Transcript [00:00] There are no total victories. There are [00:02] also no total solutions to political [00:05] problems. There will always be um large [00:08] constituencies within the Israeli [00:10] nation, but also within the Palestinian [00:13] nation, that will object to the [00:16] existence of the other to some extent or [00:18] other. Even after you have the UN [00:21] partition plan, which we all know about [00:23] in 1947, [00:25] secretly King Abdullah of Jordan again [00:27] approached Golda Meir that secretly he [00:31] would take over the Arab parts of the [00:34] partition, and there would have been [00:36] population swaps so that there would [00:38] have been great Jewish and Arab [00:40] minorities in each in each of the [00:42] states. So, I think some of these [00:44] earlier plans are relevant today. [01:01] >> This message is sponsored by the Israel [01:03] Democracy Institute. [01:05] Every election cycle in Israel is [01:07] accompanied by the words, "This is the [01:09] most consequential election in history." [01:12] It's become a cliché. [music] [01:14] But, this time it may actually be true. [01:17] As followers of Israeli politics, you [01:18] know how hard it can be to distill the [01:20] issues from partisan spin, to go behind [01:24] the headlines and understand [music] [01:25] what's really going on. [01:27] If you enjoy the kind of thoughtful, [01:28] fact-based conversations [music] [01:30] we have on this podcast, I think you'll [01:32] appreciate the work of the Israel [01:34] Democracy Institute, [music] IDI, a [01:37] leading non-partisan center of research [01:40] and action. [01:41] IDI offers practical proposals for [01:43] strengthening Israeli democracy and [01:46] clear, accessible analysis of the [01:48] biggest challenges facing the [music] [01:50] Jewish state. Their explainers on [01:52] everything from Israel's electoral [01:54] system to the ultra-Orthodox draft make [01:57] complex issues easier [music] to [01:58] understand. And their regular polling [02:01] and public opinion research are among [02:03] the best tools available for tracking [02:05] where Israeli society [music] is moving [02:07] in real time. As Israel heads towards a [02:09] pivotal election, regardless of where [02:11] you stand politically, IDI is an [02:14] essential resource for making [music] [02:15] sense of what's at stake and where the [02:18] country may be headed after the votes [02:20] [music] are counted. To learn more, [02:22] visit elections.idi.org.il [02:28] /2026. [02:30] >> [music] [02:31] >> That's elections.idi.org.il/2026, [02:39] or follow the link in the show notes. [02:43] >> In 9/11, as you know, the the Al-Qaeda [02:45] attacks America, America attacks [02:48] Afghanistan, and then Iraq. And [02:52] it knocks Iraq out of the power [02:54] architecture of the Middle East. [02:57] And Iraq has always been the major Arab [03:00] state that restrains Iran, and that is [03:02] always in conflict with Iran. [03:05] And actually, there was no need to take [03:07] out this runt state. And you know, it [03:10] would have I I think it would have been [03:11] wiser. We may disagree on this now, but [03:14] I think it might have it would have been [03:15] wiser to leave it there, su- separating [03:17] in it in its own decay. But but by [03:20] taking it out, [03:22] um America gives Iran a great [03:23] opportunity not only to back the [03:25] insurgency, and to back all sorts of [03:27] militias in Iraq, which you know all [03:29] about, but also um [03:32] it creates a sort of vacuum. Iraq is out [03:35] of the game. It's still out of the game. [03:37] You know, it'll be a long time before [03:39] Iraq is a major Middle Eastern power. [03:42] And Iran therefore has this amazing [03:45] opportunity. And what they do with it is [03:47] they create this informal empire. Some [03:50] people call it the Shiite Crescent. Some [03:52] people call it the six armies and this [03:54] is what General Soleimani, the sort of [03:56] mastermind of this strategy. [03:59] >> The former head of the IRGC who was [04:01] killed in the first Trump [04:02] administration. [04:03] >> Correct. [04:03] >> Uh Qassem Soleimani [04:05] was the architect of all of this. [04:06] >> Who was the architect of He was the [04:07] specialist. He was the sort of planner [04:09] of this proxy system throughout the [04:11] region. The proxy system and the proxy [04:13] system is kind of brilliant and the idea [04:15] is like we get Arab people who we [04:18] support because they're radicals and [04:20] they support us cuz they're radicals and [04:22] they need our support. But we we use [04:25] Arab fighters, Arab blood to to defend [04:28] Iran on Arab soil and they are also the [04:33] vanguard against Israel and America. So [04:36] they have Hezbollah which is that really [04:39] that prime [04:41] their prime military force. And it's its [04:45] leader Nasrallah [04:46] really becomes almost a member of [04:50] the sort of top planning um group that [04:53] really run this six armies um the six [04:56] armies structure. And the the six armies [04:59] are leading Hezbollah led by Nasrallah. [05:02] Um in Gaza, Hamas and and Palestine [05:08] Islamic Jihad, a smaller paramilitary. [05:12] The Houthis in in Yemen. [05:14] And the Assads are the only state actual [05:17] state in uh in Syria. And then you've [05:21] got a variety of about three or four [05:24] really powerful is Shiite milissa [05:27] militias in Iraq that are really more [05:29] powerful at times than the state. [05:32] And [05:33] Hezbollah is so successful that it [05:35] gradually captures Lebanon and takes [05:37] control