Transcript [00:00] Haviv, thank you so much for being here. [00:02] >> It's an honor to be here. [00:03] >> On the eve of October 7th of 2023, many [00:07] Israelis would have said that the [00:08] biggest threat to the country was from [00:10] within. For 9 months, hundreds of [00:12] thousands of people filled the streets [00:14] every week, protesting Prime Minister [00:16] Benjamin Netanyahu's plan to overhaul [00:17] the judiciary. His critics said the plan [00:20] would gut the court's power to check the [00:21] government, and some reasoned it was [00:23] meant to help him escape his own [00:24] corruption trial. Then on the morning of [00:27] October 7th, Hamas terrorists broke [00:29] through the border fence, killed around [00:30] 1,200 people, and dragged more than 250 [00:33] hostages into Gaza. It began a war that [00:35] would spread across the region and [00:37] arguably the globe. Of course, the [00:38] protest stopped, and the fabric of the [00:40] country changed forever. It's been 3 [00:43] years, and in just a couple of weeks, [00:44] Israelis, in the first national vote [00:46] since the massacre, will determine the [00:48] governing coalition that will succeed [00:50] Netanyahu, who has led the country for [00:52] 30 years. There is a lot at stake in [00:54] this election. Just to name a few, [00:57] accountability for the security failures [00:58] of that day, whether ultraorththodox men [01:01] will draft into a military stretched [01:02] thin by three years of war, and a [01:05] potential judicial overhaul, the same [01:06] one that divided the country before the [01:08] war. There is really no one better to [01:10] help us understand all of these issues [01:12] than Haviv Retigore, a free press [01:14] contributor and Middle East analyst. So, [01:16] thank you for being here. [01:17] >> Thanks for having me. I want to start by [01:19] asking you for our American audience [01:21] especially to set the scene of what this [01:23] moment and what this election means for [01:25] Israel. [01:26] >> Israel has a tendency after disasters to [01:30] have those disasters [01:32] demonstrate themselves in the political [01:34] system in profound changes. So after the [01:36] 73 war, it would take two more [01:38] elections. But nevertheless, by 77, for [01:41] the very first time, the Labor party [01:43] that founded Israel and had basically [01:45] won every election in 29 years lost [01:47] power and Likud rose for the first time. [01:49] And it was also a social revolution [01:51] where Mizrai Jews for the first time [01:53] became um much more um prominent uh in [01:57] terms of the representation in the [01:58] Knesset. And you you you see that often. [02:03] And what what we face today in this [02:04] election is an election that tests [02:07] whether the old politics, the old ways, [02:09] the old structures, the old behaviors of [02:12] voters are going to survive the post [02:14] October 7 moment. And this is a [02:16] government that um oversaw October 7. A [02:20] lot of the ministers were some of the [02:22] ministers were new. They were not part [02:24] of the old guard, but Netanyahu [02:26] certainly was part of the old guard. [02:27] most of the liquid front bench and [02:29] that's the old guard that put in place [02:32] the ways of thinking what we call in [02:35] Hebrew the concepts the concept the [02:37] strategic understanding uh paradigm you [02:40] might call it um that led to October 7 [02:43] that our enemies were deterred that they [02:45] were building all these missile arsenals [02:46] but they were not in fact going to use [02:48] them and um and October 7 sort of [02:52] brought all that crashing down [02:54] and so Netanyahu's great idea great [02:57] vision kamas can be contained time is on [03:00] our side we don't have to deal with [03:01] these things um crashed down around our [03:04] feet and then we spent three years in a [03:07] war that was very very costly uh costly [03:10] obviously for all sides but um also [03:13] costly to ordinary Israeli households [03:14] and families right and one of the [03:18] fascinating points about this war is [03:19] that during the war when a member of my [03:22] family has been called up to serve again [03:25] um I don't even know if it's the fifth [03:27] time or sixth time, but he's already [03:28] done 435 days. You have a army reserves [03:32] app on your phone that tells you how [03:34] many days because you get paid for them. [03:36] Uh, and it says 435. And while calling [03:40] on Israeli society to be so invested in [03:43] three long years of war across so many [03:45] fronts, [03:47] uh this government also doubled down on [03:49] exemptions for the ultraorththodox, [03:51] double down on massive welfare payments [03:53] to groups um that the coalition depends [03:56] on but that nevertheless are not [03:58] contributing during the war. And and so [04:00] this is an election that is being seen [04:03] by many Israelis [04:05] as a kind of referendum on all of that. [04:08] all the drama, all the trauma. I want to [04:10] just caution people, it often takes two [04:12] cycles. In other words, there's this [04:14] talk over the last three years in Israel [04:16] in Hebrew about the the the generation [04:18] of warriors coming back from whether [04:21] it's Lebanon or Gaza or Syria or Iran [04:24] coming back from the war and saying, [04:26] "We're we're a competent society. Look [04:29] at our incompetent leadership talking in [04:31] crazy ways, doing crazy things, not [04:33] actually doing what most people want." [04:35] that generation is frankly either still [04:38] at the front lines or still reeling from [04:40] the economic [04:42] after effects of go of October 7 and of [04:44] the wars. Um that generation might not [04:47] yet express itself. But in the ne this [04:49] election or the next we we probably if [04:52] we take history as a guide are going to [04:54] begin to see a real shift in Israeli [04:56] politics. Even before October 7th, these [04:59] issues that you've named the herd draft [05:01] security, those have only become more [05:03] saturated and more high stakes. I wonder [05:06] what has changed for people when they [05:08] when they cast their vote since that day [05:10] and what has stayed the same. [05:12] >> It used to be um a luxury belief. In [05:15] other words, I serve um my fellow [05:19] ultraorththodox compatriate doesn't [05:21] serve. That's costly for me to serve. [05:24] you know, um, army salaries are below [05:27] minimum wage. You don't earn, right? And [05:29] those are years of your life that they [05:30] can you could do other things with, 18 [05:32] to 21. Those are pretty valuable years [05:35] in one's life. Um, but but the problem [05:38] with the ultraorththodox draft or [05:40] exemptions before October 7 was a [05:43] problem essentially of equality. [05:44] >> If I have to, how come they don't have [05:46] to? After October 7, we literally don't [05:49] have enough soldiers to hold down the [05:51] order of battle that Israel's leaders [05:54] say they need on the borders. That [05:55] Israel's military planners say they need [05:58] on the borders. And if that's true, we [06:00] actually need them at the tail. We [06:01] actually need everyone at the wheel. Is [06:03] that the right euphemism? At the right. [06:04] Um, and so it's no longer about [06:06] equality. It's no longer about feelings. [06:08] Um, and now the question is, can they [06:10] antie up? Can they enter into the larger [06:13] Israeli social contract? And one of the [06:16] interesting things is to have [06:17] conversations on the street with [06:19] ultraorththodox young men [06:20] >> who are very defensive on this point, [06:23] very embarrassed by it and looking for [06:27] ways around it. So we are seeing at the [06:29] margins only at the margins but we are [06:31] seeing not just growing numbers looking [06:34] to join. We're also seeing a tremendous [06:37] shift across ultraorththodox society in [06:40] acceptance of ultraorththodox joining. [06:42] In other words, a soldier 20 years ago, [06:44] an ultraorththodox young man 20 years [06:46] ago who had joined the army when they [06:48] went home to their families, they would [06:51] get shouted down because they were [06:53] walking home in uniform through their [06:55] neighborhood. It was anathema. It was [06:57] something you don't do. It's a sign of [07:00] religious crisis. And today they are [07:03] held up by leaders of the community to [07:05] show that actually the ultraorththodox [07:06] are participating, are doing their part. [07:09] >> That shift has already happened. And now [07:11] the question is, can we actually get [07:13] people to actually stand up and take [07:16] part in the society, the polity on which [07:19] they depend? [07:20] >> Before we get more into these issues, I [07:23] want you to give a recap of who the [07:25] characters are and and what they stand [07:27] for because it's far more complicated [07:29] than the American um election process. [07:33] Israeli society is a mix of a European [07:36] parliamentary system on top of a Middle [07:39] Eastern culture which is to say the [07:42] society Israeli politics in other words [07:44] society is divided into these social [07:47] political cultural religious tribes [07:50] sometimes ethnic tribes and these are [07:52] the profound realities in which people [07:54] live they're not at the state level and [07:56] they're not at the local level they are [07:58] something in between something informal [07:59] something tribal um that's how Iraqi [08:02] societies organized Lebanese societies [08:04] organized to beared ultraorththodox [08:07] safari versus to beared Ashkinazi. Those [08:10] are two groups that sometimes live [08:11] together often can live apart certainly [08:13] vote apart to two different political [08:15] parties. Um and to be secular Jewish as [08:18] opposed to secular Arab and to be Arab [08:21] Muslim conservative. These are all [08:23] different social groups