Transcript [00:00] It used to be one of those kind of hot [00:02] takes that if you know the Middle East, [00:04] you know that Sunnis and Shias can't [00:05] work together. Well, that that's [00:07] nonsense. They really can. Ayatollah [00:09] Khomeini was among his many incredibly [00:11] sort of clever moves was to use Israel [00:14] and anti-Zionism [00:17] and anti-Americanism to rally an Arab [00:19] world that had become disaffected and [00:22] disillusioned with the pan-Arabism of [00:25] Nasser [00:26] that had been defeated by Israel in [00:28] 1967. And what Khomeini offered was a [00:31] steroid-injected [00:33] Islamism of Sunni Islamism and it really [00:37] looked to Islam rather than the Arab [00:39] nation as the way that a state could be [00:42] run could be run like this. And so, you [00:45] know, for example, you know, Yasser [00:47] Arafat is one of the first to fly in to [00:49] see Khomeini when he takes power. [00:52] And all over the Middle East, [00:54] Iranians, despite being Shiite, start to [00:57] back these entities. Where it really [01:00] takes off is long after the death of [01:02] Khomeini, who dies in '89. In '89, he [01:06] makes sure his successor is chosen. And [01:09] Khamenei [01:10] is still in power 37 years later until [01:13] this very year. [01:15] >> [music] [01:26] [music] [01:27] >> My conversation with Simon Sebag [01:29] Montefiore right after this short [01:32] message. [01:34] >> [music] [01:35] >> This summer, more than 4,000 North [01:37] American teens experienced Israel and [01:39] deepen their Jewish identity through [01:41] Root One. Root One provides families [01:44] with $3,000 vouchers toward the cost of [01:47] an Israel trip and helps teens find the [01:49] experience that's perfect for them. [01:51] That matters because Root One alumni [01:53] arrive on campus better prepared to [01:56] lead, engage in Jewish life, and stand [01:58] up to antisemitism. But, don't take my [02:00] word for it. Listen to what teenage [02:02] participants have to say. This is Elijah [02:05] from Michigan, who said, "Traveling to [02:07] Israel with Root One gave me a shared [02:09] experience with other Jewish students. [02:12] I've seen firsthand how gaining this [02:14] wider understanding of the world has [02:15] allowed me to grow as an individual." [02:18] And this is Chuck from Virginia, who [02:20] said, "There's so much value in having [02:21] had opportunities to engage with [02:23] Israel's modern history. It would have [02:25] been so much harder to maintain my [02:27] connection and support for Israel if I [02:29] hadn't experienced it for myself. Root [02:31] One is helping the next generation build [02:34] a strong foundation and a lasting [02:36] connection to Israel, [02:37] one they'll continue to carry with them. [02:40] Learn more at root1.org. [02:46] Simon, welcome to Call Me Back. [02:49] >> Great to be with you. [02:51] >> We have had many conversations, [02:54] uh [02:54] over the last several years, uh but this [02:56] is your maiden voyage on on Call Me [02:58] Back. Uh I'm grateful for you being [03:00] here, and I'm [03:02] grateful for this book. There's been a [03:04] lot of books written since October 7th. [03:07] There have been a lot of books written [03:08] on the history of the Arab people, the [03:09] history of the Jewish people, the [03:11] history of Israel, the history of the [03:12] Middle East. Um this book is different, [03:16] and I hope this conversation captures [03:18] that. I want to start our conversation [03:21] with um something that I was most struck [03:24] by, which is that most of us learned [03:26] that the modern Middle East that it was [03:29] created, essentially created by the [03:30] collapse of the Ottoman Empire, [03:33] and by European powers drawing new [03:35] borders in the 20th century, you know, [03:38] after the first World War. What does [03:40] that story get wrong? [03:43] >> [snorts] [03:43] >> Well, I mean, in this book, The [03:44] Cauldron, I've really I've really [03:47] deliberately started it much earlier. [03:49] And it starts in 1900. and that's [03:52] because most books traditionally start [03:55] in 1970, 1918 [03:59] with Britain and France and the end of [04:01] World War I, fall of the Ottoman Empire. [04:03] And I think you can't really understand [04:05] anything in the Middle East today [04:07] without understanding what the Ottoman [04:09] Empire looked like. I mean, after all [04:11] I mean, just as the sheer sort of span [04:14] of it, you know, both geographic and [04:16] chronological, you know, it's 400 years. [04:19] It it extended from the the borders of [04:21] Morocco [04:23] to the borders of Iran. And [04:27] I mean, it had North Africa, it had it [04:29] had half of Europe. Um [04:31] but also it was a particular way of [04:34] ruling a multi-ethnic, multi-sectarian [04:37] empire. [04:39] And you really can't understand the [04:41] nations, the peoples, even the new [04:43] states that come out of the Ottoman [04:45] Empire without understanding what the [04:47] Ottoman Empire was before. What we're [04:49] seeing today is in part the ricochets [04:53] from the the end of the Ottoman Empire. [04:56] >> Why do we cling then to this story about [04:59] the end of World War I, the fall of the [05:01] Ottoman Empire, the Sykes-Picot [05:03] Agreement, you know, these British and [05:04] French [05:05] diplomats, [05:07] you know, drawing up borders that that, [05:10] you know, creating [05:11] nation-states, creating the modern [05:12] Middle East. That's the story we have. [05:15] Like, who decided that was the story? [05:18] >> Well, that became the conventional [05:19] wisdom. It plays into all sorts of [05:22] traditional stories about the Middle [05:23] East. One is that the whole Middle East [05:26] is the result of [05:29] all the British and French and American [05:32] outside interference, sort of [05:33] neo-colonialist, neo-imperial or [05:35] imperialist interference, meddling, and [05:38] mishandling. [05:40] And of course, that is part of the [05:41] story. But it really [05:44] it really ignores a lot of a lot of what [05:47] is also important to understand, which [05:49] is the agency of of Middle Eastern [05:51] players. As you said, there are lots of [05:54] there are lots of books on the Middle [05:55] East, a lot of books on the Arabs and [05:57] the the Jews and the Iranians and what [05:59] have you, Iraq Israel Palestine, but I [06:02] begin this book really [06:04] with [06:05] um Abdul Aziz um the Saudi emir [06:08] >> seizing what what [06:10] and and and taking control of what today [06:13] we think of Saudi Arabia. He was what? [06:15] 19, 20, 21 years old when [06:17] >> Yeah, he was just a boy. He was very [06:19] tall, very dashing, very determined and [06:23] very brave. [06:24] >> And the founder of what we what we today [06:26] refer to as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. [06:28] Where does that take place? When does [06:30] that take place? [06:31] >> That takes place in early 1902. It's [06:34] it's in Riyadh, which is now the capital [06:36] of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. [06:38] The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia that we see [06:40] today is in fact the third Saudi state. [06:43] The first Saudi state started in the [06:45] middle of the 18th century. The second [06:48] was in the middle of the 19th century. [06:50] Both collapsed. And he was so he was [06:54] restoring it. And you know, it's it's [06:57] important to understand Saudi Arabia is [06:59] now the center of the world in many [07:01] ways. That's what Donald Trump said when [07:03] he when he visited recently a couple of [07:06] years ago. Um but you know this is how [07:09] it started. It started with 30 men [07:12] climbing over a wall in the middle of [07:14] the night to this small town Riyadh, [07:17] climbing in [07:18] with their swords and spears and a few [07:21] kind of Lee-Enfield English rifles. And [07:24] they hide in the [07:25] in the harem of the governor. [07:28] And then at dawn when the governor walks [07:30] out of the [07:31] the fortress of Riyadh, they attack him. [07:33] There's a fight and they kill him and [07:36] they seize Riyadh. And of course it [07:39] takes [07:40] um it takes Abdul Aziz [07:42] about 25 years to conquer Arab Saudi [07:45] Arabia. It's not that you don't often [07:47] realize that Saudi Arabia is a huge [07:49] country. It's really the biggest country [07:51] in the Middle East. And in the 1920s, he [07:55] finally take he finally took Mecca and [07:57] Medina. And it's the guardianship of [08:00] Mecca and Medina that gives the Saudi [08:02] monarchy its prestige. So, why did I [08:05] start with this story? I started this [08:07] story [08:08] um, [08:09] because Saudi Arabia is now the central [08:13] power of the Middle East. [08:15] This is where it started. It started in [08:18] 1902 [08:19] in a world that is completely different [08:22] to anything that we could imagine now [08:24] looking at the Middle East. And wherever [08:26] possible, [08:27] not for not for reasons of ideological [08:30] political correctness, it just makes [08:32] sense to recognize the agency of the [08:35] players in this region. And I do that [08:39] all the way through. [08:40] >> You do do that all the way through. It [08:42] is one of those striking themes of this [08:44] of of your book. And I guess why have [08:47] very few of these other histories taken [08:50] this approach? Is this Is this kind of [08:52] western, you know, like like we have to [08:55] believe that we shaped It's It's just [08:58] another theater around the world that is [09:00] a a theater of great power conflict and [09:02] great power interests and geopolitical, [09:05] you know, strategies. We can't accept [09:07] that this region has its own players, [09:09] its own leaders, its own families, its [09:12] own monarchies, its own dynasties that [09:14] actually, you know, determine their own [09:17] future and have real agency. We have to [09:19] believe that these places are our our, [09:22] you know, are all our theaters that are, [09:24] you know, expressions and extensions of [09:26] our own politics and geopolitics. [09:28] >> Correct. And that's a narrative that has [09:30] got stronger and stronger. [09:32] Um, it's it's partly our it's also the [09:34] narrative that, you know, suited Arab [09:36] nationalists to tell. [09:38] >> Meaning that that they that many Arab [09:40] nationalists rose to power by saying [09:42] they were they were resisting or [09:44] rebelling or reacting to these outside [09:46] forces. [09:48] >> Yeah, and also the historians, the Arab [09:49] historians, [09:51] um like like George Antonius and others, [09:53] used that as their main one of their [09:55] main arguments in their new Arab [09:57] histories. And [10:00] you know, the but the but that's became [10:02] a conventional wisdom and, you know, [10:04] historians are actually, [10:06] um [10:06] you know, quite tend to retell the same [10:08] story over and over again in a [10:10] conventional wisdom. [10:12] It gives a much more naturalistic and [10:14] realistic approach to understanding [10:17] what's happened. And it also means that [10:19] when you look back at these powers, the [10:20] Saudis, the Iranians, the Turks, [10:23] even Israel, Egypt, Moroccans, you can [10:25] understand where all these people came [10:27] from and how they came to be how they [10:29] are today. Particularly since [10:33] today we're in a period when more than [10:35] ever these powers are following their [10:38] own interests, their own ambitions, [10:39] their own aspirations freer than ever [10:42] before of foreign interference. That is [10:45] why we're in a multiplayer game now in [10:48] the Middle East as well as in in the [10:50] world, but particularly in the Middle [10:51] East. And that's what I'm trying to [10:53] understand in the book. That's what I'm [10:54] trying to [10:55] project in the book. How did the How did [10:57] the Middle East of the 1890s, 1900 [11:00] become 2026 and