of Lebanon. [05:39] So you have all you have this amazing [05:41] structure and it's really an astonishing [05:43] thing that Iran, you know, from being [05:46] this kind of state try this [05:48] revolutionary state try to survive [05:50] suddenly becomes thanks to Iraq 2003 [05:54] becomes this kind of proto empire. And [05:58] that lasts right through to our period. [06:00] And of course, when the Assads are are [06:02] threatened [06:04] um in the after the Arab Spring after [06:06] 2011 [06:08] um the Assads look like they're going to [06:10] fall and the Iranians say like no way [06:13] are we going to let this this ally fall. [06:15] And so the Russians join in, Hezbollah [06:18] joins in, the Iranians join in and they [06:20] save um the Assads. [06:23] And so [06:25] they hold together this sort of proto [06:27] empire until um October the 7th, 2023. [06:32] And the problem with proxy strategies [06:35] is that proxies don't always do what you [06:37] say. And when they when they light the [06:39] the touch paper, the fuse can burn all [06:42] the way back to the patron. And that is [06:44] essentially what happened um with [06:46] October 7th attacks. As far as we know [06:51] the Hamas leadership with under the [06:53] Sinwar brothers [06:54] had consulted the Iranians and the and [06:57] Hezbollah about the plan. Um but they [07:02] haven't agreed on a date. And but but [07:04] Hezbollah and Nasrallah and the and the [07:07] Iranians had said, "You cannot you are [07:10] absolutely cannot launch this without [07:13] pre-warning us, without coordination [07:15] with us. We will give permission." [07:17] And the the Sinwar brothers decided [07:22] "No, um we don't trust the Iranians or [07:25] Hezbollah because we we believe probably [07:29] that the Israeli security service Mossad [07:31] has infiltrated them. And therefore we [07:35] will launch our own our own operation [07:37] when we're ready um with all the help [07:39] they've given us, but we won't warn [07:41] them, but they'll find out soon enough, [07:43] and then no doubt they'll join in. [07:45] But when it happened, [07:47] Hezbollah um sat on their hands. They [07:51] They didn't fully intervene. They [07:53] weren't prepared. And they instead um [07:57] started to bombard Galilee. [07:59] As we know, this is now very recent [08:02] um very recent history. And I think it's [08:05] true to say that if Hezbollah with its [08:08] 50,000 men and its huge missile [08:12] um arsenal had intervened on October the [08:15] 8th, Israel really would have been in [08:17] jeopardy. [08:18] Um but but that didn't happen. And so [08:21] Israel was able to defeat each of these [08:23] powers um or at least [08:25] um severely hobble them um one in in [08:29] turn after another. But the thing to [08:31] understand about the Islamic Republic is [08:34] it has a extreme radical [08:37] but also um apocalyptic [08:41] modest and ideology and theology, which [08:44] means that [08:45] you know, they're not afraid of [08:47] apocalyptic wars, first of all, in in in [08:51] a general sense. Some parts of the [08:52] regime actually think this could be a [08:54] good thing. [08:55] But secondly, [08:56] they've studied how to defeat [08:58] conventional powers. The Iran-Iraq War [09:01] is really a study of how to defeat a [09:02] power with lots of tank Iraq had lots of [09:04] tanks [09:05] and and aircraft. But actually, if you [09:09] throw enough waves of people, children [09:12] running at you, the tanks don't work. [09:15] And [09:16] you know, they can't break they can't [09:18] break through. And in the end, um you [09:20] can undermine them. Again, with America, [09:22] all the shock and awe and the grandeur [09:24] of America, the greatest military power [09:26] in history, [09:28] um could be threatened by a few IEDs [09:33] and by an insurgency. [09:35] Because America, like all Western [09:37] democracies, is extremely inconsistent, [09:41] um [09:41] is is always erratic, even even when it [09:44] doesn't have an erratic president, and [09:47] also has very little endurance for for [09:51] um casualties, even when wildly provoked [09:54] as it was on 9/11. So, they learned [09:56] that. The third thing they learned was [09:58] the from Soleimani was that actually, [10:01] you know, that you can take out the [10:02] leaders, but if you have a [10:04] a sort of [10:06] a mosaic what they call a mosaic [10:08] leadership, um it's much harder to take [10:11] out. And the last thing to understand is [10:13] that they understood always that the [10:15] Strait of Hormuz was something not just [10:18] an asset, but something they'd always [10:20] wanted. The Shah had wanted it. And the [10:22] last thing to understand about Iran [10:24] today [10:25] is that there everyone says this is this [10:26] is a sort of new regime, the military [10:28] have taken control. These guys have [10:31] always been at the top since the '80s. [10:34] They started in the early '80s in that [10:36] war against Iraq as junior officers. [10:39] Some of them, like Soleimani, actually [10:40] raised their own brigades and took them [10:42] to the front. And [10:45] the generals today who are in their 60s, [10:48] um have been at the top of the regime [10:50] forever in the Revolutionary Guards, in [10:52] the Quds Force, [10:54] um around [10:55] um the supreme leader and his son [10:57] Mojtaba, whether or not he's alive, [10:59] dead, occluded, vanished, comatose, [11:03] this group has been at the top. And they [11:06] appear various times, um [11:09] every time there's an uprising or [11:10] there's kind of um an opposition, these [11:12] are the generals