that live apart. [08:25] They often have different education [08:26] systems. Um, Israel has a system that is [08:29] again very widespread in the Middle East [08:31] in different forms, but that basically [08:33] says whatever the the community wants is [08:35] what the education system is. So, Arab [08:37] kids learn in Arabic language schools. [08:39] There are Christian schools and Muslim [08:40] schools. Uh, Jewish kids are divided [08:42] into religious modern orthodox schools, [08:44] secular schools, ultraorththodox [08:46] schools. And the political system [08:48] reflects that very fractured society. [08:50] And so, political parties in Israel [08:52] don't represent ideas. You're not going [08:54] to find a party that's, you know, into [08:56] free market business as opposed to the [08:58] socialists. You might have parties that [09:00] use words like that that sort of borrow [09:02] it from overseas, but what they actually [09:04] represent is a social group. Tel Aviv, [09:06] secular, yepy, so to speak, culturally, [09:09] um, will be one political party. Uh, [09:11] ultraorththodox, big cities will be [09:13] another political party. Um, and that's [09:16] true among the Jews. It's true among the [09:17] Arabs. And so this election, like every [09:21] Israeli election, is a essentially a [09:23] poll we take because the entire country [09:25] is a single constituency. We don't have [09:28] regional representation at all. And [09:30] because you only vote for a party list, [09:32] you don't you don't have you're not [09:33] personally represented by a member of [09:34] parliament like in Britain or Australia. [09:36] And so the Israeli uh election really is [09:39] about how many Arabs are going to turn [09:41] out to vote for the Arab parties. How [09:42] many ultra orthodox are going to turn [09:44] out to vote for the ultraorththodox [09:45] parties? Is Likood's base, which is [09:47] heavily Mizrai Jewish, going to turn out [09:49] more than the opposition's base, which [09:52] is heavily Ashkenazi Jewish? Um, these [09:54] these are the fundamental questions. The [09:56] people who represent them are one of the [09:59] most interesting ironies of this moment [10:01] which is to say the party liud which [10:04] represents more over represented among [10:07] its voters are Misrai Jews which are [10:09] traditionally workingclass more [10:11] religiously traditional Jews are [10:13] represented by a secular Ashkenazi [10:16] multi-millionaire who is the son of the [10:19] um secretary of Jabotinsky meaning he [10:22] comes from the old elites that founded [10:24] the state the Ashkenazi elites and [10:26] Nitanyao. He represents the Misrai [10:28] voter. Whereas the Ashkenazi dominated [10:31] opposition parties are led by a guy [10:34] named Gadi Eisenkot who is a Moroccan [10:36] kid who was born in Tiberius on the Sea [10:39] of Galilee, workingclass town when he [10:41] was born in it and still and grew up in [10:43] a lot even more working-class town. Um, [10:46] and worked his way up the army to the [10:48] rank of chief of staff and now is [10:51] running to replace Natanyao. So this [10:53] Mizrai success story through the army is [10:56] representing the Ashkinazim so to speak [10:59] and the you know Ashkenazi [11:01] multi-millionaire descendant of the [11:03] founders of the state is representing [11:05] the misraim. So we have um an [11:07] interesting crossing of of [11:09] representatives in that sense. Um and [11:11] and really the question of which tribes [11:14] or which alliance of tribes is going to [11:16] be the one that runs the place uh you [11:19] know by October by after the election. [11:22] >> Most world leaders would have been [11:25] finished after a failure like October [11:28] 7th. BB has been fluctuating in the [11:31] polls. I would say in large part because [11:33] he's had major wins with Hezbollah, with [11:35] Iran, despite the fact that most [11:37] Israelis, you know, some polls say don't [11:40] trust him at all. And I wonder what your [11:42] assessment is of why he is still so [11:44] competitive. [11:45] >> I think there are two factors at play. [11:47] One is the tribal one, which I'll get to [11:48] in a moment, but the other one is [11:50] culture. Culture is really important, [11:53] and because it's hard to quantify, [11:54] analysts often ignore it. Um, Likud has [11:59] never replaced an incumbent candidate [12:02] ever. Not since it was called, which is [12:05] a party that existed in 1948. From the [12:08] founding of Israel until today, there [12:09] have only been four leaders of liudon [12:15] shamir and Benjamin. [12:17] And so there is a culture of loyalty. [12:20] There was a period about 10 years ago [12:22] where for over the course of 10 years, I [12:24] think the Labor Party replaced its [12:25] leadership 11 times or nine times or [12:27] something like that. This is a very [12:29] unique culture of unbelievable loyalty [12:33] that is not present on the other side. [12:35] Um we have not yet found a failure a [12:39] liker could oversee [12:42] uh that will make a lik rank and file [12:46] replace that leader. There's that [12:48] loyalty and it's a loyalty not just of [12:50] the party sort of real deep sort of [12:52] activist that would vote in a primary [12:55] but of the base generally. Netanyahu's [12:57] danger the thing that could cost him the [12:59] election is not the party faithful. It's [13:01] the swing voters the center right who [13:05] who really don't like a lot of the [13:08] things this government has done a lot of [13:10] the things that represents a lot of the [13:11] failures of the last three four years. [13:14] Um, and it does almost everything he can [13:17] to convince them that they should ignore [13:20] the populist parts of the party, the the [13:24] corruption scandals that are here and [13:25] there pop up in the party, but actually [13:27] they should believe that he is the [13:29] liberal economic reformer of old that he [13:32] likes to style himself as. So, um, that [13:35] loyalty of that core base means you [13:37] can't replace him as leader of the [13:39] right. And once you can't replace him as [13:41] leader of the right, he basically that [13:43] forces a choice on the voters in the [13:45] center. Do you really trust the center [13:47] left? Because if you don't trust the [13:48] center left, you're kind of stuck with [13:50] Nitanyao. The other piece to it which [13:53] maybe explains the anxiety and fear also [13:56] during the judicial reform of the [13:58] opposition parties and of the center [14:00] left is that this coalition of five [14:04] parties from the far right from the [14:07] religious Zionists from the [14:08] ultraorththodox and likud [14:11] this coalition is defined by its [14:14] religiosity [14:15] which is to say there are studies um [14:17] after the last election which was in [14:19] December 2022 to that tried to identify [14:23] shared characteristics of voters because [14:25] it's a multi-party opposition and a [14:26] multi-party coalition and they tried [14:29] income levels and the income levels are [14:31] not that far apart and they tried um you [14:33] know all kinds of different identity [14:35] measures and the single measure that [14:37] correlates by far the best between [14:39] whether you voted coalition or [14:41] opposition is how religious you are. So [14:44] the more religiously observant whether [14:45] you classify yourself as traditional [14:47] misrai or you know modern orthodox [14:51] observant or ultraorththodox you are I [14:54] forget the numbers but it's something [14:55] like 75% of Israeli Jews who classify [14:58] themselves as religious in some way [14:59] voted for the coalition parties and 75% [15:02] of those who classify themselves as [15:03] secular voted for the opposition [15:05] parties. It's in that scale and that's [15:07] by far the biggest correlation. And so [15:10] to ordinary Israelis, what is this [15:12] Netanyahu coalition actually? And why [15:14] did it hold together in the 18 months of [15:17] the Bennett Laid government in 21-22 [15:19] when they went into the opposition? Why [15:21] didn't the ultraorthodox break away and [15:22] join Bennett Laid? Why? And and they [15:24] lost hundreds of millions of shekels to [15:26] their yeshivas to be loyal to Netanyahu. [15:28] What's the source of that loyalty? And [15:30] the answer seems to be that it is a [15:32] religious coalition versus a secular [15:34] coalition. And that's by the way why you [15:36] would have a party called Israel Betenu [15:39] led by an immigrant from from Russia an [15:42] immigrant 40 years ago but nevertheless [15:43] a man with a Russian accent still named [15:45] Avdar Lieberman who is quite hawkish on [15:48] many things ironically on territorial [15:50] concessions to Palestinians he's less [15:52] hawkish but he is willing to bomb [15:54] anybody who comes for Israel quite [15:56] easily and yet he sits with the left now [15:59] he doesn't sit with the left he sits in [16:01] a secular world because a lot of the [16:03] Russianleaning voters many of his voters [16:05] are no longer Russians. They are um you [16:08] know native born Israelis, either the [16:09] children of Russian immigrants or just [16:12] Israelis who like what he talks about. [16:14] But it's a secular party. It's on social [16:16] issues liberal on social issues secular. [16:19] So if we have a religious coalition and [16:21] a secular opposition, [16:23] a lot of the loyalty to Netanyahu then [16:25] again suddenly makes sense. you're [16:28] voting for a fundamental question of way [16:30] of life and judicial reform which would [16:33] weaken the major check on executive [16:35] power felt to the secular half of [16:38] Israeli society like a religious war on [16:41] them [16:42] >> without getting to the debate they're [16:44] not crazy for having felt it and so that [16:47] explains you know also I think some of [16:49] the sticking by Netanyao despite all of [16:52] the things he's responsible