how did we get here? [11:03] Because of course, you know, down, you [11:05] know, there's a whole another story [11:07] which is that everything in the Middle [11:08] East is to do with Israel and Palestine [11:11] and that you can't, you know, that [11:14] should be completely central. Well, it's [11:16] important, but is it central? There's a [11:19] hell of a lot else going on here as [11:21] well. And what I try and do in this book [11:23] is put everything in its correct place. [11:26] >> Okay, among the myths you puncture in [11:28] this book is [11:30] that the idea of empire is a is a [11:33] uniquely Western [11:35] phenomenon. You know, we tend to think [11:36] of the British Empire or people talk [11:38] about American Empire or, you know, we [11:41] these very various European empires. Um [11:46] you say that that's not the case in the [11:48] Middle East. [11:49] >> Well, I mean, I think, you know, the [11:51] Middle East today, there's plenty of [11:53] neo-imperialistic powers now um loose in [11:56] the Middle East trying to win prizes and [11:59] trophies but also to protect themselves [12:01] from from enemies and threats and so on. [12:04] Um [12:05] but yes, if you go back, I mean, you [12:07] know, one of the sort of narratives [12:09] that's most preposterous but which is [12:11] but which became very popular [12:14] um particularly after 9/11 was that the [12:16] Ottoman Empire was this kind of, you [12:19] know, Kumbaya, wonderful, peaceful, [12:22] poetry-spouting, tolerant empire that [12:24] was later destroyed by Western [12:27] interference and nationalisms and [12:29] American ambitions and Zionism and all [12:32] of this. Um [12:34] well, in fact, the Ottoman Empire, like [12:36] all long long-standing empires, had many [12:39] different um versions and and and [12:42] periods, all of them very different. But [12:46] um [12:47] there was indeed a period of reform in [12:49] the mid-20 in the mid-19th century, the [12:51] Tanzimat period, but [12:53] by the time we reached 1900, uh the [12:57] Ottoman Empire is going on a very, very [12:58] different trajectory to that. [13:01] It's it's pursuing under Abdul Hamid, [13:04] the Sultan Caliph, a religious um [13:08] Islamist Ottomanist Caliph Caliphal [13:10] approach in in which um he hoped hoped [13:14] to hold together this tottering empire [13:18] by by promoting Turkish and Islamic [13:22] culture and power and by playing off um [13:26] different ethnic groups and against each [13:28] other in in brutal repressions, which [13:32] led to massive massacres [13:34] um across the empire. And by the time [13:37] you get to the beginning of World War I [13:39] in 1913-1914, [13:42] he's been overthrown and the Sultanate [13:45] is then ruled not by its monarch, but by [13:48] it three really tough um ideological [13:52] dictators [13:53] who are the three pashas who really [13:57] believe in [13:58] what we'd now call it almost a sort of [14:00] proto-Nazi [14:02] um Turkish Ottoman nationalism [14:05] um [14:06] eugenicist social Darwinism and that war [14:11] would would kind of improve the Turkish [14:13] Ottoman nation and save the empire. And [14:16] of course, that approach led [14:18] to a series of appalling disasters, the [14:22] Armenian massacres in which 1.1 million [14:25] people were killed in the Armenian [14:26] genocide. And then a whole lot of other [14:27] forgotten ones where [14:29] um [14:31] Christian Maronites in Lebanon, um [14:33] Assyrians in on the borders of what are [14:35] now Iraq, um Pontic Greeks on on the [14:38] shores of the Black Sea, um all of these [14:41] peoples were massacred in huge numbers. [14:44] And so, [14:46] that is part of the motive for [14:49] um the Western powers in 1918 when they [14:51] when they when they defeated the Ottoman [14:53] Empire finally, [14:55] that is one reason why they did not [14:57] envisage any role in the future for this [15:01] genocidal power. [15:03] And of course, today in our present [15:05] period, that is why [15:07] President Erdogan is so is so keen [15:10] to constantly deny [15:13] um that the Turkish state has any ever [15:15] played in any role in any repressions at [15:18] all. So, [15:20] that too ricochets forward um to our [15:23] period. [15:25] >> We'll be right back. [15:28] >> Hi, I'm Donniel Hartman, president [15:29] [music] of the Shalom Hartman Institute [15:31] in Jerusalem. [15:31] >> And I'm Yossi Klein Halevi, senior [15:33] fellow at the Shalom Hartman Institute. [15:36] >> What's more important? To be feared by [15:38] your enemies or morally true to [15:40] yourself? [15:41] >> Should Israel strive to be a nation [15:43] among nations or should it accept the [15:45] fact that it is now a fortress apart? [15:48] >> What do Israelis and diaspora Jews owe [15:50] [music] each other? [15:51] >> If you're Jewish or a friend, an ally, [15:53] >> these questions have been knowing at you [15:55] these past few years. [15:57] >> For some of you, like for us, [15:58] >> [music] [15:59] >> these questions have been keeping you up [16:00] at night. And for some, they've been [16:02] simmering in the background waiting for [16:05] answers. [16:05] >> Dilemmas don't always have clear [16:08] answers. What they do deserve are honest [16:12] and respectful debates. [16:13] >> And as it happens, Yossi and I love to [16:16] challenge each other to get to the [16:17] bottom of things. [16:19] >> We look at current events through the [16:20] lens that speaks to us most deeply, the [16:23] Jewish ones. [16:24] >> So if today's Jewish dilemmas are on [16:26] your mind, tune in to our conversation [16:29] [music] on For Heaven's Sake, a [16:30] partnership between Arc Media and the [16:33] Shalom Hartman Institute. [16:34] >> You can find For Heaven's Sake on Apple, [16:36] Spotify, YouTube or wherever you get [16:38] your podcasts. [16:40] >> See you there. [16:44] >> Um Simon, the beginning of the book [16:47] the region is extraordinarily diverse. [16:51] Okay? [16:52] We learn about Jews and Christians and [16:53] Muslims and Armenians