who write to the [11:14] leadership to say you've got to crush [11:15] these people. Back in 2009, back in the [11:18] '90s, um back in 2019, so they are [11:22] always there, and they are always [11:25] ruthless followers of the regime. And [11:29] the leaders of today, Vahidi and Jafari, [11:32] have always been there and they're there [11:34] now. [11:35] >> Okay, you know, here we are in the 2020s [11:38] and something remarkable has happened, [11:41] which is [11:42] the dominant military powers, I'm not [11:43] talking about Iran now, dominant [11:44] military power in the region. We talked [11:46] before about Turkey. Dominant military [11:49] power in the region today. We're [11:50] obviously talking a lot about Israel. [11:52] Dominant military power [11:54] in the region. None of these [11:57] are Arab countries. And there's Saudi [11:59] Arabia, obviously, which you argue has [12:01] effectively replaced Egypt as leader of [12:04] the Sunni Arab world. So, we tend to [12:07] think of the Middle East and talk about [12:09] the Middle East in in in the frame of [12:11] the Arab-Israeli conflict. But three of [12:13] the four countries I just mentioned, [12:14] Israel, Iran, and Turkey, [12:16] the dominant the dominant military [12:18] powers in the region, none of them are [12:20] Arab. So, [12:22] what is the significance of that? How [12:23] fundamental is that is that realignment? [12:26] >> Well, it it's fundamental cuz it really [12:28] shows [12:29] um it really shows how Israel-Palestine [12:32] isn't really the center of the region. [12:34] But obviously, it's a separating sore [12:37] and a and a major issue. [12:39] But you only have to look at the major [12:41] powers to see that these powers um are [12:44] on are not except for Israel itself are [12:46] not part of that that the Arabs the Arab [12:49] world, in fact. Um but they are very [12:51] significant Middle Eastern powers. And [12:54] the reason why they're so important is [12:57] because of their histories. And the the [13:01] the Arab the Arab power the Arab states [13:04] at the center of what we think of as the [13:06] sort of fulcrum of the Middle East, you [13:08] know, the Levant the Levant, which is [13:10] sort of Syria and that, they were all [13:12] invented by British and French statesmen [13:16] sitting in conferences in in San Remo [13:18] and Sevres um in 1920s. And so, [13:23] they have all the problems of contrived [13:25] states. [13:26] Um [13:28] but Turkey became the successor [13:30] of a powerful empire. [13:33] And, you know, the reason why in 1922 [13:36] Turkey was able to assert its [13:38] independence under the future Ataturk, [13:41] one of the great nation builders of the [13:43] of the of the period and of the of of my [13:45] book, [13:46] was because [13:47] he had control of a major army group [13:51] that was left intact. Um an an Ottoman [13:54] army group. He was able to defeat the [13:56] Greeks, defeat the Armenians, throw out [13:59] the French, [14:00] and in the end challenge the British. [14:02] And out of that came [14:04] um [14:05] came a brutal war, an ethnic war, a huge [14:10] deportation, massacres, ethnic ethnic [14:13] conflict, and a swap of populations. And [14:16] out of it came the Turkish Republic. [14:19] So, [14:20] the reason why Turkey is such Turkey is [14:22] an impressive state because it is a [14:23] successor state to the Ottoman Empire. [14:27] And it is also [14:30] um it is also born out of military [14:33] dynamism from 1922. It was born as a [14:36] military state. And and because of that, [14:39] it's new nationalism um is tempered by [14:43] struggle. In that way, it's very like [14:45] Israel. It the foundation of of Turkey [14:49] really does resemble Israel in many [14:51] ways. And it's very unfashionable to say [14:53] this. And [14:54] >> I remember when you were working on this [14:55] book, you were we were sitting together [14:58] in my apartment and you made this point [14:59] of all the things you talked about in [15:00] your book, this really [15:03] um struck me as a as a as a very very [15:07] original [15:08] um thought in the in the in the in the [15:11] kind of swirl of Middle East history and [15:13] all the academia. This was This was this [15:15] very this very specific insight of yours [15:19] kind of knocked me off my feet. So, I do [15:21] want to spend a minute on it. Can you [15:22] explain what you mean by that? [15:24] >> When the Turkey was What happened at the [15:25] end? What You know, to look at to [15:27] understand the other one today and why [15:28] Turkey is is thriving at this minute, [15:30] you have to go back to its creation, [15:32] 1922. What happens is at the end of the [15:35] war, um we've already talked about what [15:38] happened to all what the Western allies [15:40] what the plans they had for the Middle [15:43] Eastern states, which we've talked about [15:45] Syria, etc., Palestine. But they had [15:48] another plan um for Turkey itself, what [15:51] we now call Turkey. And what they [15:53] decided to do with that was um [15:57] at Sevres and Remo, they decided they [15:59] were going to carve up the Turk the the [16:03] heartland of Anatolia. Now, there was an [16:06] ancient Greek uh population in the in [16:09] Anatolia, Christian, that would that had [16:12] lived for 2,000, 3,000, 4,000 years. I [16:15] mean, since the Trojan War, literally, [16:17] on on what is now what is now Western [16:20] Turkey, [16:21] places like Izmir, that was then called [16:23] Smyrna. And [16:26] so what they decided was that the [16:28] Ottoman Empire had discredited itself [16:30] and shamed itself by its