this situation. it can act to make sure [57:34] that those military gains stick and [57:37] there's quite a bit that it can do on [57:39] the diplomatic front as well. [57:42] >> I guess related to this is the fact you [57:44] know the the USIsraeli offensive against [57:46] Iran that began in February of 2026 is [57:49] beyond the scope of your book but how do [57:52] you and obviously it impacted what you [57:54] just said. How do you assess its impact [57:57] on the USIsrael relationship and the [58:00] long-term conflict, you know, the [58:01] outcome of the conflict between Iran and [58:03] its proxies in Israel? [58:05] >> My answer to your question about uh Iran [58:09] uh in early 2026, [58:12] um I split the screen between, you know, [58:15] Israel and the United States uh because [58:17] from an Israeli perspective, it was [58:19] basically successful. The ballistic [58:22] missile program, if Israel doesn't [58:24] attack in early 2026, was predicted to [58:28] reach something like 6,000 ballistic [58:30] missiles around now, around the end of [58:33] the year. I don't have the exact number. [58:35] They won't give us the exact number of [58:38] what volume beats Israel's missile [58:41] shield, the Arab defense system, but [58:42] it's somewhere in 4,000 4,000 and half. [58:45] 6,000 is way too many. It's definitely [58:47] above that. And so Israel has that [58:50] number down, you know, at the end of the [58:52] word around, you know, 1,300,600 [58:55] missiles. Maybe they're up to around [58:57] like 2,000 by the end of this year, [59:00] which is still less than what they had [59:02] in June 2025. That's a big win. It [59:04] doesn't remove the threat forever, but [59:06] it an imminent threat has been pushed [59:09] off twice for, you know, at least a few [59:12] years. Um, and their future production [59:14] capacity is pushed off. The United [59:16] States is a completely different, you [59:18] know, understanding of they Americans [59:20] don't feel the threat. I I try to tell [59:22] them that they should. I say, "Look at [59:24] North Korea. You thought North Korea [59:26] couldn't threaten you because when they [59:28] made nuclear weapons, they couldn't [59:29] reach you. Three years later, they made [59:31] ICBMs which could reach you." So, the [59:32] Iranians are the same thing. They could [59:34] they'll make nuclear weapons. They can [59:36] only reach the Middle East first. And [59:37] three years later, they'll be able to [59:38] reach the United States also. You don't [59:40] want that. But Americans don't feel that [59:42] now. They felt their gas prices. that's [59:44] what they just voted in the recent [59:45] election. They've voted on gas prices. [59:48] Um and so that is, you know, an issue uh [59:52] going forward is, you know, Israelis, if [59:55] they want to influence American policy, [59:58] are going to have to think not only [60:00] about, you know, what did the war mean [60:02] to us, but what did the war mean to [60:04] Americans? Even if Americans don't fully [60:06] realize, you know, what what their [60:08] long-term security interest should be, [60:10] we have to meet Americans, you know, [60:12] where they are. Well, there's a lot more [60:14] we could discuss. I want to thank you [60:16] both um for coming on and discussing it. [60:19] Um Elliot, since the owner just left, [60:22] how can they um find the book and follow [60:25] uh your work? [60:27] Thank you so much. You can you can find [60:30] in the war room, Amazon, Barnes & Noble, [60:35] uh bookstores all over. Uh, and you can [60:39] follow my work uh at the Wall Street [60:42] Journal editorial page, Yona's work in [60:46] the Jerusalem Post. Thank you once [60:49] again. [60:50] >> Thank you. We also want to thank our [60:52] audience. Please remember to read JNS at [60:54] jns.org and subscribe to our newsletters [60:57] and also to tune in every day for [60:59] Jonathan Tobin Daily Edition, which is [61:01] available on all of the audio podcast [61:04] platforms. And whether you're listening [61:06] to us on any one of those, watching us [61:09] live on Facebook or X, or on the JNS [61:12] YouTube channel, please like and or [61:13] subscribe to JNS. Click on the bell for [61:16] notifications and give us good reviews. 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