and Greeks and [16:55] Kurds and [16:56] you know, Turkmen and Yazidis and [16:59] obviously Arabs, Persians. [17:01] By the end [17:03] much of that [17:05] mosaic has disappeared or at least it's [17:07] very [17:08] it's concentrated. You have these [17:10] populations, but they're in very [17:11] specific places. How did we get here? [17:14] >> Yeah, I mean, nationalism has been a bit [17:17] of a has been a bit of a disaster for [17:19] the Middle East. [17:20] And you could argue and I I I I I [17:23] suggest this, but you know, [17:25] that the nation-state itself [17:28] doesn't necessarily work for a [17:30] multiethnic, multi-sectarian [17:33] um a region like the Middle East. But, [17:37] one thing's for certain, [17:39] um you know, the combination of 50 years [17:42] of nationalism and then 50 years [17:46] um of rising Islamism have had the [17:49] effect of, you know, massive [17:52] persecutions of minority peoples, um [17:56] and whether by um [17:59] Islamist terror organizations like the [18:01] Islamic State, ISIS, or by um or by [18:04] local terrorists, uh Islamist [18:07] terrorists, or by dictators and [18:09] autocrats who who wanted to um who [18:12] really wanted to convert multiethnic [18:16] states into single nationalities like we [18:19] have in like we had in Europe [18:20] traditionally. [18:22] And for all these reasons, these [18:24] multiethnic societies have been whittled [18:26] down and ground down, and there are two [18:28] big examples. I mean, one is [18:31] at the beginning of this period, Egypt [18:34] is one of the most cosmopolitan um [18:37] countries on Earth, and it has been for [18:40] 2,000 years since the Ptolemaic dynasty [18:43] of Cleopatra, and and Alexan- and you [18:45] know, it started by Alexander the Great [18:47] in effect. And you know, there'd been [18:50] huge Jewish population in Egypt, but [18:52] also a huge Levantine population of Leb- [18:56] well, you know, what we now call of [18:57] Lebanese, of Maronites, um of of Greeks, [19:02] of Italians, um of Armenians. So, [19:06] actually, it was this incredibly mixed [19:09] um society, and it really thrived in [19:13] that kind of mercantile cosmopolitan mix [19:16] and you could have people like the ruler [19:18] King Farouk who's in one of the amazing [19:20] characters in the book. You know, he's [19:22] famously his love life just illustrates [19:25] this. You know, he's having love affairs [19:27] with kind of Jewish showgirls [19:30] uh French countesses, Italian Italians, [19:33] Lebanese, all these peoples, Americans, [19:36] all of them are part of this uh [19:39] fascinating this fascinating uh [19:42] interwoven society. But in 1956 when [19:46] Gamal Abdel Nasser who's over who [19:48] overthrows um King Farouk um when he's [19:51] challenged by the British and the French [19:53] and the Israelis in the Suez Crisis, he [19:55] then throws out all these people to [19:58] assert Pan-Arab nationalism and that [20:00] really asserts the Arab nature of Egypt [20:04] for the first time and it's a disaster [20:06] the the Egyptian [20:08] um economy has never has never recovered [20:10] and all those people were expelled and [20:12] lost their properties and their estates [20:14] and their businesses. [20:16] On a wider sense [20:18] um in a wider sense [20:20] you know, if you look at 1900, 25% of [20:23] the Middle East was Christian. [20:25] >> 25% [20:27] of the population of the Middle East was [20:29] Christian. [20:29] >> One has to remember that in 630 AD just [20:33] before the Arab conquest, the Arab world [20:36] was was the Middle East was virtually [20:38] 100% Christian and had been for 300 [20:41] years and there were still there were [20:43] still pagan tribes particularly in [20:45] Arabia and the borderlands but mostly it [20:49] was overwhelmingly Christian and [20:51] amazingly you know, in in in over a [20:54] thousand years of Islamic rule [20:56] um many of those Christians you know, [21:00] kept their Christian many must have [21:01] converted to of course to Islam over the [21:04] decade over the centuries. But in 1900 [21:06] they were still um 25% [21:09] and there were also That was the Middle [21:11] East, the sort of Middle East proper, [21:12] but in Turkey, of course, you then had [21:15] millions of other peoples, uh [21:16] particularly Armenians and Greeks who [21:19] lived who lived in in the Ottoman [21:21] Empire. Jump ahead now. Um you know, [21:25] Iraq, for example, you know, in in 2000, [21:29] there were a million Christians in Iraq. [21:32] Now, there are 115,000. [21:35] Where they all gone? Well, that is just [21:36] the result of civil war, but [21:39] particularly of Islamist strife, Shia [21:41] and Sunni, and the fact that all of [21:45] these um extremist ideologies preyed on [21:49] and tried to drive out um uh the [21:52] Christians who have just left the Middle [21:55] East and the You know, this this is what [21:56] I call the slow cleansing, the slow [21:59] purge of the last century, but it really [22:01] speeded up later in the century. And so, [22:04] you see this kind of bleak binary um [22:08] nationalism, really, and and Islamism [22:11] really kind of diminishing the the [22:13] region. And, you know, while everywhere [22:15] else in the world is getting more [22:17] cosmopolitan, the Middle East is is [22:18] getting steadily less so. [22:21] >> Okay, we talk about the limits of [22:24] Western influence in the region, but [22:26] these states [22:28] the West did create these nation-states, [22:30] right? So, Libya, [22:32] modern-day Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, what we [22:34] think of of of these countries, these [22:35] are these are nation-states that were [22:37] created by Western powers. [22:40] They are very fragile today, [22:42] these states. [22:44] So, in areas where the West did try to [22:46] construct um you know, kind of piece [22:49] together peoples and and kind of create [22:51] these these nation-states, integrating [22:54] them to some degree um in into into [22:57] within