genocidal [16:34] massacres. Um so they were going to [16:37] carve it up and the Turks were going to [16:38] get a very small part of this. [16:41] So they decided that they would give the [16:44] new the new Greek kingdom, [16:46] which had broken away from the Ottomans [16:48] in the 1820s, they decided they were [16:50] going to give a new empire, a sort of [16:52] Byzantine empire, really. [16:55] And so in 1920, [16:57] um Turkish troops start to move into [17:00] what is now Turkey, and they advance [17:03] slowly across Turkey, across Anatolia, [17:06] towards Ankara. [17:08] The Western allies were going to keep [17:10] Constantinople for themselves, but they [17:12] were considering whether to give it to [17:13] the Greeks as well. [17:15] And in Eastern Turkey, [17:17] they were going to give um they were [17:18] going to give states to the Kurds and [17:21] the Armenians in various forms. [17:24] Only in the middle was there going to be [17:25] a rump that was going to be Turkish. And [17:28] you got to remember that there was this [17:29] was still the Ottoman Sultanate, but it [17:31] was going to be very small. And at this [17:34] point, [17:36] the most successful Ottoman general of [17:38] World War I, Mustafa Kemal Pasha, [17:40] extraordinary figure, brilliant figure [17:43] in many ways, leads a rebellion against [17:47] the British Imperial interests and [17:49] orders and designs. And he gets control [17:53] of an Ottoman army, and he leads this [17:56] war. And first of all, he defeats the [17:58] the Armenians, so they don't get a [17:59] state. Then he defeats the Kurds, they [18:02] don't get a state. Then he throws the [18:04] French out of north what is now sort of [18:06] northern Syria. And then he turns [18:09] around, and he fights these huge [18:11] battles, which are completely forgotten [18:12] now. The armies were like 150,000 [18:16] people. So, much bigger than anything [18:18] else taking place in anywhere in the [18:20] Middle East at this time. And he he [18:23] fights them, and he defeats them. And in [18:25] the end, he drives out the Greeks in [18:28] these massive um in these mass a massive [18:31] cleansing ethnic [18:34] um deportations, [18:35] massacres. Um Smyrna, the city is burnt. [18:39] There are apocalyptic scenes. And all of [18:41] this is all of this is taking place in [18:44] this in in a war that is that is really [18:47] an incredibly brutal war, but is also an [18:49] anti-imperialistic war. And Kemal Kemal [18:53] Pasha wins it. Mustafa Kemal Pasha wins [18:55] the war. And when he comes up the [18:57] British against the British, he faces [18:59] them down, and the British retreat. And [19:02] he gets Constantinople as well. And the [19:05] Lloyd George government, Lloyd George [19:07] was the British Prime Minister who's in [19:08] charge of all of this stuff that's [19:09] happening, resigns. And the Turkish [19:13] Republic is agreed at that point in 1923 [19:16] at the Treaty of Lausanne. [19:18] Um [19:19] Kemal Kemal becomes Atatürk. He assumes [19:22] a new name and a new name. [19:24] Atatürk, father of Turks, and he creates [19:26] a new nationality to go with the new [19:29] Turkish Republic. And this new [19:31] nationality is an ethno- [19:34] sectarian religious um identity to be a [19:38] Turk. [19:39] And he says it's a wonderful thing to be [19:41] a Turk. And he creates this new [19:43] nationality [19:45] out of ancient history, out of modern [19:47] history, out of Ottoman history. [19:50] But the Turkish Republic, the borders of [19:52] the Turkish Republic are limited. He [19:54] wants them to be much bigger. He wants [19:57] Mosul, which is a third of Iraq, too, [19:59] but he doesn't get it. He wants more of [20:02] northern Syria, but he doesn't get it. [20:04] So [20:05] out of all of this comes a Turkish [20:07] Republic [20:08] that has a new nationalism based on a [20:11] sort of on based on an ancient history [20:13] going back to the Seljuk Turks, [20:16] based on a language, Turkish, based on a [20:20] religion, Islam. [20:22] So you see [20:24] it it it is based on a military ethos. [20:26] He is the Grand Marshal Atatürk, and he [20:30] becomes the new president. Um and this [20:32] is a new nationality, a new republic [20:35] throwing back to ancient glories, but [20:38] also based on [20:40] on an ethnic conflict in which huge [20:42] ethnicities [20:44] are huge numbers of ethnic minorities [20:46] are driven out. The numbers are colossal [20:48] if you look at the whole picture. [20:50] Um you know, Armenians, they've been [20:53] liquidated. Greeks, they are totally [20:55] driven out except for a few in Istanbul [20:58] who survived and remain. Um the numbers [21:01] are eye-watering. [21:03] They are They are inexact, but there are [21:06] hundreds of thousands of um Greeks [21:09] driven out. There are millions of Greeks [21:11] driven out altogether in the longer part [21:13] of this part of the 20th century. Um [21:16] Turks and uh Muslims are also driven out [21:18] of Europe, by the way, and that's part [21:20] of this story. And out of it comes this [21:22] new republic. And so [21:25] there are great similarities um [21:28] with the creation of Israel. And [21:32] um [21:33] you know, Israel, the creation of Israel [21:35] in 1948 is in fact much smaller. You [21:38] know, the armies are much smaller. You [21:40] know, the armies are tiny in in that [21:42] that they're new armies. They're also [21:43] new countries. And in '48 there are also [21:48] um ethnic um ethnic deportations. [21:52] Um some Palestinian Arabs are driven [21:54] out, but many leave as well and escape. [21:58] And