for [16:53] >> how much of it is about the devil You [16:57] know, I think there's a ton of fear and [17:00] anger and resentment, of course, but do [17:02] Israelis feel like at least we [17:04] understand what we're getting with the [17:05] Netanyahu government? [17:07] >> I don't know. You know, most Israelis [17:09] are Israelis are pessimistic about the [17:12] direction that the political leadership [17:13] is taking the country. They're quite [17:16] optimistic about Israeli society. [17:18] They're quite pessimistic about the [17:19] political system. They do think they [17:22] have been largely failed by their [17:24] political leadership. [17:25] And Eisenhood is not a complete unknown. [17:28] He's the former chief of staff. He's [17:30] been around a long time. He's he was in [17:32] the war cabinet for some time. And also [17:34] he's the father of a of a young man who [17:38] was a soldier who died in in Gaza in the [17:40] war against Kamas. And he also lost a [17:43] nephew in the war against Kamas. And so [17:44] he's a bereaveved father, former chief [17:46] of the army, you know, workingclass [17:48] young Moroccan kid from Taria. Um, I [17:52] don't think there's a sense that he's [17:54] some kind of mysterious, you know, out [17:55] of the blue, like a Trump figure sort of [17:58] parachuting into American politics out [18:00] of nowhere. Um, I really think that the [18:04] fear of Eisenkot, and by the way, you [18:05] see this in Netanyahu's campaign. [18:07] Netanyao's campaign is is really [18:10] sticking to one message and that one [18:13] message isn't against Eisenkot. Awfully [18:15] hard for a liquid leader to tackle [18:17] Eisenkot. is pretty immune just from his [18:19] identity politics to lik identity [18:21] politics of the misrakenazi culture war. [18:25] Um but it's about who Eisenot will be [18:27] dependent on. You know how people argue [18:31] that because the far-right parties have [18:33] the deciding vote that could topple the [18:34] Netanyahu coalition. So Netanyahu is [18:36] indebted to them and a lot of the [18:38] policies and maybe some of the conduct [18:39] of the Gaza war was run by the most [18:41] extreme Israelis demand demands. Right. [18:45] Well, Netanyahu's campaign is a reverse [18:47] of that. It's a flip side of that, which [18:48] is to say, yeah, Eisenkot obviously is a [18:50] loyal Israeli chief of staff, good kid. [18:52] But he's going to need Islamist Raham [18:56] Party. That's the Muslim conservative, [18:59] deeply conservative Muslim, Beduinbased [19:02] political party. He's going to need them [19:05] and they are not going to allow him to [19:08] order vote in the cabinet to allow an [19:10] Israeli offensive against some terror [19:12] group in Syria. So Israel's security [19:14] will be undermined not by Eisenkot but [19:16] by the people Eisenot will depend on for [19:18] his coalition. That is currently [19:21] probably the primary message of Likood's [19:23] campaign. [19:25] >> Where do Bengavir and Smodrich fit into [19:28] all of this? [19:30] >> Uh Ben and Smutric are Netanyahu is [19:34] banking on a the same coalition going [19:37] forward on a coalition of far [19:40] right-wingers. [19:42] Um it lik uh spokespeople often say [19:47] um if the center-left parties if the [19:50] centrist parties like Eisenkot were [19:52] willing to sit with Nitanya which they [19:53] are not willing to do Nitanya wouldn't [19:56] need the far right the extremists [20:00] and that would be better for everybody [20:03] you know you wouldn't need the [20:04] ultraorththodox parties and so you could [20:06] end the draft exemptions or cut the [20:08] benefits and and take care better care [20:10] of the reserveists [20:12] Um, I think that the LI could people [20:15] arguing that the veto on Netanyahu by [20:17] the center left is the reason he sits [20:19] with the farrightists is is a fiction. [20:22] And I think it's a fiction for two [20:24] reasons. One, the center left broke the [20:27] veto already once, broke the embargo on [20:29] it once, which was in 2020 when the [20:32] leader of the center left, Benny Gunce, [20:34] because COVID was breaking out in March [20:36] 2020 because it was a national emergency [20:38] because the election was split and we [20:39] were going to go to another round of [20:40] elections. He said, "Okay, well, we will [20:43] sit with Netanyahu." And Netanyahu um [20:46] got up on national television and he [20:48] gave a big speech in which he said, "I'm [20:49] I'm going to have a rotation agreement [20:51] with Benny Gans. I swear to you that I [20:54] will honor the rotation agreement. He [20:56] literally said the phraseim [21:00] without stickicks and without tricks. Um [21:03] and uh in other words, to paraphrase, to [21:07] translate, uh I know you all think I'm [21:10] lying. I promise you I'm not lying. And [21:13] then they rewrote Israel's basic laws, [21:15] Israel's structure of government to [21:17] create a new institution in government [21:19] called uh the parody government, which [21:21] is a government in which there are two [21:22] prime ministers at a time. One is the [21:24] sitting, one is the uh going to be [21:26] sitting in the rotation. Each controls [21:28] their side of the cabinet does not [21:30] control the other side of the cabinet. [21:31] This is a completely new invention. Not [21:33] since Rome to avoid kingship had two [21:36] consils at a time. Had anybody tried [21:38] this kind of institution? also that [21:40] there would be no legal way for [21:42] Netanyahu not to give Gansce the [21:44] rotation after his two years are over. [21:48] And they forgot one stipulation in the [21:50] Knesset basic law that details how the [21:53] parliament works. A parliament that [21:56] doesn't pass a state budget by March of [21:58] that year automatically dissolves. And [22:01] so the year 2020, Netanyahu simply [22:03] prevented the passage of a budget. The [22:05] year 2020 was the first year in the [22:07] history of Israel in which the [22:09] government did not pass the cabinet, the [22:11] parliament, excuse me, did not pass a [22:13] state budget for the entire fiscal year. [22:15] And the parliament dissolved and Gunce [22:17] never got his rotation. And so the last [22:20] time they did this when all of these [22:22] people were already in government, this [22:24] isn't 30 years ago, Netanyahu changed [22:26] the constitutional order of the country [22:28] and then cheated his way around it. [22:30] That's why I know that they can't really [22:32] seriously honestly be blaming the center [22:35] left for the embargo and sitting with [22:36] Netanyahu because they know that Neta [22:38] will cheat them. The second reason I [22:40] know it is that Netanyahu has done [22:42] everything possible in the run-up to [22:44] this election to unify the far right, [22:46] guarantee that every farright party gets [22:49] in. His immense political pressure [22:52] united Smootri's religious Zionism list [22:54] which was falling below the 3 and a/4% [22:56] threshold you need to get in with a [22:59] little bit of a weird sort of extreme [23:02] far-right but also pro marijuana [23:04] legalization little bit of a hipster [23:06] farright party called Zahoot with a guy [23:08] named Moshe Feelin he carries maybe half [23:11] a percent of the vote 1% of the vote and [23:14] smotovic was hovering right at the three [23:15] three and a quarter% and Netanyao [23:18] essentially squeezed on them until they [23:20] unified into a single list, which is [23:22] polling at four and a half. And so to [23:24] get in every last extremist, right, [23:28] weird, strange, marginal 1% of a vote, [23:31] so that not a single future potential [23:34] Netanyahu right-wing religious coalition [23:36] um Kesseter vote falls below the [23:38] threshold, Netanyahu has shephered them [23:41] all in. That is extremely smart [23:44] politics. Um, we all talk about how it's [23:47] a shame Netanyahu is under um has to [23:52] cater to Smootric and Beng right because [23:55] they have the deciding vote in his [23:56] coalition. It is also true that they [23:59] have no coalition without him. Their [24:01] only way to be in power is in a [24:03] Netanyahu coalition. There's simply no [24:05] one else in the leadership, you know, [24:07] front row, the Bennett, the laid, the [24:09] Eizenotes who could possibly sit with a [24:12] Bengir. So Benvir is not quite as [24:14] powerful as he looks. Nitanyao makes him [24:18] that that powerful and all of those [24:21] complex realities. If people are [24:22] starting to get a headache, all Israelis [24:24] are living with this headache when they [24:26] as they go to vote, they have to think [24:27] tactically in this way. [24:29] >> How much of a of a liability is that for [24:31] people? [24:33] >> It's an interesting thing. We have polls [24:34] of people where we ask them when you go [24:36] to vote, what are you voting on? Are you [24:38] voting on your identity? And most voters [24:40] are just, you know, these are the people [24:41] I trust. I'm a Sephardi ultraorththodox, [24:45] you know, woman in the Harnof [24:47] neighborhood of Jerusalem, which is a [24:49] very sh I'm voting shots. Uh huge [24:51] numbers, [24:53] double-digit percentages vote [24:55] tactically. [24:56] >> They go to the voting booth and they [24:58] say, "If I vote for this small party, [25:00] they'll pressure this big party to do [25:02] that." And that's right. And and by the [25:04] way, parties run their campaigns that [25:06] way. So for example, Smotech's religious [25:08] Zionism party in the last election back [25:10] in 2022, his entire campaign was [25:13] explicit. This was the campaign slogan. [25:16] We're going to recommend Netanyahu. In [25:17] other words, we're going to back [25:18] Netanyahu [25:20] says the question you have to ask [25:21] yourself, dear right-wing voter, is [25:24] which Netanyahu you're going to get. [25:26] Because if you have a Netanyao dependent [25:27] on centrist parties, he's