borders that many cases made no [22:59] sense, [23:00] what should that tell us? [23:01] >> It just tells us that um the Western [23:03] empires tried to do two things. [23:06] The thing that they're notorious for [23:07] doing is entirely justified. They wanted [23:10] to create empires. They wanted power [23:12] over the Middle East for different [23:13] reasons, but um and for that reason they [23:16] created the mandates, but they also [23:18] shaped these countries because [23:21] they also embrace ironically embraced an [23:24] idea of nationalism. [23:26] And so at the end of World War I, these [23:28] powers were really backing all sorts of [23:31] nationalisms. [23:32] And they saw that not as contradictory [23:35] to their their imperial interests [23:37] because they were planning to create [23:39] states that would be client states, [23:41] would be allied states, would be vassal [23:43] states to them and be friendly to them. [23:46] And that to some extent that worked in [23:47] some of them. [23:49] For example, in you know, in Jordan [23:51] still still an example of that. Um the [23:54] Kingdom of Iraq that worked for a while, [23:56] too. Um and so on and so forth. But to [23:59] they actually backed an Arab [24:00] nationalism. They were backing Armenian [24:02] nationalism. They were backing Greek [24:03] nationalism. They were backing Jewish [24:04] nationalism. And in Arab nationalism [24:08] they they hoped to create these these [24:10] Arab states that would work, but would [24:12] work as friendly in a way that was [24:14] friendly to [24:15] to um to the to the allied imperial [24:18] powers. And so they started to create [24:21] these these states in the in the Middle [24:22] East proper. And so [24:25] the they divided it up. The the British [24:27] got [24:28] um you know, what is now Israel plus [24:31] Jordan plus Iraq. And the French got um [24:34] Lebanon and Syria. And in and in North [24:37] Africa they had Algeria and and they had [24:40] Tunisia. And [24:43] they they designed these states to [24:45] endure after they left. Um when they [24:48] were ready to hand over to to rulers who [24:51] they hoped would be friendly. Um but [24:54] just to give you an idea of how [24:56] um these states developed. Um there were [24:59] many challenges to the way they have [25:01] developed now. One of the big myths that [25:04] you see a lot on TikTok these days is [25:06] that, you know, these are all ancient [25:08] states. [25:09] Um [25:10] that [25:11] you know, [25:13] in in contradiction to Israel, which is [25:15] a very new state. [25:17] And in fact, [25:18] all these states are new. None of them [25:20] existed before. None of them had ever [25:22] existed before in any shape or form. The [25:24] only two that had [25:27] were were Iran, Persia, and Egypt. And [25:30] those had been ancient units, ancient [25:32] entities for a very long time with [25:35] ancient histories. [25:36] Um so, all the others were were were [25:39] kind of new states. And you've got to [25:41] realize that all of these states in this [25:42] region now are effectively new. So, Iraq [25:47] is an ancient name for that for parts of [25:49] Mesopotamia, but it had never been a [25:51] state. Syria is a is a Syrian province, [25:54] but it never been a state, and so on. [25:56] So, it could have been very different. [25:57] For example, [25:59] the British took over Mesopotamia, which [26:01] they called Iraq. And when they took [26:03] over Iraq, the um province of Mosul, [26:06] which is where a lot of the oil is, [26:09] uh [26:10] was it was questionable whether that [26:12] should join Iraq or not. And whether [26:15] large parts of it could be part of an of [26:17] a Kurdish state, which they also hoped [26:19] to create. [26:20] At the same time, the new Turkish [26:22] Republic, which had been created after [26:25] 1922, [26:27] and also had never create existed before [26:29] as such, [26:30] um it hoped to get Mosul. In the end, [26:34] the Iraqis got it. Another example, when [26:37] the French took over greater Syria, [26:39] which which includes Lebanon, they [26:41] didn't want to create two states, Syria [26:43] and Lebanon. They wanted to create five [26:46] or six states. [26:47] And those five or six states, they were [26:49] going to create two Sunni states, one in [26:52] Aleppo, one in Damascus. [26:54] A Druze state, an Alawite state in [26:57] Latakia on the Mediterranean coast. And [27:00] you know the Alawites were the sect from [27:02] which came [27:03] the Assads, the Assad dictators. And [27:06] then they wanted to create another state [27:08] that would be controlled by the Maronite [27:11] Christians who were their chief allies, [27:13] their Christian allies in the region. [27:15] But after [27:17] the 1925 Great Syrian Revolt against the [27:20] French, [27:22] um the French decided this was too [27:23] expensive, too complicated, create [27:25] bigger states. And so they created uh [27:29] Syria, which was a multi-ethnic state [27:31] that contained all of these different [27:33] peoples and still does, Kurds, Druze, [27:36] Alawites. And we see today in 1920 in [27:39] 2026 [27:41] how [27:42] the the new rulers of Syria are trying [27:44] to work out how to run this state with [27:46] all these minorities within it. [27:50] And they also created Lebanon, which [27:52] they specially um designed in a very [27:55] weird way so that the they hoped that [27:57] the Christians would remain kind of in [28:00] charge, but it would also reflect that [28:03] the Sunnis who were there, the Druze who [28:05] were much smaller, and then the Shia um [28:08] the Shia who were rising fast in in um [28:12] in population and in the end became [28:14] larger than everybody else. And [28:18] Lebanon therefore is what you might call [28:21] a one-state solution. [28:23] And as you can see a one-state solution [28:26] is doesn't really work that well. [28:28] There've been brutal civil wars, um a [28:32] small one in 1958, a huge one in 1976 [28:35] for almost 10 years. Um [28:38] and and then we've seen how Hezbollah, [28:42] uh a paramilitary organization, has [28:44] seized control of the state. And the [28:46] state is now trying to get its power [28:47] back. [28:49] So, [28:50] these are all experiments, but the point [28:52] of the story is [28:53] that these states didn't have to be have [28:55] the borders or names that they had [28:57] today. They they the the the the powers [28:59] played with different ideas, [29:02] and in the end, [29:03] um these were these were the states that [29:06] emerged, and they could have been very [29:08] different. Another example, you know, [29:10] the the the British were um created a [29:12] new entity in 1980, and they called it [29:15] Palestine. [29:16] Again, an old name, a Roman name [29:19] uh for for a province. And [29:22] um almost immediately, [29:24] um [29:25] Prince Abdullah, son of Hussein of [29:29] Mecca, who was [29:30] uh who had led the pro-British [29:32] anti-Ottoman Arab revolt in 1916, [29:36] his son galloped up, seized what is now [29:39] Amman, [29:40] uh the capital of the kingdom of Jordan [29:42] today, [29:43] and said, "I'm going to create my own [29:45] little kingdom here. Can I have it?" [29:48] And Winston Churchill, who was happened [29:50] to be in in Egypt at the time creating a [29:53] new Middle East, said, "Okay." [29:56] Um and he wrote in his he wrote a [29:57] letter. He said like, [29:59] "Today in Jerusalem, I created a new [30:01] country, Transjordan." [30:03] And so they gave that to Abdullah. [30:06] So, [30:07] you can see that this is a very fluid [30:09] situation in which, you know, in which [30:11] many many different entities could have [30:14] emerged. But the ones that did emerge [30:16] were the ones they decided upon. [30:18] And they they they are very fragile [30:21] because they were created by um [30:23] outsiders, by imperial statesmen. And um [30:28] they often didn't develop or developed [30:30] very slowly a nationalist consciousness [30:34] because they were they were they were [30:35] superficial and created by, you know, [30:38] foreign statesmen. And at the same time, [30:41] the one institution that endured from [30:44] the colonial power to the new state was [30:47] the army [30:48] because the French and British were very [30:50] keen at creating [30:52] um paramilitary or auxiliary forces [30:55] often using minorities to create the [30:57] armies. And so, that's why the Assads [31:02] the Assads were able to take power [31:03] because much of the military were [31:05] members of [31:07] a minority, the Alawites. So, overall, [31:10] all these states were formed [31:13] put together out of Ottoman provinces in [31:16] a makeshift way combining different [31:19] provinces together. [31:21] And um some of them never really [31:23] developed the civil institutions that [31:26] such societies need to work. And before [31:29] they left, the Western powers in the in [31:32] the '40s when they left, they tried to [31:34] leave democracies that were a bit like [31:38] French or British democracy. And those [31:40] didn't last long, and they were rapidly [31:42] taken over by military officers and [31:45] radical dictators like Saddam Hussein. [31:48] And and those states are still [31:50] struggling to exist. And what we really [31:53] need [31:54] is a rethinking of how these states work [31:57] and how they look. [31:59] And it may be that federal federal [32:01] states actually work better for this [32:04] environment. And you see in Iraq today [32:06] >> Right. [32:07] >> I'm not looking at Iraq cuz and you know [32:09] Iraq, Dan. [32:10] >> I know. I Trust me, this this question [32:13] is is could be its own episode. I I [32:15] lived and breathed um [32:17] some of these some of these decisions in [32:18] terms of the political organization [32:21] of Iraq today, but I think you're right. [32:22] I want to talk about I'll spend a little [32:23] bit of time here on Iran. [32:25] Where Where do you put the revolution in [32:27] Iran, the Islamic revolution in Iran in [32:30] 1979? Where does that fit in terms of [32:33] significance of this period the entirety [32:36] of the period you're covering. [32:37] >> It matters hugely. Um it really you know [32:41] 1979 needs to rank right up there with [32:44] um the way that we that you know the way [32:46] that 1789 [32:48] uh [32:48] or 1776 [32:50] or or 1917, those sort of dates. It's [32:53] right up there with the American [32:55] Revolution, the French Revolution, the [32:57] Russian Revolution. It changes [32:59] everything. [33:00] >> Why? Why does it change everything? So [33:02] it's set this up for us. And maybe maybe [33:05] Simon tell us just briefly [33:08] what was there [33:09] before 1979, what existed, and then what [33:11] when then what how did it change [33:13] everything? [33:14] >> The twen- the 20th century begins with [33:16] Iran as a shambolic empire under the [33:20] Qajar dynasty, um barely holding [33:22] together its multi-ethnic [33:25] um its multi-ethnic uh peoples. And [33:28] about 50% of its people then and now are [33:31] not ethnically Persian or Iranian, but [33:36] they speak Persian. And there are Arab [33:38] peoples, there are Kurdish peoples, [33:40] there are Azerbaijani peoples, Assyrian [33:42] peoples. [33:43] And they have been ruled in this [33:45] imperial domain [33:48] um for many many centuries. Uh but it is [33:50] a Persian empire. It has to be [33:52] understood as an empire. That's the [33:53] first thing. This is the heir to not [33:57] just the ancient empires that we know [33:59] about of Cyrus the Great and Darius the [34:00] Great. Um not just the Sassanids, but [34:04] also you know very recently in the 18th [34:07] and 19th century you had um self-made [34:11] shahs founding dynasties and and leading [34:15] massive tribal armies of conquest. And [34:19] in 1789 [34:21] um a shah of Iran actually takes Delhi [34:24] and takes northern India, for example. [34:26] So first of all there's an imperial [34:28] ethos, but in the early in the early [34:30] 20th century it's falling apart. In the [34:32] World War I, it's it's basically a [34:35] battlefield between Russian and and [34:38] British and Ottoman fighters. And then [34:42] um [34:43] the end of World War I, the British [34:44] wonder what to do with it. And it's [34:46] important to Britain because of its oil. [34:48] They have oil there. And that's the oil [34:50] that funds the British Empire, funds the [34:51] Royal Navy. And um and so they wonder [34:55] what to do with it and they find a [34:57] candidate to take over. And that is Reza [35:00] Shah, Reza Khan who becomes Reza Shah. [35:02] He in 1925 becomes king of a new country [35:06] that he calls Iran. It's a new but an [35:09] ancient name um for this kingdom. And he [35:13] is one of the most remarkable characters [35:15] in this in this um story, one of the [35:17] nation builders. He's 6'7. [35:20] Um he's autocratic. He's a Cossack um [35:23] officer in the Persian army. [35:26] And um and he makes himself king and [35:28] founds a dynasty. He opens up Iran to [35:32] railways and education. He founds [35:34] universities. He emancipates the Jews. [35:37] He um he frees the women from wearing [35:39] hijab and so on. Um but in 1941 [35:44] he makes a terrible mistake at the [35:45] beginning of World War II when he tries [35:48] to remain neutral between the Allies and [35:50] the Nazis. Bad idea. Stalin and [35:53] Churchill get together and they occupy [35:55] Iran completely. Which is why the Tehran [35:58] Conference of 1943 takes place with FDR [36:01] in Tehran. It's occupying. And so they [36:05] run it and Stalin actually tries to keep [36:07] some of it after the war. [36:09] But the young Shah who's succeeded his [36:12] father is is is um Mohammad Reza Shah. [36:15] Pahlavi. He's the one we call the Shah. [36:19] And without going into his story in [36:20] detail he is both a highly gifted [36:25] politician a radical reformer, um an [36:29] emancipator of women, a promoter of [36:31] female education, [36:34] an opponent of the hijab and clerical [36:37] Islamism. [36:38] Um [36:39] And he's also brilliant at foreign [36:40] policy, playing off the Soviets and the [36:42] Americans. And in ultimately, he makes [36:45] Iran the regional superpower, master of [36:48] the Straits of Hormuz, [36:51] policeman of the Gulf, and the greatest [36:53] power. He has relations with everybody. [36:55] He has his controls his own oil. But [36:59] he also makes the mistake of [37:01] concentrating power more and more [37:03] in his own hands to the extent that [37:05] there is no ability for any part of the [37:09] Iranian body politic to express [37:11] themselves, to protest, to take any part [37:13] in ruling. And in the end, this is [37:15] disastrous because the Shah becomes [37:17] exhausted. The Shah controls everything. [37:21] And in the end, the Shah runs out of [37:23] ideas and becomes a victim of his own [37:25] success, particularly in his industrial [37:28] and agricultural reforms, which lead [37:31] millions of peasants to move to the [37:33] cities. There's corruption, [37:35] the oil wealth goes on a drift, and [37:38] suddenly at the end of the '70s, the [37:40] Shah is increasingly vulnerable. The the [37:43] whole of Iranian society is gradually [37:45] turning against him. Who should lead [37:48] this? [37:49] They should turn to moderate Islamists [37:51] or liberal Democrats or or or anybody. [37:55] But all of these peoples have been [37:58] excluded from power, all of these [38:00] parties. And so, [38:03] it's in the nature of Iranian society [38:05] that they turn to a clergyman. And the [38:06] clergyman is Ayatollah Ruhollah [38:09] Khomeini, who [38:11] looks like a brutal firebrand [38:14] from the 7th century. [38:17] He is in fact one of the great [38:19] revolutionary statesmen of the 20th [38:22] century who ranks in brutal ruthlessness [38:26] and cunning with [38:27] Stalin, a Mao, a Lenin. [38:30] And he he basically [38:32] tricks everybody. He puts together a [38:36] coalition of all parts of Iranian [38:39] society from liberals all the way to [38:42] Islamists and including Leninists and [38:45] Marxists and socialists and Marxist [38:48] Islamists in the middle. [38:50] All of them believe that he's going to [38:51] do what they want. [38:53] And his brilliance is not really to tell [38:55] anybody what he thinks or what he does, [38:58] but just to remain inscrutable. He also [39:01] tricks the Americans into what he's [39:03] going to do because they they think this [39:05] they begin to think the Shah is doomed. [39:08] There are millions of people in the [39:09] streets. [39:10] And this guy may turn out to be a kind [39:12] of people figure, a kind of Gandhi-like [39:15] figure. [39:16] And so [39:17] um [39:18] and as like today, large parts of [39:21] American um leftist academia [39:25] sort of see him as a a wonderful [39:27] humanitarian [39:29] um liberator. [39:30] >> Right. And so [39:31] >> No, they they fall in love with these [39:32] kinds of characters. [39:33] >> They fall in love with these kinds of [39:34] characters. [39:34] >> been entirely predictable. [39:36] >> Yeah, and of course those articles all [39:37] appear in the New York Times and I quote [39:39] them in the book. So [39:41] in in 1979, the Shah leaves because he [39:43] doesn't want to massacre his people. And [39:48] and and in a way that's a problem of [39:50] monarchs because they never want to do [39:51] that because they're always worrying [39:52] about the succession of their sons. [39:55] And so [39:56] he leaves knowing that he'll never [39:58] return. [39:59] And [40:01] Ayatollah Khomeini flies back. And it's [40:03] just worth pointing out because [40:06] the Shah is such a notorious autocrat [40:09] that it's just pointing out worth [40:10] pointing out that in his entire 41-year [40:14] reign [40:15] um about 4,000 or 3,000 people were [40:18] violently killed by that regime. Many of [40:21] them in fights with terrorists and and [40:24] um, urban guerrillas. And in the last [40:26] months