you know, we know the figure 700 to [22:00] 750,000 [22:02] leave. And so also there's a new a new [22:07] kind of ethnic religious nationality is [22:10] created by this. [22:12] To be an Israeli, the Israeli nation. [22:14] And the Israeli state. [22:16] And it also is created with a military [22:18] ethos, with a nationalistic ethos linked [22:22] to ethnicity and religion. So there are [22:27] um other similarities, too. Both are [22:30] created in an anti-British rebellion, [22:32] effectively. [22:33] >> Yeah. [22:33] >> Um against British interests, against [22:36] British arms. So there are major [22:39] parallels between the two. [22:40] >> When when I think about um [22:43] the contemporary criticism of Israel, [22:47] one of the criticisms I hear, which I [22:49] think is disingenuous, but be that as it [22:50] may, you hear [22:53] when you when I [22:54] you know, when I talk to American [22:55] critics of of Israel, and they say, [22:58] "Well, the reason I'm and I and I point [22:59] out there's all all other [23:01] um countries and governments and [23:02] policies around the world including the [23:04] Middle East that they're not critical [23:05] of. They point out, "Yes, but America [23:07] has this deep strategic relationship [23:10] with Israel and our taxpayer dollars are [23:13] are funding the {quote} {quote} the [23:14] {quote} {quote} genocide or {quote} [23:16] {quote} these policies that we so [23:18] strongly disagree with. So, that's why [23:19] we're focused on on Israel. The irony is [23:23] Turkey is which is a member of NATO. [23:26] Unlike Israel, we actually have a treaty [23:29] obligation to deploy American forces [23:33] to defend Turkey. [23:35] >> Yeah, I will say and if I can just jump [23:36] in there, um [23:38] you know, [23:39] it's very interesting because you know, [23:41] Turkey faced um a successive rebellions [23:45] by its Kurdish minority. [23:47] Um it used it used poison gas against [23:49] them in the in the in the 20s and 30s in [23:51] fact. Um it massacred huge numbers of [23:55] them. Um in the in the in the most [23:57] recent Turkish um insurgency uh by the [24:00] PPK against against the Turks, [24:05] 40,000 Kurds were killed. [24:07] Um and and parts of Eastern Turkey were [24:11] highly militarized [24:13] and repressive zones. On top of that, um [24:17] you have the Turkish invasion of um of [24:20] Cyprus in 1974 when their half of Cyprus [24:25] was was was completely cleansed of [24:27] Greeks. [24:28] And um and then you have the fact that [24:31] ironically um people often say to me, [24:34] "Aren't you you know, what do you say to [24:36] the fact that um [24:37] that Israel is occupied a very small [24:40] part of of um of Syria?" And I like, you [24:44] know, during the Syrian Civil War, there [24:46] were many many kind of foreign powers in [24:48] Syria including the Russians, the [24:50] Iranians. But of course, um there was [24:53] also, you may not know, but since 2016 [24:56] and for 10 years there's been a Turkish [24:59] zone of occupation in northern Syria. Uh [25:02] and it still has troops there, [25:04] incidentally. Um [25:05] which no one has mentioned. Plus [25:08] um Turkey always reserves the right to [25:10] follow um Kurdish guerrillas um into [25:13] northern and eastern Iraq, where there [25:16] are also Turkish troops right now. So, [25:20] there are in fact three zones of [25:21] occupation. And this isn't I don't say [25:23] this in any way to [25:25] to justify uh what is happening in the [25:28] West Bank, what is happening in Gaza, or [25:29] anything else. These are just facts that [25:31] you need to know. The whole point of my [25:33] book is it it is not to follow any [25:36] ideology or any um or or or any purpose [25:43] other than know the facts. You know the [25:47] facts. If you if you have the facts at [25:49] your fingertips, you can argue whatever [25:51] you want to argue. But, this book simply [25:53] tells you what there is. It doesn't [25:56] favoritize. It doesn't have a favorite [25:58] victim, a favorite grievance, a favorite [26:01] hero people. It doesn't have goodies and [26:03] baddies. It has grays and the reality of [26:08] human life. And that's what I'm trying [26:10] to do in this book. That's the cauldron. [26:14] >> One of the things I've noticed over the [26:15] last couple of years is how many people [26:17] in my own circle have started learning [26:19] Hebrew again. And a lot of them found [26:21] their way to today's sponsor, Citizen [26:23] Cafe. [26:24] Here's the thing that nobody tells you [26:25] about learning a language as an adult. [26:27] It's not that you can't learn it, it's [26:29] that most classes teach you the theory [26:31] of the language instead of how to speak [26:33] it. That's the part Citizen Cafe [26:35] changed. You're not memorizing [26:37] conjugations for a test that never [26:39] comes, you're in a conversation from day [26:41] one. And the language starts to feel [26:43] like something that belongs to you. [26:45] Their teachers are Israeli, all their [26:47] classes are online, and they work with [26:49] students in over 25 countries. What [26:52] actually struck me is the community [26:53] around it. Thousands of people learning [26:55] together, showing up for each other, not [26:57] just logging into an app on their own. [26:59] In an industry that's all about [27:01] automating everything, Citizen Cafe went [27:04] the other way. [27:05] This is the moment Hebrew stops being [27:07] something you study and starts being [27:09] something you're part of. To schedule [27:11] your free intro session with Citizen [27:13] Cafe, head