going to be a [25:29] lefty. And if you have Netanyahu [25:30] dependent on us, he's going to be a [25:32] proper right-winger. That was the [25:34] campaign. In other words, tactically, [25:35] vote for us. Don't vote Likood because [25:37] that's a Netanyahu that could go either [25:39] way. Vote for us and you'll only get one [25:41] Netanyahu. So, um, Israeli voters are [25:44] sufficiently tactical for that to shape [25:47] the campaigns. [25:49] >> So, part of it is tactical, part of it [25:50] is identity. Other than wanting BB gone, [25:54] what is actually uniting the opposition, [25:57] if anything? [25:59] >> It it isn't it isn't about wanting BB [26:02] gone? There is a deep sense on among [26:04] many opposition voters and these are is [26:06] a very diverse group but I would say the [26:08] bulk of them and we're leaving out the [26:11] Arab parties for a moment because they [26:12] have a very different politics but among [26:15] the the Jewish opposition voters there's [26:18] a deep sense that the country is headed [26:20] in very very wrong directions that the [26:23] strengths of Israel ultimately are not [26:26] religion and they're not ideological [26:29] politics [26:30] uh most Israelis I think we can't leave [26:33] the West Bank anytime in the foreseeable [26:35] future because Kamas will take over. Not [26:38] because it's the beginning of the coming [26:39] of the messianic age, which is what [26:40] Smootrich believes. And so there's a [26:43] sense that um if if I try to represent [26:46] on that side, so just to try to [26:48] represent on the other side, um [26:52] ideological crazies are at the helm. the [26:55] fact that you can have um [26:58] violent Israeli extremists running [27:01] around um abusing Palestinian villagers [27:06] and there is an order or a policy or [27:11] it's not explicit. Nobody knows quite [27:12] why it's not happening, but it's pretty [27:14] clear that Smut being a minister in the [27:16] in the uh defense ministry in charge of [27:18] the West Bank has something to do with [27:20] the army's incredible difficulty even [27:22] when commanders talk publicly about the [27:23] need to rein this thing in. The fact [27:26] that that can be something that the [27:27] Israeli state just lets happen is is a [27:30] breakdown. And a breakdown of law and [27:32] order like that is a place where it's [27:33] awfully hard to do great high-tech and [27:35] it's awfully hard to have a good health [27:36] care system and it's awfully hard to [27:38] live a good life. And so there's a sense [27:40] of a really deep crisis and a and and a [27:43] country headed to a kind of implosion, a [27:46] kind of collapse. Not the collapse our [27:48] enemies fantasize about where we're all, [27:50] you know, dead and getting on boats, but [27:53] a collapse like the fiscal collapse of [27:54] the 1980s where our currency lost all [27:56] its value and we devalued it twice in 8 [27:58] years and everyone's life savings were [28:00] wiped out. like a like an economy that [28:02] can't run itself, a society that can't [28:03] function properly because people who are [28:06] not competent managers are at the helm [28:09] helped by Netanyahu's political needs. [28:11] >> You wrote a few weeks ago about settler [28:14] violence in the West Bank. It's gotten [28:16] worse since then. Today, Herzog said we [28:19] need to pick up police enforcement in [28:21] the area. How much is that negatively [28:24] affecting the far right in the polls? In [28:27] other words, are people are voters [28:29] taking this issue seriously when they [28:31] get to the ballot? [28:32] >> Almost all the [28:35] um problems, challenges, disasters, [28:40] mistakes, crimes um are already factored [28:44] into the polls. In other words, there's [28:46] no um that violence horrifies the [28:49] Israelis who are already voting against [28:51] it. M [28:52] >> and the Israelis who ignore it um either [28:56] think it's much smaller problem than [28:57] they believe um some of their data on [29:00] how it's a smaller problem than [29:03] international press makes it seem it's [29:04] absolutely true the numbers are not [29:06] immense but it's a terroristic [29:08] phenomenon which is to say its influence [29:10] can be very immense with small numbers [29:12] that's kind of what terrorism is and so [29:14] the idea that it's somehow something we [29:16] can ignore because it's merely a few [29:18] hundred people [29:19] >> right it's not a scale issue [29:20] >> it's not a scale issue [29:22] That's enough for somebody who wants to [29:24] vote ino to say I got bigger fish to [29:27] fry. Um and and they do have bigger fish [29:30] to fry. The average voter does have [29:32] someone who uh is involved is you know [29:35] in the war their business is folded [29:38] because somebody missing 300 days from [29:40] their small business the small business [29:41] is closed. Um they have a lot going that [29:44] it's hard to pay attention to this [29:46] thing. So I think that on the specific [29:49] narrow question of will it move votes, [29:52] it won't move votes or what mo what [29:54] votes have moved or have already moved. [29:57] >> I'm going to read you something that [29:58] Eisenkot said in in an interview with [30:00] Times of Israel. I think it was last [30:02] week. Anyone who wants to impose full [30:04] sovereignty over all of the West Bank [30:06] and bring another 2.8 million [30:07] Palestinians into Israel is endangering [30:09] the Zionist enterprise and the Jewish [30:11] demographic majority. Anyone who wants [30:13] to weaken the Supreme Court and crush [30:15] the judiciary is endangering democracy. [30:17] So this election is fundamentally about [30:19] the future of the state of Israel. To me [30:21] as an as an American, that seems [30:23] completely reasonable. I wonder if you [30:25] agree with that assessment and if that [30:26] is the kind of language that's putting [30:28] him neck-and-neck with Netanyahu. [30:31] >> Yes and no. Um the right-winger, if a [30:35] right-wing Israeli were sitting at this [30:36] table, they would say they would [30:38] absolutely correctly say we really need [30:40] to weaken the Supreme Court. We have the [30:42] most powerful Supreme Court in the [30:44] history of democracy is way outlier. [30:47] It's not even close. [30:49] But we don't have any other checks and [30:50] balances. And the people trying to [30:51] weaken it are not trying to introduce [30:53] new checks and balances. And they [30:54] themselves are not liberal. [30:57] And so it really is, in other words, the [30:58] left is not wrong to see a danger. And [31:00] the right is not wrong that uh [31:03] constitutional reform is really overdue. [31:05] Um so I I I want to hold that middle [31:08] ground because that middle ground I [31:09] think is where the truth is. Um, on the [31:12] question of uh, yeah, I I'm the last [31:15] person in the Middle East uh, who uh, I [31:18] really am. So, please don't take this as [31:20] a serious comment. This is a completely [31:22] stupid comment from a marginal idiot uh, [31:25] who thinks that's still going to somehow [31:27] end up uh, as two states. And it's not [31:30] even because I think that I want that. [31:32] It's because no one has ever yet [31:34] explained how it goes any other way. [31:37] Military rule over people forever and [31:39] ever is not. So, so is Smrich would like [31:41] uh full sovereignty, total sovereignty [31:43] of every kind, right? So, therefore they [31:46] get citizenship. There is no situation [31:48] where they don't get citizenship. That [31:49] is a fundamentally different Israel. And [31:51] if they do get citizenship, um they vote [31:55] and if they vote, by the way, they don't [31:58] want this. We don't want this. But [32:00] somehow this has to happen. um that's a [32:02] collapse of some kind that will lead to [32:04] a kind of clash that Israelis and [32:06] Palestinians certainly this generation [32:08] and probably the next and probably the [32:10] one after that are not able their whole [32:13] story is is structured against each [32:15] other. They're not able to live in a [32:16] single state and the result of trying to [32:19] force it will be a kind of civil war [32:23] bloodshed that'll be more chaotic, more [32:26] destabilizing. Certainly the stable [32:29] democratic [32:30] high-tech uh basically liberal um order [32:34] that Israel has managed to build for [32:36] itself is absolutely threatened by that. [32:39] And there hasn't yet been a right-winger [32:42] who stepped forward and explained how we [32:44] navigate through that, how you can have [32:46] it all. And I I'm not saying that [32:49] because I'm saying the left is right and [32:52] the right is wrong. And I'm saying that [32:53] because I'm saying, "Dear rightwing, [32:56] explain to us how this goes." Like, [32:57] actually, come forward, not [32:59] rhetorically, and tell us how how it [33:01] goes. [33:02] >> So, if BB wins, we assume the judicial [33:04] overhaul comes back. Paint us a picture [33:07] of what Israel looks like. Does it look [33:09] like it did before October 7th, where [33:10] there are hundreds of thousands of [33:11] people in the streets every week? [33:14] >> I I don't know. It depends on the [33:17] coalition. Um the way the justice [33:19] minister Yuriv Lavine handled it he he [33:22] proposed a radical ridiculous completely [33:26] unreasonable [33:28] proposal. Every defender of Yariv [33:31] Levine's judicial reform agrees to that [33:34] knows that accepts that has said it [33:36] publicly that that that was a crazy [33:39] maximalist position. But they argue that [33:41] what Yariv Levine, the justice minister, [33:43] was trying to do was propose a [33:45] maximalist position so that the rest of [33:48] the political system, the center left, [33:49] will come and negotiate and pull him [33:52] back to a middle ground, which is the [33:54] actual judicial reform he was actually [33:55] hoping for. The problem with starting [33:59] out with a maximalist position like [34:01] that, a very populist maximist position [34:04] on something so important like checks [34:06] and balances in your constitutional [34:08] system. Um and [34:11] the problem is trust. [34:14] There is a lot of research on [34:15] negotiations in all the business [34:17] schools. And one of the things that this [34:19] academic research of negotiation tells [34:21] us is that there's an enormous [34:23] difference between a simple negotiation [34:24] and a complex one. If we are negotiating [34:27] a simple negotiation, you have an apple. [34:30] I have a dollar. I would like your [34:32] apple. You would like a dollar. If we're [34:35] having a simple interaction, a simple [34:36] negotiation, the maximalist position is [34:39] a very good strategy. You will ask me [34:42] for $4. Because if you ask me for $4, [34:45] you reset my expectations. And there's a [34:47] some chance that I will look in my [34:49] pocket and see if maybe I have $2 to buy [34:51] the apple for twice what I was prepared [34:52] to buy it for. You want to start at a [34:55] crazy place to get that $2. But if we [34:58] have a complex negotiation, which is to [35:00] say, we're negotiating over seven [35:02] different things where I give you over [35:04] here and you give me over there and [35:06] there's time gaps. So I have to give you [35:09] now and trust that a year from now you [35:12] will give me this thing over there that [35:13] is the quidd proquo of the negotiation. [35:16] If you have a complex negotiation across [35:18] many arenas, across many different [35:20] items, across time, trust is the only [35:23] way to do it. And when you have a [35:26] complex negotiation where the first [35:28] thing you do is take a maximalist [35:30] position, then you have burned the trust [35:34] necessary to pull it off. [35:37] There is nothing more complex than [35:38] constitutional reform. [35:41] And this government launched a judicial [35:44] reform, an incredibly complex [35:47] negotiation involving time, quid proquo, [35:50] give and take, and decided that the [35:53] first thing it would do was burn every [35:56] possible imaginable iota of trust and [36:00] then see if we can get somewhere on on [36:02] constitutional reform, judicial reform. [36:05] If that lesson hasn't been learned on [36:08] the Israeli right and listening to [36:11] Benvir promise deeper judicial reform [36:14] and listening to Likood defenders refuse [36:17] to even pretend or begin to consider [36:20] that maybe they did something wrong. I [36:22] suspect that lesson has not been [36:24] learned. [36:25] >> Um then it'll be worse rather than [36:27] better. [36:29] The election is only a couple of weeks [36:30] away and no one is really close to [36:34] owning the majority. So what what [36:37] happens in that scenario? [36:38] >> We go to a new election. It's going to [36:41] be a week before we actually know the [36:43] actual Knesset. Once we have the actual [36:44] Knesset and we know everyone every [36:46] party's seats numbers, then everyone [36:49] goes to the president and begins to uh [36:52] recommend a candidate and the president [36:54] takes these recommendations. [36:56] Technically, the president is free to [36:58] choose any member of Knesseta to be [36:59] prime minister to try to become prime [37:01] minister. The president will choose the [37:04] person that the president thinks is most [37:05] likely to be successful. They begin a [37:08] four-week process. The president can [37:09] give them a two-e extension. If they [37:11] fail, the president could choose another [37:13] candidate. That's a four-week process. [37:14] If they fail, the Knesset then has a [37:16] couple of weeks to try and vote from [37:17] within itself. If they fail, what are we [37:20] at? Three months. Then we go to a new [37:22] election. Automatically, it dissolves. [37:24] So, the most likely scenario in the [37:25] polls at the moment might be [37:29] three months of trying and then a new [37:31] election. [37:31] >> That's what your prediction is. [37:34] >> I I don't have a prediction and I'll [37:36] tell you why. Um, first of all, because [37:38] why? Why have a prediction? People can [37:40] dig up and prove me wrong. Uh, but [37:41] second of all, [37:42] >> yeah, I'm a coward. Um, but second of [37:45] all, um, it depends on two groups that [37:48] are very hard to predict because they're [37:50] in turmoil right now. Uh, one is [37:52] religious Zionists. All the parties [37:54] running to represent the religious [37:55] Zionist community in Israel come from [37:57] the right-wing end of religious Zionism. [37:59] And we are seeing a surprising number of [38:01] religious Zionists who are a little more [38:03] on the liberal side of the community [38:05] voting Eisenkot saying they're going to [38:06] vote Eisenkot. What we don't know is if [38:08] that's 10% of them or 40% of them. And [38:11] we don't know where a potential 30% of [38:12] them we have no idea where they are are [38:14] going to end up landing. I don't think [38:16] they know where they are. Um that's [38:18] enough to change turn the election when [38:19] it's this close. [38:20] >> And finally the Arab vote. Yeah, I want [38:23] to ask you about that because you you've [38:25] said it could really decide the election [38:27] and I wonder how each of these people is [38:30] are campaigning and what they're saying [38:31] to them to try and win their vote if at [38:33] all. [38:34] >> It's a fascinating thing. We have seen [38:36] over the last probably seven or eight [38:38] elections that ArabIsraelis when they [38:42] come to vote um have a very specific set [38:45] of agendas that the voters will always [38:48] favor. So for example, the Arab [38:50] community is divided politically into [38:51] four political parties traditionally for [38:53] quite a few years. Sometimes they change [38:54] names a bit or unify or divide but four [38:56] parties and the four parties represent [38:58] four different cultures. Um the the [39:00] Betterin religious base of Raham, the [39:03] progressive urban elites of Khadash, [39:05] which is a socialist party, used to be [39:07] the Communist Party, all these different [39:09] groups, the Palestinian nationalist [39:11] Ballad Party, all these different [39:13] groups. And when they run apart, Arab [39:16] turnout traditionally for the last eight [39:18] elections, which is quite a few years [39:19] now, is about 50%. Arab of Arab voters [39:23] show up, meaning many don't. And when [39:25] they unify [39:27] repeatedly, I think it's been, this is [39:29] might be the third time, so twice, voter [39:32] turnout jumps 15 to 17 points. In other [39:36] words, the Arab voter wants an Arab [39:39] political elite that is unified as [39:43] Arabs. They don't care about the Muslim [39:46] progressive nationalist divides, the [39:48] ideological divides. They care about a [39:51] unified Arab front that goes to the [39:53] Knesset and represents the needs of the [39:54] Arab community to the majority Jewish [39:57] politics. That is what will bring out [40:01] enough Arab voters to decide this [40:04] election. The Arab parties know this. I [40:08] wrote this about 12 years ago in an [40:11] essay and uh an Arab member of Kesset, [40:14] very thoughtful guy called me and said [40:17] this is deeply patronizing. This is just [40:19] it's it's um you know for a Jew to write [40:23] that Arabs just care about being Arabs [40:25] and all the deep ideological divides [40:26] within the Arab community don't matter [40:29] is very patronizing. And I said I don't [40:32] know what to tell you to that. I mean [40:33] you can accuse me of being patronizing [40:35] and maybe I'm guilty sometimes of being [40:37] patronizing. Uh it has been suggested [40:39] and I apologize for it. But your voters [40:42] are saying this. This is not me. They [40:44] will show up. If you unite you'll have [40:45] more votes and if you don't unite you [40:47] won't have more votes. And if that's [40:48] consistent across eight elections, it's [40:50] it's not nobody makes that phone call [40:52] anymore. Nobody questions it. That is [40:54] the known understood reality of Arab [40:56] politics in Israel. The voters don't [40:59] care about the ideologies. The number [41:01] one issue in the Arab street. We've [41:02] pulled this and it's unbelievably the [41:04] number one number one in double every [41:06] it's 70% of Arab voters. Nothing comes [41:09] within halfway of that. And that is uh [41:11] crime. Crime is the single biggest [41:13] issue, bigger than the Palestinian [41:14] questions, bigger than u racism, bigger [41:17] than economy. Economy, by the way, I [41:19] think is second if I'm not mistaken. Um [41:21] there's a lot of concern among the Arab [41:23] community for Gaza. There's a lot of [41:25] concern for a thousand issues and really [41:27] big important issues. But when they [41:29] vote, what they want for their political [41:31] parties, and they say this very clearly, [41:33] is crime and the economy. Crime is [41:37] exploding in the Arab streets and a lot [41:39] of is organized crime. And this [41:41] government has really failed deeply to [41:43] to rein it in and to crack down on it. [41:45] And so two things happened. One is the [41:47] Arab political parties, three of the [41:49] four unified into a single joint list [41:52] and they hope that that'll bring out the [41:54] votes. And a fourth one, the Muslim [41:57] party stayed apart but stayed apart. [42:01] This is a party that is ideologically [42:03] Islamist, but also has publicly [42:05] recognized the Jewish state in Arabic [42:07] for years and has brought in as number [42:11] two to the party list a pretty hawkish [42:15] former police commander [42:18] >> named Yav Sealovich who found who was [42:21] the head of the um uh the biggest uh [42:24] police internal investigations unit and [42:26] major crimes and corruptions unit. He [42:28] was also the head of the task force