before in of 1978-79, [40:30] within weeks, [40:32] um, the Islamic regime of Ayatollah [40:34] Khomeini had killed way more than that. [40:36] And I think it's true to say that in a [40:39] couple of days in in January of 2026 our [40:44] time, they killed more than the Shah had [40:47] killed in his entire 41-year regime by [40:50] 10 times. But when when Khomeini takes [40:53] power, he immediately cut to he [40:55] immediately appoints a a rather [40:57] civilized-looking prime minister in a [40:59] suit and tie, um, Mehdi Bazargan. [41:03] But he also sets up in a girls' school [41:07] his secret Islamist committee. In 1970, [41:11] Khomeini had written a very eccentric [41:13] book. And in this book, he said, [41:15] "You know, Iran shouldn't be ruled by [41:18] kings anymore. And it shouldn't be ruled [41:20] by elected politicians. It should be [41:22] ruled by an Islamic clergyman, an [41:25] Islamic scholar, [41:26] who before the return of the Mahdi, [41:30] the Mahdi be or the there's the sacred [41:32] Imam who had vanished in the 10th [41:34] century, [41:35] before the return of that that [41:37] apocalyptic figure, a messianic figure, [41:40] a scholar should rule." And of course, [41:42] he's thinking of himself. But no one [41:44] believed this would really happen. It [41:45] was an innovation that he'd come up [41:47] with. But within months of his returning [41:51] to Iran, he begins to to put this into [41:54] practice. [41:55] And he creates, partly aided by [41:59] Kurdish and Marxist um, rebellions when [42:02] they turn against his regime, the [42:04] invasion of Saddam Hussein from Iraq, [42:07] all of these things turn the regime into [42:09] a crisis regime. And he enables him to [42:13] massacre his opponents and to create [42:15] this new weird hybrid constitution where [42:18] they have elections for a parliament, [42:20] the Majlis, [42:22] um and a presidency, but it's ruled by a [42:25] sacred monarch scholar, and that's him. [42:28] So, for 10 years he rules and he creates [42:31] this new society. And um it's extremely [42:36] repressive. Um it's extremely brutal. It [42:39] massacres its opponents, and that is the [42:41] regime that is still in power. As your [42:44] viewers, um your listeners all know, and [42:46] you know very well, too, that you know, [42:48] this is obviously a Shiite regime, and [42:51] the Shiites are different from the [42:52] Sunnis. It used to be one of those kind [42:55] of hot takes that, you know, the experts [42:57] on the Middle East always said is that [42:58] we all know that, you know, Iran you [43:00] know, if you know the Middle East, you [43:01] know that Sunnis and Shias can't work [43:03] together. Well, that that's nonsense. [43:05] They really can. And what happened [43:08] as soon as he came back was among his [43:10] many incredibly kind of clever moves was [43:13] to use Israel and anti-Zionism [43:16] um and anti-Americanism to rally support [43:19] across [43:20] the Arab Sunni world. Of course, there [43:24] were large Sunni minorities, um [43:26] particularly in Lebanon and particularly [43:27] in Iraq. [43:29] But actually, he was very clever and he [43:31] used this to rally um [43:34] to rally an Arab world that had become [43:36] disaffected and disillusioned with the [43:39] pan-Arabism of Nasser that had that had [43:42] been defeated by Israel in 1967 [43:45] and discredited to a certain extent. [43:48] Many of the the sort of pan-Arab [43:50] nationalist rulers had become [43:52] kind of long-serving pro-Western [43:55] autocrats [43:56] um often with brutal secret police [44:00] um like Saddam, like like um Nasser and [44:03] Sadat [44:04] in in Egypt, for example, um like in [44:07] Syria. And so, these people um, looked [44:11] stagnant, looked brutal. And [44:14] and what Khomeini offered was to was a [44:17] kind of like on a steroid injected um, [44:21] new version of um, of Islamism, of Sunni [44:25] Islamism, but injected with ultra [44:29] anti-Western nationalism as well. And it [44:33] really looked to Islam rather than the [44:36] Arab nation as as the answer, as the as [44:40] the inspiration, but also the actuality, [44:44] the way that the states could be run, [44:46] could be run like this. So, for example, [44:49] among Sunni communities um, Hezbollah is [44:52] founded not against Israel, but it's [44:55] founded very soon after the um, Khomeini [44:57] comes to power in Lebanon. It's founded [45:00] to create a Khomeini-like entity in [45:03] Lebanon. And it's only later that it [45:05] becomes [45:06] that it comes anti-Israeli. [45:08] But [45:09] all over um, the Middle East, everybody [45:12] is excited, is inspired, is is [45:16] encouraged by this this process. And [45:19] this becomes a Sunni uh, a Sunni Isla- [45:23] Islamist um, cause that really inspires [45:27] the whole Arab world. And it's cleverly [45:31] merged Islamism is merged with [45:32] anti-Western radicalism. [45:35] And so, you know, for example, you know, [45:37] Yasser Arafat is one of the first to fly [45:39] in to see Khomeini when he takes power. [45:42] Um, and all over the Middle East, um, [45:44] Iranians, despite being Shiite, start to [45:48] back these entities. And it takes a long [45:50] time. Where it really takes off is long [45:54] after the death of Khomeini, who dies in [45:56] '89. In '89, he makes sure his successor [45:59] is chosen, Ali Khamenei. And Khamenei [46:03] is still in power 37 years later until [46:06] this very year. But, the key date here [46:10] is is 9/11. [46:11] >> That's a good cliffhanger to end part [46:13] one of my conversation with Simon Sebag [46:16] Montefiore. [46:17] >> [music] [46:17] >> Please tune in to part two on Thursday. [46:25] >> [music] [46:29] >> You've caught me back [46:30] >> is where you come for honest [46:31] conversations about Israel and the [46:32] Jewish world. [music] Please hit [46:34] subscribe and also share it with a [46:36] friend. And if you missed our last [46:38] episode, it's worth going back [music] [46:40] for. See you next time.