now to the link in the show [27:15] description or go to CitizenCafeTLV.com. [27:24] Okay, so Simon, earlier in this [27:26] conversation I was struck by you you [27:28] used the term one state solution, which [27:31] as you can imagine is like jostling, [27:33] um because we hear that so much now in [27:35] another context. You you you you used it [27:38] to describe the mess that is Lebanon [27:40] today. [27:41] Now, [27:42] you've just written one of the most [27:43] expansive books about the trajectory of [27:45] the Middle East [27:46] and the conflicts that shaped it. In [27:48] your writing process, did any insights [27:50] emerge about a possible solution [27:53] to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? Is [27:55] the framing of a one-state or two-state [27:57] solution still [27:58] even relevant in terms of framing? [28:01] >> I mean, it's very interesting cuz [28:03] you know, um just [28:05] to go back to the beginning of Zionism [28:07] and to the early in the 20th century, I [28:09] have to do this. I'm a historian. Um but [28:12] you know, it is very interesting to see [28:14] that until 1942, [28:16] from early the 20th century, official [28:19] Zionist policy was not a Jewish state [28:23] partitioned from the Arab state. It was [28:26] a single bi-national state. [28:29] And that remained [28:31] um the aim of David Ben-Gurion [28:34] well into the 1930s. [28:37] And various [28:38] uh events changed his mind. The biggest [28:41] one was um the Arab revolt of Palestine, [28:44] 1936 to 39. But [28:48] it's interesting that the early [28:50] Zionists, all of them followed various [28:53] concepts of this of this um of this [28:56] theory of this idea of of of how [29:00] Palestine could be organized. And you [29:02] know, in 1919 1920 you have um Zionist [29:07] delegates going to Damascus to see uh to [29:10] see King Faisal, [29:12] uh the Hashemite king of then of Syria, [29:14] later of Iraq. Um Weizmann we meets with [29:17] him also. [29:18] And the there are at that point [29:22] um [29:22] all sorts of different definitions of [29:25] how these kind of this could be settled. [29:28] And one of them was federal, a federal a [29:31] Jewish canton within a Arab state or an [29:35] Arab kingdom. I think that the basic [29:38] presupposition precondition for that to [29:40] work is it's got to be bigger than just [29:45] what was then Palestine and is now [29:46] Israel-Palestine [29:48] because [29:49] um the the the way the two states would [29:53] be divided um or the way the two [29:55] entities would be divided are are really [29:57] too small to function on their own. And [30:00] that's why with the the Peel [30:03] >> The Peel Commission 1936. [30:05] >> Yeah, 36. And the the key thing about it [30:07] was this was not a Jewish idea. This was [30:10] a British idea. And the but the but the [30:13] Jews accepted it. Because even though [30:16] the Jewish entity in it was small, it [30:18] was the first offer they'd ever had for [30:20] a Jewish state or a Jewish entity [30:23] for 2,000 years. So they accepted it. [30:25] And what was interesting was the Arab [30:29] territories which were were much larger [30:31] because the Arab population was larger, [30:33] um [30:34] they were going to be joined to King [30:37] Abdullah's Transjordanian Kingdom of [30:39] Jordan as it became. And [30:42] they were going to their prime minister [30:43] was going to be Ragheb Nashashibi, who [30:46] was one of the great Palestinian Arab [30:48] aristocratic families, who led the other [30:51] party opposed to the Mufti of Jerusalem, [30:55] Amin al-Husseini, that we've all heard [30:57] of. And so, [30:59] that was actually a very feasible idea, [31:01] and many parts in the Arab world and [31:03] other parties in the Arab world, in [31:05] Syria and Lebanon, for example, actually [31:07] welcomed this arrangement. [31:09] And so, that was one of those moments [31:11] where you just wish that this had [31:13] worked, because [31:15] you know, that would have given the [31:17] Palestinian Arabs, they would have been [31:18] part of a larger state that would have [31:20] that would have probably worked, and [31:24] the Jews would have got a state as well, [31:25] and there would have been population [31:27] swaps, so that there would have been [31:29] great Jewish and Arab minorities in each [31:32] in each of the states. [31:34] And [31:35] that is a vision of another way that [31:37] this could have worked. And again, this [31:38] came up again [31:40] in 1947, [31:42] even after you have the UN partition [31:44] plan, which we all know about, in 1947. [31:48] Secretly, King Abdullah of Jordan again [31:50] approached the Jews, and he met with [31:53] Golda Meir several times, [31:56] and the British approved this plan that [31:59] secretly he would take over the Arab [32:02] parts of the partition, and they would [32:05] be ruled with with the kingdom of [32:07] Jordan. [32:09] So, that again is one of those glimpses. [32:12] So, I think some of these earlier plans [32:14] are relevant today. Um I I I [32:16] deliberately never use the expression [32:20] two-state solution. I don't like it, and [32:22] I also think it's a false promise, [32:25] because there are always going to be [32:27] um huge differences uh and different [32:30] constituencies in the wider Middle East. [32:33] Um [32:34] there There no total victories, and so [32:38] there are also no total solutions to to [32:41] political problems. I believe that there [32:43] will always be um large constituencies [32:46] within the Israeli nation, but also [32:49] within the Palestinian nation, [32:51] that