of [42:30] the Israel police fighting Arab [42:31] organized crime. [42:33] >> Wow. [42:33] >> And he's the number two in the RAM list [42:35] right now. And he's an Israeli Jew who's [42:38] pretty hawkish in his views. He comes [42:40] from the centristid party. And Raham's [42:44] cell to the Arab community is we're [42:47] going to sit in the next coalition. Any [42:49] coalition that'll have us, we'll sit in [42:50] it. Our vote will be dependent on [42:52] sending a lot a lot of money and [42:54] bureaucratic attention and bandwidth [42:56] toward our community to fix the things [42:58] that we need fixed and deal with our [42:59] issues. And Yav Sealovich will sit there [43:02] having gone in on our votes and he's the [43:04] guy with his experience [43:07] and also with the trust he can have he [43:09] has within the Israel police within the [43:11] political system. Um, this isn't an imam [43:14] from a mosque, you know, in some bedawin [43:16] community coming in and saying, I'm [43:17] going to tackle Arab crime, you know, [43:18] come all police commanders and, you [43:20] know, work with me. This is a guy from [43:22] deep within the system. He's going to be [43:24] our representative in this war on crime. [43:26] All of which is to say those two Arab [43:30] political worlds in their way are trying [43:33] to capitalize on the idea that the Arab [43:35] voter wants their needs cared for. [43:38] They're maximizing their showing and [43:40] they're hoping it pays off on election [43:42] day. If the Arab vote is 52%, the lowest [43:45] it's been in the last seven races, um [43:48] that massively strengthens Netanyahu's [43:51] chances of winning. If it's 67%, [43:54] which all of this political organization [43:56] is trying to do, it massively [43:59] strengthens Eisenkot's chances of [44:01] forming some kind of a coalition uh and [44:04] uh and ousting Netanyahu. So, [44:06] ironically, the post October 7 election [44:10] might be decided by Arab voters. [44:13] >> First of all, are they thinking that [44:15] tactfully about it? And are they does [44:17] their do their campaigns reflect that? [44:19] >> The campaigns absolutely reflect that. [44:21] The the actual politicians campaigns [44:23] reflect that. Uh just this week uh the [44:27] joint list of those three parties um [44:29] publicly announced that they will [44:31] support an an anti-Netanyao [44:34] parliamentary coalition just enough to [44:38] oust Netanyao. They were playing a [44:40] delicate game. If they say Eisenot can't [44:44] win without us, we will wield tremendous [44:47] influence over him. They will play into [44:50] Netanyahu's campaign for that [44:51] center-right vote that hates what Likood [44:54] has become in its view, right, but is [44:55] skittish on voting Eisenode if he's [44:57] dependent on the Arab parties. They [44:59] don't want to push those people over to [45:01] Netanyao. But they do want to tell their [45:03] own voters, "Vote for us. It could [45:06] deliver real dividends. It could be a [45:09] tremendous difference." Right now, the [45:10] Minister of Police of Israel is Itamar [45:12] Beng who has publicly said that it's not [45:15] his job to take care of Arab crime. [45:18] let's get someone in there who thinks [45:19] it's his job to take care of crime in [45:21] the Arab community as well. [45:23] >> And um so they're trying to play that [45:26] game. The voter is always tactical. The [45:29] Arab voter, the Jewish voter, Israeli [45:30] voters in our system, it favors sort of [45:32] tactical thinking when you vote. [45:34] >> I want to get into the foreign policy [45:37] questions this election brings up, which [45:38] are many. For a lot of Americans, the [45:41] the war in Gaza is the story of the last [45:44] three years. How much of that issue is [45:47] is on the ballot for them? And do these [45:49] candidates actually disagree about what [45:52] happens there next? Is that a big part [45:53] of the conversation? [45:56] There is among the Jewish electorate a [46:00] pretty large mainstream agreement maybe [46:04] uh a guesstimate would of my own [46:06] guesstimate would be 80% of Israeli Jews [46:10] that the enemy is really an enemy that [46:14] it is coming for us that it is part of a [46:16] much larger um system of enemies the [46:20] Iranian regime the mukawa access [46:23] there's this immense enemy we have to [46:25] fight it. We have to engage it. Um that [46:29] doesn't go away. If you want to tell [46:31] Israelis this air strike over here was a [46:33] crime, this was a mistake, this was [46:35] reckless, that that there's a lot of [46:37] openness in the Israeli conversation for [46:38] that. If you want to tell them the [46:40] entirety of the war is immoral, illegal, [46:42] how dare you, you by the way shouldn't [46:44] exist as a country. There's going to be [46:46] a lot less listening to that. Um and [46:49] people keep mixing those messages, which [46:51] is not a great way to talk to Israelis. [46:53] There's this movie Naza which is um are [46:58] which alleges I haven't seen it because [47:00] it's not showing in Israel. Um I'm in [47:02] New York. Maybe it's a chance to go see [47:04] it. Uh I'll wait until fellow Israelis [47:06] can see it, see the experience from [47:08] their eyes. Um but it's a movie that [47:11] that alleges um Israeli recklessness to [47:15] the point of purposeful targeting of [47:17] civilians in the Gaza war. But it's also [47:19] a movie with a moment in it that was [47:22] raised by every Israeli reviewer, [47:23] including very left-wing ones who are [47:25] very who who were very critical of the [47:27] movie for this reason. Even if they [47:28] agree the Gaza war was wrong, that it [47:31] then pivots over to showing people [47:33] sipping coffee in Tel Aviv and talking [47:34] about how Gazins are refugees from Tel [47:36] Aviv, which gazins are in fact not [47:38] refugees from Tel Aviv. The Gazins who [47:40] in 48 were displaced are displaced from [47:42] Ashkalonto from that area. But the movie [47:45] alleges that there's something immoral [47:48] about Tel Aviv, that the Gaza war is an [47:50] extension of an Israeli state that isn't [47:54] really legitimate. And so even when an [47:57] Israeli far-left activist tells this [48:00] story, they they mix it up. Israeli Jews [48:03] think there's a real enemy. They're open [48:05] to the suggestion. They really, I think, [48:07] are I I say this and I have never [48:10] encountered angry push back. I've [48:12] encountered people sitting and and [48:13] quietly trying to figure out if maybe [48:15] there's something to it. Um that not [48:18] everything was good in this terrible [48:19] terrible war. You know, the best case [48:21] scenario is that it's a terrible but [48:23] necessary war. Every other scenario is [48:26] worse. I happen to believe in the best [48:27] case scenario, but you're not crazy for [48:30] thinking less than I think about this. [48:31] Right. [48:33] But um because of that [48:36] it's it's not on the ballot in the sense [48:38] that what is on the ballot is did [48:41] Netanyahu mishandle it? [48:42] >> In other words, once Gaza paid such a [48:44] high cost for this war [48:46] >> and Lebanon [48:49] once they paid such a high cost [48:53] and Israelis paid such a high cost and [48:55] Netanyahu kept promising total victory. [49:00] Nobody told him to promise it. He [49:01] decided to promise it again and again [49:03] and again as he was trying to claw back [49:04] his political position. [49:07] Can he deliver a victory? Can he [49:09] actually oust kamas from Gaza? There [49:12] isn't an urgency among Israelis to, you [49:14] know, let Benvir run Gaza, you know, [49:16] something like that that like is [49:17] imagined around the world. But kamas [49:19] actually can't live next to us. And that [49:22] is the mainstream of Israeli Jews. So [49:24] the Gaza war is not on the agenda, not [49:26] because it's not on anybody's mind, but [49:29] because Gaza really is ruled by an [49:32] eliminationist enemy that openly wants [49:36] to totally annihilate us and is backed [49:38] by countries building capabilities. [49:41] We've set back those capabilities in the [49:42] last three years, but they're still [49:43] building them and they still want them [49:45] um to to actually destroy us. And that [49:48] that keeps it off of the election. It's [49:51] not anywhere far from anyone's mind. Um, [49:54] you know, most Israelis know somebody [49:56] who served there or who is serving [49:57] there. So, it's not like people aren't, [49:59] you know, ArabIsraelis think a lot about [50:02] Gaza, don't vote on Gaza because it's [50:04] just there's no differences of policy to [50:07] be debated. It's not that they don't [50:08] think about it. It's just not a [50:10] political issue. [50:11] >> How much are people thinking about what [50:14] the election would bring in terms of an [50:16] inquiry into October 7th? [50:18] >> Every opposition party has pro almost [50:20] everyone. Everyone I'm aware of as I [50:22] think about it now. Maybe you'll find [50:23] one that didn't, but everyone has [50:25] promised that on day one they're [50:26] launching a commission of inquiry. [50:28] Netanyahu has one political party in his [50:31] coalition, future coalition, potential [50:33] future coalition that demands a [50:35] commission of inquiry, and that is that [50:38] right-wing religious Zionist party led [50:40] by the new one led by a former general [50:42] named Doer Vintel. It's a very [50:45] interesting, very right-wing. Um, Gazins [50:48] need to leave Gaza is a part of its [50:51] platform, but its number two guy is an [50:55] ArabIsraeli Christian who served in the [50:57] Golani brigade in the infantry. Um, and [51:00] it has non-religious women on its list, [51:03] which for a very right-wing religious [51:05] slate is strange. So it's a it's a kind [51:08] of coalition of different forces on the [51:11] right that share a very hawkish [51:13] worldview but are otherwise very diverse [51:15] in other views. Um they one of their [51:19] demands is that u a commission of [51:21] inquiry be established immediately [51:23] before the government is sworn in. [51:25] Netanyao has run an intense campaign of [51:29] pressuring right-wing factions to unite [51:31] to push every single right-winger over [51:33] the three and a quarter percent [51:34] threshold, not lose a single vote [51:36] because everything could depend on two [51:37] seats except for this one. This one, [51:41] Netanyahu has been publicly [51:45] repeatedly arguing that they're bad, [51:47] they're evil, they're going to go left, [51:48] they're secretly left-wingers. These are [51:50] people who in their views are to the [51:52] right of Netanyahu. Um but they they [51:55] demand accountability for October 7 in a [51:57] commission of inquiry and that is enough [52:00] for him to be willing to risk everything [52:02] on them falling. So everyone around Nino [52:06] understands that uh not having a [52:08] commission of inquiry investigate [52:09] October 7 is his red line. [52:12] >> Every opposition party promises that as [52:14] the first thing they do. [52:16] >> I want to go back to something you [52:18] touched on earlier. There are so many [52:19] gaps in the way Americans talk about the [52:22] Middle East, but I think one of the [52:24] biggest ones is how we talk about a [52:26] two-state solution. You know, Bennett, [52:29] for instance, opposes a Palestinian [52:31] state, maybe even more firmly than [52:32] Netanyahu. Um, Golan is the only major [52:35] candidate who talks about separating, [52:37] and I use that because I think it's it's [52:39] tactful language. And I wonder how and [52:42] if the two-state solution even on the [52:45] left has disintegrated and how how [52:48] Americans should understand that. [52:51] You know, the Palestinians have one [52:52] enormous advantage. [52:55] Um they exist [52:58] and that's a fact that's going to be [53:00] awfully hard to get around. [53:02] You can't wish them away. You can't [53:04] pretend they don't exist. [53:06] Um there's millions of them. [53:10] And the Jews have one great advantage. [53:14] As Joe Biden loved to say, uh, Golden [53:18] once told him, you know, we have a [53:19] secret weapon. We have nowhere else to [53:21] go. I tell this to my fellow Israelis. [53:24] We have to win the war with Iran. We get [53:26] to bombah into submission. They have no [53:29] right to come for us. They are a [53:30] genocidal. If any of the world really [53:33] cared about the word genocide, they [53:34] would notice that we face enemies that [53:36] publicly demand a genocide. and they're [53:39] heroicized by the very activist core [53:41] claiming there's a genocide in Gaza. Um, [53:44] and nobody cares because this is all [53:46] third worldist. This is all ideological. [53:48] There's so little of this that is honest [53:50] and authentic and universal and actually [53:52] cares about. But we still rule millions [53:55] of people who are not citizens and we [53:57] have no plans and no real way to make [53:58] them citizens and they don't want to be. [54:00] and they, you know, for all the problems [54:02] that that pulling out involves, we need [54:04] to start, um, potentially laying a [54:06] groundwork for a future solution. So, [54:09] all of that just brings me to say, um, [54:12] what should the world think about a [54:14] two-state solution? Stop pretending the [54:16] problems aren't real. Stop pretending [54:19] you know more than the people on the [54:20] ground. Stop pretending the existential [54:22] fears of Israelis or of Palestinians, [54:25] but right now, at this moment, we're [54:26] talking about Israelis, are fake. If [54:29] it's true that 90% of Israeli Jews think [54:32] that the enemy's number one priority, [54:35] the Palestinian politics, Iranian [54:37] politics, you know, politics, whatever, [54:41] that those organizations and those which [54:43] are the majority opinions in Palestinian [54:45] politics, they're the most influential [54:46] forces in Palestinian politics. If it is [54:48] true that a 90% of Israeli Jews think [54:50] that their overarching priority is our [54:52] elimination, [54:55] you cannot pressure us. We become immune [54:58] to international pressure. What are you [54:59] going to do? Sanction me to hand over [55:01] the highlands overlooking all my major [55:03] cities to kamas. Sanction me. Let's get [55:06] this over with quickly. Like, sanction [55:07] me. You know what? Bomb me. Send NATO [55:11] bombers. Bomb me. And if that makes me [55:14] pull out, we all live in peace and [55:15] harmony for all time. You were right. I [55:17] was wrong. But even that's not going to [55:20] make me pull out. They actually are [55:21] coming for me. And the idea that you can [55:23] have a moral discourse on Israel that [55:26] totally ignores the fact that the [55:28] entirety of the Arab world is completely [55:30] udenrine, that no Jew can live in any [55:33] Arab country, that half the Jews of [55:35] Israel come from those Arab countries, [55:37] that the Jews who come from the Arab [55:38] countries with which we are at war, the [55:40] regimes at least, Hamas, Iran, Iraq, [55:44] Syria, that the Jews who come from [55:46] there, they're the base Netanyahu's most [55:50] loyal voters come from and the fact that [55:52] you think you can completely ignore [55:55] everything happening in Arab politics, [55:57] all the radicalism, all the extremism, [55:59] all the brutality, the emptying of [56:01] minorities throughout the Middle East. [56:03] Christians used to be 15% of Syria, 10% [56:05] of Syria in 2011 at the beginning of the [56:08] civil war. They are now 2% of Syria. [56:10] Minorities are still being cleansed from [56:12] the Middle East. And the Jews were [56:13] cleansed of the last man, woman, and [56:15] child from the Middle East. And no, it's [56:17] not about occupation. Not for kamas. [56:20] There are real Palestinian peacemakers [56:22] for whom it's about the occupation. When [56:24] the occupation ends, we have peace. But [56:25] they don't run the place. And if you [56:27] don't get that that's the problem, you [56:28] will fail. If you do get that that's a [56:31] problem, if you come to the Palestinians [56:33] with demands, just as you come to the [56:34] Jews with demands, then you can begin to [56:36] have a conversation about a kind of [56:38] future that actually makes sense. Very, [56:41] very few actors around the world are [56:42] useful in this sense because they can't [56:44] distinguish between the good and the [56:45] bad. There's consensus, at least here, [56:50] and I believe in Israel, that the [56:52] relationship between the US and Israel [56:54] will change. The next American president [56:56] very well could put sanctions on Israel. [56:59] That's definitely the way that other [57:00] countries are moving. How do these [57:02] candidates think about that? Do they [57:04] think about that? [57:06] >> It's part of, you know, there's a danger [57:08] politically here. Um, it's part of the [57:11] opposition message. um you know you [57:13] re-elect Netanyahu, we are in for some [57:16] punishment. Um but there's a danger to [57:18] it because you don't want to raise the [57:21] sort of close the ranks, right? If if [57:24] the sanctions are pull out of the West [57:26] Bank right now and let Hamas take it [57:28] over. Um then that's something to resist [57:31] and that favors a right-wing vote. It [57:33] favors being more hawkish, more [57:35] suspicious. Um and I'm talking we're [57:38] talking tactically here. We're not [57:39] talking substantively. Maybe correctly [57:40] that's what it would favor, right? [57:42] But just tactically the there would [57:44] those centrist voters would fall back on [57:48] the safer feeling position. And so I [57:51] maybe I'm imagining but I'm detecting in [57:53] the campaigns of the center of the [57:56] center left of the centrist parties [57:58] Bennett Eisenot um they do want people [58:01] to understand that there are costs if [58:03] Netanyahu wins. They don't want people [58:06] to think there are tremendous costs if [58:07] Netanyahu wins because the enemy is [58:09] coming for us. And then what are they [58:11] actually saying? I'm going to cave to [58:13] this pressure, so don't worry. Or right, [58:16] it it would convince the center right [58:18] that's wobbling that Netanyahu is trying [58:20] to get back to his banner um to actually [58:23] vote for Netanyahu. So it's it it as a [58:25] just political tactical question, it [58:27] functions in a complicated way. It's a [58:29] little more complicated than yes, [58:30] there's an awareness that that's that's [58:32] something that's going going to happen. [58:35] I wonder if if you think a non-Netanyahu [58:38] government would change the the way the [58:41] world sees Israel, especially in the [58:43] wake of October 7th. In other words, [58:45] will the world call Israel's prime [58:47] minister a genocidal wararmonger no [58:49] matter who it is? Or or does BB heighten [58:53] those tensions? [58:56] >> A lot of the campaign is by people who [58:58] think Israel doesn't deserve to exist. [59:01] um a lot of you know Abdul says and uh [59:04] Mayor Mumdani and um who introduce a [59:09] politics that is [59:12] really strange and to my ear, forgive me [59:15] Americans, profoundly bigoted. Um, the [59:19] idea that the last living Jews in the [59:21] Eastern Hemisphere, the refugees who had [59:23] nowhere else to go, they should not have [59:24] that country and that every Arab [59:27] extermination war on them has nothing to [59:29] do with the predicament Palestinians [59:31] find themselves in. It's only just [59:32] Jewish powerful perity from day one and [59:35] until today. And that is all Zionism [59:37] really is, is racist supremacy. And all [59:40] the history can be erased because [59:41] history no longer matters because we've [59:42] got all the answers. And it's a history [59:45] they