will object to the existence of the [32:54] other to some extent or other. [32:56] Um but you've also seen between say 1985 [33:01] and [33:02] and 2010, you've seen um for over 20 [33:06] years that the world majorities in both [33:08] peoples, in both nations, for some sort [33:11] of um settlement, some sort of [33:13] compromise, and that can return. But [33:16] these deals can still be done, and they [33:18] will be done at some point. But what is [33:20] required is A, [33:23] both sides have to wish [33:26] better for the other side than their [33:27] total destruction. It's going to be [33:29] extremely difficult to do anything right [33:31] now when millions of Palestinians are [33:34] living um in in tents in in in um [33:39] in Gaza when [33:41] both sides, the Israelis and the [33:43] Palestinians, are deeply traumatized and [33:45] still bleeding from the nightmous [33:49] nightmare scenarios of of October 7th [33:52] and the Gaza war. But in the end, [33:54] somehow um one of these structures could [33:57] work, and one day it will work. You [34:00] know, there were many Jordanian plans to [34:03] link up the West Bank with um with Gaza [34:07] so that the you know, even and even join [34:10] it up contiguously, [34:12] um which now would be unthinkable, but [34:13] across the South Negev. [34:16] Um [34:17] and [34:18] these plans were actually quite [34:19] feasible. These were the plans that King [34:21] King Abdullah was discussing when he was [34:23] assassinated in 1951. [34:25] >> But Simon, [34:27] even if you had these plans, had they [34:29] been successful, [34:31] if you or any one of them [34:34] in the context of this conversation, [34:35] when you look at the plays that the, you [34:37] know, Turkey is playing or the Iranian [34:39] regime is playing in the region, [34:42] the Israeli-Palestinian conflict being [34:44] resolved is not really [34:46] what [34:48] what they're solving for. [34:49] >> No. [34:49] >> And so, you still would have chaos and [34:52] bloodshed. The reason I'm not saying [34:54] it's it's not a reason to pursue some of [34:55] these, but I'm just saying it's it's it [34:58] almost like as we're talking, it's it's [34:59] what I felt, but your book reinforces [35:02] it, it's a sideshow. [35:03] >> Yeah, it's a sideshow. And it's not it [35:06] but it's a very useful it's a very [35:08] useful banner and cause for all sorts of [35:10] reasons, and it really justifies all [35:13] sorts of things about the in the [35:15] internal politics of these states as [35:17] well. [35:18] Um [35:19] but you can see and that's the theme of [35:20] the book is that the big competition in [35:23] this region is in fact, if you step back [35:25] from all of our contemporary ideological [35:27] obsessions in the West, [35:30] um the big picture is, you know, massive [35:33] um newly ever more active and ambitious [35:36] and aspiring states [35:39] um fighting for power. Behind them there [35:42] are there are other um ideological [35:44] struggles, too. I mean, all of this is [35:47] part of a much bigger struggle within [35:49] Islam itself about the nature of Islam [35:53] and what sort of Islam you're going to [35:54] have. And what you what you have is on [35:57] one side you have the Iranians, yes, [36:00] with their with with their proxy um [36:03] militia um allies. But what they're what [36:06] they're promoting is a vision of Islam [36:09] that is Islamist first of all. So, the [36:11] Islamic religion dominates the state, [36:14] not vice versa. Um but also um it's an [36:18] anti-Western closed [36:21] version of Islam that fights the West, [36:24] that rejects Western moderation and [36:27] openness. And on the other side, you [36:29] have Islamic powers that um can do [36:33] business with the West, that are [36:34] interested in the West, that are open to [36:36] Western ideas, [36:38] and and that um and and and also [36:40] influencing the West themselves. And [36:44] those are all the monarchies basically [36:46] and places like and places like Egypt as [36:48] well. And places like Turkey to a [36:51] certain extent. And these powers are [36:54] promoting a different version of Islam. [36:57] Um [36:58] and you know, Turkey is always Turkey is [37:01] Turkey is always had a sort of [37:03] Janus-like [37:05] almost like interro- interrobang [37:07] attitude where it's two things at the [37:09] same time. It is an Islamist country now [37:12] increasingly dominated by Islamism, [37:15] but it's also a highly sophisticated [37:17] NATO member that that it that can or can [37:20] can look openly towards the West. But [37:25] so but part of this interstate [37:27] competition is this is this argument, [37:30] this battle for for the nature of Islam [37:33] itself. But in other ways, it's just a [37:36] competition between major states, [37:39] all of which have major ethnic and [37:42] sectarian problems within their within [37:45] their countries. So in that way, Israel [37:47] is exactly like the others. All of these [37:50] countries are also major military powers [37:53] in the Middle East. I'm looking to [37:55] promote themselves abroad if they can [37:58] um [37:59] with international interests, with [38:00] intercontinental interests. They now [38:03] will have interests in Africa, for [38:05] example. They have interests in Europe. [38:07] They have interests in West Asia. Um [38:09] Pakistan has now joined this game. It [38:12] has always wanted to. And its creation [38:16] is very similar to the creation of [38:18] Turkey and of Israel for that matter. [38:20] Pakistan um [38:22] is important. It has always aspired [38:24] since 1947 [38:26] to play a role as the Islamic power with [38:29] the Islamic bomb. It's the only Islamic [38:32] power to have a nuclear weapon. Um, [38:34] now thanks to, um, really awful lobbying [38:39] with the Trump administration, um, [38:41] however that has been achieved, um, [38:44] it is also, um, managed to place itself [38:48] thanks to the the dilemma the conundrum [38:52] that America has found itself in with [38:54] Iran, [38:56] it has found a way [38:58] to, um, become a Middle Eastern power, [39:01] and, um, also because of the problem [39:05] that Saudi Arabia finds it it now feels, [39:08] um, extremely exposed and in its quest [39:11] for security, [39:13] it doesn't mean it would never join the [39:14] Abraham Accords. It doesn't mean it it [39:17] it won't always want American alliance [39:19] and security and protection, but it's [39:21] looking for more protections as well. [39:24] Pakistan has an army of 600,000. [39:27] It has nuclear weapons. [39:29] Now it is part of this game and if [39:31] because Pakistan is part of the game, [39:34] that means India is part part of the [39:36] game. Simon, you end [39:39] this enormous history [39:42] on a surprisingly hopeful note. [39:45] Uh, which I was I was I I found, um, [39:48] disorienting, which is a [39:49] >> After all the empires, massacres, [39:51] revolutions, betrayals, you you write [39:54] that peace becomes possible when people [39:56] can hear and accept the narrative of the [39:58] other, which I feel like sometimes is [40:01] like an over romantic. If we just [40:02] understand the other side, you know, [40:04] there's just a kind of overly, [40:05] >> [snorts] [40:05] >> um, maybe idealistic take on what's [40:08] necessary. [40:09] So, having spent years immersed in [40:11] everything this region has done to [40:13] itself, what gives you reason to believe [40:17] that its peoples might someday choose [40:19] what you you call blood or honey, that [40:21] they actually may choose honey. [40:23] >> Blood or honey, that's a great question. [40:25] Um I'll tell you what, I think that you [40:27] know, with in this book, I always have [40:29] tried [40:31] um in writing it to show not just the [40:34] Middle East of massacre, extremism, [40:37] bigotry, [40:38] um war, but also to show the other [40:41] Middle East, which is one that has [40:43] always traded with other societies, that [40:45] has always taken in other philosophies, [40:49] um [40:49] one that is always a a society that is [40:51] rich in poetry and music and and and and [40:55] a whole sort of lifestyle that that is [40:58] not necessarily the lifestyle that we [41:01] think of when we think of the cauldron [41:04] um and the intolerance of the Middle [41:06] East. So, you know, so much attention in [41:10] this book and and in the news is about [41:13] um these the Islamist regime, the [41:15] slaughter and protesters, the the [41:17] massacre by Hamas of Israeli citizens, [41:20] the tragedy of Palestinian [41:22] um civilians in Gaza. But, [41:25] actually, there's always present another [41:28] Middle East, another Islam, another Arab [41:31] world, another side of Israel and Turkey [41:34] and all these countries, which is one [41:37] that is open uh to outside influences, [41:40] that is interested in literature and [41:41] philosophy, [41:43] and is also extremely pragmatic in in [41:46] foreign affairs, [41:48] and uh [41:49] and and in peacemaking and in making [41:51] money. [41:53] And that was the tradition of the the [41:54] the Trucial States, that the the Gulf um [41:57] monarchies along along the Gulf coast. [42:01] Um [42:01] historically, they always traded with [42:03] India, they traded with Egypt. Egypt [42:05] traded with um [42:07] Western powers like Venice. The Mam- [42:10] Mamluk Egypt was the biggest was the [42:12] traded overwhelmingly with Western [42:14] Europe and Southern Europe. So, [42:17] all of this is as much part of the [42:19] Middle East and as much part of Middle [42:21] Eastern history as as [42:24] the realm of intolerance and proxies and [42:27] militias [42:29] Hamas and Hezbollah and the Ayatollahs. [42:32] And so that's why I end [42:35] with optimism and that's why I quote [42:37] poetry and sages and great learning from [42:41] Arab and Iranian and Turkish and Hebrew [42:44] scholars and poets and singers [42:47] throughout the book. Because this is a [42:49] book not just [42:50] about the Middle East of war and death [42:53] but also of the Middle East of openness [42:55] and of of philosophy and and of and of a [42:59] relationship an ancient relationship [43:02] between um [43:05] realms and worlds and theaters beyond [43:07] the Middle East with India in the East [43:09] with Europe and America in the West. [43:12] And [43:13] if that idea triumphs [43:15] then we will be living in a very [43:17] different world. [43:19] And and there's every hope that one day [43:22] it will. [43:23] For the moment though [43:25] the conflict goes on. [43:27] >> Simon, it's a um this is the book now. [43:30] When people want to understand the [43:31] history of the Middle East, this is the [43:33] book I am going to tell them to read. I [43:37] I feel like we we could talk for hours. [43:38] I but thank you for doing this. [43:40] >> Thank you. Thanks for having us. Great [43:41] to be on. [43:47] >> [music] [43:52] >> If you call me back is where you come [43:53] for honest conversations about Israel [43:55] and the Jewish world. [music] Please hit [43:57] subscribe and also share it with a [43:59] friend. And if you missed our last [44:01] episode, it's worth going back for. See [44:04] you next time.