barely even know. um that that [59:48] those people will have they they don't [59:51] care if the progressive left become [59:54] comes to be in charge of Israel as long [59:56] as it wants a Jewish independent [59:58] sovereign self-determined people. Uh [60:02] that is a great crime against [60:05] the great moral system to which they [60:07] have become attached. Um [60:12] but [60:13] this government, this outgoing Netanyahu [60:16] government [60:18] has done almost everything possible [60:21] to convince almost every ally we have [60:23] and friend we have that it is comically [60:28] villainous. [60:30] Comically villainous. Um [60:35] I laugh out of because otherwise I would [60:37] cry. Um, you remember the hunger crisis? [60:41] The government said publicly, "We're [60:45] stopping all aid from going in." 3 [60:47] months in, there are signs of actual [60:49] hunger. The government shocked, opens [60:52] the gates wide, floods Gaza with aid, [60:55] and then people say, "You just tried to [60:57] starve the Gazins." And then the Israeli [60:59] government says, "Anti-semite? How could [61:02] you say such an anti-semitic thing?" [61:05] That's an astonishing turn of events. [61:07] And we've explained it at great length [61:08] at the free press. We by the way uh [61:11] played a not insignificant role that I'm [61:13] very very proud of in pushing to the [61:15] four the actual data showing real hunger [61:17] because there had been basically fake [61:19] totally fake just lies uh reports that [61:22] there was starvation in Gaza as early as [61:24] January 2024. Uh an IPC famine report on [61:27] a famine in Gaza that was just not true. [61:30] It simply was incorrect. [61:32] But what the Israeli government thought [61:34] it was doing was pressuring the Gazin [61:37] civilians to rise up against Hamas or [61:40] pressuring Kamas to concede on hostages, [61:42] creating all these levers of pressure [61:44] using aid. And it was convinced from the [61:46] UN dashboard of how much aid is going in [61:47] that there were months of aid left in [61:49] Gaza that there would be a buffer. Um, [61:51] and so they thought they could keep up [61:53] the pressure, make Gazins think that [61:55] there's going to be potentially no food [61:57] coming in and 3 months before there's [62:00] any danger, reopen it. they had that [62:02] window that would make Kamas cave that [62:05] would make the the nent protests against [62:07] Kamas that we saw in that period maybe [62:09] blow up in Kamas's face that's what the [62:11] Israeli government thought it was doing [62:14] and so the ICC's warrant against [62:19] Netanyahu for the his arrest includes [62:22] deliberate starvation of a population [62:24] that did not starve [62:27] the first time a world leader as far as [62:28] I know uh has ever faced an ICC warrant [62:32] for the deliberate starvation of a [62:34] population. And he didn't deliberately [62:36] starve that population, but he pretended [62:38] to. That scale of stupidity, [62:43] that scale of incompetence, that scale [62:45] of venality, [62:47] that's beyond all the other questions of [62:48] is was the war fought in the right way [62:50] or in the right. [62:52] If we're talking about will the next [62:54] government do better for Israel's [62:56] diplomatic standing, [62:59] how many times can someone like me say, [63:02] "I know Israelis. I know what they want. [63:04] They they would be happy to have a Gazin [63:07] emirate flourishing on the Mediterranean [63:09] that isn't kamas. Can't live next to [63:11] kamas. Love the Emiratis, hate kamas." [63:14] You know what that is? That's not [63:15] racism. That is kamas are trying to kill [63:17] us all. That is their one joy and [63:19] happiness and goal in life. If that's [63:22] what most Israelis think and I say that [63:24] in public and then Betal Smutri says, [63:27] "No, no, the Gaza war is actually about [63:28] ethnic cleansing. I want them all to [63:30] disappear." [63:31] What does it matter what any actual [63:33] Israeli says about what actual Israelis [63:35] think and feel if the government is [63:37] composed of such incredible, you know, [63:39] barn just people who just burning down [63:41] the house despite everybody. So the next [63:44] government is quite likely unless it's [63:47] that but more unless it's a doubling [63:49] down and an affirm Benvir will read a [63:52] Netanyahu Benvir win as as confirmation [63:56] uh of his of his way of thinking about [63:59] the world. Um if it's a different [64:01] government all it has to do to improve [64:03] Israel's diplomatic standing is not [64:06] up quite as much. For the first two [64:08] years of this war, Netanyahu's most [64:12] senior position in the prime minister's [64:13] office in charge of synergizing public [64:17] diplomacy across all the institutions of [64:19] the state wasn't even staffed. It was a [64:22] paid government position that nobody was [64:24] appointed to. He just didn't care. While [64:28] Smutuch and Benvir were insisting this [64:30] was a war of ethnic cleansing publicly [64:31] and openly, while the government claimed [64:34] to be willing to starve the Gazin [64:36] population, Gazins did not starve. But [64:39] you wouldn't know it from the Israeli [64:41] government's claims. Um, the scale of [64:44] that failure, I I I don't think Israelis [64:47] quite understand that scale because they [64:48] live in Hebrew and they they've had [64:51] their heads down and focused on the [64:52] enemies and the problems and the trials [64:54] and tribulations the last three years. [64:56] But the scale of that failure of this [64:58] >> I don't think American Jews understand [64:59] it either because I think we are aware [65:02] of the fact that there's always a big [65:04] lie about about us whether it's Simon of [65:06] Trent in the 1400s or it's that we [65:08] killed Jesus and right now the big lie [65:10] is about the genocide in Gaza and it [65:12] feels as though once the big lie creates [65:15] a permission structure for all these [65:16] smaller ones at which point when [65:18] everyone believes the big one fighting [65:20] the small ones doesn't matter anymore [65:22] and so what's happened and I think your [65:24] point is is important that The Israeli [65:26] government has played a huge part in [65:27] this is that now we're talking about [65:29] genocide because we failed to adequately [65:31] address claims about starvation. So now [65:34] no one's talking about the starvation [65:36] anymore even though the people that put [65:38] out the data took it down as the free [65:39] press reported. Now we're talking about [65:41] a genocide. Um which is a entirely [65:44] different conversation. But your point [65:46] is well taken. [65:48] >> I I don't want to interfere in an [65:50] election. Like I don't want to tell [65:52] people who to vote for, but it's awfully [65:54] hard, but it is absolutely our job to [65:58] look at the people in power and point [65:59] out their mistakes. [66:02] If that is translated into vote for the [66:04] other guy, then I've then I've [66:07] accidentally done something that is not [66:08] a journalist world to do. But you cannot [66:11] you cannot pretend these mistakes [66:14] haven't been made. They have been [66:15] shocking. They have been egregious. They [66:17] have been astonishing. By the way, every [66:20] single thing I have said now is if you [66:22] agree with Netanyahu on the substance, [66:25] these were still these mistakes. This is [66:27] not even partisan in the sense that I've [66:30] not yet asked the question, [66:32] do we actually need a Palestinian state? [66:35] Do we actually need to be allies with [66:37] the Democratic Party? Do we or can we [66:39] just give that up because they've all [66:41] gone progressive? But we all these [66:42] questions that are fundamentally [66:44] political questions even without dealing [66:46] with that just on competence basic [66:48] competence questions these failures are [66:51] egregious shocking and have been [66:52] tremendously costly for Israel. [66:55] >> My last question which maybe will have a [66:57] more optimismistic answer maybe not is [66:59] whether you or other Israelis see [67:02] perhaps not in this cycle but other [67:04] inspiring leaders on the horizon. I [67:06] think back to the Gulas, the Beagens, uh [67:10] the Rabbines, the Bengurans. Do those [67:12] people exist anymore? [67:16] I meet Israelis all the time who are [67:21] shocked at the gap between the political [67:25] leadership, the these these these people [67:29] who oversaw every one of the failures of [67:31] October 7, every one of the failures [67:33] since October 7, and have never taken [67:36] responsibility for any of it, including [67:38] Natanya himself. He doesn't want to give [67:40] that video footage to the enemy in the [67:42] election. I meet a lot of Israelis who [67:44] look at that political class and and [67:46] don't see themselves. And so I think [67:48] that this election cycle is locked in. [67:51] These are the candidates. We'll see what [67:52] happens. Next election cycle, if Eisenot [67:55] wins, [67:57] maybe for the first time in Liood's [67:58] history, there'll be a purge over there. [68:00] There'll be a replacement of an [68:01] incumbent or there'll be some kind of a [68:03] dramatic dramatic shift. I suspect that [68:06] the election after this one, those [68:08] soldiers voices and the sense among so [68:10] many Israelis that uh it's it's if we [68:14] don't have the kind of competence in our [68:16] leadership that we have in our high-tech [68:19] sector, uh then the price that we're [68:21] going to pay for it is going to keep [68:23] growing and uh become [68:25] >> too high a price. [68:27] >> Havib, thank you so much for being here [68:29] as always and we'll see what happens and [68:31] we'll have you back the next election [68:33] cycle to see if you're right. I'm sure [68:34] everything will be fine. [68:35] >> Yeah. [68:36] >> Thank you very much.
